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THE NATURE OF THE STUDY 
Justirication 
Thirt7 years after Colonel Claus Schenk von st.aurfenberg planted the 
bomb that failed to kill Hitler, the German resistance to National Social-
ism remains largely unexamined as a movement.1 A review of theses and dis-
sertations in speech communication, tor example, reveals that no work has 
been done to analyze or interpret the rhetorical structure or the members 
of the "decent Germany. 112 Even more surprising, only a little wot"k has 
been done to explain the rhetorical interface of movements in general, 
the whole amounting to fewer than thirty theses and diosortations ,3and a 
dozen essays in scholarly journals.4 And this in the race of F.dwin Black's 
lirerms like 11German Resistance," "German Resistance Movement," and 
"German Opposition" are often used interchangeably and include all types 
or anti-Nazi activity in Hitler• s 11New Order. 11 In this study, the termi-
nology will be the same but the resistance with which it deals will be 
limited to those groups which aimed at eliminating the Nazi regime and 
which had some hope of obtaining support from the necessary agencies ot 
force. Of necessity, then, the study will deal with individuals who held 
military or civilian offices, or who had held such oftices under the re-
gime, and who maintained contact with it. 
2A Review of Dissertation Abstracts International (.Ann Arbor., 1938-
1973), I-XXXIII, disclosed no studies in speech on the Ge1"Bl.an opposition 
to Hitler. Similarly, a review of "Graduate Theses-An Index of Graduate 
Work in Speech," Speech Monographs, XVII-XXXVI (1950-1969), as well as 
11Graduate Theses and Dissertation Titles: An Index of Graduate Research 
in Speech Communication, 11 Bibliographic Annual, I-II (1970-1972), dis-
closed ·no studies on the German Resistance Movement. 
4This count was arrived at by reviewing Quarterly Journal Of Speech, 
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equation of movement studies with nee-Aristotelian and psychological stud-
ies as the "three distinct approaches to the practice of rhetorical crit-
icism. 11 5 At the least, then, another movement study would help to fill 
the thin ranks or one of the three major genres or speech criticism, while 
at the most, it could provide some of that mutual influence between theory 
and practice called for by critical scholars from Thonssen and Baird6to 
the Wingspread Conferees.? 
In addition to this lack of interest in movements within the field of 
speech communication, a review or dissertations in other fields reveals on-
ly two bearing directly upon the German Resistance Movement.8 The first, 
The Crisis of Political Direction in the German Resistance to Nazism, by 
George K. Romoser, is limited to an interpretation of the political motives 
and programs or Hitler's opponents. As such, it encompasses only half of 
XXXVI-LVIII (1950-1972); Speech Monographs, XVII-XL (1950-1973); _§peech 
Teacher, I-XXII (1952-1973); Central States 1 II-XXIII (1950-1972); West-
ern Speech, XVI-XXXVIII (1950-1973); and Southern Speech Journal, XVI-
XXXVIII (1950-1973). 
5Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method (New York, 
1965), p. 18. 
61ester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism (New York, 
1948), p. 16. 
7The Prospects Of Rhetoric, ed., Lloyd F. Bitzer and Edwin Black 
(Englewood Cliffs, 1971), p. 222. 
8Dissertation Abstracts International, in which subject areas were 
reviewed (Modern History, Religion, and Political Science), themes (Ger-
many, Movements, Nazi, Resistance, and War), and individuals (Ludwig Beck, 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Carl Goerdeler, Adolf Hitler, Helmuth Moltke, and 
Claus Stauffenberg), revealed other studies: Carolsue Holland, The For-
eign Contacts Made By The German Opposition To Hitler; David Riede,~ 
Officia.l Attitude Of The Roman Catholic Hiera.rchy In Gerniany Toward Na-
tional Socialism; Richard Peters, Nazi Germany_And The Vatican: July 1933 
-January 1935; Larry Rasmussen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Reality And Resist-
ance1 Chrisvology And Conspiracy; and Fred Casmir, ~itler: A Study In Per-
suasion. In each case, a reading of the abstract disclosed no information 
which would be of use in this study. 
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the area in which movements occur.9 More importantly, Romoser 1s judg-
ments are open to serious criticism--criticism which will be specified 
in the course of this study. And finally, Romoser says nothing about 
the form of movements--the dialectical enjoinment between the Germ.an re-
sisters and Hitler's 11New Order, 11 and it is this enjoinment which iden-
tifies rhetorical movements.10 The second, German Resistance To Hitler: 
Ethical and Religious Factors, by Mother Mary Alice Gallin, is limited 
to an interpretation of the ,moral motives of Hitler's opponents. As 
such, it encompasses the other half of the area in which movement oc-
cur, so perhaps a study combining both politics and morality would be 
more than the sum of the parts. Also, while Mother Gallin' s judgments 
are not open to criticism similar to Romoser 1s, she does place a dispro-
portionate emphasis upon the church as an agency of change--an emphasis 
which will be criticized in the course of this stucty* And again, she 
says nothing about dialectical enjoinment between the German resisters 
91eland M. Griffin writes that "movements are essentially politi-
cal, concerned with governance or dominion, •the wielding and obeying ot 
authority• •• • [a:niJ movements are essentially moral-strivings for sal-
vation, perfection, the •good. 111 Leland M. Griffin, 11 A Dramatistic Theocy 
of the Rhetoric of Movements, 11 in Critical Responses To Kenneth Burke, ed., 
William H. Rueckert (Minneapolis, 1966), p. 456. 
lOaobert s. Cathcart writes: 110n the one hand ••• there must be one 
or more actors who, perceiving that the 'good order• (the established sys-
tem) is in reality a faulty order full of absurdity and injustice, cry out 
through various symbolic acts that true communion, justice, salvation car..-
not be achieved unless there is an immediate corrective •••• On the oth-
er hand there must be a reciprocating act from the establismnent or counter 
rhetors which perceives the demands of the agitator rhetors ••• as direct 
attacks on the foundations of the established order. It is this reciproc-
ity or dialectical enjoinment. • • which defines movements. • • • " Robert 
s. Cathcart, 11 New Approaches to the Study of Movements: Defining Movements 
Rhetorically," Western Speech, XXXVI (Spring, 1972), 87. And Griffin adds: 
11The development of a counter-movement is vital: for •it is the bad side 
that produces the movement which makes history, by providing a struggle. 8 ~ 
Griffin, 1p. 464. 
X 
and Hitler's 11New Order," the reciprocating acts by which rhetorical move-
ments are distinguished. 
There are, of course, many published accounts of the anti-Nazis, but 
they too are partial in the sense or a complete rhetorical movement. For 
example, some of them deal with dialectical enjoinment, but only within a 
single frame, as a focus on one act, the narrowness of which diminishes 
the quality of dynamism, the sense of action chronologically, the progress 
of a movement from the "stasis of indecision •• • fiiJ the stasis of deci-
sion persevered in ••• /Jrai/ Guilt and the dream of salvation •• • [f,iJ 
achievement and maintenance of a state of redemption. 1111 Typical in this 
respect is Harold Deutsch's The Conspiracy Against Hitler in the Twilight 
War12( which covers the period from September 1939 to May 1940), or William 
Bayles' Seven Were Han~_g_l3(which covers the period from May 1942 to Feb-
ruary 1943), or Constantine Fitzgibbon 1s July 2014(which covers the move-
ment's penultimate moment • ) Excellent as each of these works are, they 
are still partial views. Thus, there would seem to be a problem or .frag-
mentation to which the rhetorical critic could make a synthesizing con-
tribution. If nothing else, an integrated approach to the Garman Resist-
ance Movement-a dramatic presentation of it as a series of acts"! fronte, 
fu.turistically1115--would have the merit or a complete performance. 
11.oriffin, p. 461. 
12Harold C. Deutsch, The Conspiracy Against Hitler in the Twilight 
!1!! (Minneapolis, 1970). 
13william Ba1les, Seven Were Hanged (London, 1956). 
14constantine Fitzgibbon, July ,gQ, (New York, 1956). 
15Griffin, p. 458. 
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The other kind of partiality is to be found in the many secondarJ' 
sources which treat the German opposition from the perspective of biog-
raphy--the single conspirator or "great figure 11 within the movement. Rep-
resentati ve of such studies are Joachim Kramarz•s Stauffenberg,16 Gerhard 
Ritter's The German Resistance: Carl Goerdeler 1 s Struggle Against Ty:ran-
.!1!,17and Michael Balfour and Julian Frisby1s Helmuth von Moltke.18 These 
profiles are certainly valuable. For one thing, the authors have had ac-
cess to documents--to the remaining private papers and letters of the in-
dividuals involved. And they have been able to interview and correspond 
with families and surviving friends. But having said this, the fact re-
mains that such works are incomplete in terms of a movement. 
From a practical standpoint, members of a secret movement do not al-
ways know who their fellow-conspirators are or what they are doing.19 Al-
so1 police pressures may become so severe that even the leaders of a move-
ment are forced to go into hiding. This is what happened to Ulrich von 
Hassell, the designate foreign minister in the resistance movement's pro-
visional cabinet, during the summer of 1942.20 And it also happened to 
16Joachim Kramarz, ptauffenberg, trans., R. H. Barry (New York, 
1967). 
17Gerhard Ritter, The German Resistance To Hitler: Carl Goer-
deler1s Struggle Agains~ Tyranny, trans., Re T. Clark (New York, 1959). 
18Michael Balfour and Julian Frisby, Helnruth von Moltke (London, 
1972). 
19In a letter smuggled to friends in Britain, Moltke specified the 
nature of opposition in a police state. 11Can you imagine what it means to 
work as a group when you cannot-use the telephone, when you are unable to 
post letters, when you cannot tell the names of your closest friends to 
your other friends for fear that one of them might be caught and diwlge 
the names under pressure?" Quoted in ~-, p. 217. 
20Hassell wrote on August 1, 1942: 11 For several months I have not 
been able to write in my diary because certain information I received 
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Carl Goerdeler, the designate chancellor, in the weeks just prior to the 
attempt or July 20, 1944.21 Finally, leaders in the early- phases of an 
opposition movement who, by virtue of their actions, draw attention to 
themselves, may be placed under surveillance or arrested, and new lead-
ers replace them.22 Thus, any study viewing a movement through the eyes 
of one man must be necessarily fragmented. 
From a theoretical standpoint, it can also be argued that it is not 
enough for an individual to voice his alienation from an existing order; 
that he is not a member of a movement until he joins with others-becomes 
part of a 11 aaving Remnant, 1123as Griffin puts it. Illuminating in this re-
spect is the journal of the poet Friedrich Reck-Malleczewen1 an opponent 
of the Nazis, who belonged to no resistance group. In his loneliness, he 
was compelled to vent his anger and despair in a diary. 11My life in this 
pit will soon enter its fifth year. 1''or more than forty-two months, I have 
thought hate, have dreamed hate and awakened with hate. I suffocate in the 
knowledge that I am a prisoner of a horde of vicious apes •••• "24 Count 
toward the end of April made it imperative to exercise more caution.u Ul-
rich von Hassell, The Von Hassell Diaries, trans., Hugh Gibson (Westport, 
1971), p. 258. 
21.oerhard Ritter, Goerdeler•s biographer, writes that 11Stauffenberg 
advised him strongly to disappear as quickly as he could, and not endanger 
the whole conspiracy by staying ••• in Berlin." Ritter, p. 286. 
22Hans Oster, Hans Dohnanyi, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and Josef Mueller 
were leading members of the resistance until a chance discovery of incrim-
inating evidence by the Gestapo put an end to their ac-ti vi ties in early 
1943. See Roger Manvell & Heinrich Fraenkel, The Canaris Conspiracy (New 
York, 1969), p. 19lff. 
23Griffin, p. 462. 
24Friedrich Pereyval Reck-Malleczewen, Diary of a Man in Despair, 
trans., Paul Rubens (London, 1970), p. 22. 
Malleczewen was executed in February 1945 in the Dachau concentration 
camp. He died never having joined the German resistance, and today his 
frustrated testimony is witness to the fact that the individual is not 
a movement-that he is largely helpless in his isolation. Moreover, all 
of the opposition fjgures mentioned previously achieved much or their 
significance in terms of others: their fellow-conspirators, those they 
attempted to persuade to join them, and their opponents, Adolf Hitler 
and his henchmen. Put differently, no man is a movement by himselt, 
even if he would play a leading role since movements, like most human 
dramas, not only have protagonists but antagonists and lesser players. 
As Kenneth·Burke observes: 11 A character cannot 1be himself• unless many 
others among the dramatic personae contribute to this end, so that the 
very essence of a character's nature is in a large measure defined, or 
determined, by the other characters who variously assist or oppose him • .n25 
Thus, once more, there would appear to be some warrant for a rhetorical 
study of the German Resistance Movement, if only to transcend the singu-
larity of its individual members and tie together the strands of their 
internal dialogues and external dialectics. 
Methodology 
To study a movement dramatistically26(defined as merger, division, 
25Kenneth Burke, 11 Coriolanus-and the Delights of Faction, 11 in 
Language As SYII]bolic Action (Berkeley, 1968), p. 84. 
26.rhe titular t,erm 11 dramatism11 is Kenneth Burke's, but the meth-
odology comes primarily from Leland M. Griffin, author of the movement 
study, who, together with Robert s. Cathcart, has developed a model for 
the rhetorical structure of a movement, drawn almost entirely from the 
theory of Burke. Insofar as possible, the model will serve for this 
study except where conditions alter categories or concepts from Burke 
or some other contemporary theorist are needed to fill in gaps. 
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and transcendence),27is to study the concepts of dialectic and rhetoric 
through the frame or critical moments, viewing actors in hierarchies that 
are political and moral, concerned with "the wielding and obeying of au-
thority •• • faniJ strivings for salvation., per:fection, the 'good. rn28 
Thus, to study a movement is to study Order, Secret, and the Kill, for 
to study the "relation between rhetoric and di.aleei;ic, and the applica-
tion of both to human relations in general, is to circulate around these 
three motives.1129 
The first moment is a state or merger in which the men who make move-
ments identify with the existing order, "acceptfJ.niJ the 'mystery,' striv-
/J.ni/ to keep the Secret, preserv/J.nii/ the hierarchy ••• energized and sus-
tained by the motive of piety. 1130 The enduran-ce of' a good order depends up-
on this--Secret or mystery being "that point where different kinds of be-
ings [.or classei] a.re in connnunication ••• there must be strangeness; but 
the estranged must be thought of in some way capable of communication. 1131. 
And piety being "a discipline of the will thrcmgh respect ••• aiJ.mitltini/ 
the right to exist or things larger than the ego, n32as well as a "system 
builder, a desire to round things out, to rit experiences into a unified 
whole. 1133 
27Kenneth Burke, A Grammar or Motives {Berkeley, 1969), p. 402. 
28Griffin, p. 456. 
29~., p. 458. 
JOibid., pp. 458-459. 
31icenneth Burke, A Rhetoric or Motives (New York, 1955), p. 115. 
32Richard Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences (Chicago, 1948)., p. 172. 
33Kenneth Burke, Permanence And Change (Indianapolis, 1965), p. 74. 
Inevitably, however, any order becomes evi1,34as witnessed by its 
"verbal corruptions, vile error in the use of language. • • the growth 
of absurdity and injustice, the increasing loss of communication and 
identification. 1135 And because men desire perfection, because their 
hierarchies are reflections of their language's entelechical or ab-
stractive impulse, they work to reform the system from within, apply-
ing ncorrectives ••• to the established order ••• cry/JngJ out through 
various symbolic acts, 1136hoping to purge it of corruption, error, and 
injustice. But orders are resistant to change,37and as communication 
grows ever more malign, 11 piety yields to the temptation of impiety., n38 
merger turns to division, and the reformers come to "reject the •mys-
tery,' cease to identify with the hierarchy, the prevailing system of 
authority ••• [i.n{/ rise up and cry 1 No? ' 1139 
The second moment is a state of division, merger, and dialectical 
reciprocity. The division is the distance now separating the reformers 
-the "pivotal ••• group 1140from the corrupt establishment. With some, 
the gap may not be great, for even having said 11 No, 11 the origin of a 
movement is a time of indecision, of silence before speech, of 11the 
340n the inevitability of imperfection in social orders., see 
Kenneth Burke, Toe Rhetoric of Religion (Berkeley, 1970), pp. 4-5. 
35Griffin, pp. 459-460. 
36cathcart, er,. 
37on the resistance of social orders to change, see Permanence 
And Change, p. 179. 
38ariffin, p. 459. 
39Ibid., p. 460. 
40Ibid., p. 462. 
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heart-conscious kind of listening ••• that precedes expression. 1141 This 
is a variation on the agency-scene ratio, defined as "custom, usage, man-
ner. . .[a.n.iJ right. n42 And to the extent that men explain themselves in 
terms of it, all the symbols presumptively associated with existing hier-
archies-loyalty, obedience, law, order, and the like, serve as "trained 
incapacities," measures which prevent their full support of the incipient 
movement's "Negative ••• announcement of a stand, a standing together, an 
understanding. 1143 In response to the increasing perversions of the cor-
rupt system, these incapacities may change, allowing them by slow degrees, 
or in part, to reach the agent-act ratio where men will their acts, for 
"an act is by definition I free'. • .and a will, to be a will, must be 
free. 1144 But in this moment, they have not yet progressed beyond ".E!-
thema ••• 'a suffering, misfortune, passive condition, state of mind. 11145 
With others, the gap is greater and they begin to work for merger a-
mong the 11 saving Remnant," those who have said 11 No" to the established or-
der's "perversion of reason and justice. 1146 Also, they will undertake the 
construction of a counter-statement based upon their 11 No. 11 Their motives 
for this will be moral and political, dialectic purifications of the evils 
4loriffin, pp. 461-462. 
42Grammar, p. 15. 
43Griffin, pp. 462-463. 
44Burke, 11 A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language," in~-
bolic Action, p. 463. This categorical imperative is qualified in~-
~: 11 In reality, we are capable of but partial acts, acts. • • that pro-
duce but partial transformations • 11 p. 19. Thus, the critic can account 
for some men performing a few acts but not others, while other men per-
form still more acts. 
45Griffinj p. 461. 
46Ibid., p. 462. 
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that drove them into opposition. And though their terms will be imprecise 
at first (for programs, like movements, are re.fined across time, as actions 
against changing exigencies), they will still identify, albeit vaguely, "the 
heaven of the movement as well as its •hell'; its ••• god, as well as its 
devils ••• £and thus these term.if prefigure •.•• the lineaments of the 'per-
fecting myth' that draws the movement forward futuristically, !: fronte. 1147 
Finally, the reformers will try to influence those still in the syste1ll-
11the potentially alienable ••• the uncommitted ••• [even parts of the •pow-
er struct,ure.!7 ••• with attitudes or rejection toward the hierarchy, n48di-
viding them from it in order to merge them into the ranks or the incipient 
movement. 
There is a danger here, however, for as the movement grows, so too does 
the possibility that it will "splinter-fail. to achieve solidarity, merger; 
th~i. the myth which prefigures the Purpose of the movement, imperfectly corr-
veyed or received ••• will yield in the minds of a crucial number of con-
verts. • • to an impious new vision of Order. n49 Also., "most movements, as 
they develop, acquire a complex of issues. 11 50 Thus, the need for dialogue 
among the members, a sort of conflict between "spokesmen whose ideas are 
an extension or special interests [a.nd whi/ remain sanewhat unconvinced 
by any solution which does not mean the complete triumph of. • .gheii/ 
interests, /_but whi/ compromise, putting through some portion of {_theii/ 
47Grlffin, p. 463. 
48Ibid. 
49Ibid., pp. 465-466. 
50Ibid. , p. 466. 
program making concessions to allies. 11 51 This is part of the refinement 
mentioned earlier--a merger which is less than ultimate (an impossible 
condition for men anyway), but more than dialectic (which 11would leave 
the voices in jangling relations to one another. 11 )52 
xviii 
The dialectical reciprocity is the challenge-- 11the creation or ••• 
tension growing out of moral f;.nd politica.Y conflict 11 53as the leaders of 
the incipient movement and the priests of the existing order vie in rhet-
orical thrust and parry with the fate of their hierarchies at stake. As 
previously noted, this enjoinment identifies movements in the dramatistic 
construct, distinguishing them from other groups which are merely alien-
ated from the establishment.54 But depending upon the kind of scene-
whether it is more or less threatening-the nature of this dialectic in-
terchange will vary.55 Thus, in a democracy, there might be direct con-
flict, as when minority groups demonstrate violently and the government 
mobilizes to protect itself. In a totalitarian scene, however, the in-
terchange is more likely to be mediated, as the leaders of the opposition 
strive to influence agencies within the existing hierarchy to overthrow it, 
while the priests of that hierarchy, sensing the potential alienation of 
these agencies, strive equally to maintain their loyalty.56 
51Rhetoric, p. 187. 
52Ibid. 
53cathcart, 87. 
54see p. ix. 
55Burke explains the relationship between scene and act: 11Using 
'scene' in the sense of setting or background, and •act• in the sense 
of action, one could say that the ••• scene is a fit •container• for 
the act. 11 Grammar, p. J. 
56Thia is a departure, particularly from Cathcart 1s interpretation 
xix 
Again, we are confronted with the agency-scene ratio a.nd the tradi-
tiona that prevent its agents from acting freely. For in a totalitarian 
state, established orders do not crumble at the sound of the rhetorician's 
voice. Instead--but in a way no less rhetorica15?--violence must be em-
ployed, and that means agencies with arms, and that means an army, and 
that means a revolution, and for armies in which mutiny is low among the 
terminoiogy of motives, "that sort of thing just isn•t done. 11 58 
Thus, the dialectic interchange becomes a kind of deja .!1!,, extending 
through as many frames or moments as it takes the leaders of the incipient 
order, speaking ~, 11to promote decision, to convert. • • the unde-
cided to turn from their hellish state of indecision ••• toward the move-
ment.1159 And the agents of the agency, explaining themselves in teI'lll3 of 
their traditions, may make certain demands the price of their action--a 
fox'ffl of dialectic within a dialectic. 
Some may ask for the support of other hierarchies, 11 orders ••• ex-
trinsic ••• considered from the standpoint of the specialized activity 
alone /f,he dialectical enjoinmeny ••• but not extrinsic to the field 
of the construct, since he argues that "t.he new order, the more perfect 
order, the desired order, cannot come about through established agencies 
of change." Cathcart, 87. However, his own e.Y..amples of the abolition 
movement and the women's suffrage movement are at odds with his argument 
because both employed existing agencies--churches, schools, and press-
in their dialectic opposition to the system. And in a totalitarian scene, 
an opposition movement requires a fulcrum, an Archimedean point, if it is 
going to overthrow the existing order. 
57Burke makes the link between the non-verbal and the verbal: 11 For 
non-verbal conditions or objects can be considered as signs by reason of 
the persuasive ingredients inherent in the 'meaning' they have for the 
audience to which they are addressed." Rhetoric, p. 161. 
58Gramm.a.r, p. 15. 
59Griffin, p. 464. 
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of moral action ••• considered from the standpoint of human activity in 
genera1. 1160 For a totalitarian order is an evil est.ablishment which ex-
tends the scope of the dialectic through 11adm:imstrative rhetoric ••• 
provok/J.ni/ war. 1161 And for the agents or an arm.y, war places "national 
motives ••• in a hierarchy ••• graded from personal and familial, to na-
tional. 1162 Even the least rigid among them-those who have begun to make 
the transformation from 11 pa.thema through poiema ••• from 1a suffering, mis-
fortune, passive condition, state ot_mind, 9 j_towar{J •a deed, doing, ac-
tion, act,' 11 63may rear for the nation•s survival during the moment ot 
crisis as the incipient movement supplants the existing order. Thus, 
the dialectic becomes triple-tiered (between the movement and the a-
gency; between the establishment and the agency; and between the move-
ment and the extrinsic orders) as the leaders o:f the opposition aend 
anvoys to these other hierarchies, seeking identification of interests. 
On occasion, this third level dialectic will be successful; more often, 
however, it will not because 11 once a national identity is built up, it 
can be treated as an individua11164with no distinctions made between com-
peting orders. 
others, tied by "magical decree and religious petition11 65to the 
6~hetorie, p. 27. 
61Ibid., p. 158. 
62Ibid., p. 156. 
63Griffin, p. 461. 
64Rhetoric, p. 165. 
65&rke discusses the influence ot 11oathll'I as a variation of the 
magical decree and religious petition in Philosophy Of Literary Form 
(New York, 1957), pp. 5-6. 
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establishment ( 11 obligations of order ••• even when we Lwant ti/ revolt a-
gainst order 11 ),66may ask for a killing as the price of action--a rhetor-
ical act "for men may murder ••• in the name of the movement. 11 67 Though 
these agents are ready to say 11 Yes 11 to the incipient order-although 11by 
reason and justice /J,hez7 ought to be in it ••• L_although they knoi/ that 
the movement ••• constitutes a Saving R~bellion--a striving for salvation, 
perfection, the I good 111 68--they cannot bring themselves to say 11 No11 to the 
establishment and its "magical decree." 
The kill they ask for is the last of the major motives in the drama-
tistic construct, and as such, it represents the crisis period of a move-
ment: a progress from "an original state of merger in /J,hai/ the iniqui-
ties are shared •• • jJ,iJ a principle of division, in that the elements 
shared are being ritualistically alienated. 11 69 If the leaders of the 
mo•rcment have transformed their own attitudes as the dialectic spirals 
toward its climax; if they "see through ••• the errant symbols of the 
existing order ( 'faulty principles,' 'vile beasts•) ••• /Jhen they wiJ.Y 
slay them, 11 70and the movement will have reached its object, its state of 
Redemption, its "new principle of merger, this time in the unification 
of those whose purified identity is defined in dialectical opposition to 
the sacrificial offering.1171 
66Griffin, p. 467. 
67Ibid., p. 465. 
68Ibid., p. 464. 
69Grammar, p. 496. For an act to be ritualistic, it must first be 
committed in the mind and speech; Literary Form, p. 41. 
70Griffin, pp. 464-465. 
7:lorammar, p. 406. 
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Tragically, however, seeing through the "errant symbols" of the evil 
order is not always enough. For men are not products of a single order 
but of many orders, 72and not just simultaneously but temporally. Thus, 
their orientations from earlier bierarchies--patterns or experience that 
"prepare ff,hei/ for some functions and against others 1173--may inhibit 
them from "revising their strategies /Jheri/ confronted by retrograde or 
recalcitrant factors in the gradually- shifting Scene. 1174 Perhaps the 
very pieties which the evil order tumed impious and which drove them 
into opposition prevent them from killing, for 11killing is impious, in 
the order or murder. 1175 Or perhaps they- believe that the "new order, 
the more perfect order," cught not come about through a killing. 1176 
Caught between this "wavering line of pressure and counterpressure, 1177 
they may try to redefine the problem--call for arrest instead of murder, 
or shirt the burden of proof to the agents of the agency; demand that 
they a.ct in spite of the "magical decree, 11 without the killing. And 
so., they fail 11to make /_theii/ utterance •perfect by adapting it in 
every minute detail to the natural appetites' of /_thei'i] hearers., 1178 
and the dialectic is a failure as the leaders of the opposition, unable 
72Rhetoric, p. 224. 
73Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward History (Boston, 1959), p. 4. 
74Griffin, p. 465. 
75Ibid., p. 464. 
76rhis is an extension to Griffin and Cathcart•s formulation be-
cause neither discusses the possibility of dialectical tensions growing 
out or competing claims between morality and politics. 
77Rhetoric, p. 23. 
78Griffin, p. 466. 
at the moment to 111 shift their coordinates,• 'acquire new perspectives,• 
•see around the corner• ••• err in their efforts to adapt to exigencies 
un.foreseen. 1179 
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This struggle to separate themselves from the distant past is yet 
another dialectic in the rhetoric of movements; an internal one, to be 
sure, but no less important, since men are the makers of movements. And 
just as a movement has form--from origin through crisis to object, so too,: 
men must progress 11 .from pa.thema through poiema to mathema: from •a suffer-
ing, passive condition, state of mind,' through 1a deed, doing, action, 
act, 1 to •an adequate idea; the thing learned.1 1180 
To the extent that they are unable to do so, the crisis period of 
the movement is prolonged, a "problem to the rhetoricians of any cause 
••• [sinci/ desired action £should be takei/ before the point of alien-
ation is reached and reaction develops. 1181 In a totalitarian scene, the 
difficulties are intensified, in pa.rt because of the threat of exposure, 
and in part because the extrinsic orders, now in conflict of their own 
with the evil establishment, may be powerful enough to destroy it and 
its opposition, without respect to character or conviction. Thus, il 
the movement is to circumvent the dangers confronting it, the early 
leaders will either make the change-- 11 progress through the act to an 
adequate understanding," or be replaced by other men 11who were quicker 
to sense new factors in their incipient stages. 1182 
79Griffin, pp. 464-465. 
80Ibid., p. 461. 
8l1ela.nd M. Griffin, 11The Rhetoric Of Historical Movements, 11 Quar-
terly Journal Of Speech, XXXVIII (April, 1952), 186. 
82Griffin, 11 Dramatistic Theory, 11 p. 467. 
:xxiv 
The ,final moment is really two moments and includes the states of di-
vision, merger, and transcendence, centered around the motive of the kill. 
The first of these moments-the penultimate one-occurs when the new lead-
ers of the movement, together with those of earlier stages who have made 
the necessary transformation, "who persevere in their assent to the :move-
ment ••• say No to the errant negatives that rise up in themselves., 1183un-
dertake a "drastic revision •• • /J.i/ rhetorical strategy and so succeed 
in irrevocably disturbing the balance between the ffeovement and the es-
tablishmeny. 11 84 
This is the Kill, a purgative act of division, merger, and transcend-
ence: division, because it 11affirms the commitment of the converted to the 
movement--fti/ the new understanding, which is an adequate understanding; 11 85 
merger, because it "provokes action--move.Ls the agents of the agenci/ ••• 
to rise up and cry No to the fexisting ordei] ••• thereby saying Yes to the 
movement; n86and transcendence because "it endows ft'hose who undertake i'i/ 
with a new condition or •substance. 11187 
Thus, the attempt to reach the "salient Victim ••• /J,hi/ rhetorical. 
Vile Beast to be slain ••• [thi/ Negation to be negated. 11 88 In a totali-
tarian scene, this will be the leader of the corrupt order who is "made 
83Griffin, 11 Dramatistic Theory," p. 465. 
84Leland M. Griffin, "The Rhetorical Structure of the Antimasonic 
Movement," in The Rhetorical Idiom, ed., Donald C. Bryant (Ithaca., 1953) 
p. 155. 
85Gri.ffin, 11Dramatistic Theory, n p. 465. 
86Ibid., p. 464. 
87Jbid., p. 465. 
88Ibid • , p. 464. 
worthy legalistically ••• an offender against legal or moral justice ••• 
/j',hiJ •deserves• what he gets, 1189and whose death is the "death of alle-
giance to a former system of authority--a time of negation, rejection, 
•the rebel snapping or the continuity.• u90 And rhetoric 11in the order 
or killing is the rhetoric or •personal enmity, of factional strife, ot 
invective, polemic, eristic, logomachy•; is 'e!: excellence the region 
or the Scramble, of insult and injury, bickering, squabbling, malice and 
the lie, cloaked malice and the subsidized lie.1 1191 
Yet, it must be remembered that rhetoric in the order of killing is 
also in the order of love. This is the dialectic nature between the kill 
and the sacrifice: "In the sacrifice there is the kill; in the kill there 
is the sacrifice.n92 Thus, depending upon the exlgencies of the scene and 
the way they are perceived, the Kill, or Victimage, can merge into its op-
posite--the Sacrifice, or Mortification, as men begin to realize, imper-
fectly perhaps, that they may rail practically but succeed s,mbolically, 
a kind of 11 pu.re persuasion, 1193or per.feet act of martyrdom, a totally vol.-
untacy self-sacrifice enacted in expiation for their own and other•s guilt. 
This is the ultimate moment of the movement because 11Victimage ••• in the 
order of Mortification ••• is at its highest mounting ••• in the order of 
89Literary Form, p. 35. 
90Griffin, 11 Dramatistic Theory," p. 466. 
91 Ibid., p. 461. 
92titerary Form, p. 40. 
93Burke describes this as persuasion which "involves the saying of 
something, not r or the extra-verbal advantage to be got from the saying,. 
but because of the satisfaction intrinsic to the saying." Rhetoric, p. 
269. 
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love (Greater love hath !!Q !!!_c!!l th~ that rn gj.ve !!E his life fQ!:. 
his friends). 1194 And while the leaders of the existing system "may murder 
for the sake of terror, in the name of the Lestablishmen!:.7 ••• their Vic-
tims, though silenced, may speak: for Death, though the ultiniate failure 
of communication, is nevertheless, being a mode·of conduct, in the realm 
of speech ( 'Q eloquent ••• mighty Death! whom™ could advise, ih2!! 
persuaded ••• ').1195 
Organization 
A movement critic has a dual responsibility. On the one hand, he 
needs to preserve the chronology of the movement; to convey the quality 
of dynamism as it progresses from origin to object. On the other, he 
needs to explain the movement I s rhetoric; specifiea.lly, the pat.tern of 
dialectic inherent to it. The method most suitable to such conflicting 
obligations is that of the literary historian.,96who, while endeavoring 
11to present t,he movement synthetically, in a broad chronological manner 
. . .turnis it as on a spi,!] ••• piercing it now from one angle, now from 
another, 1197analyzing those aspects of it which best illustrate its inter-
active nature. 
Since the German opposition to Hitler can best be understood in terms 
of four critical moments when the resisters succeeded in mastering some of 
their own incapacities, importuned other powers for help, answered the 
94Griff'in, 11 Dramatistio Theory," p. 461. 
95Ibid., p. 465. 
96Griffin makes this suggestion in "Historical Movements, 11 187. 
97llig_., 188. 
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objections of the military, and set in motion plans to strike, the bulk 
of the study ,tlll center on those mcments, showing the motives of the re-
sisters, the acts they engaged in as a consequence of those motives, the 
agencies they utilized for change, and the reciprocating acts of Hitler 
and his followers. In each moment, a different part of the military es-
tablishment provided the necessary instrument of force; thus, these a-
gencies are so important that they are the "representative anecdote 1198 
for each act. 
Chapter One is a review of the Third Reich, the dialectically se-
cured position, and its attractions and evils with which the resisters 
were merged. Chapter Two is the first of the critical moments, the in-
itial division between the resisters and Hitler's order, and their at-
tempt to overthrow his regime through the agency of the Army High Can-
mand during the Munich Crisis of 1938. Chapter Three is the second 
critical moment, the attempt by the resisters to overthrow Hitler's 
order through the agency of the Army Intelligence Service during the 
period of the twilight war in 1939-1940. Chapter Four is the third 
critical moment, the period in which the resisters dialectically merged 
their moral and political programs and attempted to kill Hitler during 
a frontline visit to Army Group Center on the Ea.stern Front. Chapter 
Five is the fourth critical moment, the attempt of July 20, 1944, or-
ganized and executed by officers in the Reserve Army. Chapter Six 
carries the narrative of the resisters forward through their trials 
98Burke writes that 110ne should seek to select, as representative 
anecdote, something sufficiently demarcated in character to make analysis 
possible, yet sufficiently complex in character ~o prevent the use of too 
few terms in one's description. 11 Grammar, p. 324. For a more complete 
discussion of the anecdote, see~., pp. 59-61; and 323-325. 
and executions, discusses reasons for the failure of their movement, and 
offers some methodological implications for future study. 
Finally, if the chapter heads are viewed superficially, they might 
appear to follow Griffin's suggestion of studying movements from incep-
tion through crisis to consummation. The first and second of these per-
iods are accurately reflected, but with the third, the pattern breaks a-
part; that is, the German Resistance Movement never achieved fulfillment 
in the commonly accepted sense of a successfully completed political act 
--of one hierarchy overthrowing another and taking its place. Instead, 
the resisters failed in their efforts to topple Hitler and his order, 
and the price they paid was their lives. Nevertheless, there is con-
summation present in another, more profound sense, and Griffin hints 
at it when he writes that the period of consummation can be considered 
xxviii 
as "a. time of redemption: men have been purged of absurdity and injus-
tice.1199 This was surely the objective of the men of the German oppo-
sition who, in the last analysis, acted with the foreknowledge that they 
might fail, but whose resolve to press on suggests the symbolic sense in 
which they saw the act-as a gesture of atonement for the evils committed 
in the name of Germany. 
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CHAPTER I 
PROLOGUE: ADOLF HITLER AND THE THIRD REICH 
"The fact that evil appears in the form of light, or beneficence, of his-
torical necessity, and social justice, is utterly confusing for someone 
nurtured in our traditional ethical system." Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
This chapter seeks to illuminate the nature of the Third Reich-the 
forces which led to its rise, the figure of its Fuehrer, the thrust or 
its ideology, the structure of its social order, 'the instruments or its 
control. There will be no attempt to make the description detailed. 
For one thing, many of the features should be familiar. 1 For another, 
we are not,concerned with the Third Reich ~r 1!£, but with the dialec-
tical relationship between Adolf Hitler's 11New Order" and the Gennan 
Resistance Movement. 2 
1cumulative Book Index (Minneapolis, 1924-1973) lists several 
hundred titles under National Socialism and related topics. 
2This is the fonnulation of Robert s. Cathcart. "It is ••• 
reciprocity or dialectical enjoinment in the moral arena which de-
fines movements •••• " 11New Approaches to the Study of Movements: 
Defining Movements Rhetorically, 11 Western Speech, XXXVI ( Spring, 1972), 
87. Leland M. Griffin, the author of movement studies, has discarded 
the historical placement of movements and now argues "that all move-
ments are essentially concerned with governance or dominion, 'the 
wielding and obeying of authority'; that 'politics above all is drama'; 
and that 'drama requires conflict' ••• all movements are essentially 
moral-strivings for salvation, perfection, the 'good.'" Leland M. 
Griffin, 11A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of Movements," Critical 
Responses io Kenneth Burke, ed., William H. Rueckert (Minneapolis, 
1969), p. 456. 
1. 
Having made these disclaimers however, it should be emphasized 
that the drama of the deutscher Widerstand--the motives of its mem-
bers, the acts they engaged in as a consequence of those motives, and 
the reciprocating acts of the Fuehrer and his followers, would make 
little sense without the scene of National Socialist Germany. From 
an abstract standpoint, enjoinment requires a premise or thesis to 
work against, 3and the Third Reich supplied that premise. From a cir-
cumstantial standpoint, the Zeitgeist in which the resisters moved-
the climate of opinion and the particular conditions which prevailed-
helped to shape the structure of their movement and the nature of their 
discourse, and these patterns can only be understood in relationship to 
the Third Reich. From an individual standpoint, the problem for many 
men of the opposition was not only one of dissent and division from 
the Nazi state, but of struggle to separate themselves from areas of 
agreement with it before they could dissent. Thus, it is important 
to postulate what Richard Weaver calls the "dialectically secured 
position114--the attractions and evils of the Gennan dictatorship--
against which the resisters, morally and politically, had to justify 
their positions, and practically, had to execute their plans. 
The Third Reich came into being with mutually-exclusive attri-
butes; that is, it belonged simultaneously to the century of the mass 
man and to the tradition of nationalism. These two forces, as the 
historian Friedrich Meinecke reminds us, are the most important of 
311Dialectic, 11 in A Syntopicon of Great Books of the Western 
World, ed., Mortimer J. Adler, 54 Vols., (Chicago, 1952), ii, p. 346. 
4Richard Weaver, The Ethics Of Rhetoric (Chicago, 1968), p. 27. 
2. 
3. 
the age.5 On the one hand, an ever-increasing population, made possible 
by advances in medical science, but dislocated by industrialization and 
technology, created a work force of many millions, most of whom looked 
to labor unions to help them safeguard their precarious standard of liv-
ing and to socialism for hope of a better future. On the other, an ed-
ucated upper-middle class and an aristocracy, enriched by the work of 
the masses, but no less disoriented by the defeat in World War I and 
the Versailles Diktat, looked back to a golden time when the Kaiser 
still ruled at Potsdam and Prussian officers moved through the world 
like 11demi-gods. 116 
Only once in the past century had the8e two forces united. This 
was during the political "Burgfrieden" or truce of August 1, 1914. On 
that day the Kaiser had declared: "When it comes to war all parties 
cease and we are- all brothers."? Then Socialists had joined Nationa1-
ists in voting war credits and cheering the Feldgrauen off to Paris. 
Like most belligerents, the Gennans believed that the war would be over 
before the leaves fell and that the unity gained in the face of a com-
mon danger would solve all their problems--political, economic, social, 
and even moral. 8 It turned out differently. Four years of trench war-
fare, nearly two-million dead, and a homefront where food supplies fi-
nally ran so short that turnips were the staple diet, not only broke 
5Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe, trans., Sidney B. 
Fay (Boston, 1969), see esp., Chapter One, "The Two Waves of the Age." 
6This is Gordon Craig's characterization, in The Politics Of 
The Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (Oxford, 1955), p. 204. 
7Wilhelm's statement to the Reichstag is quoted in Koppel S. 
Pinson, Modern Germany (New York, 1968), p. JlJ. 
8Meinecke, p. 25. 
the fragile bonds of unity but placed the two forces into increasingly- an-
tagonistic positions. 
Nor did the Weimar Republic reunite them. If anything, it made them. 
even greater enemies than before. While the socialists and their allies 
now became the government, and the nationalists and their allies became 
the opposition-the climate was so poisoned by the aftermath or war, by 
conspiracy theories or defeat and accusations or blame tor the peace, 
that democracy as mutual cooperation never took hold. Instead, Interea-
senpolitik and its counterpart, demagoguery, became the order or the 
day-at the polls, in the Reichstag. and even inside the many coalition 
governments. In such a heated political atmosphere, it is little wonder 
that character assassination bred political assassination, that coups 
were attempted from both right and left, and that rival gangs battled 
oacn other for control of the streets. 
The multiple political causes of the collapse or Weimar are not 
the concern here. What is the concern is that Hitler was able to take 
these two forces-the nationalist and the socialist, and all their many-
factions, and unite them into a new political order which was predicated 
not on the victory or one side or the other, but on the cooperation of 
bot.h. This was the 11Volksgemeinschart, 11 or 11People 1s Canmunity," whose 
origins date to the German philosopher turned nationalist, Johann Fichte, 9 
9For Fichte•s doctrine of a Volkish state, see Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte, Addresses to the German Nation, trans., R. F. Jones and G. H. 
Turnbull (Chicago, 1923). It is not my intention to argue that Fichte 
was a Nazi, or that Nazism can trace its origin to German ideas exclu-
sively. Nazi genealogy is a game some have played badly, as witness 
Rohan D•O Butler, The Roots of National Socialism (New York, 1942); 
and William McGovern, From Luther to Hitler (Boston, 1941). However, 
in Fichte's ideology the notion of a state as more than a politica1 
entity appears for the first time. 
and whose principles the Nazis employed as a merger of an apparent so-
cialist future a..~d an apparent nationalist past. 
It is important to look closely at the principles underlying the 
construction of this new order because in maey respects it represents 
Hitler's greatest achievement.10 He began with the assumption that the 
basis of society was race, or as he put it, "the .folkish philosophy 
finds the importance of mankind in its basic racial. elements. nil This 
meant, of course, the Acyans, the "founders of' cult.ure1112--and while 
all Nordic peoples were part of its biological. development, the'German 
was pre-eminently its finest product. There are negative implications 
to this assumption, but let us put them. by for the moment and stress 
positive features. To race, Hitler added the notion of soil. As he 
wrote in Mein Kampf, the policy "of the folkish state must be to safe-
guard the existence •• • of the race embodied in the state by creating 
a healthy, viable natural relation between the nation's population ••• 
and the quantity and quality of soi1. 11lJ 
Rasse und Boden: in reducing distinctions to a matter of race and 
soil,14Hitler had devised a means by which individual Germans could 
10Even his future opponent, Carl Goerdeler,. credited Hitler with 
having taught the German people that "we have to help one another." Ger-
hard Ritter, The German Resistance, trans., R. T. Clark (New York, 1958), 
p. 29. 
p. J8J. 
11Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans., Ralph Manheim (Boston, 1962), 
12Ibid., p. 290. 
13Ibid., p. 64.3. 
14Hitler's use of race and soil as· essences corresponds somewhat 
to Burke's suggestion that substance, in its most complete sense, is both 
intrinsic and extrinsic. Kenneth Burke, A Grammar Of Motives (Berkeley, 
1969), pp. 24-28. 
discover a sense of identity-15--a membership in a community which required 
an awareness of who you were and where you were. This was the essential 
Nazi definition of society and we will have cause to return to it again. 
For our immediate purpose however, the point to be made is that this re-
duction erased the old divisions between employers and employees, pro-
fessional and non-professional, producers and consumers, industry and 
craft--in short, all the factions that saw themselves as adherents of 
one or the other of the two major forces. In saying this, there is no 
intention to suggest that these groupings no longer existed. An employ-
er was still an employer and an-employee was still an employee. But 
these were occupational designations and nothing more. Hitler's egal.-
itarian col!l.?Ilunity was meant not so much to change relationships as to 
change the manner in which the relationships were perceived16--and to 
a large extent he succeeded. 
In part, Hitler's ideology succeeded because many Germans wanted 
it to. The expectation that the state was finally developing into a 
15This is, of course, the amalgamative use of identification. 
Its counterpart, the divisive, will be discussed later. Kenneth Burke, 
A Rhetoric Of Motives (New York, 1955), p. 45. 
16Hitler explained this distinction in one of his early speeches. 
"In Gennany where everyone who is Gennan at all has the same blood, has 
the same eyes, and speaks the s~~e language ••• there can be no class 
••• there can only be a single people and beyond that nothing else. 
Certainly, we r~cogni~e ••• that there are different occupations and 
'professions' /Stande/ --there is the Stand of the watchmaker, the Stand 
of the common laborers, the Stand of the painters and technicians, the 
Stand of the engineers, officials, etc. Stande there can be. But in 
the struggle which these Stande have amongst themselves for equaliza-
tion of their economic conditions, that conflict and division must 
never be so great as to sunaer the ties of race." Adolf Hitler,~ 
New Order, ed., Raoul de Roussy de Sales (New York, 1941), p. 23. 
This explanation illustrates Burke's argument that man's attempts to 
name things are 11not because they are precisely as named, but because 
the name is a hortatory device, designed to take up the slack." Burke, 
Grammar, p. 54. 
more open society impressed them. This was part of the new socialist .ru~ 
ture mentioned earlier and it needs to be examined in some detail. Among 
the twenty-five points in the National Socialist Party Program., twelve 
were proposals for social and econanic reform,17and with Hitler's acces-
sion to the Chancellery., the signs of their implementation., economic and 
otherwise., seemed to be everywhere. Hitler's requirement of "Kamerad" 
as the offlcial form of address was one.18 The Volkswagen project., un-
dertaken at a time when automobile ownership in Europe was largely for 
the rich., was another.19 The slogan., 11Gemeinnutz geht E_t Eigennutz" 
( "Common welfare before individual wel!are"), was a third.20 A fourth 
was the establishment of required training camps for those entering 
the professions.21 A fifth was government pressure on fraternities 
a.~d corps., long strongholds of class privilege, to adopt volkish prin-
ciples in place of feudalistic ones.22 A sixth was the Winterhilfe, 
or Winter Relief Campaign, whose declared aim was aid for the leas 
fortunate and whose collectors included not only the rank and file 
17The National Socialist Party Program can be round in I!:!! 
Nazi Years: A Documenta;y History. ed., Joachim Remak (Englewood 
Cliffs., 1969), pp. 28-30. 
l~ein Kampf, p. 478. 
19The cost of the Volkswagen., as announced by·the government 
in 1938., was 900 marks, or $235 at the then rate of exchange. Nazi 
Years., p. 76. 
2~or the significance of this slogan, particularly at a time 
when the country was disunited., see the autobiographical excerpts in 
Theodore Abel, Why Hitler Came Into Power (New York, 1938), p. 137ff. 
21For an unfavorable description of life in the camps, see the 
letter of Helmuth von Moltke, quoted in Michael Balfour and Julian 
Frisby., Helmuth von Moltke (London, 1972), pp. 54-55. 
22see the directive of Gerhard Krueger, leader of the Nazi stu-
dents' union, in Nazi Culture., ed., George L. Mosse (New York, 1966), 
p. 307. 
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but the leadership as well. Thus, Propaganda Minister Goebbelo took_his 
turn on a Berlin street corner collecting coins from by-standers, and so 
did Hermann Goering and a host of other officials.23 
To intrude a bit on chronology, the German Workers' Front decreed 
that everyone within its organization (and that included all trade and 
white collar employees and their employers) had to wear the same blue 
uniform on public occasions, thereby concealing all marks of social 
status.24 In purely economic terms, the cost of living index advanced 
only 7.2 percent during the first four years of the Third Reich, and 
that increase was pegged to 1933 as a base, probably the worst year of 
the depression.25 Moreover, fringe benefits played an important role, 
and the story of an old worker's reaction to a concert given by the 
Reich Symphony Orchestra at his factory in Wurttenburg, speaks vol-
umes: "Who would have dared think that the Kaiser would send his or-
chestra to us here in the plant? Now the Fuhrer himself has sent us 
his orchestra; we can never thank him enough."26 Finally, there are 
Milton Mayer's interviews, conducted after the war with a group of 
former Nazis in a hypothetical town he called Kronenberg. Among those 
he talked to was Heinrich Hildebrand, a middle-class democrat and 
teacher, whose answer to the question of why he joined the party 
reveals the motive of Mystery, one of the fundamental impulses to 
23sven Hedin recounts these scenes in his German Diary, trans., 
Joan Bulman (Dublin, 1951), p. 8. 
24Richard Grunberger, The 12-Year Reich (New York, 1971), p. 51. 
25The price index is quoted in Nazi Culture, p. 360. 
26Grunberger, p. 50. 
maintaining social order:27 
For the first time in my life I was really the peer of men who, 
in the Kaiser time and in the Weimar time, had always belonged 
to classes lower or higher than my own, men whom one had always 
looked down on or up to, but never at. In the Labor Front--! 
represented the teacher's associa~ion--I crune to know such men 8 
at first hand, to know their lives and to have them know mine. 2 
The young also wanted the system to work. In part, their response 
9. 
was idealistic, and in part, it was a rebellion against the "bourgeoisie" 
prejudices of their parents--another manifestation of the classless social-
ist hope for the future. Inge Scholl, whose book, Die weisse Rose, tells 
the story of the resistance group organized by herself, her brother and 
sister at the University of Munich, still acknowledges in the opening 
pages the enthusiasm they all felt for the new Volkish community. 11We 
believed ourselves to be members of a great, well-ordered society which 
embraced and esteemed everybody. We felt we were part of a proc-
ess, of a movement that created people out of a mass. 1129 Ilse McKee, 
who wrote about her schooldays in Nazi Germany from the vantagepoint of 
life in England, is derogatory in her references to Hitler's promises 
as 11bait 11 and pointed in her remarks about 11pressure 11 put on her father 
27Burke identifies mystery, or "The Secret, 11 as one of the three 
central motives in human relations. Rhetoric, p. 265. Briefly, mystery 
occurs where ''different kinds of beings are in communication. In mys-
tery, there must be strangeness; but the estranged must also be thought 
of as in some way capable of communion. 11 Ibid., p. 115. As noted above, 
the Volksgemeinschaft retained the old classes, but by redefining and re-
combining them, particularly on the lower levels, the "little men, 11 as 
Hilton Mayer calls them, had the impression that they were part of a less 
divisive society. We shall see that this impression proved increasingly 
false as one moved up the Nazi hierarchy. 
105. 
28Mi.1ton Mayer, They Thought They Were Free (Chicago, 1955}, P• 
29Inge Scholl, Die weisse Rose (Frankfurt am Main, 1952), Pa 10. 
10. 
to join the party, but at the end of her account of a youth rally held 
at Weimar, the old fervor comes to the surface: "the leader stepped for-
ward and shouted: 'Adolf Hitler! 1 We replied: 1Sieg, Heil! Sieg, Heil! 
SiegJ Heil!' We yelled these words with all the strength our lungs could 
muster, and they sounded enormously powerful. 1130 And Hermann Stresau 
quotes the response of a leader of the Bund deutscher Madel, or German 
Girl's League, to her middle-class mother's complaints that the body 
odor of her lower-class troop was offensive: 11Do you think people like 
us smell any better-zn31 
Still another group which welcomed Hitler's Volksgemeinschaft was 
the mass of unemployed. In one sense, their reason was economic since 
they were out of work and hungry and wanted jobs and food. But in an-
other, more profoundly human sense, their attraction to Hitler trans-
cended economics ) 2 "Der Hitler der sorgt !'!!!: !ID.§) 11 ( 11Hi tler he is our 
provider!") was a common utterance heard among the lower classes in those 
years,33and the word "provider" with its connotation of "Providence" has 
a certain ideological flavor. Also, in 1930, when unemployment rose by 
three millions, the National Socialist delegation in the Reichstag 
30rlse McKee, Tomorrow The World (London, 1960), p. 10. 
31Hermann Stresau, Von Jahr zu Jahr (Berlin, 1948), p. 80. 
32Burke explains this transcendence: "Man qua man is a symbol-
usero In this respect, every aspect of his 'reality' is likely to be 
seen through a fog of symbols. And not even the hard reality of basic 
economic facts is sufficient to pierce this symbolic veil (which is 
intrinsic to the human mind)." Rhetoric, p. 136. Hitler, too, makes 
much the same point in Mein Kampf: "economics is only of second or 
third-rate importance ••• the primary role falls to factors of ethics, 
morality, and blood." Mein Kampf, p. 227. 
33Pinson, p. 483. 
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increased from twelve to one-hundred and seven and rose or fell thereafter 
in proportion to the number of unemployed--certainly an ideological trans-
formation or an economic goad. And the swelling ranks or the SA in the 
same period is another indicator.34 or the original Storm Troops, some 
were criminals and some were veterans who had never made the adjustment 
back to civilian life. The new recruits, however, were largely jobless 
and joined for a free meal at the organization's soup kitchens. But the 
SA gave them more: it offered not only food but meaning to their lives, 
a brown shirt as a sign of identification, and the comradeship of a 
crowded hall or a column of marching men. 
Admittedly, the spectacular decrease in unemployment during the 
first years of Hitler's government-from almost five million in 1933 
to less than five-hundred thousand in 193$35-cannot be credited to the 
p .. ·inciples of the Volkish community. But it does belong in pa.rt to the 
socialist future of job security and a full lunch bucket. Backed by 
the post-depression upturn in the business cycle, the Nazis undertook 
a massive job-procurement program-public works like the Autobahnen, 
subsidized housing projects, and land rehabilitation--which added to 
the Kraft durch Freude, or 11Strength-Through-Joy 11 Project36with its 
cheap theater tickets, plans for better working conditions, and pre-
arranged inexpensive vacation tours, must have suggested to the workers 
34Between 1928 and 1930, the SA expanded in size from twenty-eight 
hundred to nearly one-hundred thousand. See~ Heinz Hohne, The Order of 
the Death's Head, tra.~s., Richard Barry (New York, 1970), pp. 26; 63. 
35unemployment figures are quoted in Nazi Years, p. 75. 
36rhe "Strength-Through-Joy" organization, for all the jokes about 
its name, was one of the government's most popular undertakings. 
that the millenium was at hand. Also, the decrease in unemployment can 
be credited in part to Hitler's rearmament program and his re-introduc-
tion of compulsary military service. But these are features which prop-
erly belong to the nationalist tradition mentioned earlier-the second 
force which Hitler used to make hia Third Reich--and it is to this force 
that we now turn. 
It is outside the scope of this study to trace the history of Ger-
many's power elite from the halcyon days of the Kaiserreich to the shat-
tering defeats of August 1918. Perhaps a statement which Wilhelm Lieb-
knecht once made to a visiting Englishman can serve to point up the ex-
tent of this group's dramatic reversal: 
If you want to understand Germany you must grasp the fact that 
Germany, particularly Prussia, is an inverted pyramid. Its a-
pex, firmly embedded in the ground, is the spike on the top of 
the Prussian soldiers' helmet. Everything rests on that. One 
day, unless people are very careful, it will topple over smash-
ing itself and much else in the process.37 
That day came on November 9, 1918, when Germany sued for an armistice, 
and the full realization of what toppling over meant was made clear a 
year later with the signing of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. As 
Liebknecht,predicted, much was smashed in the process. Germany had to 
sign a confession of war guilt, surrender thirteen percent of her land, 
all of her colonies, promise to pay thirty-eight percent of her wealth 
in reparations, allow part of her territory to be demilitarized, and 
reduce her anny to 100,000 officers and men, equipped only with light 
anns.38 
37w. H. Steed, Through Thirty Years, 2 Vols., (London, 1924), 
i, p. 28. 
38These terms are listed in Gordon A. Craig, Europe Since 1815 
(New York, 1966), PP• 543-546. 
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Undoubtedly, the group most smashed was the power elite--the Junkers, 
rich industrialists, and conservative upper-middle-class--from whose ranks 
the leadership of the nation, military and bureaucratic, was largely drawn. 
For them, as well as for those soldiers who felt themselves undefeated in 
battle, and for other millions at home who had heard nothing but stories 
of triumph through a regulated press, the reality of the armistice and 
surrender were too much to bear. Ludendorff's invention of the .QQ1£h-
stoss,39or stab-in-the-back myth, gave them a means of coping and they 
seized ito In Frontkampfer and Herrenklub, in soldaten Verbande and 
Direcktorium, these people embraced the myth, first to shield them-
selves against defeat and loss of national pride, and later to justify 
their attacks on the men who had signed the peace treaty and formed the 
new government--the "November Criminals" as Hitler called them. 
Whether the Versailles Treaty was just or unjust is not the issue 
here. The important point is that many Germans believed it was unjust. 
"We prefer to sacrifice everything and fight to the last man rather than 
accept as cowards a peace that is against our honor. 1140 Thus, a reso-
lution adopted by the faculty and students of the University of Breslau, 
which was representative of the thousands of protests and petitions sent 
to the government. In such an atmosphere, the leitmotifs of Hitler's 
39The invention of the Dolchstoss dates from November 1918. In 
that month, Ludendorff was visited in Berlin by the British General Sir 
Neill Malcolm. After Ludendorff had inveighed against the government 
and people, 1 both of whom, he claimed, had left him in the lurch, Malcolm 
asked, 11 Do you mean, General, that you were stabbed in the back?" Luden-
dorff seized the phrase. 11 Stabbed in the back? Yes., that 1s,it, exactly. 
We were stabbed in the back." Quoted in John Wheeler-Bennett, Wooden 
Titan (New York, 1936), pp. 236-2J7fn. 
40The Breslau resolution, as well as other examples of protest, 
are included in Abel, pp. 29-34. 
nationalistic appeal--revanchism for the war, restoration of militaey 
power., and a return to the glories of the Bismarck Reich--stru.ck re-
sponsive chords., particularly with the power elite. We cannot make a 
detailed account of these themes, but three samples may serve toil-
lustrate their attraction. First., retribution for the war: "It can-
not be that two million Germans should have fallen in vain., and that 
afterwards one should sit down as friends at the same table with trai-
tors. No, we do not pardon, we demand--Vengeance. 1141 Second, prom-
ises to the militaey: 11We shall see to it that, when we come to power, 
out of the present Reichswehr shall rise the great army of the Gennan 
people. 1142 Third, the vision of the Bismarck Reich: 
The very founding of the [Bismarc"iJ Reich seemed gilded by the 
magic of an event which uplifted the nation. After a series of 
incomparable victories, a Reich was born ••• a reward for im-
mortal heroism. • • • This unique birth and baptism. • • sur-
rounded the Reich with a halo of historic glory such as only 
the oldest states--and they but seldom-could boast.43 
It might have been possible to resist such blandishments in nor-
mal times, but as Meinecke writes., "the times were out of joint. 1144 
The inability of the Weimar Government to secure changes in the terms 
of the treaty; the economic crisis which made the Nazis the largest 
party in the Reichstag; the threat of a Red Revolution from the Left 
or a Brown Revolution from the Right-in short, the failure abroad 
and the instability at home in the years just prior to 1933 led the 
41Hitler., New Order, p. 45. 
42The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, ed., Norman H. Baynes., 2 Vols., 
(New York, 1942), i, p. 552. 
4~ein Kampf, pp. 225-226. 
44Meinecke, p. 58. 
nationalist power brokers who surrounded President Hindenburg to press 
for Hitler's appointment as Chancellor. 
Their motives were varied. In part, they were simply reverting to 
type, the whole trend of German history having been a shift to a more 
extreme nationalism whenever the fabric of social order seemed to be 
-· 
unraveling,45and the most fanatical nationalists were the Nazis. And 
in part, they hoped to control Hitler and his movement for their own, 
less radical nationalistic purposes,46to which end they tried to hedge 
him on all sides with safeguards, extracting from him pledges to re-
spect the rights of the president, the legislature, and the press, and 
forcing him to accept eight of their own number for the eleven cabinet 
positions.47 
It cannot be said that their choice of Hitler was completely bad, 
at least in the short run. Although the brokers themselves-Papen, 
Hugenburg, Seldte, and the others--soon discovered that they were with-
out much personal power, Hitler's behavior toward their cherished agen-
cies-industry, civil service, the judiciary, and above all, the army, 
was deferential. Thus, to take the example of the staatsakt, or open-
ing of the Reichstag in March 1933, the nationalists could find no rea-
son to fault Hitler. At the Potsdam garrison church, the frock-coated, 
45Pinson, pp. 503-504. 
1.5. 
46.rhus, Franz von Papen to Ewald von Kleist: 11I have Hindenburg's 
confidence. In two months we will have Hitler pushed into such a comer 
t,hat he will squeak. 11 Quoted in Joachim c. Fest, The Face of the Third 
Reich, trans., Michael Bullock (New York, 1970), p. 232. 
47In his memoirs, Papen lists the safeguards which he and the oth-
er conservative leaders used to try and check Hitler. Franz von Papen, 
Memoirs, trans., Brian Connell (New York, 1953), pp. 238-240. 
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top-hatted Chancellor spoke of celebrating the "union between the symbols 
of the old greatness and the new strength, 1148and he made public obeisance 
to Hindenburg in front of the coffin of Frederick the Great and before the 
uniformed ranks of the Prussian nobility. Further, he largely refrained 
from interfering in army affairs, leaving promotion selection, courts mar-
tial verdicts, and planning operations in military hands.49 Finally, while 
he did secure the suspension of personal and civil liberties in order to 
proscribe the Communist Party after the Reichstag fire,.50the power elite 
had little sympathy with the "Bolshevists" anyway since they represented 
a threat to stability which Hitler's appointment had been designed to 
prevent, and if a few heads were cracked in the process, as Hugenburg 
put it, 11Wo gehobelt wird, fliegen Spane" (You can't make an omelet with-
out breaking eggs). 51 
To move past the early months of 1933, several other events need to 
be recounted because, unlike Potsdam, they represented more than ages-
ture on Hitler's part to lay claim to nationalist support. The first 
was his declaration on October 14, 1933 that the Reich was withdrawing 
from the League of Nations. This revisionist act met with widespread 
approval in Gennany, 52not only because the League was inextricably 
48Baynes, i, p. 263. 
49Friedrich Rossbach, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler (Hanover, 
1949), PP• 45-46. 
50Bullock quotes the justification for the decree as a "defen-
sive measure against Communist acts of violence," although, of course, 
all citizens lost their liberties. Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study In 
Tyranny (New'York, 1961), p. 222. 
51nugenburg is quoted in Fest, p. 223. 
52Bullock notes that a subsequent plebiscite expressed ninety-
five percent approval. Bullock, p. 279. 
linked with the Versailles Diktat, but also because the concept of a 
transcendent community of nations clashed with the traditional German 
view that the state, as Ranke claimed, was "not a subdivision of some-
thing more general-but a living, individual, unique self. 11 53 
17. 
The second and third events followed from the first. On January 
15, 1934, Hitler announced that Germany- intended to reann, and two 
months later, he decreed a three-told increase in the size or the army. 
Once more, these acts were welcomed, particularly by the nationalists 
and the military, who saw them as redress for national grievances, one 
or the few exceptions being General Ludwig Beck, the Army Chief of start, 
who wrote that the trebling was "not a building up of a peacetime army 
but a mobilization. 11 54 However, Beck's voice or protest was lost amid 
the activity with which the 11Nur-Soldaten," or "soldiers-only" tuned 
up the military- machine, 55while others-still very few in number--
dreamed of decorations, promotions, and perhaps even Marshal's batons 
as in the days of the Emperor Bonaparte • .56 
The fourth event took place in the summer of 1934. This was the 
Nazi Party's Sicilian Vespers in which Hitler used his Gestapo to put 
down what he and the military perceived as a revolt by the leadership 
53The position of Leopold von Ranke, nineteenth-century German 
historian, is quoted in Hans Kohn, The Mind of Germany (London, 1961), 
p. 264. 
54Beck is quoted in Wolfgang Foerster, Generaloberst Ludwig 
Beck (Munich, 19 53), pp. 2.3-24. 
55Heinz Guderian, a "Nur-Soldat" of "Nur-Soldaten," notes the 
acceleration in work on the armored forces; Panzer Leader (New York, 
1967), pp. 18-27. 
56These aspirations are attributed to A1.fred Jodl. by John 
Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis Of Power (New York, 1954), p. 430. 
of the SA. 57 At base, the conflict between Hitler and his Storm Troop 
Command was over matters of tactics, not principle. Ernst Roehm, the 
SA Chief, wanted to absorb the armed forces into the brown shirts, there-
by creating a great "People's Army" for the conquest ·of Germany. He 
thought in terms of battles on barricades, of the smoke of gunpowder, 
and bloodshed, as the Nazi movement destroyed the old forms, replacing 
them. with a revolutionary order embodying the values of the political 
tighter.58 In his simplicity, Roehm was unable to grasp the clever 
tactics for consolidating power which the Fuehrer meant to employ. 
Direct assaults on important state agencies were scrapped for what 
Hitler, in his own words, sought ''by slow and determined degrees."59 
Thus, Roehm and his lieutenants were liquidated in a blood purge, and 
Hitler was able to offer an earnest of his promise that the army was 
to be the sole bearer of arms in the nation.60 
Liberty, it has been said, is seldom ravished, but often seduced. 
So it was in the beginning with Adolf Hitler and the majority of the 
German people.61 Workers, attracted to the prospect of a regular 
57An exceptionally well-documented account of the army's role 
in the SA massacre appears in Robert J. O'Neill, The German Arm.y and 
the Nazi Party, 1933-1939 (New York, 1966), see esp., Chapter Three, 
"The Army and the S. A." 
58Roehm. 1s view on the direction of the Nazi revolution and the 
construction of a "People I s Anny" are given in Hermann Rauschning, In! 
Voice Of Destruction (New York, 1940), pp. 151-154. 
59 .!h!g., p. 158. 
6°For Hitler's pledge to the military, see below, P• 51. 
610tto John, who was to become a member of the resistance, spe-
cifically refers to the Germans as being 11 seduced by Hitler." Otto 
John, Twice Through The Lines, trans., Richard Barry (London, 1969), 
p. 20. 
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income or a better house, or to the promise of a car or vacation in Ma-
deira, did not trouble them.selves greatly with the fact that they had 
lost their civil liberties. Industrialists, who preferred to see their 
factories operating at full capacity, only gradually became aware that 
government regulations of commerce were leading to total state controi.62 
The young, in their enthusiasm for the Volkish community and the sense 
of national rebirth, hardly realized that their education was becoming 
less substantive, or that the organizations to which they belonged--the 
~itlerjugend and the Bund deutscher Madel--were totally regimenting 
their lives. The nationalists, blinded by their desire to recapture 
the golden age they had known in the Kaiserreich, could not foresee 
that within a few years, their once-proud land would be truncated and 
divided, no longer even a sovereign state. And the anny,_dazzled by 
visions of reannrunent and satisfied with its tacit involvement in 
crushing the SA, could not understand that in ridding itself of one 
rival, it had acquired in the SS another, more dangerous one, or that 
for Hitler, armies did not exist for the maintenance of peace, but for 
the victorious fighting of wars.63 
It is important to bear these facts in mind as the discussion now 
turns to the transformation of Hitler's government from a coalition to 
a dictatorship: the extension of his power, the darker side of his id-
eology, and the means he used not only to sustain public support but to 
coerce it as he proceeded, almost imperceptibly, to eliminate or severely 
62Fritz Thyssen makes this point; I Paid Hitler, trans., Caesar 
Saerchinger (New York, 1941), p. 147. 
63This paraphrase has been made from a statement in Hitler's 
Secret Book, trans., Salvator Attanasio (New York, 1961), p. SJ. 
restrict those elements within the state which might have been able to 
oppose the final form of his regime. 
20. 
The first step has been mentioned already. This was the emergency 
decree under Article 48 of the Constitution which Hitler obtained from 
President Hindenburg as a result of the Communist burning of the fuaQh-
stag.64 Such decrees were not uncommon, chancellors having had recourse 
to them in the early days of Weimar when times were unsettled, and more 
frequently, since 1930 when the impossibility of forming any sort of 
parliamentary coalition made government by decree a necessity.65 The 
significant difference between this decree and its predecessors, how-
ever, was that it suspended civil liberties irrevocably, the arrested 
person having no recourse to counsel or courts. But Hitler assured the 
President and the people that the decree was temporary and would only 
be used to ward off the 11Red Peril." In fact it was never revoked 
through the whole period of the Third Reich, and more than a few so-
cialists were swept into the dragnet intended for communists. 
The second step took place on March 23, 1933. This was the so-
called "Enabling Act," or "Law for Terminating the Suffering of the 
64The only suspect was a half-witted Dutch Communist, Y!B.rinus 
van der Lubbe. Hans Gisevius notes that even in police headquarters, 
they "never succeeded in getting hold of any tangible evidence or even 
obtaining any ideas of where such evidence might be lurking" to link 
the Nazis with the fire. Hans Gisevius, To The Bitter End., trans., 
Richard and Clara Winston (Boston, 1947), p. 54. Research suggests 
that the first public statement that anyone had been involved besides 
van der Lubbe did not appear until 1940 and Hermann Rauschning•s ac-
count of Goering I s boasts of ''how 'his boys' had entered the Reich-
stag building by a subterranean passage ••• and how he regretted that 
the 'whole shack' had not burned down." Rauschning, p. 77. 
65All Chancellors since Heinrich Bruning had used Article 48 
of the Constitution. Pinson, p. 469. 
People and Nation," which the Reichstag passed by a two-thirds majority 
and which gave Hitler unrestricted powers to by-pass the Reichstag and 
to promulgate decrees deviating from the Constitution, although no laws 
were to "affect the position of the Reichstag" and the prerogatives of 
the President were to "continue unchanged. 1166 Again, Hitler gave as-
surances that the powers conferred on him would be used only "insofar 
as they are essential for carrying out vitally necessary measures,n67 
and a clause in the act limited these powers to four years. But the 
act was renewed at appropriate intervals, dying only with the Third 
Reich, and the essential measures included 11Gleichschaltung." an al-
most untranslatable word which means 11leveling" or "synchronization" 
or "coordination." 
It is beyond the scope of this study to recount the details by 
which all individuals and all agencies in the state were "coordinated" 
into a new order which was meant to reflect Hitler's ideology.68 
66The full provisions of the act are in Nazi Years, pp. 52-53. 
67Baynes, i, p. 246. 
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68imile the motive of order has been present in much of the dis-
cussion to this point (and indeed, will recur again), an examination or 
11Gleichschaltung" provides an opportunity to begin to treat it methodo-
logically. Burke writes that "order is no!:, jgst 'regularity. 1 It also 
involves a distribution of authority ••• Lang/ takes roughly a pyramidal 
or hierarchical fonn (or, at least, it is like a ladder with 'up' and 
'down•)." Kenneth Burke, Permanence And Change (Indianapolis, 1965), 
p. 276. Later, the discussion on 11Fuhrerprinzip" will have more to say 
about the "distribution of authority." For the moment, however, it is 
enough to note that 11Gleichschaltung" was designed to accomplish the 
structural integration of all individuals and agencies within the state 
--to make them aware of their co1111D.on identity, and more importantly per-
haps, to subordinate them to the demands of Hitler's 11New Order. 11 In 
theory, this would seem somewhat similar to Burke's description of ul-
timate order as an "evaluative series Lthat goei/ by a fixed progression 
••• the members of the entire series being arranged developmentally with 
Suffice to say that sane organizations like the paramilitary- Stalhelm 
and the Industrial League cooperated willingly;69others like the Social-
ist and Christian Trade Unions offered to cooperate and were spurned by 
the government, which then proceeded to destroy the structure of these 
organizations and reconstitute them as the "Gennan Workers' Front; 1170 
and still others like the churches and the amy were never fully ad-
justed to the proper point of view, though not through lack of effort. 
Also, party organizations like the Gestapo gradually enveloped exist-
ing law enforcement agencies, and new structures like Goebbels' Ministry-
of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda were created. In sum, a whole 
network of Nazi agencies was established which embraced all political 
professional, and workers groups, and in addition, individuals and 
families were organized into other groups which extended Nazi influ-
ence into the private areas of society; thus, the "German Mothers" 
and the 11National League of the Gennan Family." 
This was the outline of the "New Order" by the end of Hitler's 
first six months as Chancellor. If it bears a totalitarian imprint, 
that was certainly the intent, although many Gennans did not neces-
sarily see it as such. To explain, the "Enabling Act" and the first 
decrees based on it were only the scaffolding to control the state 
relation to one another ••• Lwitbi a •guiding ideal' or 'unitary prin-
ciple' behind the diversity." Rhetoric, p. 187. In practice, however, 
it meant that the Nazis closely supervised everything, penetrating the-
private as well as the public sector, making certain that nothing in-
terferred with Hitler's intention to direct German life in its entirety. 
69Eliot Wheaton, Prelude to Calamity: The Nazi Revolution 1933-
ll (Garden City, 1968), pp. 298; 304. 
7°1.!&g., pp. 281; 291. 
and society, the edifice itself requiring several more years to be com-
pleted.71 Beyond this, the "coordination" or agencies, particularly 
those which had divided the nation during Weimar, was viewed by many-
as a step toward necessary order.72 Also, some of the early protests 
that the state was becoming a dictatorship were answered by counter-
protests that the state was becoming German.73 And thd influx of 
11Marzgefallene, 11 or "March violets 11 as the Nazis sarcastically dubbed 
latecomers to the party, proved to be a militating £actor since these 
individuals were more adept than the old Nazis at getting government 
jobs. 74 Finally, even if some of the conservative members of the 
coalition had lost their infiuence or left the government-Papen to 
negotiate the Concordat with the Vatican75and Hugenburg to retire to 
71Fest writes that the "whole of national e-.x:i.stence could not 
be reshaped overnight. Part of Hitler's keen tactical sense was a 
sure feeling for tempo." Joachim C. Fest, Hitler, trans., Richard 
and Clara Winston (New York, 1974), p. 18. 
72For the importance of discontent with the divisive institu-
tions of Weimar, see the autobiographical excerpts in Abel, pp. 127-
136. 
73Thus the exchange between Romain Rolland and the 11Kolnische 
Zeitung." For details, see Appendix VIII in Henri Lichtenberger, The 
Third Reich, trans., Koppel S. Pinson (New York, 1937), pp. 364-368. 
74nauschning recounts examples of the unhappiness of some of 
the "alte Kampfer," or "old fighters" over their -inability to wrest 
government jobs away from the "March violets. 11 Rauschning, pp. 98-
99. 
75wbile Papen provides plausible reasons for negotiating the 
Concordat (Memoirs, pp. 278-282), he begs the question of the treaty 
as another factor in blurring the harsh features of the regime. As 
the first international agreement of Hitler's Chancellorship, it pro-
vided legitimacy to the Nazi government. Also, while the Catholic 
Church secured some rights within the state, Hitler reaped all the 
advantages in prestige and public opinion. 
23. 
private life76--President Hindenburg still had the final say and he con-
trolled the arniy. 
To this point, the emphasis has been on those Germans who were Volks-
genossen--members of the People. But thus defined, some individuals were 
excluded since Hitler's "New Order" did not automatically comprise all 
Gennans.77 As members of the wrong race, the Jews were excluded. So 
were the communists who preached the Revolution of the Proletariat. The 
same can be said for the officials of the trade unions who were to blame 
for class warfare, and their political arm, the leaders of the Social Dem-
ocratic Party. The place in the hierarchy of the two major churches-
Lutheran and Catholic--is less clear. Almost certainly, to judge from 
76Hugenburg 1 s return to private life was prompted by his bel-
ligerent attitude at a World Economic Conference in London where his 
demands for a colonial empire and German economic expansion in the 
Ukraine provided Hitler with an easy opportunity to appear reasonable 
and a peacemaker by dismissing him. Fest, Hitler, p. 414. 
??Incipiently, at least, this divisive use of identification--
the union of Gennans on the basis of enemies shared by all-reveals 
the 11Kill, 11 which, together with "Mystery" and "Order" comprise the 
trinity of motives in a dramatistic study of movements. Griffin, 
p. 458. What is involved in the "Kill" is authoritative control of 
the masses through expiation of guilt. The guilt, of course, was 
the German defeat in World War I and the failure of the Weimar Re-
public to overcome that defeat, either at home or abroad. The ex-
piation, as Burke puts it, was the "projection device of the scape-
goat, whereby the 'bad' features can be allocated to the 'devil' 
and one can 're~pect himself.'" Kenneth Burke, "The Rhetoric of 
Hitler's Battle, 11 'in The Philosophy of Literary Form (New York, 
1957), p. 168. In this chapter, the concern is merely to trace 
the presence of these motives and to begin to describe how the or-
der they created turned "faulty ••• corrosive ••• malign11--the 
characteristic invitation to a new movement. Subsequent discus-
sion will detail the specific corruptions, usually in a dialectic 
comparison between the existing system and the resister's plans 
for a new Germany. 
25. 
Hitler's table talk,78or Goebbels' Diaries,79or Bormann 1 s directives,80 
the churches were to be excluded in a kind of ecumenical excommunication 
on grounds of ideology or sedition after the final victory, although un-
til that millennium was reached, Hitler was willing to tolerate them as 
necessary evils, confining his displeasure to the arrest and murder of 
individual clerics. 
What happened to these asocial elements of the Third Reich can be 
explained best by looking at the Jews. In singling them out, there is 
no intention to suggest that they represented any real threat to the 
state. Rather, the fact of their elimination from the Volksgemeinschaft 
discloses an important negative part of Hitler's ideology, and the man-
ner of their elimination discloses the method by which Hitler, these-
ducer, separated his enemies from the rest of the members of his social 
order without unduly disturbing them. First, his warning to the Aryans: 
All great cultures of the past perished only because the origi-
nally creative race died out from blood poisoning. The ultimate 
cause of such a decline was their forgetting that all culture 
depends on man and not conversely; hence, that to preserve a 
certain culture the man who creates it must be preserved. This 
preservation is bound up with the rigid law of necessity and 
the right to victory of the best and strongest in this world. 
Those who want to live, let them fight, and those who do not 
want to fight in this world of eternal struggle do not deserve 
to live.Bl 
Next, the enemy to be struggled against: 
78Hitler 1 s Table Talk, intro., H. R. Trevor-Roper, trans., Norman 
Cameron and R.H. Stevens (London, 1953), pp. 15; 90; 189; 304; and 410. 
79Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, ed., and trans., Louis P. 
Lochner (New York, 1948), pp. 115; 118; 173-174; and 328-329. 
8°For Martin Bormann's directives, see Trial of the Major War Crim-
inals, 42 Vols., (Nuremberg, 1947), xxxv, pp. 7-l?e Hereafter abbreviated 
as TMWC. 
81Mein Kampf, p. 289. 
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The mightiest counterpart to the Aryan is represented by the Jew. 
The Jew possesses no culture-creating force of any sort since the 
idealism, without which there is no true higher development of man, 
is not present in him and never was present •••• The Jew is and 
remains the typical parasite who, like the malign bacillus, spreads 
more and more as long as he finds some favorable feeding ground. 
And the consequences of his existence, too, resembles th~t of a 
parasite: when he appears, the host nation will ••• die. 2 
In view of their importance as the archenemy of the Aryan-the adver-
sary against whom Germans of good blood had to continually struggle in this 
world of Social Darwinsim--i t is surprising to learn that out of the fifty 
million inhabitants of Germany when Hitler came to power, only five-hundred 
thousand were Jews, and that half of these had emigrated by the time war 
broke out in 1939.83 In part, this discrepancy between the size of the 
forces of good and evil can be attributed to Hitler's capacity for sim-
plification84-his reduction of all opponents to the single hyphenated 
pejorative of Jew; thus, Jewish-liberals, Jewish-Ma.r.xists, Jewish-Social 
Democrats, Jewish-revolutionists, Jewish-intellectuals, and so on. But 
in part, the discrepancy can be traced to the fact ~hat Hitler, for all 
his inveighing against the Jews, invariably kept his attacks impersonal 
so that actual Jews became more of an abstraction or principle to the 
average German than a devil made flesh and bl.ood. 8·5 Add to this the 
82Mein Kampf, pp. 300-327. 
83These figures are given in Karl Bracher, The German Dictator-
ship, trans., Jean Steinberg (New York, 1972), p. 235. 
84H. R. Trevor-Roper calls Hitler one of the "terrible simpli-
fiers" of history. Table Talk, p. xxxv. 
85This is, of course, contrary to Burke's argument that Hitler 
"materialized the Jew into a 'visible, point-to-able form. 1 " Burke, 
"Hitler's Battle" in Literary Form, p. 167. This counter argument 
rests on two points: first, the small number of Jews in proportion 
to the total population; and second, Hitler's own statement to Her-
mann Rauschning that the Jew was a 11princip1e." Rauschning, p. 233. 
fact that there were so few Jews living in Germany and the inference 
seems inescapable that Hitler's portrayal of the struggle between the 
Aryan culture-creators and the Semitic culture-destroyers was never 
meant to be a battle which each German waged personally; that in 
strictly quantitative terms, th~re were insufficient Jews to go a-
round, and that the real intention was to create a state of mind in 
the Herrenvolk whereby they not only would not struggle but would be 
able to refrain from paying attention to whatever struggle there was.86 
Such a hypothesis certainly accords more closely with Hitler's 
stated policy of indirection,87and it also accords more closely with 
his gradual method of eliminating Jews from his 11New Order." For 
despite his eventual decision on genocide, Hitler acted very dis-
cretely in weeding out Jews from the different sectors of the Ger-
man economy. Thus, while Jewish teachers, civil servants, and law-
yers were driven from their jobs within the first few weeks of the 
Nazis coming to power, 88doctors, merchants, and technicians were un-
touched until the passage of the infamous Nuremberg Laws of 1935,89 
and some Jewish businessmen were on occasion actually prevented from 
liquidating their businesses because of the economic dislocation which 
86Mayer quotes an unnamed university professor on this same 
point: 11all that was required of most of us fyiai/ that we do noth-
ing." Mayer, pp. 171-172. 
87Thus, Hitler to his circle of listeners after the evening 
meal at the 11Wolfsschanze 11 in 1941: "When I was younger, I thought 
it was necessary to set about matters with dynamite. I•ve since 
realized that there's room for a little subtlety." Table Talk, p. 
143. 
88Nora Levin, The Holocaust (New York, 1968), p. 60. 
89Ibid., p. 71. 
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might result. 90 
In describing the treatment of the Jews through the pre-war years 
of the Third Reich, the point has not been to excuse the mass of German 
people for their responsibility in the events leading up to the "final 
solution to the Jewish question. 1191 Instead, it has been to try to un-
derstand that their's was more a sin of omission than comrnission--of 
weakness predicated on the path of least resistance rather than active 
participation in the execution of a pre-meditated plan of murder. More-
over, as noted above, the methods by which Hitler first began to elimi-
nate the Jews--the generalizing of them to an abstract level and the 
gradual elimination of them beyond the pale--tended to create a sepa-
ration between thought and referent which made the process all the 
easier for the Burgertum. 
Extending the discussion still further, it can be argued that 
Hitler followed variations on this theme in psychologically condi-
tioning the Herrenvolk to accept the elimination of other, more nu-
merous and potentially dangerous enemies of his regime like the com-
munists and the trade unionists. For one thing, he had them excluded 
90Levin, p. 73. 
91This phrase, whose documentary origin can be traced to an order 
from Hermann Goering to Reinhard Heydrich, dated July 31, 1941, is another 
example of the deliberate use of abstraction by the Nazis. In this case, 
the sensibilities they wanted to avoid offending were not only the mass 
of Germans but their own. To those who subscribe to the Burkean notion 
that symbol systems structure reality (Language As Symbolic Action (Ber-
keley, 1968), p. 5.), there is support in Yehudi Menuhin's argument that 
the German language is particularly susceptible to such ambiguity. "The 
Germ.an language is an abstraction •••• In English ••• emotion and 
thought go together. In German, they're divorced. Everything is ab-
stract. That was how they made abstractions of the Jews. They didn't 
kill them as individuals, the way we shot our Indians, but as abstrac-
tions. 11 Quoted in Otto Friedrich, Before The Deluge (New York, 1972), 
P• 344. 
physically. Hans Gisevius, an early recruit to the resistance movement, 
recounts the difficulty which he as a police offical had in trying to 
enter one of the SA "bunkers" on the Prinz Albrechtstrasse in Berlin 
where strong-arm Nazis first took their opponents for beatings and mur-
ders after Hitler became Chancellor.92 And of course, when Himmler got 
the first concentration camps established at Dachau and Oranienburg in 
April 1933, the physical separation became even more pronounced as did 
the opportunity for imprisoning greater numbers. Thus, the four-thou-
sand communists who were arrested in the first days of the regime93only 
amounted to one-seventh of the total being held in protective custody 
six months later,94and this figure probably does not include other cap-
tives imprisoned in "wild" or temporary camps which the SA located in 
twenty remote sections of the country,95nor does it include the thou-
sands of communists and socialists who fled Germany in anticipation of 
what Hitler had in store for them.96 Finally, there remains to be ad-
ded the conditioning which prisoners underwent before they were allowed 
to return to the fellowship of the Volksgemeinschaft. Alexander Scholtz, 
a Social Democrat, describes the end of the journey: 
The bitterest road after such an experience was the homecoming, 
from prison through the streets to one's home, past coffee houses, 
92Gisevius, pp. 43-44. 
93Wheaton, p. 427. 
94Ibid., p. 429 
95Ibid. 
96This early and effective destruction of the socialist and com-
munist organizations led Theodore Haubach, a Christian Socialist, to de-
cide that resistance activity could not exist except on a personal basis. 
Hermann Graml, et. al., The German Resistance To Hitler (Berkeley, 1970)., 
p. 59. 
cabarets, and other places of amusement from which the noises of 
merriment were penetrating. 'What did they know, they who lived 
happy-go-lucky lives, of the sacrifices exacted by the tyranny? 
They did not see and they did not want to see. Those who had 
suffered could nowhere rise and give testimony or those d81's• 
Their mouth had to be kept closed, even with the closest rela-
tives.97 
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Besides making it easy for the Volksgenossen to ignore the unpleas-
ant features of the regime through gradualism and secrecy, Hitler and the 
party leadership distracted their attention in other ways. The most im-
portant was by making the Reich dramatic and giving every citizen a role 
to play, even if it only amounted to being an extra with thousands of oth-
ers in one of the many "Front" organizations which the government created 
under its policy of 11Gleichschaltung." This was largely the responsibil-
ity of Dr. Goebbels' Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, one 
of Hitler's two main instruments of control, which turned Ge:rmany into a 
stage with massed flags, ceremonial bunting, searchlights, smoking torches, 
unifo:rms, and pylons. 
The spectacles were the massive party rallies held annually in Nurem-
berg, or the Day of National Labor which, in terms of numbers alone, was 
the largest event on the calendar.98 Medium sized productions included 
the Summer Solstice Festival with its night-time bonfires, massed bands, 
and incantations,99or the Harvest Day where Hitler himself presided and 
97scholtz is quoted in The Struggle For Democracy In Ge:rmamr, 
ed., Gabriel A. Almond (Chapel Hill, 1949), P• 48. 
98Albert Speer tells of Hitler's unhappiness with the sizable 
paunches and disorderly ranks of middle and minor party officials dur-
ing an early "Workers' Front" Rally. Fortunately, Speer had the idea 
of a night rally with searchlights blazing not on the marchers but in-
to the sky, thereby merging everyone into a general glow and sparing 
Hitler's sensibilities. Albert Speer, Inside The Third Reich, trans., 
Richard and Clara Winston (New York, 1970), pp. 96-97. 
99An account of the activities at the Summer Solstice Festival 
awarded a harvest crown before a harvest altar laden with fruit of the 
harvest.100 Minor pieces were ubiquitous. The "German Greeting" was 
one.101 The continual marches of para-military units, "fahnen halt 
hoch" was another, as William Shirer discovered when he had to keep 
ducking into buildings to avoid saluting passing standards.102 A 
third was the singing which seemed to accompany every procession, 
the song being "a montage of slogans /yhic'if gradually transforms 
reality in favor of the expressed idea provided it is sung often 
enough and gradually assimilated by the psyche. 11103 A fourth was 
the never-ending rallies, meetings, and demonstrations where the 
faithful were addressed either by Hitler himself or by one of a 
host of lesser speakers, many of whom were trained in the Nazi 
Schools of Oratory.l04 A f~fth was Goebbels' success not only 
in building a wall of censorship around the nation but also in 
disseminating only that information which the government wanted 
is given by Gudrun Strei ter, 11The Diary of an SA Man I s Bride, " in 
Nazi Culture, pp. 122-126. 
lOOFor a description of the Harvest Festival, see Andre 
Francois Poncet, The Fateful Years, trans., Jacques LeClercq (New 
York, 1949), pp. 87; 208. 
l01Frau Ballestrom-Solf, a member of the opposition, relates 
how she always carried a shopping bag in each hand whenever she went 
out in order to avoid the "German Greeting." In Erich H. Boehm, We 
Survived (New Haven, 1949), p. 132. 
102william Shirer, Berlin Diary (New York, 1941), P• 15. 
l03Hans Gamm quotes a party directive in Der braune Kult 
(Hamburg, n. d.), p. 73. 
l040n the party speaker system, see Derrick Sington and 
Arthur Weidenfeld, The Goebbels Experiment (London, 1942), PP• 
41-48. 
the citizens to know.105 Thus, the average Gennan was provided with a 
continual barrage of announcements, news bulletins, special communiques, 
and direct hook-ups to stadiums like the Sportspalast which made it pos-
sible for him to take part at one-removed in those events where he was 
unable to participate directly. 
The result of all this activity was inevitably a state of mind bor-
dering on the hyperactive and a body moved by the viscera, which is an-
other way of describing the Nazis' essential view of mass man.106 In 
such an atmosphere, time to think, as one of Mayer's interviewees ob-
serves, was the first casualty.107 Closely behind, destroyed amid the 
muffled thud of blows and screams of pain, were the early centers of 
potential resistance, which were swept away, almost unseen, in the 
Zeitgeist of collective drama and restless emotionalism which marked 
the early years of the Third Reich. 
Consideration of Nazi Germany as theater brings us to the pro-
tagonist of this drama, Adolf Hitler himself, the figure around whom 
l05rn executing Hitler's principle of propaganda: 11the basie-
cally subjective and one-sided attitude it must take ••• •" (Mein 
Kampf, p. 182), Goebbels' banned the undesirable, as in the case of 
book burnings, the earliest of which occurred in May 1933 when twenty--
five thousand publications were consigned to the names. ' 
106For Hitler's view, see Rauschning, pp. 210-211; for Goebbels' 
view, see Diaries, p. 22. 
l07Mayer quotes Heinrich Wedekind, a baker in Kronenberg; p. 167. 
Another interviewee, an unnamed university professor, makes the same ar-
gument: 11 1 was plunged into all the new activity, as the university was 
drawn into the new situation; meetings, conferences, interviews, cere-
monies, and, above all, papers to be filled out, reports, biographies, 
lists, questionnaires. And on top of that were the demands of the com-
munity, the things in which one had to, was 'expected to' participate, 
that had not been there before. It was all rigamarole, of course, but 
it consumed all one's energies, coming on top of the work one reaJ.ly 
wanted to do. You can see how easy it was, then, not to think about 
fundamental things. One had no time. 11 Ibid. 
33. 
the supporting actors--the practitioners, technicians, and functionaries 
of the totalitarian state--played their parts; and against whom, in later 
scenes, the antagonists--the leaders of the res:istance movement--acted in 
dialectical opposition. In examining the life of AdolE Hitler, there is 
no need to involve ourselves at great length with the historical debate 
over his character. By the third decade since his suicide, the early 
verdicts that his ideas lacked either "profundity of mind or spirit, 11108 
or that he was "uncreative and unoriginal"l09have given way to more dis-
cerning assessments that he was a "systematic thinker"llOand had an "ex-
traordinary capacity •• • [toiJ mingling reality and dreams. 11111 Taken 
together, these last two evaluations suggest the development of a man 
who, unable to discover his own identity or place in society, resolved 
his problem by inventing his own world and his place in it--a kind or 
mythopoeic dream112--that was at once both an expression of personal 
108Pinson, p. 481. 
l09sir Lewis Namier, Personalities and Powers (New York, n. d.), 
p. 144. 
llOH. R. Trevor-Roper, Table Talk, pp. viii-ix. 
111Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, trans., Lelia Vennewitz 
(New York, 1966), p. 288. 
112The idea of Hitler's ideology and its expression in his "New 
Order" as being products of a personally systematized myth is relatively 
new in historical thinking. A few authorities comment on it, as in the 
case of Dean Nolte, cited above, and even more complete is the psycholog-
ical analysis of Walter C. Langer, The Mind of Adolf Hitler (New York, 
1972). Left undone, however, is any effort to relate Hitler's mythic 
ideology to a theoretical formulation of myths in general. Here, de-
finition provided by Susanne Langer seems particularly appropriate. 
"Myth ••• is a recognition of natural conflicts, of human desires 
frustrated by ••• hostile oppression •••• It presents, however 
metaphorically, a world picture, an insight into life generally •••• 
The mythic hero is not the subject of an egocentric daydream, but a 
subject greater than any individual. He is always felt to be super-
need and an attack upon the existing system; and that by sheer force 
of willpower, he imposed this dream, or Weltanschauung. as he called 
it, upon others, at first in small numbers, and later in hundreds and 
thousands, until at last the myth became reality and the Weltanschauung 
stretched from the Atlantic Ocean to the Vogla River, and from the Arc-
tic Circle to North Africa. 
Certainly, neither Hitler's followers nor his opponents, in the 
last analysis, made the mistake of underrating his intellectual ca-
pacity or the force of his mythic ideology, although they differed, 
of course, as to the merits of the man and the Weltanschauung. Thus, 
Hans Frank could assert in retrospect, "Everything came exclusively 
from Hitler himself. 11113 Joseph Goebbels, whose own mental abilities 
have been amply documented, declared himself content to serve a gen-
ius.114 And Hennann Goering, probably the most pragmatic and least 
ideological of Hitler's hierarchs, wrote: "for us the Fuhrer is in-
fallible in all political and other matters which touch the national 
and social interests of the people. 11115 
If the opinions of these men, who admittedly served Hitler, are 
dismissed, then perhaps statements by some of those who tried to as-
sassinate him in order to destroy his Weltanschauung provide more 
human, even if not quite divine. • • • The material of myth is, in-
deed, just the familiar symbolism of dream-image and fantasy ••• 
[ft is userf/ for understanding actual experience. 11 Susanne Langer, 
Philosophy In A New Key (New York, 1951}, PP• 151-152. 
113Frank is quoted in Fest, Face of the Third Reich, P• 433. 
114Goebbels, Diaries, p. 166. 
115Goering is quoted in Charles Bewley, Hennann Goering and 
the Third Reich (London, 1962), p. 156. 
credible evidence. Thus, Gisevius' paraphrase of Ludwig Beck's deter-
mined argument for tyrannicide. "An unsuccessful Putsch with a dead 
Hitler would be better than a partially successful uprising in which 
that master of the black arts would be alive. 11116 Elizabeth Gutten-
berg assessed the motives of her cousin, Claus von Stauffenberg: "he 
became convinced that Hitler ••• was indeed controlled by a diabolic 
power. He was sure at last in his own mind that in the assassination 
of Hitler he would be removing a creature actually possessed, body 
and soul, by the devil. 11117 And finally, there is the terse answer 
of Peter Yorck, co-founder of the Kreisau Circle, before the "People I s 
Court. 11 When Judge Freisler accused him of disagreeing with Hitler's 
ideology--his concept of justice, his extermination of the Jews-
Yorck replied: "The essential point is the connection between all 
these questions; the claim by the state to total power over the cit-
izen with the elimination of his religious and moral obligations be-
fore God. 11118 
At the point where we cut in, the man and the myth are nearly 
one. Although Hitler is still Chancellor, he is Fuehrer in all but 
title119--the leader of the people, the focal point of expectations 
and desires, the ideology made flesh. In terms of the earlier dis-
116Gisevius, p. 532. 
117Elizabeth von Guttenberg, Holding the Stirrup (New York, 
1952), p. 194. 
118Yorck is quoted in Germans Against Hitler, trans., Erich 
Zimmerman and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, trans., Allan and Lieselotte 
Yahares (Bonn, 1964), p. 199. 
119with the death of President Hindenburg on August 2, 1934, 
he would formally claim the title. 
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cussion on equality of race and soil, it may appear paradoxical to call 
Hitler 11Leader." Yet, he himself saw no paradox nor did he intend for 
the German people to see one. In Mein Kampf, he carefully united the 
concepts of racial equality and hierarchical inequality: 
The folkish philosophy is basically distinguished ••• by the 
fact that it not only recognizes the value of race, but with 
it the importance of personality, which it therefore makes 
one of the pillars of its entire edifice •••• According-
ly, the folkish state must free all leadership and especially 
the highest--that is, the political leadership--entirely from 
parliamentary principles of majority rule--in other words, 
mass rule--and instead absolutely guarantee the right of 
personality.120 
This was leadership based not on class or wealth or majority 
votes, but on disposi tion--the right of "able men. • .LtiJ struggle 
through for themselves" to the pinnacle of social order.121 Hitler 
referred to the government of the Third Reich as a hierarchy of lead-
e~ship, frorr. the local leaders up to himself as Fuehrer of all the 
people. He called it "Fuhrerprinzip" and described it as the 11auth-
ority of every leader downward and responsibility upward" with the 
ultimate responsibility being "borne by only one man f:ihij alone 
possesses the authority and right to commanct~ 11122 
12~ein Kampf, pp. 448-449. 
121Ibid., p. 449. Hitler's clearest statement on the 1rrl.ll to 
struggle to the top of the hierarchy ~~as made as part of his conclud-
ing speech to the court at his trial in 1924. ''The man who is born 
to be a dictator is not compelled; he wills it, he is not driven for-
ward, but drives himself. The man who feels called upon to govern a 
people has no right to say: If you want me or summon me I will co-
operate. No it is his duty to step forward." Quoted in Bullock, 
p. 89. 
122Mein Kampf, p. 450. From an ideal standpoint, Fuhrerprin-
zip is similar to Burke I s notion of mystic order as a "chain or lad-
der or pyramid of mounting worth, each kind striving towards the per-
fection of its kind, and so towards the kind next above it, while the 
strivings of the entire series head in God as the beloved cynosure 
36. 
37. 
Whatever the purpose of this unusual definition, it resulted in the 
inversion of the democratic principle. For the mass of Germans, a gap 
would begin to widen between themselves and their government. Although 
they were told it was a "People's Community" and were allowed an occa-
sional plebiscite, the fact is that the government began to accustom 
them to decisions made in secret and presented as accomplished facts, 
the justification being that the situation was so complex that they 
could not understand it, or so dangerous that, even if they understood 
it, they should not know for reasons of national security.123 And be-
cause they identified with Hitler and his "New 0rder, 11 or because they 
were so distracted, or because they lacked what Bismarck said they 
lacked--"civil courage 11124--the courage which makes men want to gov-
ern themselves, they accepted the gap, or reassured themselves with 
concepts like 1'Artgleichheit," which the government invented to ex-
plain the gap between Fuehrer and Volk.125 
For those higher up in the order, Hitler deliberately kept lines 
of authority ill-defined and channels of communication blocked except 
and sinecure, the end of all desire." Rhetoric, p. 353. Of course, 
once again, the reality was a good deal different, with most Germans 
having no worth in terms of power, while higher up, there was a com-
plex of rival leaders and patronage which Hitler, from the top, was 
able to control by keeping everyone in competition. 
123This is how one of Mayer's more perceptive "little people" 
retrospectively described the relationship; Mayer, p. 166. 
124For Bismarck's views on "civil courage," see Kohn, pp. 158-
159. 
12511 Artgleichheit Oiterally, "identity of speciesg stipulated 
that while people and Fuehrer were equal in kind, the latter was dif-
ferent in degree by virtue of his ability to embody the will of the 
people, to make them aware of their peoplehood and lead them to its 
fulfillment. For details, see Carl Schmitt, "Public Law in a New 
Context," in Nazi Culture, pp. 323-326. 
where they concerned him.126 And though he often spoke of plans for de-
veloping a new "Fuehrer Class" to lead the nation, 127Hitler1s intention 
was to hold the reins of power firmly in his own hands. Thus, Papen dis-
covered early on that the Nazi cabinet, unlike his own which had always 
proceeded from group discussion and majority votes, operated on the basis 
of private conversations between individual ministers and Hitler.128 The 
Nazi leadership, too, would find that elite status in the Third Reich, 
while it provided an opportunity for carving out personal empires, was 
still subject to competition from other empires.129 Thus, Speer notes 
that when he was made Minister of Annaments during the war, "there was 
no precise statement of my assignments or jurisdiction, nl30and Guderian 
writes that before he accepted the post of Inspector-General of the 
126Griffin writes that when a good order turns faulty, "the 
symptom of its turning is the growth of verbal corruption-vile er-
ror in the use of language, the inappropriate use of symbols." Grif-
fin, p. 459. While Hitler's Reich is best remembered for the appli-
cation of its corruptions in matters such as genocide and conquest, 
a symptom or cause of these corruptions can certainly be traced to 
its blocked lines of communication and grotesque methods of decision 
making. Some of these are noted above; others will be discussed in 
the next chapter where the chronology is more appropriate. 
127A representative declaration appears in Rauschning. "The 
selection of the new Fuhrer class is my struggle for power. Whoever 
proclaims his allegiance to me is, by this very proclamation and by 
the manner in which it is made, one of the chosen. This is the great 
revolutionary significance of our long, dogged struggle for power, 
that in it will be born a new Herren-class, chosen to guide the for-
tunes not only of the Gennan people, but of the world." Quoted in 
Rauschning, pp. 40-41. 
128Papen, p. 290. Confinnation can be found in Hjalmar Schacht, 
My First Seventy-Six Years, trans., Diane Pyke (London, 1955), p. 304. 
129Hitler justified the competition to SS leader Walter Schellen-
berg thusly: "People must be allowed friction with one another; friction 
produces wann.th, and wannth is energy." Quoted in Fest, Hitler, p. 420. 
130speer, pp. 277-278. 
Armored Forces in 1943, he demanded certain conditions because he did 
not want to waste his ''strength in such fruitless struggles for auth-
ority as those in which I had previously been involved when holding 
similar appointments 11131--typical situations in an order where Hitler's 
policy of "divide and conquer" guaranteed him the position from which 
he could supervise, balance, and dominate everything. 
This hierarchic tangle was largely concealed by the aura of di-
vinity surrounding Hitler which was already a feature of the Germany 
of 1934. In part, it was the result of Goebbels' propaganda machine 
which devoted much of its efforts to the task of picturing Hitler as 
superhuman.132 Instructions were issued to the press on the proper 
approach to be used in reporting Hitler's activities. For example, 
he was always to be described as a man of incredible energy and en-
durance whose day consisted of sixteen to eighteen hours of uninter-
rupted work, when in reality, Hitler hated the discipline of the 
Chancellor's office; 11a single idea of genius is worth more than a 
whole lifetime of conscientious office work," was the way he put 
·t 133 J.. • Other fabrications included his being portrayed as always 
in control of his emotions, as a former soldier who abhorred the 
shedding of blood, as a man of the people unawed by the powers of 
l31Guderian, p. 225. Interestingly enough, even though Hit-
ler was desperate for Guderian's help, he still refused to grant all 
the conditions. 
132speaking to aides one night in December 1941, Goebbels told 
them that one of his greatest contributions to National Socialism was 
his creation of the Fuehrer Myth. Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels-the Man 
Next to Hitler, trans., G. S. Wagner (London, 1947), p. 57. 
lJJHitler is quoted in Fest, Face of the Third Reich, p. 73. 
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his office, and as being the world's greatest architect and one of the 
world's greatest music and art critics.134 
From this beginning, it required no great leap to add Messianic el-
ements to the picture, and Goebbels did so. One was the religious term-
inology he used in talking about Hitler.135 Another was the format of 
rally he designed with its religious motifs and grand entrances for Hit-
ler, more befitting a god than a man.136 A third was the kind of pic-
tures he approved for publicity, one depicting Hitler in armor as a 
Knight of the Grail, and another showing Hitler addressing an audience 
with the caption reading: "In the beginning was the word. 11137 Last, 
and perhaps most important, was Goebbels' attempts to make Hitler ap-
pear infallible, as in General Instruction No. 674, which went to the 
press some hours before it was clear whether Hitler would decide on 
war or peace with Poland. 11In the next issue there will be a lead 
article, featured as prominently as possible, in which the decision 
of the Fuhrer, no matter what it will be, will be discussed as the 
only correct one for Germany.11138 
134-'fhese instructions are cited in Henry Phillips, Germany To-
dav and Tomorrow (New York, n. d.), pp. 40-41. 
l35'rypical of Goebbels I hymnic praise is this statement: 11If 
ever the German nation felt itself united in one thought and one will 
then it is in this: to serve Him LHitler, not Goij and to follow His 
commandment. 11 Quoted in Helmut Reiber, Goebbels, trans., John K. 
Dickinson (New York, 1972), p. 237. 
l36see Shirer's description; Diar:v, pp. 18-19. 
l37Reproductions of both pictures appear in Hanna Vogt, The 
Burden of Guilt, trans., Herbert Strauss (New York, 1964), pp. 161; 
169. 
138General Instruction No. 674 is quoted in Nazi Years, p. 88. 
41. 
In part, however, the Messianic persona of the Fuehrer was Hitler's 
own invention. His ability as a propagandist is fully documented in sev-
eral sections of Mein Kampr,139and even the phraseology of the book, com-
mencing with the opening passage-- 11 In this little town on the river Inn, 
Bavarian by blood and Austrian by nationality, gilded by the light of 
German martyrdom, there lived at the end of the late eighties of the 
last centur.r, my parents11140--is more suggestive of the poetic fonn by 
which the birth of the mythic hero is prefigured than it is the style 
of a serious autobiography or political broadside.141 Also, there was 
Hitler's rhetorical ability, which even his critics concede as his 
strongest accomplishment,142and which helped to establish the image. 
Tirelessly, often traveling by plane, he would descend like a Savior 
to the crowds of people, exhausting himself on their behalf with his 
oratorical exertions. Providence, honor, greatness, sacrifice--these 
were some of the main themes of his speeches. And they cost him phys-
ically. As he said, after his major addresses, he was "soaking wet 
and had lost four to six pounds in weight. 11143 Finally, there was 
his private life which required little more than straight reporting. 
A non-drinker, vegetarian, non-smoker, simple dresser, not particu-
larly interested in wealth (he declined his official salary), a man 
139Mein Kampf, see esp., Vol. One, Chapter IV, and Vol. Two, 
Chapter IV. 
140ibid., p. 4. 
141This is the judgment of Dr. Langer; p. 55. 
142Bullock calls Hitler "the greatest demagogue in history." 
Bullock, p. 44. 
143Table Talk, p, 572. 
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without a family, without a wife, an anonymous corporal of the Great War 
--in short, a half-ascetic, half-soldier who denied himself in the ser-
vice of Germany, Hitler's personal selflessness acted as a public goad 
on the Burgertum and their Gemutlichkeit. 
One result of this campaign to deify Hitler was the outpouring of 
religious fervor in Gennany which can only be described as pietistic.144 
Limitations of space make it impossible to detail the many expressions 
of this phenomena, but perhaps a series of instances can serve to demon-
strate its magnitude. William Shirer•s description of the faces or a 
mob of women outside Hitler's hotel in Nuremberg in 1934: 
They reminded me of the crazed expression I saw once in the back 
country of Louisiana on the faces of some Holy Rollers who were 
about to hit the trail. They looked up at him as if he were a 
Messiah, their faces transfonned into something positively in-
human.145 
Hans Gamm's observation that churchgoers, who grieved at Hitler's re-
fusal to attend services, prayed for the forgiveness of his sins and 
for God to reach his erring soui.146 Horst Kruger's statement that 
14411Piety, 11 Richard Weaver writes, 11is a discipline of the will 
through respe£t. It admits the right to exist of things larger than 
the ego ••• Land include§l nature, our neighbors ••• and the past." 
Richard Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences (Chicago, 1948), p. 172. Ta-
ken together, the evidence suggests that piety, as it was revealed in 
the early years of the Third Reich, did not involve any special re-
spect for nature, but did include pietas toward the past, as indicated 
by thepa.gan sort of fervor described by Shirer and the Christian pray-
ers noted by Gamm, as well as respect for neighbors in the sacrifices 
mentioned by Kruger. Also, the recollections of the resident or Eich-
kamp suggest another sense of piety--as a "system builder," a desire 
11to round things out, to fit experiences into a unified whole.," as 
Hitler provided people "a sense of what properly goes with what" in 
exhorting them to a value system. Burke, Permanence And Change, pp. 
71-76. 
145shirer, Diary. pp. 17-18. 
146 60 Gamm, p. 1 . 
the "one-pot meal"--the officially designated Lenten fare, the savings 
from which went to the Winterhilfe--did not fail to elicit the appro-
priate response: the feeling that if the Fuehrer could sacrifice for 
Germany, the least the Volk could do was sacrifice for each other.147 
And an Eichkamp resident's recollection that in the early thirties 
11It was only Hitler who brought it to Eichkamp--the knowledge that 
such things as providence, eternal justice, and the Lord Almighty 
exist. There was a lot of talk about these invisible powers at the 
time. An age of piety had dawned. 11148 
The other result of the campaign to deify Hitler-and one which 
will become increasingly important in subsequent chapters--was that 
it succeeded. The man became the symbol of his social order and its 
motivating force. Call him the Weltanschauung I s god tern., or the rep-
resentative anecdote of the Third Reich, or the myth made manifest~ 
but whatever the rubric, the fact remains that Hitler was the power 
which held the 11 New Order" together, even to the end of the war. 
Thus, Friedrich Reck-Malleczewen records in his diary in the fall 
of 1944, the declaration of a woman praising the Fuehrer because 
11in his goodness, he has prepared a gentle and easy death by gas 
for the German people in case the war ends badly. 11149 Albert Speer 
writes that in March 1945, he was forced to reconsider his assassi-
nation plans when he overheard a group of farmworkers whose faith 
147Horst Kruger, Das Zerbrochene Haus (Munich, 1966), p. 145. 
148Ibid • , p. 151. 
149Friedrich Percyval Reck-Malleczewen, Diary of a Man in De-
spair, trans., Paul Rubens (London, 1970), p. 199. 
in Hitler was still strong. 11The Fuehrer is still holding something in 
reserve that he'll play at the last moment. Then the turning point will 
come. Its only a trap, his letting the enemy come so far into our coun-
try. nl50 And H. R. Trevor-Roper adds that at the very end 
Besieged in the shattered capital, cooped up fifty feet below 
ground, cut off from ordinary communication, a physical and 
mental wreck, ¼~thout power to enforce, or reason to persuade, 
or machinery to execute, Hitler still remained ••• the sole 
master •••• Goering, imprisoned under S. S. guard at Mau-
tendorf, now had leisure to reflect on the dangers of antic-
ipating that fatal inheritance. Soon Himmler was to learn 
the same lesson. The power of the Fuehrer was a magic power, 
and no profane hand might reach £~f to touch it until the 
reigning priest was really dead. 
By the late summer of 1934, Hitler had eliminated all potential cen-
ters of opposition to his regime except one--the army. As we have said, 
it was not the only agency to preserve its identity in the face of Gleich-
schaultung--the churches and the bureaucracy being two others. But rel-
ative to the churches, Hitler was willing to bide his time,152and con-
cerning the bureaucracy, State Secretary Weizsacker•s remark--that it 
was impossible to "shoot with one's files 11153-reveals the powerless-
ness of the civil service. 
Hitler was deferential to the army, in part because he thought of 
its General Staff as a sort of "witch's cave in which schemes for the 
150speer, p. 564. 
151H. R. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days Of Hitler (New York, 1968), 
p. 228. 
152Thus Hitler in 1941: nr have numerous accounts to settle with 
the church, about which I cannot think today. But that doesn't mean I 
forget them. I write them down. The time will come to bring out the 
big book." Table Talk, p. 90. 
l53Ernst von Weizsacker, Memoirs, trans., John Andrews (Chicago, 
19 51), p. 144. 
wildest kinds of agressive wars were continually on the brew, 11154and 
that prospect accorded quite well with his future foreign policy plans 
(which will be discussed shortly); and in part because President Hinden-
burg controlled the anny and insisted that it remain outside politics, 
a fact which was brought home forcibly to Hitler when he attempted in-
directly to have an officer sympathetic to him appointed Anny Commander-
in-Chiet.155 So Hitler bided his time, following a policy of circum-
spection mixed with friendly gestures and signs of favor including re-
armament, the three-fold increase in military strength, and the purge 
of the SA leadership, an act which cost him greatly, but one which he 
performed in the interest of maintaining the good will of the army and 
its backers, the president and the conservative power brokers who sur-
rounded him.156 
In War Minister Werner von Blomberg and his chief assistant, Wal-
ther von Reichenau, Hitler discovered two partisans of his movement. 
Blomberg was an enthusiast by nature. He had in turn subscribed to 
154Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General staff, trans., 
Brian Battershaw (New York, 1954), p. 311. 
l55This was General Walther von Reichenau, who Hindenburg re-
jected on the grounds that he was a "National Socialist" general. See, 
Wilhelm Keitel, The Memoirs Of Field-Marshal Keitel, ed., Walter Goer-
litz, trans., David Irving (New York, 1966), p. 19. 
156The extent of Hitler's anger about the SA purge can be judged 
by his statement to Rauschning afterwards. 11They underestimated me be-
cause I've risen from below; because I haven't had an education, because 
I haven't the manners that their sparrow brains think right •••• But 
I've spoiled their plans. They thought I wouldn't dare; they thought I 
was afraid. They saw me already wiggling in their net. They thought I 
was their tool, and behind my back they laughed at me and said I had no 
power now, that I had lost my Party. I saw through all that long ago. 
What I have lost in the trial of the S. A., I shall regain by the ver-
dict of these feudal gamblers •••• I stand here stronger than ever 
before. Forward Meine Herren Papen and Hugenberg! I am ready for the 
next round." Rauschning, pp. 171-172. 
monarchy, democracy, communism--this after a trip to Russia in 1928157 
--and finally to nazism. Combined with his enthusiasm was a "romantic 
knight-errant idealism111 58which, in the beginning at least, led him to 
perceive Hitler's "New Order" as the means to Gennany 1 s nnational re-
birth, 11 while blinding him to those aspects which he did not want to 
see. Reichenau was of a different stamp. A cold and calculating in-
dividua1,159he saw advantages in National Socialism, both to himself 
personally and to the army as a whole. And he was not opposed to the 
form of Hitler's regime since he believed that the breakdown in social 
order could be stemmed only by dictatorship.160 As a result, then, of 
impulsiveness and ambition, both officers reciprocated Hitler's ges-
tures with gestures of their own. In the spring of 1934, Blomberg or-
dered the army to adopt the party emblem (the swastika) as a part of 
its uniform, and in the early summer, he and Reichenau issued a new 
directive describing the "Duties of the German Soldiern161which com-
bined traditional platitudes -w:Lth some of Hitler's ideology. 
At the time, neither of these steps seemed significant, since 
the emblem was only one decoration among many and the directive was 
l57John Wheeler-Bennett quotes Blomberg as 
far short of coming home a complete Bolshevist. 11 
Nemesis Of Power, p. 296. 
saying, 111 was not 
1rfueeler-Bennet t, 
l58This is the description of B. H. Liddell-Hart, who draws a 
sympathetic but accurate portrait of Blomberg after talking with him 
at the 1932 Disarmament Conference in Geneva~ B. H. Liddell-Hart, 
The Liddell-Hart Memoirs, 2 Vols., (New York, 1965), i, p. 84. 
l59ulrich von Hassell's comment on Reichenau is revealing: 11He 
always hears the grass grow." Ulrich van Hassell, The Von Hassell 
Diaries (Westport, 1971), p. 84. 
160Fest relates Reichenau's belief; Hitler, p. 453. 
l6lo 1Neill lists these steps; pp. 38; 172. 
issued over Hindenburg's signature. But the important point is that 
each of these gestures created ties between the army and Hitler and 
accustomed the soldiers to thinking that they were identified with 
his "New Order." Thus, the directive allowed Nazi vocabulary to 
seep into the army's language: "sword-bearer of the German people 
••• the people united in National Socialism, and its living-space 
(Lebensraum) ••• strength rooted in German soil and German toil" 
--etc., etc., all jumbled up with cliches current in older times: 
"confidence, on which discipline rests ••• upright and loyal, God-
fearing and truthful ••• a pattern of manly strength. 11162 And with 
the emblem, the traditional German eagle now held within its claws 
a tiny swastika, and soon this sign began to appear in larger scale 
--on regimental colors, on flags, over the arches to barracks, and 
stenciled on the turrets of armored vehicles163--all of which had 
to have an effect.164 
Probably the most important steps were taken on August 2, 1934, 
with the death of President Hindenburg. At noon of that same day, 
162The directive is included as Appendix 33 in Karl Demeter, 
The German Officer-Corps, trans., Michael Howard (New York, 1965), 
p. 363. This combination of old and new terminologies is somewhat 
similar to Burke's argument that one way in which symbols function 
is by ''manipulating values in our code" thereby shifting our terms 
in such a way as to begin our adjustment to the new situation. Ken-
neth Burke, Counterstatement (Los Altos, 1965), p. 156. 
163Alan Clark notes the extension of the swastika sign. Alan 
Clark, Barbarossa (New York, 1965), p. 30. 
l64Non-verbal signs are certainly a means of achieving identi-
fication. Thus Burke: "persuasion cannot be confined to the strictly 
verbal ••• non-verbal acts and material instruments themselves have a 
symbolic ingredient •••• For Lthei/ can be considered as signs by 
reason of the persuasive ingredients inherent in the 'meaning' they 
have for the audience to which they are addressed." Rhetoric, p$ 161$ 
it was decreed that the offices of President and Chancellor had been 
united in the person of Adolf Hitler, and that he would assume their 
functions as "Fuhrer und Reichskanzeler"--functions that made him in 
one moment de jure Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces. Further, it was decreed that the officers and men of the army 
would swear an oath of allegiance to the Fuehrer, and this was done, 
beginning with the highest ranking generals, that same evening.165 
It has been alleged by some commentators that Hitler's claim to 
being Head of State and the swearing of the oath were parts of a se-
cret quid pro quo worked out between the Fuehrer and Blomberg during 
a cruise on the battleship Deutschland in April 1934; that in return 
for the purge of the SA, the War Minister agreed to support Hitler as 
Hindenburg's successor and pledged him the army's allegiance.166 The 
truth, unfortunately, is more prosaic, although the results were the 
same. Insofar as Hitler's becoming Fuhrer und Reichskanzeler. the 
fact is that he was the only real candidate for the positon, as dem-
onstrated by the last presidential election in which he received the 
second highest number of votes (thirty-seven percent to Hindenburg's 
fifty-three percent), and by virtue of the subsequent plebiscite in 
which almost nine out of ten voters confirmed his right to the two 
48. 
16511 etter of General a. D. Erich Dethleffsen," January 25, 1966. 
166see John Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis Of Power, p. 312ff. Robert 
O1Neill has subjected this claim of the 11 Deutschland Pact" to scrupulous 
examination ,and has concluded that there is no real evidence that it ever 
took place. O'Neill, Appendix F, pp. 245-246. Correspondence with Gen-
eral Hermann von Witzleben corroborates this finding. Witzleben writes: 
"There never e.xi sted a 'Pact of the Deutschland' • • • which would have 
been completely unnecessary with a War Minister like Blomberg." "Let-
ter of General a. D. Hennann von Witzleben," May 23, 1966~ 
offices.167 And the formulation of ~he oath can be traced to Blomberg 
and Reichenau who, perhaps with Hitler's prior consent, 168succeeded in 
creating an almost unbreakable bond between the Fuehrer and his sol-
diers. 
The practice of oath-taking was not new in Gennan military tra-
dition, soldiers having sworn oaths to their sovereign since the be-
ginnings of Germany's recorded history.169 But the binding quality 
of the vow had survived far longer in Genr,any than anywhere else. 
The Flag Oath, or "Fahneneid 11 as it was called, historically "de-
rived from the 'vassals oath' and bound the oath-giver to the'per-
son of the IT1onarch who embodied the state. 11170 The period of the 
Weimar Republic had represented a break in the personal nature of 
the oath. No longer did the soldier swear obedience to a Friedrich 
Ebert or Paul Hindenburg. Instead, it was to the Constitution that 
the military pledged its allegiance.171 But with the promulgation 
of the"Fuhrereid," this fom.ulation changed and the soldier was 
167Bullock, p. 267. 
168Papen, who was still a member of the government, was con-
vinced that Hitler played a role in the fonnulation of the oath, ar-
guing with some merit that it would have been impossible for the 
swearing-in to have taken place so quickly unless the Fuehrer had 
given prior approval. Memoirs, p. 335. 
l69As early as the Third Century, the Roman historian Tacitus 
wrote of Germanic warriors: 11To preserve their Prince, to defend him, 
and to ascribe to his glory all their own valorous deeds, is the sum 
and most sacred part of their oath." Tacitus, Germania, trans., 
Thomas Gordon (New York, 1910), p. 103. 
l70"Letter of General a. D. Franz Halder," August 17, 1965. 
171The forn,ulation of the Weimar Oath can be found in Eberhard 
Zeller, The Spirit Of Freedom, trans., R. P. Heller and D.R. Masters 
(London, 1967), p. 13. 
49. 
confronted again with an oath of personal fealty, at once made more im-
pressive and credible by its call to God as Witness of its sacred qual-
·t 172 i y: 
I swear to God this holy oath: That I will give unconditional 
obedience to the Fuehrer of the German Reich and people, Adolf 
Hitler, the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht and that, as a 
brave soldier, I will be ready at all times to give my life 
for this oath.173 
In an age and culture like our own, the compelling nature of the 
oath is likely to be passed over far too casually. In point of fact, 
it was one of the most important motivating forces in the German sol-
dier's life, encrusted as it was with the weight of centuries of tra-
dition and equally buttressed by its renewed personal element. In 
states where constitutions are lengthy and ambiguous, most soldiers 
do not even know what the document contains, and Weimar Germany was 
such a state. But an oath to a man, and particularly one of super-
human proportions as Hitler was coming to be, further enhanced the 
oath's persuasive impact. 
It is beyond the scope of this discussion to document the re-
actions of all the officers to the swearing of the oath, but per-
haps statements by two of them--interestingly enough, generals who 
would come to take opposing positions on breaking their vows--will 
be sufficient to indicate the seriousness with which they approached 
the oath and the moral dilemma involved in breaking it. On the eve 
of the swearing ceremony, Heinz Guderian wrote his wife: "Tomorrow 
172The Weimar Oath made no reference to God; Zeller, p. 13~ 
l 73This formulation of the Hitler Oath is taken from Germans 
Against Hitler, p. 294. 
50. 
51. 
we swear the oath to Hitler •••• Pray God that both sides abide by it 
equally for the welfare of Germany. The army is accustomed to keep its 
oaths. May the army, in honor, be able to do so this time. 11174 And Lud-
wig Beck, whose first negative response to Hitler's war policies has al-
ready been noted, and who was later to head the resistance movement, is 
quoted by Gisevius as saying that the undertaking of the oath had at the 
time caused a grave searching of heart.175 
Hitler was quick to show his appreciation to Blomberg and the mili-
tary for their oath of allegiance. In late August, he wrote a letter in 
which he thanked them and promised to regard it as his "highest duty to 
intercede for the existence and inviolability of the Wehrm.acht" and he 
repeated his pledge to ir..aintain the "Army as the sole bearer of arms in 
the nation. 11176 But as the officers (and indeed, the rest of the world) 
would finally learn, the Fuehrer followed a policy of never meaning what 
he said when he gave his word.177 
From the moment he became Chancellor, Hitler undertook a program 
whose aim was the close supervision of the population, the rationale 
being that those whose confonnity could not be guaranteed by faith in 
the ideology or by the influence of propaganda, could be coerced through 
force. Under the supervision of the party, Gennany was divided into 
l74Guderian, p. 23. 
175Gisevius, p. 19. 
176The full text of Hitler's letter appears in Germ.ans Against 
Hitler, pp. 289-290 
l77This paraphrase of Wheeler-Bennett's verdict (Nemesis Of Pow-
er, p. 461), is yet another example of "verbal corruption--vile use of 
language, the inappropriate use of symbols" as practiced in the Third 
Reich. Griffin, p. 459. 
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administrative units or Gaue. Each was governed by a party leader, a 
Gauleiter, who was directly responsible to Hitler for his area. The 
Gaue were further divided into districts, localities, cells, and blocks~ 
It was on the local level of control--that of the block and its Block-
wart--that most Germans felt the visible presence of state authority. 
The Blockwart, despite the modesty of his position, was an important 
cog in the control mechanism. A paragraph in a party manual reveals 
why: 
LThe Blockwart/ must not only be a preacher and defender of 
National Socialist ideology toward the members of the Nation 
and Party entrusted to his political care, but he must strive 
to achieve the practical collaboration of the Party members 
within his block •••• He must keep a dossier on each house-
hold.178 
Party supervision was only part of the mechanism. Even more impor-
tant than the office of the functionary was the apparatus of the police 
state, the second instrument of control. As early as 1929, Hitler had 
appointed Heinrich Himmler to command the Schutzstaffelen, or Nazi Party 
Troops. The membership was small--less than three-hundred men179 __ but 
Himmler proceeded to build upon this base and by the time Hitler be-
came Chancellor, the SS had grown to number more than fifty-thousand.180 
There was no doubt regarding their raison d'etre. 
out quite clearly: 
Himmler spelled it 
178The instructions to the Blockwart are quoted in Lord Russell 
of Liverpool, The Scourge of the s~astika (New York, 1954), p. 6. 
l79Edward Crankshaw, Gestapo {!,;ew York, 1956), p. 16. This fig-
ure is based on evidence given at Nuremberg by otto Ohlendorf, a rank-
ing member of the organization. 
lSOibid., p. 17. 
We shall unremittingly fulfill our task to guarantee the secu-
rity of Germany from within. • We shall take care that nev-
er again in Germany, the heart of Europe, will the Jewish-Bol-
shevistic revolution of subhumans be kindled from the interior 
or through emissaries from the outside. Without pity we shall 
be a merciless sword of justice to all those forces whose ex-
istence and activities we know, on the day the slightest at-
tempt is made, be it today, after a decade, or a century hence.181 
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The SS did not comprise the entirety of Nazi Germany's police state. 
Like most of Hitler's lieutenants, Himmler was an empire builder, and he 
added to his power, enveloping existing police departments by means of 
the authority provided in the "Enabling Act," and creating new ones as 
the opportunity arose. Thus, there came to be, in addition to the SS, 
the Sicherheitsdienst, or Security Service, the Ordungspolizie, or U-
niformed Police, the Geheime Staatspolizie, or Political Police, and 
the Verfugungstrupoe, the forerunner of the Waffen SS, or Weapons Po-
lice. Against such an apparatus, a mass uprising would have been im-
possible, even if the mass had wanted to rise up. So let Fabian von 
Schlabrendorff I s statement--that ''only the army had the weapons and 
the power to overthrow the firmly-entrenched Nazi regime, which was 
supported by thousands of SS troops"182--stand as surrogate for the 
many 11 0nkel Emil" groups which opposed Hitler but were forced to lim-
it their resistance activities to shielding individual Jews, or help-
ing young men evade the draft, or forging ration cards.183 
181Himmler is quoted in Liverpool, p. 8. 
182Fabian von Schlabrendorff, They Almost Killed Hitler (New 
York, 1947), pp. 14-15. 
183nonkel Emil11 was the code name of the resistance group to 
which Ruth Andreas-Friedrich, an anti-Nazi newspaperwoman belonged. 
The group contained about two dozen members, and by Miss Friedrich's 
own account, played no part in the various attempts to overthrow Hit-
It was Himmler's creation of the Verfugungstruppe in March 1933 
which rendered false at the moment he made it the first of Hitler's 
promises to the army. Admittedly, the force was srnall--only a body-
guard of about one-hundred men. But in less than two years, Himmler 
had expanded it, over military objections, to the size of a division, 
and by the early summer of 1934, the Verfugungstruppe, or "asphalt sol-
diers" as they were called, had their own training schools, a ration 
strength of eight-thousand officers and men, and a formation structure 
of three detachments which would in due course form the nucleus of the 
Waffen SS--the Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler, and the regiments Deutsch-
land and Germania.184 
The second of Hitler's promises--that he would respect the "in-
violability" of the an:ny--was rendered false less than one month after 
he wrote the letter. In mid-September, he ordered the Wehrmacht to 
participate in the annual party rally at Nuremberg, and while the ac-
tual duties the soldiers perfonned--marches, drills, equipment dis-
plays, and the like--were hardly ideological, Goebbels' propaganda 
machine exploited the event as a demonstration of military support 
for the "New Order. 11185 In breaking this promise, Hitler was aided 
by Blomberg who, in his continuing zeal, was unable to distinguish 
between military virtues and party ideology. Thus, the War Minister 
ler, the threat of the Gestapo restraining their activities to those 
noted above. Ruth Andreas-Friedrich, Berlin Underground, trans., 
Barrows Mussey (New York, 1947), pp. vii-viii. 
lB4Hohne, PP• 439-442. 
185Hamilton T. Burden, The Nuremberg Party Rallies: 1923-39 
(New York, 1967), pp. 79-90. 
decreed the introduction of political indoctrination for the soldiers, 
the voluntary nature of religious affiliation and instruction (both had 
been obligatory), the banning of military trade with Jewish merchants, 
the dismissal of officers who were Freemasons (a special hate of Hit-
ler's), and the restructuring of post life into cells and blocks for 
the purpose of propagating Nazi ideology into home and family. 186 
Hitler's announcement of compulsary military service (and a cor-
responding budget increase) provided another impetus to his program 
of bringing the army under the influence of his ideology. The call 
to the colors summoned a mass of Gennans who believed in the Weltan-
schauung: adolescents from the Hitleriugend, transferred police of-
ficials, reactivated mercenaries from the Freikorps, and SA members 
--in short, Volksgenossen who rejected the position that the army 
snould remai.n an independent agency. In part, Blomberg and the mil-
itary leadership welcomed these conscripts because they felt the ar-
my was the right school in which to teach them the proper orienta-
tion: obedience, patriotism, loyalty, mastery of weapons, and the 
like; and in part because the added money gave them sufficient re-
sources to develop their technical ideas. But some thought the 
Fuehrer was forcing the pace; as General Fritsch, the Army Command-
er-in-Chi.ef said, Hitler was "overdoing everything, rushing every-
thing far too much. 111137 And even Blomberg worried about the ob-
jections of Germany's neighbors--France, Britain, Italy, and the 
353. 
186These steps are listed in O'Neill, pp. 62-83. 
187Fritsch is quoted in Fest, Face of the Third Reich, p. 
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others--to the reintroduction of the draft.188 Making soldiers out of 
civilians and developing weapons like the panzer and the 88 mm. anti-
aircraft gun were commendable undertakings, and perhaps even regaining 
the territories lost in the Great War was within the realm of the pos-
sible. But the increases in the army--from one-hundred thousand in 
1933 to three-hundred thousand in 1934 to almost one-million in 1935189 
--these were increments which made even Blomberg lose some of his en-
thusiasm, and caused officers like Erich von Manstein to wonder "where 
all of this would lead."l90 
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What the generals should have realized was that from Hitler's per-
spective, an officer corps that approved of Wehrhoheit (reannament) but 
not of war was bound to appear contradictory. For the Fuehrer's Weltan-
schauung contained foreign policy objectives: one was short-range and 
tactical; the other long-range and strategic. The minimal objectives 
might be achieved without fighting and included the annexation of Aus-
tria and the incorporation within the Reich of all German speaking peo-
ples: 
German Austria must return to the great German mother country. 
One blood demands one Reich •••• Only when the borders of 
the Reich include every last German, and the ability to insure 
his food supply no longer exists, will there arise ••• the 
right to acquire foreign soil and foreign territory.19l 
188Hossbach, pp. 95-96. 
189Army increases are given in Ibid., p. 125. Rossbach also notes 
that in the same period, the number of general officers jumped from 44 to 
275. 
l90Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, trans., Anthony G. Powell 
(London, 1958), p. 23. 
l91Mein Kampf, p. 1. 
The maximum objectives envisioned the acquisition of Lebensraum, or liv-
ing space, to guarantee Germany's place in the sun: 
To secure for the German people the land and soil to which they 
are entitled on this earth ••• is the only action which before 
God and our German posterity, would seem to justify an invest-
ment in blood •••• If we speak of soil ••• we can primarily 
have in mind only Russia and her vassal border states.192 
This was the "exaltation" of what Alan Bullock calls the 11Machtstaat, 
the Power State 11193--a Grossdeutscher Reich stretching from Middle Europe 
to the Ural Mountins, in which the Germans were to be the Herrenvolk, or 
master race, while the Slavs-the Poles, Russians, Czechs, and all the 
rest were to be the Untermenschen, or subhumans, who had no right to live 
except as some or them might be needed to toil in the factories or fields 
as helots for their German masters. It was for this dream that Hitler 
had placed the metals of the state into the hands of his officers and 
he expected them to mould it into an axe of war and blood it in combat. 
In discussing the response of the officers to the Fuehrer's plans 
for conquest, it is difficult to generalize. For despite the historical. 
judgments passed against him,194it is not quite accurate to speak of 
the German officer as though there was a stereotype any more than it is 
to talk about the officer corps as though it had existed as a single 
entity. Bruce Catton 1s description of the amount of stress which 
192Mein Kampf, pp. 652-654. 
l93Bullock, p. 269. 
194Typical in this respect is Barbara Tuchman, whose otherwise 
excellent book on the first month of World War I is marred by its di-
vision of all German officers into two groups, 11the bullnecked and the 
wasp-waisted," both of which were "militaristic" in the worst sense of 
that term. Barbara Tuchman, The Guns Of August (New York, 1963), pp. 
33-44. 
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soldiers can bear in combat seems appropriate here. There were some, he 
writes, "the skulkers and the unabashed cowards who always ran in ever:y 
battle at the first chance they could get"; there were others who fled 
later, "men who could stand some things but not everything"; and there 
were still others, "men who had stood fast in all previous fights but 
found this one too terrible to be borne"; until at last, the thin bat-
tle lines held only the "stout-hearted," the long-dying men, who "fought 
themselves out beyond the limits of endurance. 11195 
Similarly, the army officers held differing points of view on Hit-
ler's ideology of Drang nach Osten and the implications it contained. 
For some, like Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl, the Fuehrer was the 
"greatest genius that Germany ever had 11 and it was up to the army to 
"seek to reconcile its elf with this new force of the age. 11196 For 
others, like Ludwig Beck, the idea of an agressive war against even 
one nation, to say nothing of the whole Slavic world, was ethically 
reprehensible. Thus, in 1935, when he was directed to prepare an 
operational plan of attack against Czechoslovakia, Beck did so but 
added in a preface that he considered it to be purely hypothetical 
and if Hitler ever felt impelled to put it into effect, he would be 
forced to tender his resignation.197 Finally, there was that large 
195Bruce Catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army (New York, 1961), p. 275. 
196Jodl is quoted in Goerlitz, p. 294. 
197The preface read: "After thorough consideration, I hold it 
to be my duty to declare this very day that if the memorandum ••• is 
not solely concerned "~th the purpose of operational studies, but is 
aimed at the practical introduction of preparations for war, then I 
must express the most dutiful request to be removed from my position 
• • • because I do not feel myself fitted for this latter task. 11 Beck 
is quoted in O'Neill, p. 120. 
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middle group of officers who conceived of themselves as technicians and 
who, in the Reich of the mid-thirties, were able to concentrate on their 
specialties--craining, tactics, tanks, and the like, to the exclusion of 
where these specialties might lead. For this group, Dietrich von Chol-
titz's statement, written in retrospect, that the "majority of the of-
ficers were grateful to Hitler for entrusting to them the purely ob-
jective tasks of the service, 11198may be taken as representative. 
The difficulty, of course, not only for men of high resolve like 
Beck, but also for these "techn::!.cians" was the Fuehrer's determination 
to tolerate non-believers in the army only as long as he had to depend 
upon them to fashion and arm an effective instrument of war. Identifi-
cation with the Volksg~einschaft did not mean that one was free to fol-
low an autonomous course of action, 199to pick and choose between thee-
vils and attractions of the "New Order, 11 to support the rebuilding of 
military strength while opposing plans for its use. Thus, the cooper-
ative years in which the wilitary and political leadership of the Third 
Reich had little cause for complaints were gradually replaced by dis-
agreements and tensions. 
In one sense, the quarrel was a matter of outlook. Austrian rev-
olutionary and dreamer confronted the ethos of the German military es-
tablishment and neither particularly like the view. 200 For Hitler, 
198nietrich von Choltitz, Soldat unter Soldaten (Zurich, 1951), 
p. 63. 
199This is a characteristic of hierarchies. Burke writes: "Any 
specialized activity participates in a larger unit of action. 'Identi-
fication' is a word for the autonomous activities place in this wider 
context. 11 Rhetoric, p. 27. 
2.00An excellent exposition of the Gem.an military ethic can be 
found in Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (London, 1957), 
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"reason and knowledge ••• considerations of time and space, and the care-
ful calculation of the strength of one's own forces in relation to the 
enemy's" were as nothing compared to "mystical speculation ••• the un-
bending will to victory, and the relentless pursuit of the goa1.n20l 
Then there was the negative reaction of some of the leading generals to 
what was going on behind the scenes in the Third Reich. Fritsch, for 
instance, had a strong religious orientation which led him to fight a-
gainst National Socialist incursions in military religious matters, 202 
and even Blomberg, when he was pressured by Hjalmar Schacht, went to 
see esp., Chapter Three, "The Military Mind," and Chapter Five, 11Ger-
many and Japan: Civil-Military Relations in Practice.n Philosophi-
cally, the ethic emphasizes conservative realism--the view of man as 
evil, the need for order in society, the continuity and value of his-
tory, and the dependency of state security on strong military forces, 
without however, undertaking bellicose or adventurous policies. In-
strumentally, tte ethic holds that the milita:rr-1 autcnomous in meth-
ods but subordinate in ends to the state's civilian authority, with 
the soldier a partner to the statesman, albeit a junior one, vdth 
responsibility for advice. For our purposes, the ethic is important 
because it suggests an extension to Griffin's formulation. Briefly, 
men do not come to a hierarchy without a past. To the extent that 
the new order mirrors their orientations, their "terministic screens," 
they will accept the mystery, strive to keep the secret, preserve the 
hierarchy. Domestically, the visible Third Reich represented many of 
the proper orientations to the soldiers and the conservative upper-
class whose philosophic pieties or schemata of orientations were 
quite similar. Thus, it was only uhen Hitler began to insist on 
implementing his foreign policy--his hidden vision--that doubts be-
gan to creep in. Subsequent chapters will show how these orienta-
tions also served as "trained incapacities ••• whereby one's very 
abilities can function as blindnesses." For a discussion on orien-
tation, see Burke, Permanence And Change, pp. 5-18. 
201This is the verdict of General Dittmar, made after the war 
to B. H. Liddell Hart; The German Generals Talk (New York, 1948), Pn 
44. 
202Harold Deutsch, who notes several examples of Fritsch's de-
fense of religion in the military, describes the Army Commander's at-
titude as one of "undemonstrative piety. 11 Harold Deutsch, Hitler and 
His Generals (Minneapolis, 1974), p. 40. 
Berchtesgaden to plead with Hitler for better treatment of the Jews.203 
And there was the growing competition between the anny and the SS--com-
petition which the Fuehrer with his policy of fostering rival authori-
ties could only have approved-as Himmler attempted to undennine the 
independence of the military, in part on grounds of ideology and in 
part because the soldiers represented a rival agency. 204 
On the question of long-term goals, it should be noted that Hit-
ler had made several straightforward attempts to make ardent followers 
out of his generals and to get them to share his mythopoeic Weltan-
schauung. As early as February 1933, and again a year later, he had 
tried to tell them about his dreams of a millenium--of the conquest 
of new living space in the East and its relentless Gennanization. 
But his speeches had failed to evoke the enthusiasm necessary for 
the foundation of a vigorous partnership dedicated to the achieve-
~ent of Lebensraum. Some of the officers had not understood, 205 
some had not taken his warlike prophecies seriously, 206and even the 
most zealous of them, War Minister Blomberg, had panicked when Hitler 
ordered the military reoccupation of the Rhineland, demanding that 
203neutsch, p. 40. 
204 Hahne notes some of the signs of rivalry between the SS and 
the army: brawls between members of the Verfugungstruppe and Wehm,acht, 
slanderous gossip in SS messes against high ranking generals, and in-
cidents between the amy and SS when sharing ~anoeuvre areas. Hahne, 
p. 447. 
205Beck, for example, became lost in the first hour of general 
preamble and never did grasp the point of the speech. O'Neill, p. 126. 
206rn his memoirs, General Maximillian Weichs writes that while 
Hitler did indeed "set forth his complete foreign policy programme ••• 
one did not take at face value these warlike prophecies. 11 Quoted in 
Ibid., p. 127. 
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the troops be withdrawn because he feared the French. 207 
The Fuehrer thereupon resolved to try once more. On November 5, 
1937, he assembled a group of military and political leaders including 
War Minister Blomberg, the heads of the three armed services, Fritsch, 
Goering, and Admiral Raeder, and the Foreign Affairs Minister, Konstan-
tin von Neurath. Uninvited, though also present was Hitler's army ad-
jutant, Colonel Friedrich Hossbach, whose notes on the meeting led to 
the assignment of his name to one of the most important councils ever 
held in Germany. 208 
The conference was held in the Reich Chancellery. There, in his 
study, sitting behind a desk whose inlay, appropriately enough, rep-
resented a sword half drawn from its sheath, 209Hitler spoke again of 
his vision. "The only, perhaps dreal!llike solution as it appears to 
us, lies in winning a greater arr.aunt of living space, an endeavor 
which at all times has been the cause of the building of states and 
the movements of peoples. 11 And he proceeded ·to translate this vi-
sion into terms which even a technician could understand, develop-
ing his fundamental position on the place Germany should occupy in 
the world and the requirements this would entail. 
The dictator used economic difficulties as the rationale for 
207Hossbach, p. 98. 
208 Hossbach's memorandum, prepared from the notes he made, ap-
62. 
pears in his book, pp. 207-220. The best English text is in Documents 
on German Foreign Policy, 10 Vols., (Washington, D. C., 1949-1966), i, 
pp. 29-33. Hereafter cited as DGFP. The narrative above has been taken 
from Hossbach's book and will not be cited hereafter. 
209speer writes that Hitler was especially pleased with the inlay 
because when people sitting in front of him saw it, "they'll shiver and 
shake." Speer, p. 164. 
conquest. Gennany was not self-sufficient in foodstuffs. Thus, there 
was no choice but to enlarge greatly the living space currently avail-
able. Unoccupied land did not exist which meant that it would be nec-
essary to crush the resist,ance of those presently holding it, the only 
real questions being the most advantageous time and place. Then, as 
Hossbach's account shows, the Fuehrer presented his listeners with 
three alternatives. The first was to delay for several years, until 
all preparat'ions were complete, down to the last gaiter button. But 
that would mean a full scale war since the other nations of Europe, 
particularly France and Britain, would catch up to Germany in arma-
ments, thereby blocking her path to conquest. The second and third 
choices, both of which Hitler favored, involved striking soon, either 
against Austria or against Austria and Czechoslovakia at the same time. 
France was weak, embroiled in internal political complications. Brit-
ain too was unprepared and had quietly written off Austria and Czecho-
slovakia. Poland and Russia were bound to move slowly and, if Germany 
acted with great speed, they would be presented with a fait accompli. 
Thus, the time to gain a foothold in the East--the first step to em-
pire--was now. 
When he finished, Hitler allowed his listeners to respond, and 
they did so, Goering defending the dream and its most radical appli-
cations, while Blomberg and Fritsch attacked them. Hossbach recorded 
his impression of the exchange, and his description is significant, 
not only because it reveals the attitudes of those who spoke but also 
of him who did not speak. 
The discussion took a very sharp fonn at times, above all the 
differences between Blomberg and Fritsch on the one hand and 
Goering on the other •••• Hitler participated mainly as an 
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attentive observer ••• but I do remember that the sharpness of 
the opposition, both in content and form did not fail to make 
its impression on Hitler, as I could see from his changing ex-
pressions. Every detail of the conduct of Blomberg and Fritsch 
must have made it plain to Hitler that his policies had met with 
only plain impersonal contradictions, instead of applause and 
agreement. And he knew very well that both generals were op-
posed to any warlike entanglements provoked from our side. 
From the moment they opposed his Weltanschauung, the days of the two 
officers were numbered. Although Hitler did not dismiss them then and 
there (a habit he acquired later), he must surely have decided that they 
were not made of the stuff which he required for his dreams of conquest. 
With his uncanny "finger-tip" feeling, 210he would wait to seize the prop-
er moment and replace them with men who, if they were not more ardent in 
their expression of his ideology, were more compliant to his will. That 
moment came at the end of January 1938, when Blomberg's misalliance of a 
marriage provided Hitler with the opportunity not only to rid himself of 
his War Minister, but his Army Chief and sixteen other high-ra..11..~ing gen-
erals whose views did not accord with his own. With this stroke, Hitler 
probably believed that he had finally eliminated the last agency power 
base capable of overthrowing his regime. What he could not realize was 
that he had also created a rift in his social order; that some of the 
officers were turning at last "from acceptance to rejection of the 'mys-
tery, 111 ceasing to "identify with the hierarchy, the prevailing system 
of authority,n211and that this impiety was to become the starting point 
210Perhaps the best description of Hitler's nnngerspitzengeful," 
or "sixth-sense," was his own statement to Rauschning: 11 Unless I have 
the inner, incorruptible conviction ••• I do nothing •••• I will not 
act; I will wait, no matter what happens. But if the voice speaks, then 
I know the time has come to act. 11 Rauschning, p. 181. 
211.criffin, p. 460. 
for the first of the attempts to overthrow his dictatorship--the subject 
of Act One of the Gennan Resistance Movement. 
CHAPTER II 
ACT ONE: OBERKOMMANDO DES HEERES AND THE FIRST ATTEMPT: 1938 
"Movements begin when some pivotal individual or grom>-suffering at-
titudes of alienation in a given social system •• • Ltroi/ the impious 
dream of a mythic Order--enacts, gives voice to, a No. 11 Leland Griffin 
It may be idle to inquire, as Hans Rothfels writes, "about what mo-
ment active political resistance to Hitler in fact began., 11lsince in many 
respects opposition to National Socialism developed long before the Mach-
tubernahme or seizure of power. Thus, students like Fabian van Schlab-
rendorff were arguing with Nazi speakers at mass meetings as early as 
1928.,2socialists like Carlo Mierendorff were working to make the Weimar 
system more responsive to the needs of the people,3and conservatives 
like Ewald von Kleist were penning broadsides warning against the evils 
of Hitler's ideology.4 
However, we can inquire into when these overt activities largely 
ceased. That was after the Machtubernahme. The imprisonment or exile 
1Hans Rothfels, The German Opposition To Hitler, trans., Lawrence 
Wilson (Chicago, 1962), p. 45. 
2Fabian von Schlabrendorff, They Almost Killed Hitler (New York, 
1947), p. 8. 
~erendorff 1s governmental activities are recounted in Ger van 
Roon, German Resistance To Hitler, trans., Peter Ludlow (London, 1971), 
pp. 88-89. 
4The full text of Kleist•s essay, 11Der Nationalsocialismus eine 
Gefahr," is in Fabian von Schlabrendorff, The Secret War Against Hitler., 
trans., Hilda Simon (New York, 1965), Appendix II. 
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of the leaders of the political left, the satisfaction or agreement of 
the leaders of the political right, the conformity of the majority, the 
effects of Gleichschaltung~ and the rise of the police state, combined 
to limit negative responses to minor infractipns,5fragmented and often 
ineffective underground cell work,6and personal acts of opposition, 
most of which were either so innocuous as to be unapparent to the re-
gime,7or visible enough to be ferreted out quickly and destroyed by 
the Gestapo.8 
Opposition in such forms was ineffective because it lacked what 
Gisevius called an Archemedian point9--a fulcrum for action or a pow-
er base within the state from which to mount a serious threat to the 
Nazi Government. We have already witnessed the elimination of nearly 
all such possible agencies through the regime's policy of "coordinating" 
institutions into a hierarchy reflecting Hitler's ideology. And we have 
5Telling anti-Nazi jokes is an example, especially since they con-
tained little hostility toward the regime; thus, when Hitler justified 
the murder of Ernst Roehm on grounds of his homosexuality, jokesters in-
quired: "What will he do when he finally discovers Goebbels' club foot?" 
6aeferring to communist and socialist underground activity, Ga-
briel Almond and Wolfgang Krause note that the "effect of Gestapo ter-
ror was to atomize the organizations. Liaison became difficult if not 
impossible." The Struggle For Democracy In Germany, ed., Gabriel A. 
Almond (Chapel Hill, 1949), p. 69. 
7Ruth Andreas-Friedrich recalls chalking up anti-Nazi slogans in 
obscure locations. Ruth Andreas-Friedrich, Berlin Undergroung, trans., 
Barrows Mussey (New York, 1947), p. 137. 
8Karl Bracher mentions "Neu Beginnen" as an example of a group 
which tried to create an underground popular front and was discovered 
and destroyed by the Gestapo. Karl Bracher, The German Dictatorship, 
trans., Jean Steinberg (New York, 1970), p. 137. 
9Gisevius is quoted in Ulrich von Hassell, The Von Hassell Dia-
ries (Westport, 1971), p. er,. 
seen how only one or two agencies--notably, the churches and the army-
managed to preserve their identity in the face of this policy. 
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For purposes of this study, the institutional activities of the 
churches, Lutheran and Catholic, will be dismissed from further con-
sideration as agencies of opposition.10 The reasons for doing so are 
three-fold. First, as Karl Bracher writes, "only rarely did [the Cath-
olic Church7 go over from the defense of its own concerns and interests 
to political resistance, 11 lland this seems more like the maintenance of 
the status quo than it does an agency proclaiming that "true communion, 
justice, salvation cannot be achieved unless there is an immediate cor-
rective applied to the established order. 1112 Similarly, the Evangelical 
Church was reduced to the defensive, for despite Martin Niemoeller•s 
"Confessing Church," established to counteract the Nazi's "German Chris-
tians" (a sect which sought to unite Christianity with Aryan doctrines 
of race), the fact is that the Lutherans too "were concerned solely with 
the preservation of autonomy and the freedom to teach. 1113 Second, both 
churches had a long tradition of rendering to Caesar the coin of the 
lOThis in spite of Mother Mary Alice Gallin who asserts that "the 
churches--both Catholic and Protesiant- 1resisted 111 while conceding that 
"there were repeated admonitions [by church leaderi/ to avoid violence." 
Mother Mary Alice Gallin, German Resistance To Hitler (Washington, D. c., 
1961), see esp., "The Church and Political Resistance," pp. 203-229. As 
this study will show, successful resistance; that is, resistance aimed at 
eliminating the Nazi regime, had to employ the necessary instruments of 
violence to achieve this goal. 
11 Bracher, pp. 371-372. 
12aobert S. Cathcart, 11 New Approaches to the Study of Movements: 
Defining Movements Rhetorically," Western Speech, XXXVI (Spring, 1972), 
87. 
13 Bracher, p. 381. 
realm. Thus, Martin Luther: 11lt is in no wise proper for anyone who 
would be a Christian to set himself up against his government, whether 
it acts justly or unjustly. 1114 And while t.he Catholics had more of a 
rebellious heritage, it was only a difference in degree, not in kind. 
Thus, Father Antony Koch in one of the best known texts on moral the-
ology: 
To employ illegal means is tantamount to sedition. No matter 
what the provocation, revolution against a legitimate govern-
ment is forbidden, because revolution by its very concept is 
an attack upon actually existing and divinely sanctioned rights. 
Pius IX solemnly condemned the proposition that "It is pennit-
ted to withhold obedience from legitimate rulers, nay even to 
rebel against them. 1115 
Third, there is the question of how closely these doctrines were fol-
lowed. And here, a scene drawn from the files of the Gestapo may help 
to illustrate the churches retreat from political resistance. Prior 
to the attempt of July 20, 1944, Major Ludwig von Leonrod, who was 
designated to be the resister's liaison officer to the Munich Army 
District, discussed the question of political disobedience with his 
confessor, Chaplain Hermann Wehrle. Although the priest agreed that 
it would not be a sin to keep the plot secret, he nevertheless warned 
Leonrod not to take an active part in it,16a theological distinction 
that escaped the judges of the "People's Court, 11 since they duly con-
demned both men to death. 
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141uther is quoted in Preserved Smith, The Age of the Reformation 
(New York, 1920), pp. 594-595. 
15Antony Koch, A Handbook of Moral Theology. ed., and trans., Ar-
thur Preuss, 5 Vols., {St. Louis, 1918-1921), i, p. 168. 
16spiegelbild einer Verschworung. ed., Karl Peter (Stuttgart, 1961), 
pp. 262; 288; 321. 
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In thus eliminating the churches as agencies of opposition, there 
is no intention to deny the importance of men like Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 
Father Alfred Delp, Pastor Eugen Gerstenmaier, and a number 0£ other 
clerics who joined the ranks of the anti-Nazis. Rather, it is to sug-
gest that their presence in the resistance movement, like that of so-
cialists such as Wilhelm Leuschner and Julius Leber, conservatives like 
Carl Goerdeler and Hjalmar Schacht, nobles like Hell!l.uth von Moltke and 
Yorck von Wartenburg, and police officials like Hans Gisevius and Arthur 
Nebe, can be ascribed to individual decisions, based partly- on ethical 
considerations and partly on political detenninat.ion to overthrow Hitler's 
dictatorship. 
So we come at length to the army-, the only agency- within the state 
that possessed the necessary strength to break the power of the Gestapo 
and topple the regime.17 And while its freedom too had been weakened-
the influx of conscripts having transformed it into a "blunt sword" as 
17While there is no mention in Griffin's fo:nnulation or an agency 
in the existing order serving as an instrument for the incipient move-
ment to use in replacing the old (and in Cathcart's definition, status 
quo agencies are expressly denied such a role), Griffin himself, in ap-
plying his construct to the 11 New Left 11 Movement, makes specific refer-
ences to "groups of long lineage" like the American Friends Service, 
the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the War Resisters League, which 
the radicals employed in attempting to change the political system. 
Leland M. Griffin, 11The Rhetorical Structure o:f the 'New Left' Move-
ment," Quarterly Journal of Speech, L (April, 1964), 113-134. Also, 
if the opposition's use of the army constitutes a change in the form-
ulation, the point should be made that the scene o:f Nazi Germany nec-
essitated such use, and the hope expressed that conditions sometimes 
alter categories. Finally, it might be added that even at this earl.7 
date, resistance plans were developed to where they included a military 
takeover only as a transitional phase. Gerhard Ritter cites General 
Halder as saying that he and Witzleben, two of' the maj,or military fig-
ures in the climactic stage of this act, "had pledged themselves to 
resign immediately after the putsch." Gerhard Ritter, The German Re-
sistance, trans., R. T. Clark (New York, 1958), p. lOJfn. 
General von Leeb wrote,18and the oath and other indoctrinary measures 
having brought it closer to Hitler's ideology--it still possessed suf-
ficient independence to have successfully resisted two major efforts 
by Himmler (who fancied himself the party theorist) to further per-
meate its ranks with Nazi dogma, once when it rejected a campaign to 
deprive chaplains of their military status,19and again when it re-
fused to form a "National Socialist Soldiers' Ring" which officers 
and men would join upon discharge and where they presumably would 
become imbued with the proper spirit.20 Moreover, the army still 
provided a form of sanctuary for those who wanted to escape the more 
pervasive Nazi influences in civilian life as well as the continual 
threat of the Gestapo-a kind of "inner emigration 11 as it was called, 
because within the army Hitler continued to prevent some kinds of SS 
interference, and thus the writ and dossier of the Gestapo literally 
stopped at the front door of the War Ministry, a fact which will be-
come increasingly important as the discussion turns to the resistance 
center located in the Abwehr or Army Intelligence Service. Finally, 
there was the officer corps itself, 11verwassert, 11 or "watered down," 
as General von Schweppenburg put it,2lsince expansion had led to the 
lesser levels of command becoming increasingly Nazified, and even the 
18Leeb is quoted in Richard Grunberger, The 12-Year Reich (New 
York, 1971), p. 139. 
19Alan Clark, Barbarossa (New York, 1966), p. 41. 
20John Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis Of Power (New York, 1964), 
p. 357. 
21aeyr von Schweppenburg, The Critical Years (London, 1952), p. 
202. 
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higher levels were becoming gradually infiltrated with party officers 
like Reichenau and Busch and opportunists like Keitel and Jodl. 
Yet, despite these incursions, the General Starr still possessed 
a high degree or social cohesiveness, a considerable amount of pres-
tige with the Burgertum, and something no other potential resistance 
group could boast--weapons, and the opportunity to use them it the 
need arose. The difficulty, of course, was that most of the officers 
had not yet perceived any need, either for an obstacle to Hitler's 
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plans or conquest, or for an institutional power base t~ overthrow the 
regime. Certainly, some shift in attitude had occurred within the high 
command after the clarity of Hitler's exposition at the November confer-
ence,22but it would take an even greater shock--say, an attack upon their 
agency--for more of the generals to realize that the Fuehrer intended to 
fully "coordinate" them into his "New Order" with all that that implied. 
As noted at the close of the last chapter, that shock came in the form 
of the Blomberg-Fritsch crisis, the opening scene of this act. 
The affair began in early January 1938 when War Minister Blomberg, 
a widower, "married a child of the common people, 11 as Gisevius delicately 
puts it.23 others, less delicate, called the new!!:!!! Feldmarschall a 
22General Fritsch in particular exhibited a strong negative at-
titude toward the Fuehrer 1s dreams of conquest. After meeting with 
Neurath and Beck, it was agreed that Fritsch would speak personally 
to Hitler in order to impress the military impossibilities of his 
plans upon him, while Neurath was to seek a later meeting ~o pre-
sent objections based upon foreign policy considerations. Fritsch 
met with Hitler on November 9. Unfortunately, no record of their 
conversation has survived, but the force of the Army Chief's argu-
ments can be judged by Hitler's refusal to see Neurath for another 
two months. 
23Hans Gisevius, To The Bitter End, trans., Richard and Clara 
Winston (Boston, 1947), p. 219. 
?J. 
11whore, 1124and in fa.ct, Erna Blomberg,~ Gruhn, had a police record of 
soliciting and posing for pornographic pictures that were obscene enough 
to sell brisk:i.y. In any event, when her dossier reached Hitle·r, he de-
cided that Blomberg would have to go, and the issue or his successor a-
rose. The obvious choice would have been General Fritsch, the Army Com-
mander-in-Chief, whose post had supplied all German and Prussian War 
Ministers in the past. But at this point, intrigue, in the som.ewhat 
unlikely shape of Goering and the more sinister figure of Himm1er, 
entered the scene. An old collection of documents, purporting to 
incriminate Fritsch for homosexuality, was resurrected from Gestapo 
files and placed before the Fuehrer. The fact that the same dossier 
had been presented to Hitler two years earlier, and that he had re-
jected it then, ordering the documents to be destroyed and the case 
closea, 25provides almost inescapable proof that his acceptance ot 
them on this occasion was motivated less by his fear that Fritseh 
was a little strange than by his hope that the accusations woµJ..d 
provide him an opportunity to rid himself of a man who was becoming 
a stumbling block and to undercut the army as a semi-autonomous pow-
er factor. 
This is in fact what happened. Goering, who had ambitions ot 
becoming War Minister himself, and Himmler, who had ambitions of 
making the army ideologically sound, combined forces to discredit 
24Hossbach refers to telephone calls to the War Ministry from 
members of the world's oldest profession who were celebrating the so-
cial rise of their sister. Friedrich Hossbach, Zwischen Wehnna.,cht 
und Hitler (Hanover, 1949), p. 106. 
25Gisevius recounts this earlier episode; pp. 227-228. 
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the Army Chief sufficiently to enable Hitler to exploit the situation and 
suspend Fritsch from duty.26 Even worse, on the day of his leave-taking, 
Blomberg, whose misery needed company, made no effort to defend Fritsch 
against Hitler's accusations of perversion, and in fact supported them 
by agreeing that the Arnry Chief, who was a middle-aged bachelor, might 
indeed be homosexuai. 27 With Fritsch 1 s candidacy thus dismissed, Blom-
berg suggested Goering for War Minister, and when the Fuehrer turned 
down that nomination on grounds of Goering's idleness, Blomberg then 
recommended that Hitler take the post himselr28 __ a solution that must 
have struck the Fuehrer as fortuitous since it gave him the opportunity 
to become actual as well as legal commander of the armed forces by a-
bolishing the War Ministry and establishing in its place a Supreme Com-
mand of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), with himself as 
its head and fuhrertreu men like Keitel and Jodl as its Chief of Staff 
and Director of Operations.29 Also, Hitler took the opportunity to rid 
26The French Ambassador, Andre Francois-Poncet, who was an as-
tute observer of the Nazi leaders, writes that "Hitler never lost his 
gift of profiting by circumstances. 11 Andre Francois-Poncet, The Fate-
ful Years, trans., Jacques Le Clercq (New York, 1949), p. 152. 
27Thus Hitler to Hossbach; p. 114. 
280tto John quotes Field Marshal Rundstedt on the conversation 
between Hitler and Blomberg. Twice Through The Lines, trans., Richard 
Barry (London, 1972), p. 29. 
29From henceforth L;an the decreJ I exercise personally the im-
mediate command over the whole armed forces. The former Wehrmacht of-
fice of the War Ministry becomes the High Command of the Armed Forces 
and comes immediately under my command as my military staff. At the 
head of the staff Qf the_High Command stands the former chief of the 
Wehrmacht office LKeitel/. He is accorded the rank equivalent to that 
of Reich Minister. The High Command of the Armed Forces also takes 
over the functions of the War Ministry, and the Chief of the High Com-
mand exercises, as my deputy, ~he powers hitherto held by the Reich 
War Minister." Quoted in Wheeler-Bennett, p. 372. 
himself of sixteen additional high ranking generals who were retired, 
and forty-four other senior officers who were sent to lesser commands 
--men who in almost every instance had supported Fritsch in his op-
position to the Fuehrer•s war-making proposals.JO Further, as a re-
sult of Neurath's objections to the November tour de horizon--objec-
tions which the Foreign Minister had raised on January 14 when he fi-
nally had obtained an interview with Hitler31--the Fuehrer also de-
cide~ to retire his Foreign Minister (replacing him with Ribbentrop), 
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as well as several inconvenient ambassadors who had opposed his dip-
lomatic maneuverings as he attempted to construct an alliance system 
preparatory to war.32 And for good measure, Hitler dismissed Hjalmar 
Schacht, his Minister of Economics, who had been bombarding him with 
memoranda complaining about the regime's treatment of the Jews and the 
churches, and about the financial cost to the country as more and more 
resources were being diverted into rearmament programs.33 Finally, Hit-
ler replaced Fritsch as Commander of the Army with General Walther von 
Brauchitsch, an officer who was not a particular advocate of Nazi id-
eology, but whose impending divorce was being eased by a financial 
30Telford Taylor argues that the wholesale dismissal was an at-
tempt to remove "outspokenly anti-Nazi officers" as well as a "desire 
to 'loosen up' the top of the ladder and make possible the promotion 
of several generals with definite pro-Nazi sympathies." Telford Taylor, 
Sword and Swastika (New York, 1954), p. 170 
3lsee footnote 22, page?. 
32This is the conclusion of Herbert von Dirksen, Ambassador to 
Japan, and one of the men effected. Herbert von Dirksen, Moscow Tokyo-
London (Norman, 1949), pp. 181-182. 
33Hjalmar Schacht, Account Settled, trans., Edward Fitzgibbon 
(London, 1949), pp. 87-88. 
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settlement provided by the Fuehrer,34and whose second wife, whom he mar-
ried a few months later, was described by Hassell as being "150 percent 
Nazi. 1135 
Fritsch's supporters (and they included military men and civilians, 
many of whom saw him as the ultimate guarantor of army intervention if 
Nazi abuses exceeded all limits),36were determined to resist the mach-
inations of Goering and Himmler. When they discovered that the docu-
ments incriminating Fritsch had been fabricated and that the major wit-
ness--an ex-convict named Schmidt--had been pressured by the Gestapo 
into perjuring himself (he had been "persuadedu to change the name or 
Frisch, an officer he had blackmailed for sexual peccadilos, to Fritsch), 
they assumed there was sufficient evidence to expose Goering and Him-
mler's intrigues and perhaps even Hitler's role in the frame-up.37 To 
Beck and through him to Brauchitsch, they pressed for action: a counter-
coup against the Gestapo, or Fritsch 1s immediate reinstatement, or at 
the least, a Court of Honor to clear the former Army Chief's name and 
unmask his false accusera.38 
They got the minimum. Fritsch himself could not perceive the 
larger implications of an attack in which he was only the immediate 
34Milton Shulman quotes a Canadian Army intelligence report on 
Hitler's financial help to Brauchitsch. Milton Shulman, Defeat in the 
West (New York, 1948), p. 10. 
35Hassell, p. 228. 
J6John makes this point concerning a number or anti-Nazis; p. 26. 
37Evidence of Hans Gisevius before the International Military 
Tribunal, April 25, 1946. Trial of the Major War Criminals, 42 Vols., 
(Nuremberg, 1947), xii, p. 203. Hereafter abbreviated as .. 
J8Gisevius mentions all these possibilities; pp. 248-254. 
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and observable target.39 Rundstedt, the anny's senior officer, was con-
tlnced that the military could take care of its own affaira.40 Brauch-
itsch, the new Army Commander, favored the judicial approach as the best 
guarantee that Fritsch would not be railroaded on trumped-up charges.41 
And even Beck was opposed to "mutiny," preferring to believe that Na-
tional Socialism still had "possibilities of development. 1142 
With understandably great reluctance, the Fuehrer agreed to a mil-
itary court martial, although he insisted that it be held in camera to 
avoid offending public sensibilities. Also, he exercised his right to 
appoint judges, choosing Brauchitsch, Admiral Raeder, two magistrates 
from the federal supreme court, and as presiding judge, the highest 
ranking active officer in Germany-Field Marshal Hermann Goering.43 
Behind the scenes, Hitler tried to prejudice the court's investiga-
tions by instructing Franz Guertner, the Minister of Justice, as to 
"which end of the rope to pull. 1144 But most importantly, the Fuehrer 
39Hossbach relates Fritsch's incapacity in this regard; p. 141. 
40Gisevius writes that when Schacht visited Rundstedt in early 
February, he was told that the military leadership would know what to 
do if and when it chose to act; p. 238. 
41Beck's biographer states that Beck's "repeated use of his in-
fluence" with Bra.uchitsch contributed greatly to Hitler's giving up his 
resistance to a. military court martial. Wolfgang Foerster, Generaloberst 
Ludwig Beck (Munich, 1953), P• 91. 
42Beck is quoted by General Halder in Peter Bor, Gesprache mit 
Halder (Wiesbaden, 1950), p. 113. 
43Goering's elevation to Field Marshal was a consolation prize 
for not being named War Minister. 
44Guertner, who knew which end of the rope he preferred to pull, 
made his assistant, Hans von Dohnanyi, his representative in the case. 
Dohnanyi, who was Dietrich Bonhoeffer's brother-in-law and an ardent 
anti-Nazi, obtained the help of Dr. Karl Sack, the Army's Judge Ad-
vocate General, and with the assistance of other Fritsch supporters, 
decided to divert attention from this internal crisis to an external 
one. 
Admittedly, the annexation of Austria had always been one of Hit-
ler's aims, as he himself stated in Mein Kampf, and more recently in 
the secret conclave of November 1937. But there are indications that 
he accelerated the pace of events so that the Austrian situation could 
serve as an escape from the ever-increasing dangers of the proceedings 
against Fritsch. The first evidence of this came on January 31 when 
Jodl noted in his diary: "Fuhrer wants to divert the spotlight from 
the Wehrmacht. Keep Europe gasping and by replacements in various 
posts not awaken the impression or weakness but or a concentration 
of forces. Schuschnigg /J,he Austrian Chancello,r7 should not gain 
courage but tremble. 1145 The next evidence comes from Papen, one or 
the just dismissed ambassadors, who reported to Hitler at Berchtes-
gaden on February 5. Papen had been working in Vienna to improve re-
lations between the two countries, to which end he had repeatedly 
sugges~ed that Hitler meet with Schuschnigg in an attempt to resolve 
their differences. As his last official act, Papen made the recom-
mendation once more. The Fuehrer, who until then had acted dis-
traught and weary, suddenly became enthusiastic. "That is an ex-
cellent idea," he said, "please go back to Vienna and arrange for 
made available to the Army Chief's lawyers much evidence helpful to 
their case. Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, trans., Eric 
Mosbacher, et. al. (New York, 1970), pp. 531-532. 
45Jodl's diary for the period January 4, 1937 to August 25, 
1939, appears in Nazi Conspiracy And Aggression, 10 Vols., (Washing-
ton, D. c., 1946), iv, pp. 345-390. Hereafter abbreviated as !QA. 
This particular entry can be found on page 369. 
( 
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us to meet within the next few days. 1146 
There is no need to recount the details of the well-known story 
of Schuschnigg's trip to Berchtesgaden--of Hitler's tirades about Aus-
trian provocations, or his threats of immediate German military inter-
vention.47 Suffice to say that the Fuehrer forced the Austrian Chan-
cellor into a position from which he saw no escape short of his fatal 
announcement of a plebiscite which Hitler was then able to use as an 
excuse to march. And that brings us to the final pieces of evidence 
--Goering's interventions, if such they can be called, first to push 
the indecisive Hitler forward when he hesitated in issuing the final 
orders,48and second to pressure the reluctant Nazis in Vienna to de-
mand a new govermnent and the dispatch of Gennan troops to "prevent 
bloodshed. 1149 
Goering, perhaps.even more than Hitler, was in an exposed positiQn 
in the Fritsch affair, and while there is only circumstantial evidence 
linking him to the interplay between the crisis over the former Anny 
Chief's trial and the mounting pressures on Austria, it would be naive 
to discount his ability to understand that military action would at 
least furnish an excellent reason for interrupting the proceedings of 
46Franz von Papen, Memoirs, trans., Brian Connell (New York, 
1953), pp. 407-408. 
47Probably the most accurate account of,Schuschnigg's visit to 
Berchtesgaden is in his Austrian Requiem (New York, 1946), p. 12ft. 
48Jodl 1s diary refers to Goering's intervention on the evening 
of March 9-10; NCA, iv, p. 362. 
49The transcript of Goering's twenty-seven telephone calls to 
Vienna, recorded ironically enough by his own wiretaps, appear in 
Ibid., v, pp. 629-654. 
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the court, and at most, provide an entirely different climate for the 
trial if the attack against Austria was successful.50 Thus, the court 
had hardly assembled on the morning of March 11 when it was adjourned 
0 by Goering's dramatic announcement of a delay "for reasons touching on 
the interests of the Reich." 
Gennany resounded with triumph and the noise echoed through the 
military court when Fritsch's trial resumed on March 17. Vienna had 
capitulated, the Wehrmacht had achieved another bloodless victory, 
and Hitler's reputation, at least in German eyes, was enhanced im-
measurably. Plebiscites in the two countries registered ninety-nine 
percent approval of the annexation,51another Versailles restriction 
had been broken, and at least for the younger soldiers, who had never 
known the specter of the trenches in 1914-18, the act of war must have 
seemed like General F..lfeldt' s description to otto John: "It was a walk-
over.1152 
Reflecting the new mood, Goering could not have been more help-
ful in obtaining "justice" for Fritsch. He badgered the prosecution 
r 
witness unmercifully, extracting from him the admission that his ear-
lier accusation was a lie. And if he failed to press Gestapo offi-
cials as closely on the matter of the falsified documents, at least 
Fritsch himself was satisfied with Goering's assistance. As he said 
80 .. 
50This is the conclusion of Joachim Fest, Hitler, trans., Richard 
and Clara Winston (New York, 1973), pp. 546-547; and Harold Deutsch, Hit-
ler And His Generals (Minneapolis, 1974), pp. 341-343. 
382. 
51Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study In Tyranny (New York, 1953), p. 
52 John, p. 30. 
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to Rundstedt later, Goering 11had behaved very decently. 1153 The verdict, 
of course, was a foregone conclusion: "Proven not guilty as charged, and 
acquitted. 11 54 But it was meaningless as far as repairing the damage to 
the independence of the army, or securing Fritsch's reinstatement. The 
former Army Commander received a telegram from the Fuehrer congratulating 
him on the recovery or his health, but he was not returned to his post, 
Hitler rehabilitating him only to the extent of restoring his rank and 
later appointing him as honorary colonel to the artillery regiment in 
which he had first served as a lieutenant. Brauchitsch, when he was ap-
proached by some of Fritsch's supporters, complaining about the inadequacy 
of the results, replied that in the changed circumstances, he could no 
longer be responsible for further action.55 And Rundstedt, who agreed 
to deliver Fritsch's challenge to Himmler for a pistol duel, carried 
the note for s~mc time, and finally let the matter drop.56 
Surprise has been expressed in some quarters as to why the anny 
did not revolt at the time of the Blomberg-Fritsch crisis.57 As the 
fo1•egoing narrative shows, part of the reason must be attributed to 
Hitler's mastery of the scene. For one thing, there was his achieve-
ment in confining knowledge of the affairs to the smallest possible 
53Fritsch is quoted in Wheeler-Bennett, p. 378. 
54The court documents for the Fritsch case appear as Appendix 
IV in Schlabrendorff, Secret War Against Hitler. 
5~eeler-Bennett, p. 378. 
56John, pp. 28-29. 
57see for example, William L. Shirer, The Rise And Fall Of_The 
Third Reich (New York, 1960), p. 314ff; and Wheeler-Bennett, p. 378ff. 
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circle, as Gisevius discovered when he tried to recruit Genera1 von Kluge, 
the District Commander at Meunster, who was wholly unaware of what was tak-
ing place in Berlin.58 For another, there was Hitler's ability to mask his 
real design, as indicated by the fact that he made such sweeping changes in, 
so many state agencies, thus reducing Fritsch 1s dismissal and the further 
"coordination" of the army to one act among many.59 For a third, the com-
bination of scandals--Blomberg•s real one and Fritsch 1 s contrived one-
tended to confuse the issue even for those soldiers who had knowledge,60 
as did the fact that Fritsch was a life-long bachelor; thus, it is not dif-
ficult to imagine that some people, officers among them, were prepared to 
think the worst. For a fourth, the Fuehrer•s decision to aggravate the 
Austrian crisis demonstrated his capacity to seize opportunity on the 
wing, and his, and more importantly, Goering's determination to see the 
annexation through to a successful conclusion meant, as Alan Bullock ob-
serves, "the fulfil:bnent of a German dream older than the Treaty of Ver-
sailles.n6l Thus, Hitler's popularity, especially with soldiers who had 
just returned from what Manstein calls a 11Blumenkorso, 1162or "floral war," 
might have been ext~emely difficult to counteract, and a general start 
58Gisevius, pp. 205; 208; confirmation for this state of affairs 
can be found in Jodl's diary where he quotes General Viebahn, who had 
just come to Berlin from a post in the provinces, to the effect that 
if the troops there learned or what was going on, there would be a 
revolution; NCA, iv, p. 368. 
59This is Schacht 18 opinion; p. 112. 
60Guderian confirms this; Panzer Leader, trans., Constantine 
Fitzgibbon (New York, 1957), p. 30. 
6lBullock, P• 382. 
62Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, trans., Anthony Powell 
(London, 1958), p. 22. 
leading a revolt without troops is hardly a sign of a successful upris-
ing. 
Partly, however, Meinecke's verdict on military professionals pro-
vides part of the reason for the army's failure: 11 A full understanding 
of the totality of historical experience was lacking in these techni-
cians of war. Therefore they could commit fatal blunders in their es-
timation of such matters as lay beyond the grasp of technical-military 
comprehension. 1163 Again, the narrative has shown numerous examples of 
the officers' "trained incapacities." Blomberg's inability to recog-
nize what a disastrous thing he had done in recommending that Hitler 
become his own war Minister;64Fritsch 1s mistaken view that he and not 
the army was the target of Nazi intrigues; Brauchitsch 1s unwillingness 
to seek justice beyond the letter of the law; Rundstedt's insensitivity 
to what was at stake-these and other errors in judgment, many of which 
can be ascribed to military tradition, demonstrate the vulnerability of 
men who would have had to do violence to the thought patterns of a life-
time to compete successfully with their Fuehrer.65 Carl Goerdeler found 
this out when he spoke in Leipzig to the staff of the Dresden Command, 
among whose members was Friedrich Olbricht, later to become one of Hit-
ler's chief opponents. On this occasion, however, Olbricht re.fused to 
63Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe, trans., Sidney B. 
Fay (Boston, 1969), p. 42. 
64It was only after the war, when Blomberg recounted his conver-
sation with Hitler to Fritsch's attorney, that the implications of his 
recommendation dawned on him, and then he begged his listener not to 
repeat what he had said. Hossbach, p. 115. 
65cathcart writes that "two Burkean ratios-agency-scene·and a-
gency-act11 are essential to explain the inception of a movement. Cath-
cart, 87. Modifying his choices somewhat, let me suggest that two 
act without directives from the War Ministcy.66 And even Ludwig Beck, 
who was to become head of the resistance movement, is quoted by Franz 
Halder in these troubled times as saying that "mutiny and rebellion 
are words not to be found in the German soldier's dictiona:ey. 1167 In 
sum, then, Hitler had taken the measure of his officers, "these an-
tique knights with their dusty conceptions," as he called them.68 
But his underhanded blow against their commander-and the independence 
of their agency had cracked old forms, changed some habits, and start-
ed the political education of more than a few of them. Aa General 
Thomas wrote in 1945, "The Fritsch affair entailed the beginning of 
my inner-break with the system. 1169 And Karl Sack described the scan-
dal as the point of departure for many of those officers who would en-
gage in resistance activities for the next six years.70 
ratios-agency-scene and agent-act-a.re central to the whole German 
Resistance Movement. The agency-scene ratio involves those instru-
ments within any social order which have the potential to change it, 
as for example, the army. The trouble, however, is that agents with-
in an agency usually act in terms appropriate to it-its customs, us-
age, caste codes, and the like, thereby making it difficult for them 
to employ the agency for change if such employment is not in harmony 
with these traditions. The agent-act ratio, by contrast, is not so 
extrinsically defined; instead, the agent has freed himself from. the 
shibboleths of agency, becomes the "author of his acts., 11 and possess-
es the capacity to redefine the scene in which he finds him.self. Ken-
neth Burke, A Grammar Of Motives (Berkeley, 1969), pp. 15-16. 
p. 79. 
66Ritter, p. 78. 
67Bor, p. 113. 
68siegfried Westphal, The German Army in the West (London, 1951), 
69Georg Thomas, 11Gedanken und Ereignisse, 11 Schweizerische Monat-
schefte, Heft 9 (December, 1945), 538. 
70n 6 eutsch, p. 41. 
For purposes of this study, perhaps the most important result of 
the Blomberg-Fritsch crisis was the linking up of resistance circles, 
largely consarvative, which now took place for the first time71--a 
drawing together of a "saving Remnant ('prophets,' aggressor rhetors, 
who 'see through' the existing order) •• • Land whosi/ enactment of 
the Negative LiiJ precipitated by some ••• cluster of events and at-
titudes that symbolize the unacceptable •• 1172 . . Of primary imper-
tance was the group led by Carl Goerdeler, the commonly acknowledged 
"motor" or the opposition.73 Like so many other members of the "de-
cent Gennany," Goerdeler "as little as most Germans fathomed .from 
the beginning the full demonic nature of the National Socialist Move-
ment.1174 As Lord Mayor of Leipzig, he accepted the job of Price Com-
missioner in the Nazi Government (a position he had held under Chan-
cellor Bruening), in part because'he thought the post would provide 
him a forum from which he could "exert a moderating influence_, 1175 
and in part because he "shared in that general yearning of Germans 
of that period ••• that the split within the nation which had become 
71There is no mention in resistance accounts of left-wing po-
litical groups joining up at this time, probably because the leader-
ship of the Social Democratic Party was still imprisoned in concen-
tration camps. 
72Leland M. Griffin, 11 A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of 
Movements," in Critical Responses To Kenneth Burke, ed., William H. 
Rueckert (Minneapolis, 1969), p. 462. 
73schacht quotes Joseph Mueller, another resistance member, as 
saying that Goerdeler 11was a motor which made too much noise. 11 Schacht, 
p. 257. 
74Ritter, p. 29. 
7~othfels, p. 84. 
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so intolerable ••• might be healed by the new comradeship of all classes 
and parties. 1176 
Certainly, Goerdeler was a patriot. A Prussian by birth and a na-
tionalist by disposition, he opposed the Versailles Diktat as much as 
the Nazis, although the means he advocated for its revision differed 
significantly from those employed by Hitler, as subsequent discussion 
will reveal. It was, therefore, only by degrees, that Goerdeler dis-
covered, as he wrote in 1944, that "the signs of degeneration" were 
not "counterbalanced by more hopeful inclinations. 1177 Probably, his 
personal Rubicon was crossed in 1936 when he was asked to prepare a 
report on Gezmany•s economic future. Using finances as a wedge, he 
argued that only by being more conciliatory to the Jews, the churches, 
and the Freemasons, could the Reich hope to win foreign confidence and 
economic aid. Also, in keeping with his conservative bent, he added 
that strict fiscal policies would have to be followed, even at the 
cost of rearmam.ent.78 Goering, who was Hitler's Commissioner for 
Four Year Plans, called the report "entirely useless 11 because of 
its many suggestions for moderation, economic and otherwise, and 
Goerdeler was thereafter largely excluded from any part in the de-
cision-making process, although given his characteristic optimism, 
he "continued in spite of everything to try to influence at least 
those ministers with whom he was personally friendly. 1179 
76Ritter, p. 29. 
77Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
78Ibid., P• 34. 
79Ibid., p. 35. This pattern of trying to work within the 
The rebuff at the federal level had its consequences locally. As 
Lord Mayor of Leipzig, Goerdeler had been able to forestall many of the 
worst excesses by party leaders because of his national office. But now 
this changed. The symbol of his difficulties was a statue of the Jewish 
composer, Felix Mendelssohn, which stood before the city's concert hall. 
Since the Machtubernahme, local Nazi officials had been pressing for its, 
removal, a demand Goerdeler was able to resist with help from Goebbels' 
Propaganda Ministry. 80 But when he went to Helsinki for a speaking en-
gagement in the fal~ of 1936, these officials seized the opportunity to 
remove the statue, and when Goerdeler returned and ordered that it be put 
back at the threat of his resignation, his demand was met with a flat re-
fusal. The next day, he resigned.81 
Upon leaving Leipzig, Goerdeler looked for an administrative job out-
side gover~ment. A proposal from Krupp was vetoed by Hitler who probably 
sensed the potential danger of a man with Goerdeler's views serving in the 
system, of being rebuffed and forced outside, is one that reoccurs with 
many of the conservative resistance figures. And while it is not ex-
plicitly included in the dramatistic formulation, it is at least im-
plicit in Cathcart's examples. "The abolition movement began, not when 
individuals became aggrieved over the fact of slavery, but when, per-
ceiving that ;slavery would never be abolished under the Constitution, 
they demanded the release of all slaves, and when the spokesmen of the 
established order responded in turn that the abolitionists' real de-
sire was to destroy the_sy~tem of private property and free enterprise. 
The women's sufferage Lsi£/ movement began when women, perceiving that 
they would never get the vote through the evolution of the existing 
order, demanded the ballot, and when most men, and a few women, re-
sponded in their turn that the suffragists' real purpose was to des-
troy the family and defy the laws of God." Cathcart, 87-88. 
80Ritter, p. 35. 
81The details of Goerdeler 1s difficulties in Leipzig are re-
counted by Eberhard Zeller, The Flame Of Freedom, trans., R. P. Heller 
and D.R. Masters (London, 1967), p. 49. 
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councils of heavy industry. 82 But no objection was raised when the Stutt-
gart firm of Robert Bosch offered him a post as financial adviser. Bosch 
had gathered around himself a little group of men who had come to oppose 
the Nazi dictatorship--some of his top executives, the city's retired po-
lice chief, several local church leaders, and a man wno will become more 
important as the drama of the resistance movement reaches denouement in the 
months prior to July 1944--Dr. Carl Stroelin, the Lord Mayor of Stuttgart.BJ 
Within this circle, Goerdeler found attitudes in common with his O'Wll: 
revulsion at the treatment of the Jews, support for persecuted members of 
the Confessing Church, and above all, inquiry into ways and means to avoid 
the impending catastrophe of war.84 Perhaps most important from Goerdeler's 
standpoint was the job itself. With its ill-defined responsibilities and 
its opportunities for travel, the position afforded him the necessary cov-
er to journey all over the Reich, and Western Europe and the United States 
too, until the outbreak of war limited these broader horizons. Speaking 
to potential dissidents, appealing to men's consciences, demanding rebel-
lion from those in positions to undertake it, writing endless letters and 
reports--in short, pursuing "a strategy designed to infuse increasing num-
bers of hearers ••• with attitudes of rejection toward the hierarchy1185-
he crisscrossed the country in a whirlwind of activity. And while it may 
82This is Schacht's opinion; p. 114. 
83carl Stroelin would be Field Marshal Rommel's contact in the ear-
ly months of 1944. See Hans Speidel, Invasion 1944 (New York, 1968), p. 
68ff. 
84Ritter, PP• 80-81. 
85Griffin, 11 Dramatistic Theory," p. 46J. 
be true, as Eberhard Zeller writes, that in his quest for support, "he 
was so carried away with his own wishes for what ought to be that he 
oversimplified reality ••• tending sometimes to sketch the future in 
black and white, like a Utopian, 086it is equally true that without his 
work in recruitment, agitation, and tying together fragmented sectors 
there would often have been little movement in resistance affairs. 87 
Goerdeler 1 s association with Ludwig Beck dates from 1936. 88 The 
Anny Chief of Staff, in keeping with the tradition of Moltke,89saw his 
role not only as an expert technician but also as an advisor with res-
ponsibility for his advice.90 As we have seen, in Hitler's scheme of 
authority, such a function was almost impossible to achieve, largely 
because of the Fuehrer 1 s insistence on keeping government experts in 
different fields carefully separated91--a sort of divide and conquer 
B6zeller, p. 51. 
87Gisevius ma.~es this point; pp. 437-438. Goerdeler 1s name in 
resistance circles was "Der Wanderprediger," or "circuit rider," a ti-
tle he earned both by his indefatigable journeys and the inspirational 
burden of his messages. 
88Ritter writes that a copy of Goerdeler 1 s economic report to 
Goering was found in Beck's papers, initialed in his own handwriting 
and dated November 1936. Ritter, pp. 33-34. 
89on Helmuth von Moltke's philosophy of co-responsibility, see 
Walter Goerlitz, History Of The German General Staff, trans., Brian 
Battershaw (New York, 1954), p. 76. 
90Goerlitz notes that as early as 1935, Beck called upon the 
Department of Military Science to study the question of whether the 
theory of co-responsibility between soldier and statesman could be 
upheld in an authoritarian state. Althoi..gh he received a negative 
answer, he gave orders for the principle to be re-established. 
Ibid., p. 288. 
91Albert Speer recounts a time in 1943 when he broke this re-
striction, and his Fuehrer's exceedingly wrathful response. "What 
89 .. 
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strategy which allowed him to coordinate all information himself,92and 
thus be in a position to answer military objections with economic argu-
ments, political objections with military arguments, economic objections 
with political arguments, and so on.93 In order to counter this divi-
sion, Beck had organized contacts with officials in the Foreign Office 
and with other government bureaucrats, and he used their information to 
support his not always pleasant advice. Thus, he met Goerdeler, who 
provided him with economic data such as the memorandum which he had 
prepared for Goering in 1936. 
At this time, the fonner mayor was more visionary than the staff 
officer, since Beck was still trying to work for change within the sys-
tem. But both men agreed as far as ends were concerned, opposing the 
was the idea of your giving the Chief of Staff your memorandum? If you 
have some information, kindly give it to me. You've put me in an intol-
erable situation •••• It makes me out a liar •••• I forbid you once 
and for all"--his voice rose to a scream--"to address memos to anybody 
but myself. Do you understand that? I forbid it! 11 Albert Speer, Jn.-
side The Third Reich, trans., Richard and Clara Winston (New York, 1970), 
pp. 409-410. 
92Nothing so clearly illustrates the relationship between order, 
secret, and communication than the manner by which Hitler isolated in-
dividuals who might have militated against his policies. His separation 
of underlyings, with himself occupying the position where all lines of 
com.~unication converged, is reminiscent of Griffin's description of a 
corrupt order in which "an adequate understanding ••• ('the understand-
ing which is active in that it performs the act of unification 1 )," no 
longer exists since the division or mystery between "different classes" 
or "kinds of beings" is nearly insunnountable, thereby resulting in 
"misunderstanding, the growth of absurdity and injustice, the increas-
ing loss of communication and identification." Griffin, 11Dramatistic 
Theory," pp. 458; 460. 
93Manstein comments on this "shift of ground II strategy~ "When-
ever Hitler perceived that he was not making any impression with his 
opinions on strategy, he immediately produced something from the po-
litical or economic sphere. Since he had knowledge of the political 
and economic situations with which no frontline commander could com-
pete, his arguments were generally irrefutable." Manstein, p. 256. 
extension of German "living space" at the cost of aggressive war,94and 
attempting to mitigate, if only in individual cases, the Nazi persecu-
tion of the Jews.95 Also, Beck's efforts on behalf of General Fritsch 
(he had importuned Brauchitsch to obtain a Court of Honor from Hitler, 
and he had, with difficulty, persuaded Fritsch to challenge Himmler to 
a pistol-duel), had not gone unnoticed by his fellow officers, and a 
small group of them, including his deputy, Franz Halder, Halder's as-
sistant, Heinrich von Stulpnagel, Carl Sack, the Judge Advocate General, 
Georg Thomas of the War Economy Department, and a number of o£ficers in 
the Abwehr--younger men like Colonel Hans Oster, and a group whose "in-
ner emigration11 had led them to the ideal cover provided by the Mili-
tary Intelligence Servi.ce--Helmuth Groscurth, Justice Delbruck, Franz 
Liedig, and Theodore Struenck96--now began to look to Beck for leader-
ship.97 We will put aside for the moment any further discussion or 
94As soon as Beck learned of the details of the November 5 con-
ference, he sent a memorandum opposing it to Fritsch. Foerster, pp. 
80-82. 
950 1Neill notes that Beck was one of those who attempted to as-
sist Jewish officers who had been dismissed from the Wehrmacht to find 
new positions in foreign armies. Robert J. 0 1Neill, The German Army 
and the Nazi PartY, 1933-1939 (New York, 1966), p. 76. 
91. 
96struenck's wife, Elisabeth, is one of the few women who playe9 
a prominent role in the resistance movement. During the Fritsch crisis, 
she was a courier for the general's supporters, and later, when she and 
her husband rented an apartment in Berlin, they turned it into a meeting 
place for members of the opposition. Goerdeler made it his headquarters 
whenever he was in the capital, and it was where the ex-Mayor first met 
with Claus von Stauffenberg. Theodore was executed by the Nazis after 
the failure of July 20, 1944. Elisabeth, although treated harshly by 
the Gestapo, survived. Gisevius, pp. 420; 428-429. 
97Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 395-396. 
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Ludwig Beck since his personal opposition and turning point are more ap-
propriate to the crisis over the Sudetenland in the late summer of 1938. 
But concerning the problem of information, both he and Goerdeler agreed 
that the General Staff needed to be made aware of what was going on, and 
to this end they arranged a series of infonnal meetings between opposi-
tion experts and the officers. One of the main speakers was Hjalmar 
Schacht, the ex-Minister of Economics, and the burden of his message 
was that no such thing as a quick and easy Blitzkreig was possible, 
and that Germany was vulnerable in any other kind of conflict.98 
Schacht is another conservative who was initially attracted to Na-
tional Socialism. He believed "that despite his violent methods, Hitler 
was out to do the best he could for the German people, to give them peace 
and bread, 1199and he accepted the Fu.ehrer's offer to become Minister of E-
conomics because it provided him the "use of a fulcrum ••• inside the Gov-
ernment from which it might be possible ••• to prevent the adoption of 
false or unethical measures. 11100 Unlike Goerdeler, Schacht was listened 
to, at least in the beginning. For one thing, hi~ program of reducing 
imports while increasing exports closely accorded with Hitler's notion 
of autarky--of making Germany economically self-sufficient.101 For an-
other, Schacht knew how to raise money, as indicated by his system of 
Mefo-Bills, an economic scheme by which the Reichbank dispensed credit 
98 Schacht, p. 90. 
99rbid., p. 70. 
l00rbid., p. 72. 
lOlibid., p. 69. 
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notes, largely to army contractors, redeemable with interest after five 
ye~rs.102 By 1938, notes totaling twelve billion marks had been issued 
and Schacht was insisting that these must be honored,lOJa point he could 
never make Hitler understand since the Fuehrer 1s knowledge of economics 
was ~~dimentary at best, 104and because Hitler 1s intention was to make 
good on government debts with booty won in conquest, a point which made 
little sense to Schacht since such a credit entry does not appear on 
ledger sheets. 
Schacht also won some initial victories in areas other than econom-
ics. He was able to protect employees of his ministry from being re-
placed by "alte Kampfer," or 11 old fighters," who were clamouring for 
government jobs,105he prevented Robert Ley, Hitler's Labor Minister, 
from "coordinating" apprentices into the "German Workers' Front, 11106 
and at a conference called by the Interior Ministry to discuss the ra-
cial calibration of "mischlings, 11 or Germans of mixed Semitic-Aryan 
blood, the initial proposal of seventy-five percent Jewish blood as 
the dividing line between humanity and subhumanity was defeated when 
Schacht, not without some irony, suggested that within one generation 
the quarter Aryans would be half Aryans, and within two generations, 
three-quarter Aryans, and surely a Thousand Year Reich had time for 
l02For a complete account of the Mefo-Bill scheme, see Hjalmar 
Schacht, My First Seventy-Six Years, trans., Diana Pyke (London, 1955), 
pp. 317-318. 
103schacht, Account Settled, pp. 53-55. 
l04Bullock, p. 119. 
l05schacht, Account Settled, p. 73. 
l06Ibid., pp. 73-74. 
sixty years to pass.107 But Schacht gradually made himself persona DQD. 
g'rata with his Fuehrer. The many memoranda admonishing Hitler about acts 
of violence against the Jews and churches, the cor::i.plaints about Gestapo 
terror tactics, and the warnings that excessive a:rmaments were dislo-
cating the economy, 108all played a part in the Fuehrer's decision to 
dismiss him. 
While he was still a minister, but in the final period oE his dis-
content, Schacht was instrumental in arranging for Goerdeler to obtain 
a passport and letters of introduction to friends abroad,l09the aim be-
ing to contact foreign politicians and financiers in order to convince 
them that another Germany existed besides Hitler''S Reich.llO It is be-
yond the scope of this study to detail all of Goerdeler's meetings, but 
107schacht, Account Settled, pp. 75-77. 
108These complaints are detailed in Ibid., pp. 87-92. See also, 
First Seventy-Six Years, esp., Schacht I s memorandum to Hitler of May 3, 
1935, and his 11 Koenigsberg Speech 11 of August 18, 1935; pp. 347-348; 349-
351. That Schacht spoke out directly to Hitler is con£irmed by Speer 
who writes of hearing the Fuehrer "shouting at his Finance Minister, 
evidently in extreme excitement. We heard Schacht replying firmly in 
a loud voice. The dialogue grew increasingly heated on both sides and 
then ceased abruptly. Furious, Hitler came out on the terrace and 
ranted on about his disobliging, limited minister who was holding up 
the rearmament program. 11 Speer, p. 145. 
109Ritter, pp. 81-82. 
llOThese contacts abroad constitute another departure from Cath-
cart and Griffin's explicit formulations, both of ii!ihich leave the read-
er with the impression that only two hierarchies--an existing one and 
its incipient opponent--are involved in dialectic conflict at any given 
moment. Based on Kenneth Burke's treatment of orders of motivation, it 
is possible to argue that more than two hierarchies can be involved in 
the struggle of one movement trying to supplant another. 11As regards 
'autonomous' activities, the principle of Rhetorical identification may 
be summed up thus: The fact that an activity is capable of reduction to 
intrinsic, autonomous principles does not argue that it is free from 
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two in particular need to be recounted, the one because it suggests the 
nature of political contacts between the opposition and the Western Pow-
ers, the other because it illustrates the carelessness of many of these 
early resisters. 
Goerdeler's political contact was with Sir Robert Vansittart, the 
British Diplomatic Advisor and a man whose dislike of all things German 
is revealed by the fact that his name subsequently became the rallying 
cry for anti-appeasers in Britain.lll To h.J..m, Goerdeler spoke as a na-
tionalist, stressing the need for concessions in the Sudetenland and 
the Polish Corridor, and urging that some sort of agreement be worked 
out between the German Opposition and the British Government which 
could then be followed by mutual cooperation among all the European 
states.112 Vansittart, who was distressed by the recent annexation of 
Austria, replied that the most which could be granted was a degree of 
identification with other orders of motivation extrinsic to it. Such 
other orders are extrinsic to it, as considered from the standpoint of 
the specialized activity alone. But they are not extrinsic to the 
field of moral action as such, considered from the standpoint of human 
act:;.vity in general. 11 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric Of Motives (New York, 
1955), p. 27. And despite his formulation, one of Griffin's applica-
tion essays, the 11New Left 11 Movement, makes specific reference to "al-
liances" between liberals in America and socialists in Europe. Griffin, 
"Rhetorical Structure of the 1New Left, 111 113. Resistance attempts to 
gain support from other countries, beginning in this period, are an im-
portant feature of the movement's dialectic struggle; thus, the need to 
establish a place for it now in the theoretical framework. 
lllThe reference, of course, is to the term 11Vansittartism. 11 
Those who doubt the extent of Sir Robert's Germanophobe are directed 
to his conclusions in Bones of Contention (London, 1945). 
112Ritter, whose account is based on Goerdeler's memorandum, 
notes these points; pp. 83-84. For a similar view of the meeting 
from the British side, see Ian Colvin, None So Blind (New York, 
1965), pp. 149-154. 
autonomy for the Sudeten Germans, that any change in the status of the 
"Corridor" was out of the question, and he disapprovingly referred to 
Goerdeler 1s activities as "treasonable. 11113 
It is unfortunate that the conversation was determined largely by 
each man's incapacities114--that neither could really understand what 
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the other was trying to say. For Vansittart, Goerdeler's claim to the 
"Corridor" was an issue which not even Hitler had raised. And for the 
British to throw in with the resisters over the Sudetenland would have 
meant in effect conceding to a group as yet unorganized, to say nothing 
of being in power, what might be granted to Hitler as the price of end-
ing his expansionist acts. For Goerdeler, the proposals were conditioned 
largely by the requirements of Germany's internal situation, and though 
premature, were not unlike that policy which later took Chamberlain to 
Munich. Thus, his point that while London had the right program, the 
choice of partner was wrong; that the resisters, unlike the Fuehrer, 
could be trusted and would, after their territorial claims had been 
113Ritt~r, p; 84. 
114An orientation, according to Burke, is an interpretation of 
the world that either trains or i~capacitates us. Discussing Veblen's 
"trained incapacities, 11 Burke explains it as "that state of affairs 
whereby one's very abilities can function as blindnesses. 11 Goerdeler's 
thinking on foreign policy, for example, was dominated by his concern 
for the restoration of a decent Germany which would then become the 
center of a stable Europe, and the means he advocated for achieving 
it involved a reasonable imperialism by which Germany 1 s neighbors 
would in some measure stand to gain. Vansittart, by contrast, ac-
curately forsaw Hitler's crude power plays as a menace to Europe, 
but his arguments for force against Gennany failed to distinguish 
Nazi from anti-Nazi, thereby reducing the possibility of foreign 
assistance in achieving Hitler's domestic overthrow. Means selection 
and trained incapacity are so important that Burke concludes: "Faulty 
means selecting, on the basis of an inadequate orientation, would seem 
to account for everything." Kenneth Burke, Permanence And Change (In-
dianapolis, 1965), pp. 7-17. 
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satisfied, enter into a close alliance with the Western Powers and re-
turn to the League of Nations. Thus, each man talked by the other with 
the result that their common purpose of opposing Hitler was lost in mis-
placed overtures and misunderstandings. 
Goerdeler, in keeping with his optimism, and perhaps to provide an 
earnest of opposition intentions, spoke far too openly with his financial 
contacts at the Bank of England. Specifically, he said that a major gov-
ernment change was in prospect and that officers with whom he had been 
meeting during the Fritsch crisis would take the lead in it. Unfortu-
nately, part of this filtered back through intermediaries to Hitler who 
demanded explanations and directed an investigation to be made by the 
µinistry of Justice.115 Largely through the help of Schacht, who pulled 
wires among his British friends, the inquiry was steered into safe chan-
nels a.~d the Fuehrer was satisfiect.116 But the near disaster left the 
former Economics Minister with a depleated fund of excuses and a deter-
mination to be more cautious in the future. As he put it, "Whoever makes 
up his mind to follow the dark path of the conspirator should have one 
capacity above all others: he should be able to keep•his mouth shut 11117 
--and this, as we have seen, was precisely the capacity Goerdeler lacked. 
Thus, while Schacht joined forces with the ex-mayor's growing number of 
anti-Nazis, and even added to it by recruiting General Witzleben, the 
Commander of the Berlin Military District,118it was to be a short-lived 
ll5Gisevius, pp. 259-260. 
116schacht procured dementis from his friends in London. 
117schacht, p. 116. 
118Ibid., pp. 253-254. 
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alliance, lasting only through the first critical moments of the resist-
ance movement. 
It was at the time of the Fritsch crisis that Goerdeler made the ac-
quaintance of Hans Gisevius, a fonner Gestapo official, and through him, 
SS Colonel Arthur Nebe,119the Chief of the Reich's Criminal Police, Count 
Wolf Helldorf, the Police President of Berlin, and his deputy, Fritz von 
der Schulenburg. Helldorf and Nebe a.re important, in part because ther 
provided a pipeline directly into the enemy camp,120and in part because 
they controlled armed men.121 Schulenburg is less important ~or the in-
formation he supplied or the men he commanded than for the ideas he con-
ceived. While he more properly belongs to the Kreisau Kreis, of which 
he was a leading member, or to Stauffenberg•s circle, whose political 
planner he was, Schulenburg was also part of Goerdeler's conservative 
group which was organizing in this period. Barely thirty when Hitler 
came to power, Schulenburg, like so many of his generation, welcomed 
the Nazi movement with its drive and revolutionary spirit. Younge-
nough to oe idealistic, he wanted to help the National Socialists make 
Germany a better place to live.122 Two years of government service in 
119Goerdeler never knew the name of the SS Colonel who supplied 
him with infonnation and the promised support of anned men. Nebe, who 
was accustomed to covering his tracks, was appalled at the ex-mayor's 
talkativeness and refused to attend meetings where Goerdeler was sched-
uled to appear. Heinz Hohne, The Order of The Death's Head, trans., 
Richard Barry (New York, 1970), p, 511. 
12~uch of the information about Gestapo duplicity in the Fritsch 
case came from Nebe and Helldorf. Gisevius, p. 220ff. 
121As a result of Gleichschaltung. the Criminal Police were nomin-
ally a part of Himmler's Gestapo. In reality, however, they were just a 
group of hard-bitten detectives similar to those found in large cities 
all over the world. 
122 Zeller, p. 124. 
East Prussia under Gauleiter Erich Koch, one of the most corrupt of the 
Nazi leaders,123soon disillusioned him, and when an opportunity came to 
join the police department in Berlin, he took it. According to later 
Gestapo reports, the impact of the Fritsch crisis marked Schulenburg•s 
complete break with the regime.124 For him, as for others, the army 
was the la.st foundation upon which a "decent Genn.any" could rest, and 
now the military too had been "gleichgescha.ltet." In the police de-
partment, Schulenburg saw the possibility of working from inside to 
destroy the system. As he said to August Winnig in 1938, 111 had to 
decide whether I should leave the service or become Hitler's Fouche. 
I chose the latter."125 
Gisevius too, is an important figure in the drama of the resist-
ance movement, not lea.st because he was one of its few members to sur-
vive and write about his experiences. Of more concern to us, however, 
is the fa.ct that from his vantage point in the Gestapo, he had early' 
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on begun to collect documents on Nazi crimes--"instances of extortion, 
torture, and killing11l26 __ and such material would make interesting read-
ing to the mass of Volksgenossen who wer~ largely unaware of what was 
going on behind the scenes, or as evidence for the prosecution of Hitler, 
which, as we shall see, was the plan of the resistance leaders at this 
123Koch, who had originally made his way from the Rhineland to 
Ea.st Prussia. by cycling-a margarine carton holding all his moveable 
assets--had within a decade control of a "foundation" with assets of 
more than 300 million marks. Grunberger, p. 95. 
124spiegelbild, p. 87. 
125August Winnig, Aus 20 Jahren {Hamburg, 1948), P• 79. 
126Gisevius, p. 141. 
time. In any event, Gisevius added his collection to the growing pile 
of evidence being gathered by Helmuth Groscurth, who was in charge of 
collating such material at the Abwehr, the agency to which Gisevius., 
though still a civilian outsider, had virtually attached himseir.127 
The head of the Abwehr from 1934 until the agency's final demise 
ten years later was Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, a man described by his 
contemporary, Ernst von Weizsacker, as a type "particularly rare in 
Germany ••• as wise as a serpent, as pure as a dove. 11128 Certainly., 
Canaris needed these qualities in dealing with Hitler, who, with his 
' 11Fingerspitzengefuhl, 11 or "finger-tip feeling, n had an uncamtT in-
stinct for sensing how people felt about him.129 
127Gisevius was removed from the Gestapo in 1934 because of his 
ill-concealed distaste for its activities. He found another position 
in the Ministry of the Interior, but his continuing opposition did not 
escape the notice of Reinhard Heydrich, who pressed for his dismissal. 
In 1935, Gisevius was again relieved and sent to police headquarters 
in Berlin. Then, in 1936, when Himmler gained control of all German 
police agencies, Gisevius was transferred from Berlin to a regional 
office of the Price Control Administration in Muenster. Contacts 
with Schacht, whose home and office telephones Gisevius had checked 
for wiretaps, led the Economics Minister to obtain a sinecure for 
him wi. th a Bremen factory in which Gisevius never set foot. Until 
the outbreak of the war, Gisevius was informally part of the Abwehr 
the result of an earlier acquaintence with Hans Oster, Canaris• Chief 
of Staff. Finally, in the fall of 1939, Gisevi.us was attached to the 
Abwehr as a civilian agent. Gisevius, pp. 45-46; 133-134; 194-199; 
212; and TMWC,. xii, p. 195. 
128Ernst von Weizsacker, Memoirs, trans., John Andrews (Chicago., 
1951), p. 143. 
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129Percy Schranun, who kept Hitler's war diary from 1943 until the 
end, writes that there 11 was only one person whom Hitler was not. able to 
see through, and this was Admiral Canaris ••• fi,hi/ was so perfect an 
intelligence officer that in his dealings with Hitler he was able to 
dissimulate successfully enough to deceive Hitlerrs intuitive sense 
about people being with him or against him." Percy Schramm, Hitler: 
The Man and the Military Leader, trans., Donalds. Detwiler (Chicago., 
1971), p. 34. 
Canaris is yet another of the conservatives who believed it was 
possible to work with Hitler. As he told his adjutant in the mid-
thirties, "He is reasonable and sees your point of view, if you point 
it out to him properly. Man kann mit ihm reden. 11130 Canaris had de-
voted his service to the Fuehrer because he regarded him as the re-
storer of national sovereignty and German hopes for the future.131 
But his sensitivity--he has been described as a man who "hated vio-
lence11132and was "too humane 11133-at length placed him at odds with 
the leaders of the Reich--their cruelty, their contempt for estab-
lished law and order, and especially their inhumanity.134 Though 
he seldom could bring himself to participate directly in coup plan-
ning--11Just get on with the job" was the way he would put it to sub-
ordinates135 __ his outwardly good relations with Hitler served to 
cloak the real resistance work done in the Abwehr by Hans Oster, 
the motivating force of the agency on the Tirpitzuf~ and a group 
of kindred spirits who were as dedicated as he to the goal of rid-
ding Germany of the Nazi plague. 
lJOcanaris is quoted in Ian Colvin, Chief Of Intelligence 
(London, 1951), p. 39. 
131zeller, pp. 23-24. 
132Erich Lahousen, quoted in Gisevius, p. 439. 
l33walter Schellenberg, Hitler's Secret Service, trans., 
Louis Hagan (New York, 1958), p. 342. 
lJ41ahousen writes about Canaris' "complete psychological 
breakdown under the impression of smoking and devastated Belgrade, 
where the stench of unburied corpses still lingered." Gisevius, 
P• 441. 
l35canaris is quoted in Karl Abshagen, Canaris, trans., 
Alan Brodrick (London, 1956), p. 221. 
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Hans Oster has been described by Schlabrendorff as 11a man such as 
God meant men to be, lucid in mind, imperturbable in danger. 11136 Staff 
Chief of the Abwehr, Head of its Central Division, organizer of conspir-
acy planning, and contact man between Goerdeler's circle and many other 
groups, Oster needed every strength for the number of parts he played. 
Unlike so many of the conservatives whom we have talked about, Oster 
had never gone through a period of illusion about National Socialism and 
where it might be leading Germany. Gi~evius writes that he was rather 
indifferent in his early attitudes toward Hitler's movement, 137a not un-
common stance for an officer schooled in the tradition of avoiding pol-
itics. The murder of a former superior, General von Bredow, who was 
killed during the Roehm Putsch, was probably the first cause which 
I 
moved him from neutrality toward disobedience, 138and the dismissal of 
Fritsch, who wa.s the man he most revered, was undoubtedly the final 
cause which carried him all the way to active political resistance. 
As he told Gestapo investigators after his arrest in 1944, "I have 
made Fritsch's case my own.11139 
Quite early, Oster recognized the possibilities inherent in the 
Abwehr. With its protection from the Gestapo, its multitude of covert 
activities, its potential for contacts that cut on the bias across the 
hierarchy of the Fuhrerstaat, and above all, with its chief, his tacit 
acceptance and, on occasion, outright help, the Military Intelligence 
136schlabrendorft, They Almost Killed Hitler, p. 15. 
137Gisevius, p. 143. 
138zeller, p. 20. 
139spiegelbild, p. 430. 
Service offered a well-placed center from which to keep informed about 
events in the Reich and foreign countries too. 
Oster himself never aspired to lead an uprising against ~he Fueh-
rer. That was a role for some officer with troops, or for a general 
who could claim the respect of the entire army. And for all the sol-
diers he could command, Oster might as well have been an Oberstleutnant 
ausser Dienst (Colonel, retired). And relative to his popularity, a 
number of his colleagues muttered "Helle Sachse" in reference, to him, 
a term reserved for Saxons who seem a little too opinionated.l.40 Thus, 
Oster contented himself with the backstage part of technician, mobiliz-
ing every effort to construct an intelligence net whose lines, ran to 
police officials like Nebe and Helldorf, to officers like Beck and 
Halder in the Anny High Command, to men like Dohnanyi and Sack in 
the Ministry cf Justice, to the brothers Theo and Erich Kordt in the 
Foreign Office, and to allies like Schacht and General Thomas in the 
Reich's economic leadership.141 110f course you are coming with us, 11 
was 0ster's standard invitation to those he wanted to recruit £or 
the resistance.142 And while there might have been doubts about 
his style or manner, there were none about his motives and integ-
rity. 
140This is the verdict of Halder, who thought Oster too "undis-
ciplined" and too sure of himself. Quoted in Harold Deutsch, The Con-
spiracy Against Hitler In The Twilight War (Minneapolis, 1970), p. 52fn. 
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14laisevius describes Oster standing at his desk looking down at 
four or five telephones whose secret lines connected him with various 
authorities. 11This is what I am,11 he quotes Oster as saying. "I facil-
itate communications for everyone everywhere." Gisevius, p. 424. 
142oster is quoted in Deutsch, Hitler And His Generals, p. 420. 
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The last group to become associated with Goerdeler's efforts was a 
small opposition cell of career diplomats in the Foreign Office. Their 
leader was State Secretary Ernst von Weizsacker who, like Admiral Canaris, 
tolerated and even encouraged these men in their work against Hitler. In 
trying to assess Weizsacker's motives, it is difficult to generalize. In 
his memoirs, the ex-diplomat makes no claim to having been one of the ex-
tremists in the resistance-men who would have accepted war or even defeat 
as "the means to the end of removing Hitler. 11143 Instead, Weizsacker worked 
to prevent war-to avert the catastrophe toward which the Fuehrer's policy 
was driving Germany. Perhaps the best characterization of the role the 
State Secretary chose was made by Bernardo Attolico, the Italian Ambas-
sador to Germany, in a conversation with Carl Burckhardt, the High Com-
missioner for Danzig. It should be cited at some length because it high-
lights the difficulty resisters had in working within the system, and it 
provides an insight to the carelessness of these early anti-Nazis which 
we have already mentioned. 
The Gennans are not conspirators. Conspirators require everything 
they lack: patience, knowledge of men, psychology, tact. No, they 
will be locked up, disappear into camps. There can be no insurrec-
tion against governments of force which are ready at all times to 
fully employ the force at their command. To deal with such con-
ditions as those here requires an endurance, a gift for dissimu-
lation, a dexterity of a Tallyrand •••• Where between Rosen-
heim and Eydtukenen can you find a Tallyrand! 
There is one ••• one man ••• Lwhi/ tries to play this difficult 
game. He is a German patriot and also in his way a European. He 
does everything to prevent war with a dedication worthy of admir-
ation. The one thing that could become dangerous for him is the 
carelessness, the naivete, and the indiscretion of the so-called 
conspirators •••• Yes, these people are dangerous for the man 
I have in mind; you know him, Weizsacker •••• 
143weizsacker, p. 215. 
His aim ••• is the same as mine: prevent, prevent, prevent ••• 
everything else is easier. The easiest is to emigrate and pro-
test; but also to start an insurrection, to make plots requires 
less strength and courage than to wring the most from hard real-
ity, without pathos, again and again defeated, always starting 
anew, apparently sanctioning things one loathes, tough and with-
out selfish gain, prudent, with constant watchfulness and ten-
sion.144 
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The question has been raised as to how much "prevention" could be 
wrung from the "hard reality" of Hitler's New Order.145 Certainly, there 
is no easy answer, and particularly not the simplistic one frequently ad-
vanced by Western historians who approach the issue "in a manner ••• akin 
to aesthetic criticism. 11146 That is, they examine the choice, so difficult 
for opposition figures in government to resolve, of whether the advantages 
of remaining in the regime were worth the costs in what was unachieved, 
from the standpoint of a "Gods-eye view" which treats the timebound, 
spacebound issues confronting the resisters as "frozen statues of state-
ments ••• like those of the Winged Victory of Sa.mothra...£! or the~ of 
Michelangelo, 11147and conclude, to no one's surprise, that it was better 
to go than stay.148 
144Attolico is quoted in Carl J. Burckhardt, Meine Danziger Mis-
sion 1937-1939 (Munich, 1960), pp. 63-64. 
145Paul Seabury, The Wilhelmstrasse: A Stud of German Di lomats 
under the National Socialist Regime Berkeley, 1954. 
l46This is Stephen Toulmin's charge against logical positivists 
who try to measure dialectic arguments with syllogistic rules. However, 
it seems equally applicable to historians who try to assess dialectic 
tensions from the vantagepoint of hindsight. Stephen Toulmin, The Uses 
Of Argument (Cambridge, 1955), p. 181 
147rbid. 
148see for example, Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 385-389; Seabury, p. 
150ff; Louis Namier, Conflicts: Studies In Contemporary History (New 
York, 1969), pp. 84-85; and Eliot Wheaton, Prelude to Calamity: The 
Nazi Revolution, 1933-1935 (Garden City, 1963), pp. 407-408. 
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In the stress of the times and circumstances, Hitler's opponents 
would find no such perfect solution. One of Canaris' biographers writes 
that the question of whether the Admiral could serve the regime and-yet 
oppose it "robbed him of his peace of mind and inner poise." At last, 
Canaris decided to stick it out because he "knew that only those in 
high position could hope to bring down the regime ••• Land becausiJ 
he felt a deep sense of responsibility for maintaining the protective 
screen behind which Oster and the younger officers who relied on him 
engaged in important and relentless sabotage against the Party. nl49 
Gisevius recalls that he and Oster had many arguments over whether 
Schacht or Beck should resign. On the one hand, there was the futil-
ity of "holding on to a position which no longer had any real validity 
or power; 11 on the other, there was the 11weight a name carried II in im-
pressing potential converts.150 And Eberhard Bethge adds that Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, who up to this time had been looking eagerly for people who 
could "summon up the courage to say No publicly, and were willing to ac-
cept dismissal from their posts in consequence ••• Lnow sai/ the use of 
camouflage as a moral duty.11151 
149Abshagen, pp. 119-120. 
l50Gisevius, p. 381. 
151Bethge, p. 527. Bonhoeffer's change in attitude illustrates 
another variation from the dramatistic fonnulation. Griffin writes that 
11Movements begin when some pivotal individual or group ••• gives voice to 
a No." Griffin, 11 Dramatistic Theory, 11 p. 462. The implication is that 
this expression of the Negative is publicly uttered, with the results 
which Bonhoeffer envisaged. However, in a totalitarian scene, the is-
sue of effective resistance is more frequently a matter of working from 
within. Paul Scheffer wrote a description of Adam von Trott's basic 
position which could be used to sum up many of the men of the resist-
ance. "The problem was this. The Leviathan, the monster o:f the state 
apparatus, had assumed a particularly dreadful and evil form. If one 
In Weizsacker 1s case, the decision to remain in government was dic-
tated mainly by his desire to keep the peace.152 If that meant that his 
moral fiber was not as strong as Oster's, who repeatedly warned foreign 
diplomats of the dates for attacks on their countries, 153neither does it 
mean that the State Secretary's political innocence approached that of 
Goerdeler's, who wrote in 1943 that 111 am ready to do all I can to get 
an interview with Hitler. I would say to him what has to be said, that 
his withdrawal is asked as a vital necessity for the nation. 11154 
were unwilling to allow it full freedom and unable to take a pistol in 
hand, the only alternative was to attempt to gain control of one of its 
tentacles and use it against itself •••• A people cannot live with-
out certain institutions. These institutions have to be maintained e-
ven if they have to be perverted. Opposition can only take place with-
in ·the Leviathan itself, The whole thing is like a race: Am I doing 
more to destroy the Nazis by staying in my job than I am assisting 
them by helping to keep the machine running? This was Adam's basic 
dilemma, and it wa3 on this point that we came to agree •••• ¼~at 
it comes to is that the state is ••• so overpowering that one is com-
pelled to play according to its rules, even if one is out to destroy 
it." Quoted in Margret Boveri, Treason In The Twentieth Century, 
trans., Jonathan Steinberg (New York, 1963), p. 190. 
152weizsacker, p. 63. 
l53see for example, Gisevius, pp. 454-455. 
l54Goerdeler is quoted in Ritter, p. 242. Neither Griffin nor 
Cathcart make any reference to the potential conflict between ethics 
and politics. But an individual can become so driven by his moral im-
pulses that his political judgment becomes impaired (and of course, the 
reverse is equally probable). The excerpt from Goerdeler's letter is 
a case in point$ Another, more important one, took place on July 20, 
1944. Gisevius writes that late in the afternoon, Beck was dictating 
a radio speech to him. "The basic idea was of the simplest: that it 
did not matter at all whether Hitler was dead or still living. Any 
leader whose immediate entourage included those opposed to him to the 
extent of attempting assassination must be considered morally dead." 
Ibid., p. 557. To recast Beck's argument, we could say that the fail-




Whatever the mix between Weizsacker•s ethical and political motives, 
the fact remains that in 1938, his goal of keeping the peace did not dif-
fer significantly from that of Goerdeler and his allies. Thus, identifi-
cation was reached at the point of ends.155 The State Secretary expres-
sed his willingness to take part in resistance plans, and equally impor-
tant, he directed the work of his subordinates in the movement: Adam von 
Trott zu Soltz; Albrecht von Kessel, Hans-Bernd von Haeften, and the broth-
ers Erich and Theodore Kordt. For Erich, who was Chef de Cabinet to the 
Foreign Minister, the assignment was to serve as liaison to the officers 
and to keep them informed about diplomatic developments;156for Theodore, 
who was Counsellor of the Embassy in London, the assignment was to be 
ready to convince the British Government that a resolute opposition 
group really existed in Germany.157 
With the annexation of Austria a reality, half of the preliminary 
steps in his vision of Dran~ nach Osten which the Fuehrer had outlined 
at the November 5 conference was now completed. There remained only 
Czechoslovakia, the last barrier to the Balkans and the final staging 
area for his dream of "Lebensraum." In keeping with his penchant for 
l55Agreement in one area at the expense of another is a function 
of Burke's pair-terms. "The members of the pair can be treated as in ap-
position." Grammar, p. 419. In 11Rhetoric--Old and New," he lists a se-
ries of these pairs, including means and ends. 11Are things disunited in 
1body? 1 Then unite them in •spirit.• Would a nation extend its physical 
dominion? Lets talk of spreading its 'ideals.' Do you encounter contra-
dictions? Call them 'balances.' Is an organization in disarray Talk or 
its common purpose. Are there struggles over means? Celebrate agreement 
on ends. 11 Kenneth Burke, 11Rhetoric--Old and New, " in The Art Of Rhetoric, 
ed., Francis Connolly and Gerald Levin (New York, 1968), p. 455. 
156Ritter, p. 100. 
lS7Ibid. 
quick action once he had made up his mind, Hitler SUJJmloned Keitel, his 
new Military Chief of Staff, to a meeting on April 20, only eleven days 
after the Austrian plebiscite, to discuss the possibilities for a pre-
emptive attack against Czechoslovakia. The upshot was dissatisfaction 
on the Fuehrer' s part. The original plan had been drawn up prior to 
the rearmament program and was therefore out or date. It would have 
to be re-written.158 Thus, Ludwig Beck, Staff Chief of Oberkommando 
Heeres, or the Army High Command, was made aware or the immedia~ 
or Hitler's next step, and he set about trying to stop it. 
On May 7, Beck sent a memorandum to the new Army Commander, Gen-
eral Brauchitsch, which he intended for Brauchitsch to use in opposing 
the attack. In it, Beck condemned the Fuehrer•s political assumption 
that an attack on Czechoslovakia would not lead to a general European 
war. 11 France, 11 he warned, 11has drawn closer to Britain. s .and it is 
to be accepted that if France on her own initiative marches against 
Germany for the sake of Czechoslovakia, Britain will side with France." 
Russia, he continued, who was also pledged to defend Czechoslovakia, 
"must be regarded as an increasingly more outspoken enemy of Germany. 
It must be accepted that she will take part in any war ••• with her 
' 
air force and navy ••• •" Finally, Beck referred to the geographic, 
economic, and military weaknesses or the Reich and concluded that Ger-
many lacked the "pre-requisite conditions ••• to withstand a major 
war.nl59 
158The events of this meeting are confirmed by Keitel; The Mem-
oirs Of Field Marshal Keitel, ed., Walter Goerlitz~ trans., David Ir-
ving (New York, 1965), p. 62. 
l59The full text of Beck's memorandum is in Foerster, p. 82ft. 
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There is evidence that Brauchitsch made no use of these arguments,160 
but in the third week of May, an international crisis in which the Czech 
Government, alarmed over reports that Gennan troops were massing on her 
borders, ordered partial mobilization, while the British, French, and 
Russian Governments delivered sharp diplomatic notes of protest, 161set 
the stage for Beck's second attempt. On May 29, Hitler, obviously angry 
at having been accused of something he had intended to do but had not yet 
done, called his military leaders, including Beck, to a conference at the 
Reich Chancellery. There, he spoke of his "unshakable will that Czecho-
slovakia shall be wiped off the map" while he offered assurances that 
Britain, France, and Russia would not intervene; after all, they had 
done nothing at the time of the reoccupation of the Rhineland or the 
annexation of Austria.162 The next day, a formal order was issued, 
the opening lines of which reflected the extent of the Fuehrer 1s un-
happiness: 11 It is my unalterable resolve to crush Czechoslovakia in 
the near future by military action. 11 The generals were instructed 
to make preparations "as quickly as possible. 11163 
The same day as the conference, Beck responded with a second mem-
orandum. Again, he pointed to the relative weakness of Germany compared 
16°Keitel writes that Brauchitsch showed him Beck's memorandum 
and that he advised the Army Chief not to take it to Hitler because the 
Fuehrer "would at once reject its political and military arguments out 
of hand." Keitel, p. 65. 
l61uoerlitz, pp. 327-328. 
162Hitler 1 s statement is included in Nazi Conspiracy And Aggres-
sion, 10 Vols., (Washington, D. c., 1946), i, p. 521. Hereafter abbre-
viated as NQ_A. 
163Ibid., p. 522. 
to a coalition of Great Powers. Certainly, the Czech Army might be de-
feated if the conflict could be kept localized, but that was not possi-
ble, and the "su'ccess of Hitler's foreign policy in the period 1933-38 
was no guarantee that similar decisions would be successful in· the fu-
ture. 11164 
It was not Beck's specific memorandum which prompted the Fuehrer's 
next reply, although the fact that other generals were aware of, and in 
many instances, agreed with the Chief of Staff's arguments, certainly 
had something to do with it. On May 30, Hitler summoned his army lead-
ers to a conference at Juterbog where he told them of his decision to 
deal with Czechoslovakia by force and he accompanied this with a gen-
eral order fixing the date of the attack for 11no later than October 
1. 11165 That there was division between the Fuehrer and his generals 
is revealed by Jodl 1s diary entry for that day: "The whole contrast 
becomes acute once more between the Fuhrer's intention that we must 
do it this year and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it yet, 
as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are not yet 
equal to them. 11166 
On June 3, Beck prepared yet another memorandum. In it, he re-
peated all his earlier contentions, but on this occasion, he insisted 
that Brauchitsch personally make these arguments to Hitler. That the 
Army Commander did so is indicated by two pieces of evidence, one 
l64Beck 1s second memorandum is in Foerster, p. 90ff. 
lb5NCA., i, p. 522. 
166Ibid., p. 527. 
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direct, the other indirect, but both dialecticaloi67 To Brauchitsch, 
the Fuehrer responded with a blunt rebuff., "What kind of generals are 
these which I as head of state may have to propel into war? By rights, 
112. 
I should be the one seeking to ward off the generals' eagerness for war." 
And he succinctly defined the nature of the relationship he wanted with 
his officers. 11I do not ask my generals 'to unders,tand my ord.ers, but 
only to carry them out. •1168 
In public, Hitler was more conciliatory. On June 13, he called a 
second meeting of his officers, ostensibly to announce the honorary colo-
nelcy for Fritsch, but actually to reply obliquely to Beck's memorandum.169 
After announcing his 11 shock 11 over the Fritsch affair and his pleasure at 
the former Army Chief's exoneration, the Fuehrer assured his audience that 
the real villains of the piece had been the blackmailer (who he had ordered 
167Beck 1 s memoranda and Hitler's rejoinders are nearly perfect ex-
amples of two parts of the dramatistic formulation. First, they represent 
Beck's attempt to work for change within the system; to be an .advisor with 
responsibility for his advice. Second, they illustrate the nature of the 
dialectical relationship, although in this case, the ratio is not symmet-
rical since Brauchitsch's unwillingness to use Beck 1 s first anrl second mem-
oranda and the Fuehrer's own indirect methods created some rerraction. In 
any event, Cathcart describes both parts of the modeL "On the one hand, 
for a movement to come into being there must be one or more actors who, 
perceiving that the 1good 1 order (the established system) is in reality 
a faulty order full of absurdity and injustice, Cr'J7 out througn various 
symbolic acts that true communication, justice~ salvation cannot be a-
chieved unless there is an immediate corrective applied to the estab-
lished order. On the other hand there must be a reciprocatin~ act from 
the establishment or counter rhetors which perceives the demands of the 
agitator rhetors, not as calls for correction or re-righting the prevail-
ing order, but as direct attacks upon the foundations of the established 
order. 11 Cathcart, 87. 
168Hitler is quoted in Foerster, p. 97Q 
169Keite! writes that Hitler's real aim, as he put itjl was to "coun-
teract ••• Lth~ defeatest talk of Beck's memorandum on the military poten-
tial of our prospective enemies and our3elves.n Keitel, Po 65. 
executed) and some overzealous "subordinate officals" who would find 
themselves working in the provinces before long. Concerning Fritsch, 
Hitler admitted that legal vindication was not enough, but after all 
that had passed between them, the officers should appreciate that he 
and Fritsch could not work together in the future. Thus, the honorary 
post which the Fuehrer promised as only the first step in the public 
rehabilitation of a man he greatly revered. Hitler went on to praise 
his audience for the army's excellent showing in its march into Aus-
tria, and he assured them that he would jealously guard the .military•s 
independence against "external influences." Then, according to one or 
the participants, the Fuehrer concluded by pleading with the officers 
"not to desert the flag in this serious crisis" which impended over 
Czechoslovakia. He placed his entire confidence in the army and he 
begged them to reciprocate that confidence.170 
Factually, the misrepresentations about the Fritsch affair stand 
out sharply today, 171but could not be readily perceived by an audience 
which, with few exceptions, understood only the outline of the case.172 
ll3. 
l70Hitler 1 s speech has been taken from four sources: the accounts 
given to Beck by Halder and Stulpnagel, which appear in Foerster, pp. 94-
96; Admiral Raeder 1s version, which is included in his memoirs, My Life, 
trans., Henry w. Drexel (Annapolis, 1960), p. 249; and the deposition of 
General Wilhelm Adam, TI--1WC, xxi, p. 425. 
171To take just one instance, Fritsch never received any other 
honors. In the fifteen months of life remaining to him, the former 
Army Commander lived in seculsion at Achterberg. When war broke out 
in 1939, he accompanied his regiment to Poland and was killed by a 
sniper before Warsaw on September 22. 
172Even Admiral Raeder, who was a member of the court and had 
access to some of the secret information in the Fritsch case, wrote 
in his memoirs that he was "convinced that Hitler spoke the truth" at 
the June 13 meeting. Raeder, p. 249. 
Fortunately for Hitler, Beck, who was the one officer who knew the most 
about the forces at work against Fritsch and who had taken sharp issue 
with the Fuehrer over the impending Czechoslovakian "crisis," was not 
present at the meeting. Psychologically, then, the skein of lies, woven 
into a fabric of tacit admissions, generous praise, and promises for the 
future, had no one to unravel it by saying no. And the appeal to the 
flag, which at once contains an implicit reminder of the oath /Fahnen-
eid] and an explicit call to patriotism, had its desired effect. As 
Brauchitsch later told some of his fellow officers, he had intended to 
resign, but in these circumstances, he felt he could not leave his post, 
and he urged them to remain at theirs.173 
In the face of Hitler's success, Beck made one last attempt to carry 
the issue. In a fourth memorandum, different in kind from any he had yet 
written, he called for a collective stand on the part of the General Staff 
against the Fuehrer•s war policy, even to the extent of mass resignation. 
On several occasions through June and July, he urged B~auchitsch to call 
the senior generals together so that he could place his views before them. 
Finally, in the first week of August, the Army Chief did so, and Beck read 
to them a declaration which, in the words of Zeller, "went far beyond the 
traditions which had been normally binding on a senior German officer. 11174 
In part, Beck said: 
History will burden those military leaders with blood guilt who 
fail to act according to their professional knowledge and their 
conscience. Their military obedience ends where their knowledge, 
their conscience and their sense of responsibility forbid the 
l73Brauchitsch is quoted in Foerster, p. 1.42. 
174Zeller, p. J. 
carrying out of an order •••• There is a lack of stature and 
a failure to recognize one I s mission when a. soldier in the high-
est position in such times conceives of his duties and problems 
solely within the restricted framework of h.is military assign-
ments a.i1d in unawareness that his highest responsibilities are 
toward the entire nation. Extraordinary times demand deeds that 
are also extraordinary.175 
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It has been alleged by some critics that Beck's memoranda were not 
concerned with ethical questions but with the chances of success or fail-
ure.176 Admittedly, the first three contained on1y professional objec-
tions. But it should be kept in mind that they were intended to dissuade 
Hitler from war, and it seems safe to assume that expedient concerns are 
the best reasons for advocates of morality who hope to persuade their less 
idealistic audiences. More importantly, however, such criticism ignores 
the fourth memorandum which can be called irexpedient" only by redefining 
the word. If ever a document was grounded in the "moral arena 111 and dir-
ected toward what Griffin calls "governance or dom.inion 1 the wielding and 
obeying of authority, 11177 it is Beck's final declaration to his fellow-of-
ficers. And it is this declaration, as well as Goerdeler's resignation 
and work in recruitment, and Schacht's agitation, and Giseviusi record 
keeping, and Oster 1 s information network, and the cover provided by Ca-
naris and Weizsacker, and above all, the incipient ties to the army, the 
only agency capable of overthrowing the Nazi dictatorship, that signifies 
the beginning of the German Resista..~ce Move~ent178--a beginning which some 
175Foerster, p. 12lff. 
p. 26. 
176see for example, Lewis Namier, In The Nazi Era (London, 1952), 
l77ariffin, 11 Dramatistic Theory," pa 456. 
178Because the theoretical formula has been carried forward in the 
footnotes, there will be no attempt to re-analyze in detail those features 
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historians, by their own admission, are unable to identify with any pre-
cision.179 
Concerning Beck's personal attempt, the results can only be described 
as disappointing. While all the officers present agreed with him in op-
posing the attack, 180and some, like Wilhelm Adam, Commander of the "West 
Wall," even publicly spoke on his behalf, Brauchitsch avoided calling for 
a vote on the crucial issue of mass resignation, dismissing the gathering 
with the observation that the senior generals were united in rejecting a 
war. But when the Army Commander took this diluted result to Hitler, the 
Fuehrer reduced him to such a state that he was prepared to lead the army 
that characterize the beginning of the German Resistance Movement. Briefly-, 
and in keeping with the dramatistic model, the lives of each of the men dis-
cussed_thus_far reveal "an attitude of alienation in a given social system 
•• Lwhich/ gives voice to a No." Reasons for this attitude include the 
regime's treatma:nt of the Jews, the churches, and other groups Ir.arked as 
asocial, as well as rearmament and Hitler's plans for conquest. The Frit-
sch affair is something of a catalyst since it merged previously scattered 
opposition elements, a 11 saving Remnant 11 as Griffin calls them, which had 
often been only vaguely aware of each other's existence and goals. Ibid., 
p. 461. Beyond this, however, and perhaps unique to a totalitarian scene, 
was the factor of access to information, necessitated, as Gisevius writes, 
because of the "cordon of silence Lwhicbl was one of the Nazis' most dan-
gerous weapons." Gisevius, p. 282. And there was the need for places in 
significant sectors of the governing hierarchy, for decent people staying 
"in the lions' den, 11 as Bethge puts it, and keeping a "foothold there." 
Bethge, pp. 532-533. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there was 
the possibility in this army-related opposition for obtaining the nec-
essary instruments of force to use in eliminating the Nazi system since, 
as Allen Dulles writes, 11 In a. police state equipped with machine guns, 
tear gas, tanks and aircraft, revolutions are not made by aroused masses 
with their bare hands." Allen Dulles, Germany's Underground (New York, 
1947), p. 21. 
179See Rothfels, p. 66. 
180;fueeler-Ben..riett writes that two of the generals, Reichenau and 
Busch, objected to Beck's memorandum. Wheeler-Bennett, p. 403~ However, 
O'Neill, quoting one of the officers who was present at the meeting, notes 
that the objections raised by the two generals were tactical, Reichenau 
warning, for exa,~ple, that individual visits by the officers would be 
more effective than a mass confrontation. 0 1Neill, P~ 159. 
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in an action which, by his own admission, would have meant the end of Ger-
man 11Kultur. 11181 
It is not unfair to characterize Brauchitsch as something of a man of 
straw. We have already discussed his financial obligation to Hitler and 
the fact that his wife was a zealous Nazi. But in addition to this, Man-
stein writes that Brauchitsch "often appeared slightly inhibited L;_ng/ he 
was certainly rather sensitive 11182--q_ualities that hardly provided him the 
annor he needed in his dealings with the Fuehrer.183 "Particularly," Man-
stein adds, "he was no match for Hitler dialectically. 11184 A confession 
which Brauchitsch made to Halder during the crisis in the fall of 1939 
is worth quoting now because it suggests something of what might have 
happened on this occasion. "Please do not hold it against me. I know 
you are dissatisfied with me. But when I confront this man, I feel as 
if someone were choking me and I cannot find another word. 11185 And Wal-
ter Warlimont, Jodl 1s deputy, observed the same difficulty. He writes 
that when Brauchitsch spoke with the Fuehrer, he "often appeared prac-
tically paralyzed. 11186 
181Brauchitsch is quoted in O'Neill, p. 159. 
182Manstein, p. 76. 
183some credit should go to Hitler for his ability to measure sub-
ordinates, as revealed in a statement he made to Frau von Dirksen, after 
she had heard him rudely berate and dismiss an official. "I know exactly 
with which people I can allow myself this and with whom I cannot." Quoted 
in Deutsch, Hitler And His Generals, p. 272. 
184Manstein, p. 76. 
185neutsch interview with Halder, quoted in Conspiracy In The Twi-
light War, p. 34. 
186walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, trans., R.H. 
Barry (New York, 1964), p. 61. 
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Hitler's tirade at his Army Commander d:id not. constitute all of his 
response to Beck's declaration and the senior general.s opposition to war, 
although typically, he reacted in an indirect manner. First, he tried to 
circumvent the generals by inviting their chiefs of staff to a dinner at 
the Berghof on August 10. Jodl, who was present, records in :his diary 
that Hitler spoke for three hours on his general political theories, but 
that even these lower-ranking officers seemed opposed to the ~'genius of 
the Fuhrer. 11 and one of them, von Wietersheim, Ad,am.' s Gl, or operations 
chief, went so far as to tell Hitler that it ~,as ms commander's opinion 
that the "West Wall" could not be held against French attacks, for more 
than three weeks. At this, the Fuehrer became "very indignant and flamed 
up, 11 to use Jodl' s description. Launching into another harangue, he in-
formed his listeners that German soldiers were superior to French, that 
German weapons were superior to French, and that German forti£ications 
could be held indefinitely against the French, finishing with the words: 
11E1n Hundsfott diese Stellung nicht halt, 1"'187wm.ch, being one of his 
less urbane remarks, is best left untranslated. Second, Hitler ensured 
that no further military attempts would be made to, claim co-responsibility 
by ordering changes made in the General Staff Handbook. Thus, the new 
edition "laid it down that the role of the General Staf.f o.fficer was that 
of an adviser, helper and executive, but that he did not participate in 
the Commander's responsibilities. 11188 In this way 7 the Fuehrer closed 
off the possibility that another Beck might try to gain a voice in the 
decision-making process. 
187Jodl 1s diary entry is in NGA, iv, p~ 364. 
188Goerlitz, p. 342. 
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Between Hitler's rebukes and Brauchitsch's weakness, Beck was le~ 
with no alternative but to tender his resignation, which the Fuehrer ac-
cepted on condition that it not be made public for reasons of foreign 
policy.189 Beck agreed to these tenns, withdrawing from office without_ 
attracting any of the speculation that might have been expected of such 
an event at such a time. Thus do men, even in change, come up against 
the limits forged by training and reinforced by habit.190 Gisevius, who 
was more politically astute, asked Beck why he had not insisted on a pub-
lic announcement. The ex-Staff Chief could only reply that an officer was 
not accustomed to 11thrustlf.ni/ his own personality into the foreground.n191 
Under the force of events, Beck would outgrow many of these limitations 
and become what Schlabrendorff has called the "head" of the resistance 
movement.192 But he had, as he admitted, made a "mistake," allowing the 
traditions of his ca.ate to dominate what should have been a political 
189Gisevius, p. 282. 
l90nrawing upon Burke's "Dialectic of Tragedy" in Grammar, pp. 38-
41, Griffin discusses change in those who make a movement as "a progress 
from pathema through poiema to mathema; fro~ 'a suffering, misfortune, 
passive condition, state of 11ll.nd,' through 'a deed, doing, action, act,' 
to 'an adequate idea; the thing learned. 111 Griffin, 11 Dramatistic Theory," 
p. 461. For many leaders of the German Resistance, this progress was ex-
tremely difficult, as indicated by Beck's unwillingness to make a public 
issue of his resignation, even though he had just called for a collective 
stand by the generals against Hitler's war policy. Griffin suggests that 
the inability to move completely from one state to the next means a fail-
ure "to 'shift ••• coordinates,' 'acquire a new perspective,' 'see around 
the corner, 1 and hence prophesy. ' 11 Ibid., p. 464. Freely applied to the 
anti-Nazis, it meant a prolongation of the movement through a series of 
crises or critical moments, while they not only had to contend with Hit-
ler's presumptive advantages but also with their own weaknesses and wl-
nerabilities. 
191Gisevius, p. 283. 
192schlabrendorff, They Almost Killed Hitler, p. 44. 
decision.193 It was a choice that was not to be his again. 
Hitler was probably glad to see Beck go. For one thing, he could 
not, as Manstein observed, "let himself suffer compulsion, 111941east of 
all by a refusal to obey orders. For another, Beck was a worthy oppon-
ent, as even Hitler recognized. "The only man I fear is Beck. That 
120. 
man could do something against me, 11 was the way the Fuehrer had put it 
during the height of the Fritsch crisis.195 With his fingertip feeling 
or sixth-sense, Hitler had accurately identified a man who was to become 
one of his chief protagonists. What his intuition failed to tell him was 
that there were others. 
Beck's silent exit did not mean that the resistance movement was a-
bandoning the stage to the Fuehrer. Franz Halder, Beck's deputy, was 
named to replace him, and he too, as we have seen, was a member of the 
resistance. Before taking the post, Beck had instructed Halder to get 
in touch with Oster to determine what could still be done to prevent Hit-
ler from going through with his plan of attack against Czechoslovakia.196 
Time was running short, only a month remaining until the final deadline 
date. Thus, Halder contacted Oster and the opposition reached the point 
of its first formal plot against the Nazi dictatorship--the climax of 
this act. 
193Gisevius, p. 283. 
l94Manstein is quoted in Ritter, p. 92. 
l95zeller quotes Guertner on Hitler's statement; p. 19. 
196Ritter, p. 99. 
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From the group at the Tirpitzufer, Halder obtained the script which 
has come to be known as the "Oster Study. 11197 Briefly..') it envisioned the 
arrest of the Fuehrer by an ad llQ.Q. formation of s01ldiers, workers, and 
students (a mixture designed to show the broad sco,pe of resistance sup-
port), under the command of Captain Friedrich Hei~·.z of the Abwehr. It 
was Oster's intent to take Hitler alive because the plan called for a 
subsequent show trial before the "People's Courtir-an irony the plotters 
could not resist since the Fuehrer himself had created these agencies of 
11 justice" for the protection of the Volksgenossen... The basis -J:or the 
prosecution's case was to be the pile of documents, collected by Groscurth 
and Gisevius, the hope being that Hitler would be declared insane. Bon-
hoeffer had approached his father, the director oF the psychiatric clinic 
at Berlin's Charite Hospital, with a case history of the Fuehrer's mental 
condition, beginning with his psychosomatic blindness at the end of the 
World War. While Dr. Bonhoeffer was understandab1~r reluctant to call Hit-
ler a lunatic on the basis of second-hand information, he did agree to ar-
range for a panel of psychiatrists to examine him cince he had been cap-
tured. If all else failed, the conspirators were ~esolved to introd~ce 
evidence of Hitler's meeting of the previous November, thereby revealing 
him as a man bent on starting an aggressive war. 1Hso, some preliminary 
l97The various features of the "Oster Studyrn have been culled from 
several sources: Bethge, pp. 534-535; Gisevius, PP~ 310-Jll; Halder, NGA, 
Supp., B, pp. 1552-1553; John, pp. 32-33; Ritter, ~m 101; and Schacht, pp. 
119-124. Like other resistance documents which followed it3 the plan could 
be equated with what Griffin calls "the announcemerntt of a stand .... a con-
stitution, manifesto, covenant, program, proclamation, declaration, tract 
for the times, statement, or counterstatement. 11 Griffin, 1~Drarnatistic 
Theory, 11 pp. 462-463. As subsequent discussion will indicate, the resist-
ers had recourse to many of these fonns of expressi0n, although in terms 
of the scene in which they acted, their war of word's had to be uttered 
sotto ~-
work had been done for a provisional government, and while projections 
were vague, it was expected that some leading figure from the Weimar 
period--Otto Gesler, Gustav Neske, or even ex-Foreign Minister Neurath 
--could be prevailed upon to head a caretaker administration until a 
National Assembly was convened. 
To this plan for capturing the Fuehrer, Halder added military re-
finements. With the help of his deputy, Stulpnagel, the police offi-
cals, Helldorf and Nebe, the local Military District Commander, General 
Witzleben, the City Commandant, General von Hase, and the Commander of 
the Potsdam Garrison, Graf von Brockdorff-Ahlefeld, Halder determined 
to seize Berlin by a coup d 1main in order to prevent any countercoup 
by Hitler's supporters. Also, General Erich Hoepner, the Commander 
of the Third Panzer Division, then stationed in Thuringia, was alerted 
to be ready to intercept the Munich SS should they attempt to rescue 
their leader. Finally, Halder grafted all these plans to Hitler's 
proposed attack against Czechoslovakia, the assumption being that 
these maneuvers could best be carried out as part of its execution. 
There were three factors upon which the new Chief of Staff felt 
the success of the plot hinged. The first was timing. He had to know 
in advance of the Fuehrer's final order to attack so that he could put 
resistance plans into operation. This Stulpnagel arranged for with an 
unsuspecting Jodl, and the resisters were promised forty-eight hours 
notice.198 The second factor was public opinion. Halder believed 




that there was little prospect of overthrowing him successfully. • • • 
What was needed was a setback such as no propaganda tricks could dissim-
ulate •• • • 11199 For achieving this "setback," Halder depended upon the 
third factor; namely, that Beck was correct in his assessment of the im-
pending crisis: that France and Britain really would resist an attack up-
on Czechoslovakia. Certainly, Hitler had been right 'in the past, but 
Czechoslovakia, Beck had argued, was different in kind. France had a 
military treaty with Czechoslovakia and Britain had a military treaty 
with France. 
Behind the Chief of Staff's need for a "setback" lurked the fear 
of a reverse Dolchstoss, or stab-in-the-back myth by Hitler's followers, 
just as the civilian politicians had been so accused by Ludendorff and 
other military leaders after the annistice and surrender of 1918-1919. 
For Halder, as well as for many other generals, the myth was reai.200 
Gisevius, who talked with him at this time, writes that Halder was 
"much intimidated by recollections of the stab-in-the-back •••• He 
feared to stand before the people as an individual or as the represent-
ative of a class who had brought about the Titan's fall. 11201 Also, Witz-
leben was worried over the difference of opinion between Hitler and Beck. 
Gisevius recalls that there was 
one point that Witzleben, too, wanted clarified beforehand. Would 
it actually come to a war? Or were the diplomatic disturbances that 
were being played up by Goebbels just the usual stage thunder? Were 
199Gisevius, p. 292. 
200Beck, for example, believed it. Foerster reproduces one of his 
letters dated November 28, 1918, in which Beck specifically attributes Ger-
many's defeat to a 11 long prepared stab-in:...the-back. 11 Foerster, p. 16ff. 
201Gisevius, pp. 294-295. 
not the Western Powers actually aiming at something else entirely? 
Was not some critical shift taking place beh~B~ the scenes? Would 
Hitler be given a clear channel to the East? 
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In order to reassure the generals (and themselves as well), the ci-
vilian sector of the resistance undertook to offer them proo£s of Allied 
determination. One such was a visit which Gisevius arranged between Witz-
leben and Schacht who, with his past success at financing rearmament and 
his friends in London, was considered an expert on British affairs. As 
Schacht describes the results of the conversation_, 11Witzleben was quite 
convinced ••• that the Western Powers would under no circumstances allow 
Germany a free hand. 11203 Other meetings were held. Halder., .for instance, 
also visited with Schacht, who expressed the same views to the new Staff 
Chief as he had to Witzleben.204 And Erich Kordt, whom we have previously 
mentioned, met with Brauchitsch and told him that it was the opinion of 
the Foreign Office that if there was a German attack on Czechoslovakia, 
military intervention by Britain and France was absolutely certain.205 
Another of the proofs involved sending representatives to London in 
order to inform the British Government about the situation in Germany and 
to gain British assurance that the Allies would stand firm. 206 The first 
was Ewald von Kleist, who arrived in late August under a cover prepared 
202Gisevius, pp. 304-305. 
203schacht, Account Settled, pp. 123-124. 
204 NCA, Supp., B, p. 1554. 
205Erich Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten: Die Wilhelmstrasse in Frieden 
und Kreig (Stuttgart, 1950), p. 243. 
206French 
cal instability. 
ligence, p. 59. 
guarantees had been ruled out because of domestic politi-
See Kleist I s statement to Ian Colvin in Chie.f Of Intel-
125. 
by the oppositionists in the Abwehr. Kleist spoke to Robert Vansittart 
and later, to Winston Churchill. To both, he emphasized Hitler's deter-
mination on war--11 there is only one extremist and that is Hitler himself" 
--the unanimous opposition of the generals, "all without exception," to 
war, and their willingness to try to prevent it "if they get encourage-
ment and help from outside." To this end, Kleist urged a finn declara-
tion by Britain to disabuse the Fuehrer of his belief "that the attitude 
of France and England was utterly bluff," and an appeal to the Gennans 
by "one of your leading statesmen ••• emphasizing the horrors of war 
and the inevitable catastrophe to which it would leact. 11207 
From Churchill, who was an influential political figure, but not a 
member of the cabinet, Kleist received a letter which declared as Church-
ill's personal opinion the conviction that "the spectacle of an armed at.-
tack by Gem.any upon a small neighbor ••• will rouse the whole British 
Empire and compel the gravest decisions. Do not, I pray you, be misled 
upon this point." Churchill added that he had the permission of the For-
eign Secretary, Lord Halifax, to say that the Prime Minister's statement 
in the House of Commons on March 24, 1938, in which he had declared that 
"where peace and war are concerned, legal obligations are not alone in-
volved, and if war broke out, it would be unlikely to be confined to 
those who had assumed such obligations, 11208still represented the policy 
of His Majesty's Government. 209 
207Kleist 1s conversations with Vansittart and Churchill are re-
produced in Colvin, None So Blind, pp. 223-229. 
208chamberlain 1s declaration of March 1938 is reprinted in Nev-
ille Chamberlain, In Search of Peace (New York, 1939), pp. 79-81. 
209churchill's letter is reprinted in Colvin, None So Blind, p. 
229. 
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From official circles, Kleist received nothing, but there were cer-
tain results which occurred nonetheless, although they were unknown to 
him. Vansittart had forwarded his account of the conversation to Cham-
berlain. The Prime Minister, while acknowledging Kleist•s sincerity--
"! take it that Von Kleist is violently anti-Hitler"--still thought his 
warnings sounded very much like those "of the Jacobites at the Court of 
France in King William's time." Consequently, "we must discount a good 
deal of what he says. 1121° Chamberlain's own concern was not with second-
ing French commitments to the Czechs, 211niuch less with offering assurances 
to Hitler's German opponents.212 Instead, the vague idea of a face-to-
face meeting between himself and the Fuehrer was already beginning to 
take shape in his mind, 213and this undoubtedly colored his judgment. In 
210chamberlain 1 s reply is in Colvin, None So Blind, p. 228. 
211To indicate the real direction of the Prime Minister's think-
ing, see his private letter to one of his sisters written four days be-
fore his House of Commons speech, in Keith Feiling, The Life Of Neville 
Chamberlain (London, 1946), p. 348. 
212 A number of books have sought to analyze the motives which im-
pelled the Prime Minister in his policy of appeasement; among them, John 
Wheeler-Bennett, Munich: Prologue to Tragedy (New York, 1948); Martin Gil-
bert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers (London, 1963); and A. L. Rowse, AJ:2.-
peasement: A Study in Political Decline (New York, 1961). Emphases and 
conclusions, as might be expected, vary considerably. But among the rea-
sons generally agreed upon are: (1) An emotional reaction to the short-
comings of Versailles, especially the failure of that treaty to ensure 
the right of peoples to self-determination, as promised in Wilson's Four-
teen Points; (2) A deeply-held abhorrence to war, particularly in view of 
Britain's large number of dead and wounded between 1914-1918; (3) A bus-
inessman's approach to disputes--quiet, orderly discussion, compromise 
and conciliation, which he thought could be transferred to the realm of 
international politics; and (4) A strong inclination to believe uncriti-
cally in his own judgment and to act on the basis of it. Taken together, 
these factors largely explain everything. 
213Accounts differ as to the first time Chamberlain mentioned,the 
idea of a meeting with Hitler, the latest placing it on August 29, the 
earliest around August 15. See, Colvin, None So Blind, pp. 231-232. 
any event, while he summoned home the British Ambassador to Germany on 
August 28, it was more to make preparations for this conference than to 
suggest strained relations between the two countrles. 214 
Kleist returned to Berlin the end of Auguste To Admiral Canaris, 
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he gave an unfavorable impression of his mission. "I have found nobody 
in London who wishes to take this opportunity to wage preventive war. 11215 
Still, it was decided to use all the evidence available that the British 
would fight if it came to fighting. On instrnctions from Oster, Kleist 
went from one general to another, showing them Churchill's letter as well 
as a public reaffirmation of Chamberlain's March 24 declaration, made by 
Sir John Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer, on August 27, 216urging them 
to accept these as signs of Allied intentions .. Ian Colvin, who was with 
Kleist, reports that he found some officers "keen and excitable, others 
dubious. 11217 
The meager results of Kleist's trip prompted the opposition to send 
another envoy. This was an Abwehr officer, Hans Boehm.-Tettelbach, who 
journeyed to London on September 2, repeated Kleist•s warnings, asked 
for the same assurances, and met with even fewer results than Kleist 
had.218 
214Nevile Henderson, Failure of a Mission (Mew York, 1949), p. 
151. 
215i<leist•s statement to Canaris is in Colvin, Chief Of Intel-
ligence, p. 66. 
216simon's Lanark speech is reprinted in Sir John Simon, Retro-
spect (London, 1952), see esp., p. 245. 
217colvin, Chief Of Intelligence, p. 68. 
218Wheeler-Bennett, who was a junior official of the Foreign Of-
fice at that time, reports that no one can even remember the conversa-
tions with Boehm-Tettelbach. Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, p. 414. 
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A third attempt was made. Theodore Kordt, Counsellor of the German 
Embassy in London, was sent a message by Weizsacker on September 7.219 
Kordt was instructed to repeat to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, a 
statement formulated by We'.i'.zsacker and expressly made in the name "of po-
litical and military circles in Berlin which desire by all means to pre-
vent war." Only firmness toward Hitler and his policy of force, Kordt 
stressed, would make it possible to avoid a conflict over Czechoslovakia. 
"Should Hitler still insist on ••• war, then I am in a position to as-
sure you that the ••• circles tor whom I speak will 'take arms against 
a sea of troubles and, by opposing, end them.' 11 The quotation from .Hg_-
let was meant to underscore the unusual and dramatic nature of the mes-
sage. And Kordt's final statement: "The German patriots see no other 
way out of the dilemma than close co-operation with the British Govern-
ment i:i order to prevent the great crime of war, 11220was intended to 
leave the British leaders with no doubts that firmness on their part 
was the "sea anchor" needed by the resisters if they were "to ride out 
the storm. 11221 
Unfortunately, Kordt, like the emissaries before him,,got polite-
ness and little more. The Foreign Secretary listened and replied that 
he would inform Chamberlain, treating the matter as highly confidential.222 
2l9For Weizsacker's account, see Memoirs, pp. 145-146. 
220i{ordt, pp. 279-281. 
2~his is Beck's metaphor, quoted in Colvin, Chief Of Intelli-
gence, p. 55. 
222Kordt, p. 282. 
But the decision had already been made.223 The Prime Minister was fly-
ing to Gennany to achieve 11 Peace in our time. 11 
We need not recount in detail all of the events which took place 
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in the negotiations between the Prime Minister and the Fuehrer at Berch-
tesgaden, Godesberg, and Munich. But we do need to recount the relation-
ship between those events and the plans of Hitler's opponents for a coup 
d'etat. For it is in this relationship, as prefigured by resistance mis-
sions to Britain, that the real tragedy lies in the climax to this first 
act of the drama, as well as serious questions about criticisms by some 
Western historians, criticisms which we will take up shortly. 
Chamberlain's meeting with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on September 15 
was initially viewed by the conspirators with equal parts of hope and 
despair. The pessimists, like Canaris, could scarcely believe that the 
Prime Minister would stoop to play the supplicant's role. Colonel Erwin 
Lahousen, who was with him when the news arrived, quotes Canaris as say-
ing, 11What--he--visit that man! 11 and repeating the words several times 
as if reiteration would make them more believable. 224 The optimists, 
like Gisevius, remembered the lack of clarity in Britain's policy in 
1914, 225and assumed that the trip was only a "tactical gesture. The 
223rt was not, of course, revealed to the members of the resist-
ance. As Halifax said to Kordt a few days after Munich, "We were not 
able to be as frank with you as you were with us. At the time you gave 
us your message, we were already considering sending Chamberlain to Mu-
nich.11 Quoted in Rothfels, p. 63. 
224Lahousen is quoted in Colvin, Chief Of Intelligence, p. 69. 
225Historians have frequently alleged that Foreign Secretary, Sir 
Edward Grey, failed to give sufficiently clear warning to Gennany that ag-
gression against Belgium would bring in not only France but Britain too. 
See for example, Barbara Tuchman, The Guns Of August (New York, 1963), 
pp. 97-98. 
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British ••• wanted to show Hitler glaringly in the wrong. 11226 
What neither the optimists nor pessimists could know, of course, was 
that Hitler had a persuasive weapon of insidious power: Chamberlain's weak-
ness for the principle of self-determination.227 Thus, the negotiations, 
which b~gan in acrimony and soon led to the Prime !rinister's threat to re-
turn home, reached their turning point when Hi..tler~ scaling down his real 
desire to destroy Czechoslovakia to one of merely dismembering her, said: 
"If, in considering the Sudeten question, you are prepared to recognize 
the right of peoples to self-determination, then we can continue the dis-
cussion in order to see how that principle can be applied in practice." 
To which Chamberlain replied: "If I am to give you an answer on the ques-
tion of self-determination, I must first consu:1t my colleagues. 11228 Then, 
according to Paul Schmidt, Hitler's interpreter and the only other person 
to witness the meeting, Chamberlain added that "he could state personally 
that he recognized the principle of detachment of t..he Sudeten areas •••• 
He wished to return to England to report to the Government and secure their 
approval for his personal attitude.229 
Between the Berchtesgaden conference on Septemi.ber 15 and the Godesberg 
conferences on the 22-23, Chamberlain succeeded in rallying his cabinet to 
226Gisevius, p. 321. 
2270n Chamberlain's weakness for se+f-determanation, see footnote 
212, page sixty-one. 
228Hitler 1s proposal and Chamberlain's reply are quoted in Paul 
Schmidt, Hitler's Interpreter (New York, 1951), p. 93. 
229chamberlain' s addendum is recounted in Scl'llllidt 's shorthand 
notes, made while he was interpreting, and are reprinted in Document~ 
on German Foreign Poligy, 10 Vols., (Washington, D. C., l966), ii, P• 
796. Hereafter abbreviated as DGFPG For corroboration of Chamber-
lain's attitude, see his letter~one of his sisters, September 19, 
1938, in Failing, p. 367. 
his 11 personal attitude." Also, he prevailed in carrying the French and 
in pressuring the Czechs. 
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Word of the Prime Minister's surrender had reached the conspirators 
by devious channels23°and they were quite "dismayed," to use Gisevius 1 
description. Still, plans were held in readiness since Goebbels' prop-
aganda campaign against Czech "atrocities" continued unabated and Hit-
ler's secret mobilization orders to the army remained in force. 
Chamberlain's meetings with Hitler at Godesberg on September 22-23 
were viewed by the conspirators as portending the worst. But their hopes 
were raised when they learned that Hitler had altered his earlier propos-
al.231 Although they lacked specific details, Chamberlain did not. At 
the first meeting, the Fuehrer now insisted that "the occupation of the 
Sudeten territories to be ceded must take place forthwith 11232--a plebi-
scite in which the people voted for their own preferences could come lat-
er under Gennan control. This was hardly the program of free elections 
and planned withdrawl that the Prime Hinister had envisaged, 233and the 
230Gisevius writes: "Since Hitler and Ribbentrop were not. pub-
lishing their diplomatic information, we had to keep ourselves informed 
by our own efforts •••• We had our spies everywhere--in the war min-
istry, the police headquarters, the mimstry of the interior, and es-
pecially the foreign office." Gisevius, p. 324. Still, to anyone who 
has ever played "Gossip," it should be evident that such a communica-
tions network, although necessitated by circumstances, was not the most 
accurate. 
231General information about some change in the proposal and a 
resulting deadlock was not difficult to come by. William Shirer re-
ports in his diary for September 23: "It seems that Hitler has given 
Chamberlain the double-cross. 11 William Shirer, Berlin Diary (New York, 
1941), p. 111. 
232schmidt, p. 97. 
233rn describing Chamberlain I s proposal, Schmidt writes: 11 he had 
drawn up a plan ••• whereby the territories inhabited by the Sudeten 
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only concession he gained from Hitler in a second meeting on the 23 was 
a short extension of the Czech's final evacuation date from September 28 
to the JOth. 234 Still, Chamberlain was willing to offer his services 11as 
a mediator" and transmit the Fuehrer's new terms to the French and their 
allies, the Czechs, although he had little hope that either would accept.235 
News of the deadlock spread gloom over most Europeans but filled the 
conspirators with hope. William Shirer recounts in his diary for Septem-
ber 27 the reactions of Berliners to a military show of strength: 
A motorized division rolled through the city streets just at dusk 
this evening in the direction of the Czech frontier. I went out 
to the corner ••• where the column was turning down the Wilhelm-
strasse, expecting to see a tremendous demonstration. I pictured 
the scenes I had read of in 1914 when cheering throngs on this 
same street tossed flowers at the marching soldiers, and the 
girls ran up and kissed them. The hour was undoubtedly chosen 
today to catch the hundreds of thousands of Berliners pouring 
out of their offices at the end of the day's work. But they 
ducked into the subways, refused to look on, and the handful 
that did stood at the curb in utter silence, unable to find a 
word of cheer rgr the flower of their youth going awa:y to a 
glorious war.23 
The march had indeed been meant as a propaganda gesture. Hitler, who 
was watching from a window of the Reich Chancellery, is reported to have 
turned in a rage and declared: "With such a people I cannot wage war. 11237 
And General Witzleben, who led the division, said later that "he had felt 
Germans were to be transferred to Germany. Even the details of the new 
frontier were provided for in the plan. Chamberlain then outlined a com-
prehensive and complicated system of agreements providing for relatively 
protracted handing over periods." Schmidt, p. 101. 
234Ibid. As we have seen, this was no concession at all. 
235Ibid., pp. 99-100. 
2J6shirer, Diary, pp. 114-115. 
237Gisevius, .Ifilfil, xii, p. 219. 
very much inclined to unlimber there and then in Eront of the Chancel-
lery.238 
Notwithstanding these evil portents (of which, admittedly, the 
Fuehrer was only aware of one), there was always the chance that Hit-
ler could get what he wanted diplomatically. He had not yet heard 
from Chamberlain officially239on whether the French and the Czechs 
would yield to his latest demands. Thus, late in the evening of the 
27, the Fuehrer wrote a letter to the Prime Minister in which he re-
iterated his Godesberg claims and underscored the fact that for him 
the initiative still belonged to Chamberlain, although time was run-
ning out. The closing sentence read: 11 I leave it t.o your judgment 
whether in view of these facts, you consider that you should contin-
ue your effort ••• to bring the Government in Prague to reason at the 
very last hour. 11240 
The conspirators, who were still unaware of the exact nature of 
the Godesberg demands, saw a copy of the letter on the morning of the 
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28. Gisevius notes that it was "insulting in its insistence that ter-
ritory already promised must be handed over punctually on September J0. 11241 
Halder, who until then had not been informed of the precise date for the 
238witzleben is quoted in Goerlitz, p. JJ8. 
239Hitler had had an unofficial visit from Sir Horace Wilson, Cham-
berlain's special foreign policy advisor, on the afternoon of September 27. 
Wilson largely counseled the Fuehrer to be patient, assuring him that he 
"would try to make these Czechs sensible." Schmidt, p. 105. 
240The full text of the letter is reprinted in DGFP, ii, pp. 966-
968. 
241Gisevius, p. 325. 
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attack,242grasped the significance of the September JO deadline and urged 
that the moment had arrived for issuing the orders to seize Hitler and cor-
don off Berlin.243 He went to see Brauchitsch and returned to say that the 
Commander-in-Chief would probably take part in the operation, but wanted to 
reserve his final decision until after he had visited the Chancellery.244 
Technically, there were some problems since the parade of the previous day 
had greatly reduced Witzleben's command, now on its way to the Czech fron-
tier, and Hoepner 1 s panzers, the strongest body of dependable troops, stood 
two days march from Berlin. 
At midday, Brauchitsch went to the Chancellery for a final look at the 
lay of the land before deciding whether to order troops to move on the cap-
ital. While he was there, he learned what Hitler had learned even earlier 
--that the Prime Minister was ready to grasp at any straw and had acceded 
to the Fuehrer's demands. The prev~ous night, after reading Hitler's let-
ter, Chamberlain had replied immediately: 
••• I feel certain that you can get all essentials without war, 
and without delay. I am ready to come to Berlin myself at once 
242For proof of Hitler's secrecy in this matter, there is Jod1 1 s 
diary entry for September 6: that the Fuehrer had ordered that absolutely 
no hint of the moment of the attack on Czechoslovakia was to be given to 
anyone involved. NCA, i, p. 534. 
243Gisevius, p. 325. 
244Ibid~ Brauchitsch, whose character has already been discussed 6 
was a hesitant but peripheral member of the plot. In his interrogation 
at Nuremberg, Halder explained the degree of the Army Chief's involvement. 
"I had never talked expressly to Brauchltsch about thiso But he knew my 
at~itude and he had a notion of what was going on. Once he ca~e to see 
me while von Witzleben was with me, and von Witzleben spoke in such a 
way that Brauchitsch could not help but understand unless he was deaf. 
Hay I say why I did that. It is clear that such an opinion oK the state 
of Adolf Hitler could be betrayed at any moment. It might not succeed. 
In this case, I had to keep apart my commander-in-chief. o + I may 
play with my own head, but not someone else's." NCA, Supp., B, p. 1553. 
to discuss arrangements for transfer with you and representatives 
of the Czech Government, together with representatives of France 
and Italy, if you desire. I feel convinced we can reach agree-
ment.245 
1.35. 
A telegram was also sent to Mussolini, asking him to urge the Fuehrer's 
acceptance of the plan and to agree to being represented at the proposed 
meeting. To make a long story short, the Duce, who, despite his war-like 
utterances, did not want to fight either, welcomed the Prime Minister's 
proposal and undertook to secure Hitler's acceptance as well, a feat that 
was accomplished with no great difficulty by the Italian Ambassador, At-
tolico, just before noon on September 28. The rest was anticlimactic. 
The Munich conference began on the 29. 
This was the information which Brauchitsch learned while at the Chan-
cellery. Goerlitz writes that he "immediately knew that a coup d'etat was 
out of the question. One really could not arrest a man and have him tried 
as a war criminal when he was on the point of winning a completely blood-
less victory. 11246 When he heard the news, Halder is reported to have said, 
"What can we do? He succeeds in everything he does. 11247 Gisevius confesses 
that for a few hours he imagined that "we could revolt anyway. But Witz-
leben soon demonstrated that the troops would never revolt against a vic-
torious Fuehrer. 11248 And Schacht concludes: "The intervention of foreign 
statesmen was something I could not possibly have taken into account. 11249 
245chamberlain, p. 197. 
246Goerlitz, p. 338. 
247Ibid. 
248Gisevius, p. 325. 
249schacht, Account Settled, p. 125. 
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Such a narrative seems straightforward enough, and indeed, with only 
one documentary exception which we shall discuss shortly, historians are 
generally agreed upon it. Yet, agreement upon sequence-of-events does 
not necessarily mean agreement upon interpretation of sequence-of-events, 
and a group of Western critics, basing their arguments upon the chronol-
ogy just cited, have reached the conclusion: (1) That Chamberlain's sur-
render was only an excuse for the resisters to cancel their plans; that 
the generals ought to have acted regardless o~ what the Prime Minister 
did since all the elements for a successful coup should have been pres-
ent;250(2) That the plotters were confused in their reading of Hitler's 
letter to Chamberlain on September 27; that the message should not have 
led them to believe that the moment to strike was at hand; 251and (3) That 
there was no guarantee that the coup, had it been initiated, would have 
been successful.252 
Taking these points in reverse order, there is, o~ course, no guar-
antee that an incipient act--particularly one as serious as an insurrec-
tion in a police state-can ever be fully guaranteed. Such an absolute 
is not to be found in the probable affairs of men, and to paraphrase a 
rebuke Winston Churchill once made to a British officer who demanded 
such a prohibitive condition, it only exists in heaven and critics who 
250For proponents of this position, see Terence Prittie, Germans 
Against Hitler (Boston, 1964), pp. 65-68; Namier, Nazi Era, pp. 9-10; 
Shirer, Third Reich, pp. 404-414; and Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, pp. 
414-424. 
25lrbid., except Namier, Nazi Era. 
252Ibid. 
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require it run a grave risk of never getting there.253 Furthermore, nei-
ther then nor after the war did any member of the resistance movement ever 
suggest such a guarantee. At the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Crimi-
nals, Halder was questioned on this very point by Captain Sam Harris, at-
torney on the staff of the American prosecution. Halder, noting the ef-
fect of the Prime Minister's surrender, said: 
We were firmly convinced that we would be successful. But now came 
Mr. Chamberlain, and with one stroke the danger Qf war was averted 
••• the critical hour for force was avoided. LHarriif: Do I un-
derstand you to say that if Chamberlain had not come to Munich, 
your plan WQUld have been executed, and Hitler would have been 
deposed? LHalder]: I can only say, the plan would have been ex-
ecuted. I do not know if it would have been successfui.254 
Finally, in arguing about the moot point of no certainty for the success 
of the operation, these critics miss the substantive rhetorical problem 
inherent in the failure of the plot. That is, they miss the gamble taken 
by resistance members, not only with their heads if they were found out, 
but with their credibility if they were proved wrong in trying to per-
suade the generals that the British and French would fight for Czecho-
slovakian sovereignty. The weakness of Brauchitsch has already been 
mentioned. Never again would the Anny Commander be so close to cooper-
ating with the resisters. In what will be Act Two of the German Resist-
ance Movement, the best that could be hoped for was Brauchitsch 1s neu-
trality. "I myself shall do nothing, 11 he said to Halder during the cli-
max of the struggle in the fall of 1939, 11but I will not oppose a."lYone 
who does do something. 11255 And the worst that could be feared was to 
253winston Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston, 1951), p. 339. 
254 NCA, Supp., B, p. 1558. 
255G. . 389 isevius, p. • 
act in spite of Brauchitsch. "I'll lock him up and throw the key into 
the W. C., 11 was the way a frustrated Stulpnagel would later put it to 
Halder. 256 Moreover, Halder himself would never be as prone to mutiny 
as he was in September 1938. During that month he had been prepared 
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to order up part of the anny as shock troops for a resistance uprising. 
And he had acted on the 28, only to see the results of his action come 
to nothing as Chamberlain surrendered at Munich and opposition arguments 
were proved false. Another decision of this kind would come much harder, 
as events of the following year were to prove. Looking briefly at some 
other officer reactions, we can safely conclude that the Munich agree-
ment had to be scored heavily against the resisters. Lahousen told Col-
vin that he had heard a senior officer describe Canaris and his friends 
as "the people who undermined the influence of the General Staff" by op-
posing Hitler on the wrong issue. 257 And General Rundstedt, who had a 
brief meeting with Kleist at the end of September, became extremely an-
noyed when Kleist pursued the idea of action against Hitler.258 It was 
as if the generals had been hoaxed and the Fuehrer right all along. 
The second point concerns the famous Hitler letter of the evening 
of September 27. What is involved here is that these critics are un-
able to understand how the plotters could have mistaken such a moderate 
communication as insulting, and what is more of a mystery, been prepared 
to act on the basis of it. In order to avoid prejudicing the issue, let 
256neutsch interview with Halder, in Conspiracy In The Twilight 
War, p. 208. 
257colvin, Chief Of Intelligence, p. ?O. 
258Ibid. 
them state their own position: 
But either the text of the letter had been altered in the copying 
or the generals misunderstood it, for~ • ait was so moderate in 
tone, so full of promises to "negotiate details with the Czechs" 
and to II give a formal guarantee for the remainder of Czechoslova-
kia, 11 so conciliatory in suggesting to Chamberlain that he might 
continue his efforts, that the Prime Hinister, ,after reading it, 
had immediately telegraphed Hitler suggesting a Big-Power confer-
ence to settle the details, and at the same time wired Mussolini 
asking his support for such a proposai.259 
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Now documents are important to all writers of history, but for the 
rhetorical critic, they are more than a record of ideaso 260 Put differ-
ently, documents are not only significant in their own right as persua-
sive artifacts, but also as the center of "complex ••• relationship@ 
that exist between a writer or speaker and his audience ••• of which 
both ••• are a part, and on which they exert an influenceB 11261 With 
this in mind, a closer look at the so-called 11moderate" letter, so 
"full of promises" and "so conciliatory," reveals that only the clos-
ing passage cited earlier constituted any change in Hitler's position. 262 
In matters of substance, the Fuehrer still insisted on "the immediate oc-
cupation lof the SudetenlangJ° by German contingents"; on the unavoidabil-
ity "that Czechoslovakia should lose part of her .fortifications [f.n fact, 
her whole defense system was losi711 ; and on the continued threat of war 
259Shirer, Third Reich, p. 407. 
260charles Lomas, "Rhetorical Criticism and Historical Perspec-
tive," Western Speech, XXXII (Summer, 1968), 195. 
261James T. Boulton, 1'The Criticism of Rhetoric and the Act of 
Communication, 11 in Essays On Rhetorical Criticism, ed., Thomas R. Nil-
son (New York, 1968), p. JO. 
262This is not my interpretation onlya Alan Bullock writes, 
"The letter contained no hint of modification. 11 Bullock, p. 4.12. 
if he did not get his way: 111 regret the idea of any attack on Czecho-
slovak territory. 11263 
We are left, then, with two alternatives: either the letter was 
not conciliatory, or the demands at Godesberg were not demands. And 
this choice is easily resolved by Prime Minister Chamberlain and Ambas-
sador Henderson's own words, uttered at Godesberg, when they were first 
given copies of Hitler's proposal. Interpreter Schmidt writes: 
The effect on Chamberlain and the other Englishmen was devastating. 
"But that's an ultimatum," exclaimed Chamberlain, lifting his hands 
in protest. 11 E1n Diktat," interjected Hendergon, who always liked 
to introduce Gennan words into a discussion.2 4 
In tenns of his own orientations, it is certainly possible that the 
Prime Minister, who was looking for a way to avoid what he perceived as 
impending disaster, was influenced by the civility of the letter, 265as 
well as by the fact that Hitler had troubled to write him and suggest 
that he continue his efforts. But this in no way militates against the 
accuracy of the interpretation given the letter by the Fuehrer's oppon-
ents, who might be styled an unintended if not tougher minded audience. 
Recall that they did not know the precise nature of the Godesberg ulti-
matum. Recall further that the British Government had deliberately mis-
led them in their every contact prior to Munich. Thus, while their per-
ceptions may have been understandably faulty with regard to Western treaty 
263DGFP, ii, pp. 966-967. 
264schmidt, p. 100. 
265Arguments based exclusively on the tone of diplomatic messages 
are not too impressive. As Churchill observed in a similar situation, 
"when you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite. 11 Winston 
Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston, 1951), p. 611. 
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obligations, they could still recognize a demand for the instant surren-
der of territory when they saw it. This was the issue that had in fact 
deadlocked the Godesberg negotiations, and the conspirators thought it 
meant war, as did nearly everyone else except for a Prime Minister bent 
on appeasement, or a few critics writing from the perspective of twenty 
years or more. Winston Churchill, speaking at the time, described the 
whole series of conferences for what they really were, and his interpre-
tation comes much closer to that of the resisters than it does to recent 
writers of history books. 
We really must not waste time after all this long debate upon the 
differences between positions reached at Berchtesgaden, at Godes-
berg, and at Munich. They can be very simply epitomized, if the 
house will permit me to vary the metaphor. One pound was demanded 
at pistol's point. When it was given, two pounds were demanded at 
pistol's point. Finally, the dictator consented to take~61, 17s. 6d and the rest in promises of good will for the future. 26 
Finally, we come to the first and perhaps the most important issue 
rhetorically: that Chamberlain's concessions at Munich were only an ex-
cuse for the plotters to cancel their plans; that they ought to have 
acted in spite of the Prime Minister's surrender since all of the pre-
requisites for a successful coup should have been present. In support 
of this position, these writers quote Halder's testimony at Nuremberg, 
in which he laid down a variation of the three conditions cited earlier 
which he considered essential for carrying out the operation: nclear and 
resolute leadership ••• readiness of the masses of the people to follow 
the idea of a revolution ••• Lani/ the right choice of time. 11267 These 
266winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston, 1948), p. 327. 
267 NCA, Supp., B, p. 1557. 
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critics claim that the second and third of these Factors existed, and 
that the absence of the first can only be blamed o'n the conspirators. 
William Shirer writes, "one can doubt that Genera!. Halder''s first con-
dition was ever fulfilled. n268 Terrence Pritt.ie ai.<lds_, "popular support 
might have been forthcoming at any time .... assuming t.hat the coup was 
carried out successfully. n269 And John Wheeler-Bennett co-ncludes: "they 
could have struck at any moment during the last half 0£ August and the 
first weeks of September. 11 270 
Again, taking these points in reverse order, the last half of Au-
gust and the first weeks of September did not constitute a peri,od in 
which the conspirators could act. For one thing, Halder had not even 
taken his post until September 1. For another, all Hi.tler had ordered 
was secret mobilization: he had not given his offi1~ers the final order 
to march--and that was the vital requirement. Frankly~ it is difficult 
to follow the reasoning of those who assert that g;enerals. can move mili-
tary units willy-nilly through the streets of a capital, under the eyes 
of the curious, and more importantly in this scene» the Gestapo, as cas-
ually as they might order reveille or taps.. Someo;ne will surely question 
their actions. As we shall see, this is exactly wbat happened on the af-
ternoon of July 20, 1944, before any body of troops appeared on the streets 
of Berlin. A mistaken belief by a zealous political oificer who thought 
he saw a retired field-marshal riding in a car ta t,he War Ministry helped 
268shirer, Third Reich, p. 413. 
269Prittie, p. 66. 
27~eeler-Bennett, Nemesis, p. 423. 
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trigger the defection of the commander of the Wachbataillon Grossdeutsch-
land and effectively ended the Berlin part of the revolt.271 When Hal-
der spoke of the right choice of time, he was referring to that brief mo-
ment after Hitler had ordered the attack but before the troops had actu-
ally crossed the frontier; a moment when, under the cloak of legality., it 
would be possible to muster soldiers, draw live ammunition, issue orders, 
and strike. And any historian who writes about time frames of days and 
weeks has simply failed to grasp two cardinal rules of a secret movement 
in a police state: that it must remain hidden until it strikes, and not 
attract attention even as it strikes. 272 
The second point about popular support is correct only if it is con-
ceived of statically as a public which thought there was going to be war 
over the Sudetenland. But by the time the resisters learned of the pre-
cise attack date, they no longer had such a public. Hassell notes in his 
diary for September 29: "One of the few certainties today is the overwhelm-
ing and tremendous relief of the whole nation that war has been averted~"273 
And one day later, William Shirer, traveling on the press train between 
Munich and Berlin, wrote in his journal: "Most of the leading Gennan edi-
tors on the train are tossing down champagne and not trying to disguise 
271This was Lieutenant Hans Hagen. For the full account of his 
activities that day, see "The Hagen Report" in Germans Against Hitler, 
ed., Erich Zimmerman and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, trans., Allan and Liese-
lotte Yahraes (Bonn, 1964), pp. 151-155. 
272Hitler certainly beca.Ine aware of the potential danger in un-
regulated troop movements. In what could be called another dialectical 
response, he had OKW, in the period immediately after Munich, create a 
timetable system whereby he was informed of the whereabouts of each di-
vision. Bar, p. 124. 
273 Hassell, p. 7. 
any more their elation over Hitler's terrific victory over Britain and 
France. 11274 In this reversing Zeitgeist--a mood of popular opinion 
changing from fear to relief to anticipation of a great national tri-
umph at no cost in blood or treasure--the public would not have looked 
with any great favor upon a military revolt against the man who had ac-
complished it. 
Third, and most critical, is the point about irresolute leadership. 
These commentators blame the generals for indecision, and John Wheeler-
Bennett, the most knowledgable among them, even offers a reason: "The 
conspirators hesitated to strike, just as /f,enerai/ van Lossow had hes-
itated in November 1923 /jt the time of Hitler's Munich Putscb7, looking 
vainly for that 51 per cent chance of success without which a General 
Staff will not operate. 11275 
It may be true that German officers are not anxious to act in the 
face of unfavorable odds, although there are enough exceptions to make 
the British historian's proposition somewhat less than universai. 276 
But to attribute the general's hesitation to a theory of probability 
requires an insensitivity to a central motif in the Ge:n:nany of the 
recent past as well as an unwillingness to use available evidence. 
To explain, the irresolution on the part of the officers can be as-
cribed to some statistical predictor as a surface manifestation onlyo 
274shirer, Diary, p. 142. 
275wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, p. 423. 
276Examples that come readily to mind include Frederick the 
Great's battles at Rossbach and Leuthen, Francois' attacks at Stal-
luponen and Gumbinnen, Rommel's first and second campaigns in North 
Africa, and Manstein's counterstroke at Kharkov. 
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On a deeper level--and one which none of these critics probe--the gener-
als hesitated because they feared a myth, or more accurately, a reversal 
of a myth. 277 What frightened Halder, as Gisevius 1 testimony clearly 
shows, 278was that he would have to stand before the German nation as 
the man who had destroyed Hitler at the height of his success. To as-
sign causes to odds ignores a reality Germans had lived with for nearly 
a quarter of a century. No officer, or political figure for that mat-
ter, could neglect the lesson of Weimar. It represented neither Fried-
rich Ebert 1 s steadfastness of purpose in domestic politics, nor the for-
eign triumphs of Gustav Stresemann. Instead, it stood for defeat, and 
defeat of the most abject kind. Its leaders, as many believed~ had stab-
bed in the back the victorious army in the field, 279and the burden of 
that belief lay like a weight upon all subsequent undertakings~ whether 
in the period of Weimar or after it. To establish the bona fides of the 
myth, it is only necessary to point to the hag-ridden politicians of Wei-
mar-lacking for friends, lacking for loyalty, and always on the edge of 
ruin because of agitators who could give popular voice to the myth. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the generals, one of whose num-
ber had created the myth, and who lived it, more fully perhaps, than any 
other group, so feared its impact; not surprising that Halder wanted 
277The importance of myth as a symbolic form was discussed in 
Chapter One, pp. 33-34, fn. 112. 
278see p. 58. 
279Although he was one of the chief targets of the myth, Pres-
ident Ebert himself contributed to its growth by publicly describing 
the German Army as returning "unvanquished from the field of bat.tle. 11 
Friedrich Ebert, Schriften 2 Aufzeichnungen, Reden (Dresden, 1926), p. 
128. 
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assurances that the Anglo-French Powers would stand firm on the issue of 
Czechoslovakia; not surprising that Witzleben wanted to know if it would 
actually come to war. There had to be a defeat, or the potential of a 
defeat, in order to justify the insurrection and nullify the possibility 
of a new myth at the outset. 280 Equally, the anti-Nazi civilians knew 
that they could not fonn a post-Hitler government, enjoying even minimum 
support, in the face of another Dolchstoss. Matters would be difficult 
enough without the onus of a new myth. As Weizsacker put it, "The ac-
tion would only in a certain degree have been understood and approved 
in Germany if it had been obviously taken to spare the people the mis-
ery of war. 11281 For the sake of the new government, then, as well as 
for the sake of the generals with whom they were identified, the civil-
ian members of the resistance repeatedly attempted to obtain the nec-
essary pledge. And they were humbugged by a British leadership bent 
on appeasement. 
The Munich settlement, which settled nothing, concludes the first 
act of the German Resistance Movement. Appropriately, it left few, if 
any, of the major characters satisfied. Goerdeler, who had been out of 
the country from August to mid-October, writes to a friend in America. 
"A brilliant opportunity has been lost. The German people did not want 
a war. The Anny would have done anything to avoid one •••• If Britain 
280How right these fears were was to be proved later by the def-
amation heaped upon the men of July 20. For exarnple, Hitler's speech 
at 1 A. M. on July 21 ran in part: "At an hour in which the German ar-
mies are committed to the hardest fighting, a small group existed in 
Germany ••• that believed it could deliver a stab in the back as in 
the year 1918." Quoted in Germans Against Hitler, p. 180. 
281weizsacker, p. 183. 
and France had only taken on themselves to risk war ••• it would have 
been the end of Hitler. 11282 The Fuehrer too is 1.m'happy. He had wanted 
all of Czechoslovakia {and he would get it in the early spring of 19J<j/. 
As he complained to a member of his SS entourage, "That fellow Chamber-
lain has spoiled my entry into Prague. 11283 Finally, there is Schacht, 
Oster, Witzleben, and Gisevius, sitting "around Witzleben 1 s fireplace 
and tossLing thei,d plans and projects into the fire. 11284 Perhaps, as 
Karl Bracher observes, they "were marginal plans ••• risky, hurriedly 
improvised plans for a rapidly deteriorating si tuat.ion. 11285 I..f so, it 
is fitting that they were burned--fitting that the men of the "decent 
Gennany" would laboriously begin again to create the stuff for a new 
attempt. Despite numerous setbacks, they had the beginnings of a move-
ment. 
282Goerdeler 1 s letter is quoted in Ritter, Ps 113a 
283Hitler is quoted in Bullock, p. 1470 
284Gisevius, p. 326. 
285Bracher, p. 398. 
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CHAPTER III 
ABWEHR AND THE SECOND ATTEMPT: 1939-1940 
"The task that falls to us is like the tragic conflict of the classical 
dramao Hitler must be destroyed and, at the same time, the German peo-
ple must be saved from disaster. How can we few, with an eye to reality, 
bring this about? 11 Theodore Haubach 
The beginning of war, when it finally came in the autumn of 1939, 
brought with it a Zeitgeist that both favored and hindered the cause of 
the German Resistance Movement. In terms of mill tary demands, the ad-
justments and improvisations that always accompany wartime conditions 
provided the resisters the opportunity to further infiltrate the Nazi 
hierarchy with more of their own members and, at the same time, pro-
vide them with the "cover" so necessary for a secret movement. Thus, 
in the Army's Counter-Intelligence Service, Hans Oster was able to se-
cure th~ reactivation of reserve officers like Ludwig Gehre, Werner 
Schrader, and Rudolf Marogna-Redwitz, 1and simultaneously, obtain mil-
itary commissions for civilians like Hans Gisevius, Hans von Dohnanyi, 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Hans John, and a man who will play a major role 
in this act, the Munich attorney, Josef Mueller. 2 Also, Oster de-
tached some of his own loyal subordinates to serve as contacts with 
lffans Gisevlus, To The Bitter End, trans., Richard and Clara 
Winston (Boston, 1947), p. 425. 
20tto John, Twice Through The Lines, trans., Richard Barry 
(London, 1972), pp. 51-52; 6o. 
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the General Staff and a number of field commanders. As subsequent dis-
cussion will show, the most important of these was Lieutenant Colonel 
Helmuth Groscurth, who was transferred from his post as Head of Abwehr 
II (Sabotage)3to the Army High Command where he became the connecting 
link between the two agencies as well as the moral fiber for some of 
the staff officers who, as we shall see, were beginning to show a dis-
tressing tendency to waver in their commitments. 
A parallel attempt to unite various opposition sectors was initi-
ated in the Foreign Office. By taking advantage of Ribbentrop's typi-
cal Nazi penchant for empire building, State Secretary Weizsacker was 
able to place his men in favorable positions for the task of strength-
ening connections between resistance groups. Thus, Otto Kiep, who had 
been German Consul General in New York during the Weimar Republic, was 
appointed to the Abwe~~. Albrecht von Kessel was posted to General Witz-
leben's staff, and Hasso von Etzdorf was sent to the Army High Command.4 
Further, Weizsacker regrouped his foreign service personnel to take best 
advantage of the remaining diplomatic posts from which the resistance 
movement could re-establish contact with the Allied Governments. The 
key assignment went to Theodore Kordt'who became Legation Counselor in 
Berne, one of the major diplomatic crossroads in Europe, and other ap-
pointments included the posting of opposition members to Stockholm, Ma-
drid, Lisbon, Brussels, and the Hague.5 This wide-spread dispersal of 
149~ 
3Groscurth was replaced by another loyalist, Erwin La.housen, who 
had been Chief of Austrian Military Intelligence prior to the annexation. 
See Ian Colvin, Chief Of Intelligence (London, 1951), pp. 28; 49-50. 
4Ernst von Weizsacker, Memoirs, trans., John Andrews (Chicago, 
19 51), p. 217. 
5The principle source for this diplomatic realignment is Albrecht 
anti-Nazi diplomats left the State Secretary rather shorthanded at the 
Wilhelmstrasse, but until 1940 he was able to keep Erich Kordt in his 
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position as Ghef da Cabinet to Ribbentrop, and Kordt was thus available 
to serve as Weizsacker's main assistant as well as a "most important 
source of information ••• about the plans of the Nazi leaders. "6 
Perhaps the State Secretary's greatest failure in his attempts to 
strengthen the resistance structure within the foreign service was the 
case of Ulrich von Hassell. Hassell is another or the conservatives 
who had been initially attracted to National Socialism.. As a member 
of the diplomatic corps, he had served in Denmark, Spain, and Yugo-
slavia, before becoming Ambassador to Italy in 1932. In this last 
post, Hassell had seconded Hitler's attempts to create closer ties 
between Berlin and Rome, but he had opposed turning the alliance in-
to a military pact, and was, for this reason, dismissed by the Theh-
rer in the purge of ambassadors that accompanied the Fritsch crisis.7 
Once marked by Hitler's disfavor, Hassell was unable, despite his and 
Weizsacker's best efforts, to obtain a new foreign service assignment 
or even secure a meeting with Ribbentrop so that he could make a final 
report concerning his work in Italy~8 Thus, Hassell was obliged to 
von Kessel's testimony, cited in Proceedings of the Ministries Gase, No. 
11 (Weizsacker, et. al.), u. s. Military Tribunal IV (Nuremberg, 1947-
1949), p. 9675, 
6:Erich Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten: Die Wilhelmstrasse in Frieden 
und Krieg (Stuttgart, 19,0), pp. 61-62. 
7Much of Hassell's work for and against Hitler is recounted in 
iano 1s D1 lomatic Pa ers, ed., Malcolm Muggeridge, trans., Stuart Hood 
(London, 1948; and C1ano's Hidden Diary. ed., Malcolm Muggeridge, trans., 
Andreas Mayor (New York, 1953). 
8ulrich von Hassell, Diaries, trans., Hugh Gibson (Westport, 1971), 
p. 20. 
seek camouflage elsewhere, a problem he resolved by joining the Central 
European Economic Conference, an organization whose branches in all the 
capitals of middle Europe provided him with an excuse for spending time 
in Berlin, Switzerland, and the Balkan countries. 
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Hassell's diaries, which he began in September 1938, are a valuable 
source of information on the resistance movement and will be cited fre-
quently throughout the remainder of this study. More importantly, the 
entries reveal his doubts, his critical rejection of the prevailing sys-
tem, and his search in the many talks he had with other anti-Nazis for 
ways of bringing about a change. From them emerges a man not only of 
great intellect and broad interests but also a sensitive human being 
who recoiled in horror and shame at the Nazi regime's denial of human 
values. Surely, the number of conspirators are few who could claim 
membership in the Dante Society, or write of Werner Jaeger's Paide.l! 
that it "yields surprising insights into antiquity and the future. 119 
And Hassell's moral indignation at the Nazi's crimes-- 11 I am writing 
under crnshing emotions evoked by the vile persecution of the Jews 
{ci'uring the Kristallnacht of November 193ef7. • • • My chief concern 
is not with effects abroad ••• /jut with7 the effect on our national 
life, which is dominated ever more inexorably by a system capable of 
such things1110--is a recurrent theme. 
Gisevius writes that Hassell "cannot be assigned to any circle,"ll 
and in a technical sense, this is probably correct since his diary brings 
9Hassell, p. 319. 
lOibid., p. 14. 
11.oisevius, p. 431. 
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to light many disagreements between resistance factions and his own role 
in trying to mediate them (a subject that we will return to in the next 
chapter). Yet, like Goerdeler and Beck--the men with whom he was most 
closely associated, Hassell was a nationalist and a conservative. To 
cite just one example of this, there is his diary entry of July 10, 1944, 
in which he movingly describes an era which he preferred and understood, 
but one whose time was past. 
I have already mentioned our visit to Lthe Bismarck~ •••• Every-
thing receded before the memory of the great man, in the house, in 
the mausoleum, in the little museum. It was al.most unbearable. I 
was close to tears ••• at the thought of the work destroyed. Ger-
many, situated in the middle of Europe, is the heart of Europe. Eu-
rope cannot live without a sound, strong heart •••• I have stud-
ied Bismarck and8 • ~it is regrettable what a false picture of him 
we ourselves have given the world--that of the power politician with 
cuirassier boots •••• In truth, the highest diplomacy and great 
moderation were his real gifts.12 
We can make this placement differently by looking at another organi-
zation to which Hassell belonged. This was the Mittwochgesellschaft, or 
Wedne~day Society, which afforded the conservatives one of their few for-
ums from which to discuss ways of overthrowing Hitler's dictatorship a.nd 
to prepare plans for the kind of government which would follow it. The 
society had been fQunded in 1863 by Wilhelm von Humboldt as a meeting 
place of ideas for men who had distinguished themselves in their par-
ticular fields. It contained eighteen experts and counted among its 
members such noted figures as Dr. Ferdinand Sa.uerbruch, Head of Sur-
gery at Berlin University (and ironically enough, the surgeon for both 
Hitler and Beck), Professor Johannes Popitz, Prussian Minister of Fi-
nance, Jens Jessen, Professor of Economic History and the former Head 
12 Hassell, p. 353. 
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of the Institute for World Trade, Ludwig Beck~ and Hassell himselt.13 
Beck, Popitz, Hassell, and Jessen formed, the resistance core within 
the society, and through Beck, Goerdeler was :init1ated into the group on 
an informal basis.14 Like other conservatives in opposition, Popitz and 
Jessen had been drawn at first to National Social±..sm. Eberhard Zeller 
writes that Popitz "welcomed the Hitler regime and was convinced that the 
good elements among the Germans would prevail over the wrongs and defects 
of the new movement ••• /J,ha!] they would help to make something lasting 
out of it. But he saw this goal constantly recede •• ul5 • • And Jessen, 
who had the right-winger's typical fear of Communi~m, initially considered 
National Socialism the only counter-weight to Bolshevistic pressures in 
Europe. Perceptive enough to recognize the potential dangers in Hitler's 
movement, Jessen argued that it should not be 11enc!lllillbered with elements 
which did not really belong to it, and that rigidity L11posed by party 
bosses should not divert it from its path or c:ripp;JLe it. 1116 To encour-
age this "purification, 11 Jessen had originally directed some of his most 
brilliant students like otto Ohlendorf and colleagm1.es like Dr. Franz Six 
into the Sicherheitsdienst, or Security Service,17'acts which Jessen would 
13Not all members were advocates of res,istan\ce. Hassell mentions 
a debate in which he and Saurbruch argued with Wilhelm Pinder (Art His-
torian) and Eugen Fisher (Biologist), 11who both represented official 
viewpoints. 11 Hassell, p. 197., 
14John, p. 35. 
15Eberhard Zeller, The Flame Of Freedom.. tr~~s.~ R. P. Heller and 
D.R. Masters (London, 1969), pp. 61-62. 
16Jessen is quoted in Ibid., p. 64~ 
17ohlendorf and Six became leaders in the Gestapo, the one as head 
of an ~insatzgruppe in Russia, the other as chief c,r an SS department in 
Berlin. For Jessen's part in recruiting them, see Heinz Hohne, The Order 
of the Death's Head, trans., Richard Barry (New York~ 1970), p. 21J. 
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later regret, but which were to help provide the resisters with access to 
the very center of Himmler's Gestapo. 
Popitz, too, had contact with the top of the Nazi hierarchy. His ap-
pointment as Prussian Minister of Finance had been 11at the express wish of 
the Fuhrer and Reichsmarshal Goring, 1118and if Hitler was not within reach~ 
Goering certainly was, especially to the money which Popitz withdrew from 
the state treasury in order to bribe him, and, to a lesser extent, to the 
arguments which Popitz used to encourage him in his opposition to war.19' 
But after the attack on Poland, Goering became less amenable to reason, 
and the Finance Minister wa.s forced to turn to other means. Thus, he 
worked closely with Goerdeler, Beck, and Hassell during this period, 
and even helped draft the first resistance program. In time, however, 
Popitz was to fall out with the conservative leadership, largely over 
the role of labor unions in the new state. The Finance Minister, a 
traditional economist, was opposed to the creation of a nation-wide 
union with its potential for financial and political influence, while 
Goerdeler, who was in contact with socialists for the first time during 
this period, favored strengthening the unions. 20 Neither man could con-
vert the other to his point of view, and thus, while Popitz would formally 
remain part of Goerdeler's circle, even to the extent of being designated 
as Minister of Culture and later as Minister of Finance in the resistance 
cabinet, he would take an independent approach to overthrowing the regime. 
18Allen Dulles quotes this from the indictment against Popitz,·dat-
ed September 24, 1944. Allen Dulles, Germany's Underground (New York, 1947), 
Po 151. 
l9zeller, p. 62. 
20Gerhard Ritter, The German Resistance, trans., R. T. Clark (New 
York, 1958), p. 189. 
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As he put it, 110ne cannot get out of an abnormal catastrophe with nonnal 
methods, 1121and he would try to force a split within the Nazi leadership-
by attempting to win Himmler over to the idea of a praetorian guard re-
volt. 
The urgency of war also served. to bring together for the first time 
the right and left wings -0f Hitler's opposition. Earlier, we noted that 
many socialists and union officials had been imprisoned at the time of 
the Machtubernahme.22 During the years just prior to the outbreak of 
war, some of these men were released from the concentration camps.23 
In the altered climate of the Third Reich, it did not take them long 
to discover that resistance by the working class alone had been made 
virtually impossible. For one thing, the "coordination" of all unions 
into the Deutsche Arbeitsfront had destroyed much of the old organiza-
tional structure. For another, the material attractions of employment 
and the emotional attractions of the folk community had turned many 
workers into an undifferentiated part of Nazi society. Further, the 
Gennan-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939 meant that whatever 
support which might have been expected from the Communists was nulli-
fied. And finally, the rise of the police state--"We are prisoners 
in one great house of correction. To rebel would be just as much 
21Popitz is quoted in Zeller, p. 408. 
22see Chapter Two, pp. 66-67. 
23we can only speculate as to why the,regime decided to let these 
men go. Probably, the fact that the Gestapo was finally organized into 
an effective agency of repression is one reason. Another may have been 
the fact that the period of their release, 1937-1939, corresponds to the 
best economic years of the Third Reich, and the Nazi leadership could 
have felt there was little to fear. 
suicide as if prisoners were to rise up against their heavily armed 
guards," as one of them put it24-led the men of the left, Wilhelm 
Leuschner, Jakob Kaiser, and others, to begin the difficult task of 
trying to restore an informal network of anti-Nazi cells in the work-
ing class,25while at the same time, searching throughout the Reich for 
men of like persuasion who possessed the organization and the means of 
overthrowing Hitler's dictatorship. In this quest, they came at length 
to Goerdeler's conservative circle and to the members of the opposition 
in the armed forces. 
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Gisevius writes that "it was in November, 1939, that Wilhelm Leusch-
ner, the leader of the Social Democrats, and Jakob Kaiser, a leading of-
ficial of the former Christian Union ••• put out their first cautious 
feelers. 1126 The point of contact, according to Otto John, was retired 
General Kurt von Hammerstein, "known as the 'red general' because be-
fore the seizure of power, he had discussed Hitler with socialists and 
trade union leaders and had little time for German Nationals. 0 27 
24Wilhelm Leuschner is quoted in Gennans Agains~ Hitler, ed., 
Erich Zimmerman and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, trans., Allan and Lieselotte 
Yahares (Bonn, 1964), p. 12. 
25Zeller's description or the methods employed by these lert-
wing leaders to re-establish contacts in the working class should be 
quoted if only to indicate the difficulties involved in achiev.ing 
what Griffin calls the "orgam.zation of an opposition" in a police 
state. Leland M. Griffin, 11A Drarnatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of 
Movements," in Cri ti.cal Responses To Kenneth Burke, ed., William H. 
Rueckert (Minneapolis, 1969), p. 462. 11 Speeches on the shop floor 
and membership lists, revolutionary meetings and open challenges 
could no longer help to launch the popular movement that was wanted; 
no written or broadcast word could be openly expressed. All that re-
mained possible were oral agreements and exchanges in accordance with 
agreed signs." Zeller., p. 69. 
26Gisevi.us, p. 419. 
27John, p. 55. 
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Through Hammerstein, Leuschner and Kaiser were introduced to Goerdeler 
and Beck. The captivity of the Third Reich made possible what the free-
dom of the Weimar Republic had always rendered impossible--"the achieve-
ment of solidarity, merger"28between the two sides. Nor was it merger 
based on expediency alone. Hassell's judgment that Leuschner and the 
other socialists "are thinking along clearly national and religious 
lines 1129is one indication. Another is Gisevius 1 comment: 11It is to 
Leuschner1 s credit that he ••• gave Goerdeler precedence as soon as 
he came to know him better •• • [i.niJ Kaiser refused to be seduced 
from his allegiance to Goerdeler. 1130 And Leuschner's last words to 
' his fellow prisoners after the failure of July 20, 1944: "Tomorrow 
I shall hang. Unite!" or his silent exhortation made with clasped 
hands as he went to the gallows,311.s evidence that the socialist com-
mitment was more than a marriage of convenience as some writers have 
claimed.32 
If the conservatives and their allies in the military held the 
potential means to topple the Nazi regime, the socialists and their 
28Griffin, p. 462. 
29aassell, p. 304. 
30casevius, p. 420. 
31Leuschner 1 s final statement and gesture of solidarity are 
cited in Zeller, p. 70. 
32My reference here is to Ralf Dahrendorf, who argues that the 
alliance between the socialists and the conservatives was "largely neg-
ative ••• consistLini} in the abolition of the Nazi regime and the end 
of the war. 11 Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany, trans., 
by the author (Garden City, 1969), p. 392. Full discussion of the ques-
tion of whether the conservatives and socialists went beyond the tech-
nical considerations of a coup is best left to the next chapter in which 
an examination will be made of resistance social and political reforms. 
allies in the unions held the potential to make the resistance a more 
popular movement.33 Leuschner had not been idle in the months since 
his release. Operating behind the cover of a small factory in Berlin, 
he traveled around the country as a "business man," ostensibly seeking 
markets for his product, but actually building an underground system 
of labor cadres which would be ready to support a military uprising 
whenever it took place. And while Harold Deutsch seems overly opti-
mistic in claiming that the socialists would be able to back a coup 
with a general strike,34it is safe to say that enough preliminary 
work had been done to provide the opposition with an "anti-Nazi left 
wing nuclei for the time when the Nazis would be overthrown. 1135 Thus, 
158. 
33The extent to which the Widerstand was a mass movement may con-
stitute another possible departure from Griffin and Cathcart's formula-
tion. Griffin doe~ net stipulate any size for a movement in his drama-
tistic model, but his articles on the "New Left" and the "Antimasonic 
Movement" are certainly applications of mass undertakings. Leland M. 
Griffin, "The Rhetorical Structure of the 1New Left' Movement: Part I, 11 
Q.uarterly Journal Of Speech, L (April, 1964), 113-135; Leland M. Grif-
fin, "The Rhetorical Structure of the Antimasomc Movement," in The Rhet-
orical Idiom, ed., Donald C. Bryant (Ithaca, 1958), pp. 145-159. And 
Cathcart refers specifically to mass movements like women's suffrage 
and abolition. Robert S. Cathcart, "New Approaches to the Study of 
Movements: Defining Movements Rhetorically," Western Speech, XXXVI 
(Spring, 1972), 82-88. By contrast, the German Resistance was never 
a popular movement for reasons that should be obvious. While the con-
servatives invoked the support of state agencies like the army, they 
still represented the whole of society only in a synecdochic sense; 
that is, by virtue of their social position and corresponding politi-
cal responsibility. And though the socialists could claim to speak 
for large numbers in the unions, even this amounted to only a part of 
the whole. The hope, as we shall see in subsequenL discussion, was 
that after Hitler had been overthrown, the non-Nazis, who formed the 
bulk of German society, would support the new movement. That this 
hope was not misplaced is indicated by the rapid disintegration of 
Hitler's "New Order" immediately after his death. 
34Harold C. Deutsch, The Conspiracy Against Hitler in the Twi-
light War (Minneapolis, 1968), p. 47. 
35The Strug,le For Democracy In Germani, ed., Gabriel A. Almond 
(Chapel Hill, 1949, p. 51. 
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Paul Maerker, a former trade union official and m~.m.ber of the opposition, 
estimates the number of workers organized into the resistance at about 
125,000, or three percent of those who belonged to unions prior to 1933.36 
The United States Bombing Survey reports that. 11organized opposition groups 
were found in most German cities •• • [i.ni/ while activities were normally 
confined ••• to a local scale ••• there were also, efforts on a national 
scale carried out by trade unionists and socialist-s. 1137 And Emil Henk, 
who credits Leuschner with building up an "invisibJ..e network" all over 
Germany, cites the specific area of Kassel-Heidelberg and notes that it 
contained an organization of key workers, each of whom was responsible 
for mobilizing ten to twenty more anti-Nazis at any given moment.38 
Leuschner 1 s work among socialist labor groups was matched by Kaiser's 
work among religious labor groups. otto John reca.:lls how Kaiser estab-
lished resistance contacts h~th Bernard Letterhaus, ex-Secretary of the 
Catholic Workers Union, Nikolas Gross, one of the union's form.er offi-
cials, Max Habermann, the past head of the Ge:rn1a.n National Shop Assist-
ants Association, and Ernst von Harnak, an influential member of the 
outlawed Social Democratic Party.39 Hermann Schmitt, the postwar Pres-
ident of the Catholic Workers Union, writes that it was Kaiser who "got 
in touch" with people from the Christian Trades "all over the Reich .... 
3~aerker is quoted in Hans Rothfels, The Germ.an Opposition To 
Hitler, trans., Lawrence Wilson (Chicago, 1962), P~ 96. 
37united States Bombing Survey, First Report (Washington, D. C., 
1947), pp. 101-102. 
38Henk is quoted in Rothfels, p. 97. 
39John, p. 55. 
Land thay thousands worked in the hope that 'the day' would come. 1140 
And John notes that it was in the home of Kaiser's fiancee, Elfriede 
Nebgen, where priests like the Dominican Laurentius Siemer came seek-
ing information about the possibilities of a military uprising and 
pledging the support of friends in West Germ.any, where Josef Winner, 
former leader of the Center Party, brought word of "resisters spread-
ing far outside Berlin," and where Klaus Bonhoeffer and John himself., 
in the autumn or 1939, first drew up a balance sheet of opposition ac-
tivity and found it "encouraging. 1141 
If the outbreak of war helped the cause of the resistance in some 
respects, it complicated it in others. In tenns of government control, 
the machinery of the Gestapo had become concentrated at last into one 
giant agency, the National Security Office, or RSHA,42which operated 
under Himmler's supervision in the Ministry of the Interior. One of 
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its main functions was to "suppress and avert any disturbances of •••. 
order in the Third Reich, even though an infringement of law and order 
may not yet have taken place, 1143and one of its chief means of doing so 
was through the compilation of domestic intelligence and morale reports 
- 11Meldungen ™ 9!!!!l. Reich, 11 as they were called, which provided the po-
lice and party leadership with increasingly- comprehensive and-candid 
40Schmitt is quoted in Germans Against Hitler, PP• JO-Jl. 
41 John, p. 55. 
42According to Karl Bracher, this centralization occurred on 
September 27, 1939. Karl Bracher, The Gennan Dictatorship. trans., 
Jean Steinberg (New York, 1972), p. 153. 
4Jwerner Best, author of this Orwellian statement, is quoted 
in Hohne, p. 172. 
161. 
assessments of what the people were thinking.44 At first, the sources of 
this polling operation were the regional personnel of the SD, or Security 
Service, aided by Blockwarts, party zealots, and agents provocateurs.45 
But with the attack on Poland, the whole country became a kind of intel-
ligence gathering agency. Notices went up everywhere: "Vorsicht beim 
Gespraech-Feind hoert mit! 11 ( 11 Be careful what you say--the enemy may 
be listening! 11 ), which were meant to remind the Volksgenossen not only 
that loose talk was treasonable, but also that denunciation of loose 
talk was patriotic.46 In addition, war meant air raids, which, while 
they were infrequent at first, still gave wardens the opportunity to 
exercise their right of entry into people's homes to make certain ev-
eryone had vacated the premises-Suppentopfschnuffelei, or prying in-
to cooking pots, as it was called. And the Hitler Youth and German 
Girl's League were given orders to assist the frontier and railway 
police in searching for escaped prisoners of war and foreign workers,47 
thus increasing the chances when a resister might be caught in a spot-
check, interrogated, and exposed. 
44some of these letters have been preserved and appear in Meld-
ungen aus dem Reich, ed., Heinz Boberach (Newi.ed und Berlin, 1965~ 
45Almond, pp. 38-39. 
46Richard Grunberger recounts a bizzare instance of patriotic 
denunciation. A mother in a South-German village who was informed by 
a neighbor that the name of her missing son had been read out on a 
Russian POW list, thereupon denounced the neighbor for listening to 
radio Moscow. Richard Grunberger, The 12-Year Reich (New York, 1971), 
p. 114. 
47This was formally accomplished through the Streifendienst, 
or patrol service, which each of these organizations created to aug-
ment regular police security measures. See Lord Russell of Liver-
pool, The Scourge Of The Swastika (New York, 1954), p. 20. 
In the conservative upper-class l<lllich fonned the basis for much or 
the opposition, denunciations were the execption.48 In part, this was 
due to the fact that until the war, this class was less exposed to the 
effects or 11 coordination 11 than the middle and lower classes. And in 
part, it was due to a ready-made network or personal contacts, either 
direct or indirect, which existed before resistance was ever consid-
erect.49 Thus, while many individuals were learning about the conspir-
acy, word of this never reached the Fuehrer. Nevertheless, Hitler's 
sixth sense or uncanny 11 feel 11 for concealed opposition was another of 
the-disadvantages with which the resisters were forced to cope. For 
whether they wanted to arrest him (as their intention was now), or ,as-
sassinate him (as events in this act would make plain to a growing num-
ber of them), the fact remains that with the outbreak of war, the Fueh-
rer began to exhibit a wary, almost animal-like instinct for self-pres-
ervation, which would make attempts against him increasingly difficult. 
As early as a military conference on August 22, 1939, Hitler pre-
faced his remarks about the attack on Poland with a personal statement 
which indicates that he was well aware of the importance of his own role 
in the Fuhrerstaat and of the dangers inherent in it. 
Essentially, all depends on me, on my existence ••• probably no 
one will ever again have the confidence of the whole German peo-
ple as I have. My existence is therefore a factor of great val-
ue: B8t I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or a lun--
atic.5 
48spiegelbild einer Verschworung, ed., Karl Peter (stuttgart, 
1961), p. 393. 
49variations of these reasons are offered by Franklin L. Ford, 
11The Twentieth of July in the History of the German Resistance," Amer-
ican Historical Review, LI (July, 1946), 620. 
50Hitler is quoted in Nazi Conspiracy And Aggression, 10 Vols., 
162. 
Although assassination was one word which the Nazi leadership would 
have preferred to expurgate from the language,51Hitler did discuss it on 
occasion. Thus, at a midday luncheon on May J, 1943, he said: 
••• not a soul could cope with an assassin who, for idealistic 
reasons, was prepared quite ruthlessly to hazard his own life in 
the execution of his object. I quite understand why 90 per cent 
of the historic assassinations have been successful 
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But, the Fuehrer continued, there were steps which could be taken to make 
assassination more difficult. 
The best preventative measure ••• is to live irregularly--to walk, 
to drive, and to travel at irregular times and unexpec~edly •••• 
As far as possible, whenever I go anywhere by car I go off unexpect-
edly and without warning the police. I have also given Ratenhuber, 
the commander of my personal Security Squad, and Kempka, my chauf-
feur, the strictest orders to maintain absolute secrecy about my 
comings and goings •••• 52 
More important for our immediate purposes, however, are some other 
precautions which Hitler took at this time. Gisevius reports that by the 
fall of 1939, the Fuehrer had largely ceased to make public appearanees,53 
(Washington, D. C., 1946), iii, p. 582. Hereafter abbreviated as NCA. 
At another point in the speech, Hitler made a reference to opposition 
efforts during the Sudeten crisis of the previous year which must have 
given at least three of his listeners--Brauchitsch, Halder, and Witz-
leben--an uneasy moment. Noting the more militant stance of the Brit-
ish with regard to German claims on Poland, the Fuehrer declared: 11It 
has done much damage that many relucta.11t Germans said and wrote to Eng-
lishmen after the solution of the Czech question: The Fuehrer carried 
his point because you lost your nerve, because you capitulated too 
soon. 11 Ibid., p. 584. 
5½'hus Joseph Goebbels: "In wartime ••• there are certain words 
from which we should shrink as the devil does from Holy Water; among 
these are, for instance ••• 'assassination.' One must not pennit such & term to become part and parcel of everyday slang." Joseph Goebbels, 
The Goebbels Diaries, ed., and trans., Louis P. Lochner (New York, 1948), 
pp. 114-115. 
52Hitler 1s Table Talk, intro., H. R. Trevor Roper, trans., Norman 
Cameron and R. H. Stevens (London, 1953), p. 452. 
53Gisevius, p. 404. 
a safety measure which by definition denied nearly all the resisters ac-
cess to him. And Albert Speer recounts one of Hitler's remarks during 
this same period which suggests that the Fuehrer, like his opponents, 
had come to the realization that only the army had the strength nec-
essary to overthrow his regime. Referring to the open spaces around 
his new Chancellery, Hitler said: 
"Suppose there should be some disturbances •••• " And point-
ing to the four hundred foot-wide avenue: 11If they come rolling 
up here in their annored vehicles the full width of the street 
--nobody will be able to put up any resistance. We must pro-
vide for this eventuality. All the buildings on this square 
must be equipped with heavy steel bullet-proof shutters over 
their windows. The doors, too, must be made of steel, and 
there should be heavy iron gates for closing off the square. 
It must be possible to defend the center of the Reich like a 
fortress. 11 54 
Hitler might have been somewhat less anxious if he had possessed 
a better understanding of his generals and the difficulties their at-
titudes posed for the civilians in the resistance. To begin with, 
there was the matter of the oath, which, while it had always existed, 
was less apparent in peacetime. To explain, Germans make a distinc-
tion between treason (Hochverrat) which, as Halder writes, "is a pure-
ly political offense consisting of opposition to a person or party in 
power at the moment ••• 6.nd ii/ not prompted by base motives but rath-
er by an attempt to serve the people," and high treason (Landesverrat) 
which "is commiti;,ed when vital interests of the people and fatherland 
are given away to a hostile power ••• Lruid iiJ looked upon as one of 
the most despicable offenses. 11 55 Obviously, the ethical dividing line 
54Albert Speer, Inside The Third Reich, trans., Richard and Clara 
Winston (New York, 1971), p. 219. 
55111etter of General Franz Halder," August 17, 1965. 
between treason 'Within the state and treason,in combination with enemies 
hostile to the state is much easier to draw in wartime when such enemies 
have identified themselves through declarations o~ intent. Thus, Brauch-
itsch, and to a large extent, Halder himself, would begin to hold that 
moral and military duties coincided now that war had broken out; that it 
was high treason to 11 rebel when face to face with the enemy. 11 56 
Beyond this, there was the mood of the army--its ranks swollen with 
reserve officers and enlisted men drawn largely from the training schools 
of the SA and the Hitler Youth, and inculcated with the ethos of the 11:Hew 
Order. 11 Would they obey orders to march against their Fuehrer when they 
had just returned from the first of his !3]J.tzkrieg~, the laurels of vic-
tory still on their brows? General Rundstedt, for one., did no,t think so. 
As he told Canaris when the Abwehr Chief sounded him out about the possi-
bility of a military revolt: "If I draw this sword it will break in my 
hand. n 57 Brauchi tsch was of the same opinion. John notes that aft.er 
the victory ov-er Poland, the Anny Commander argued that 11the rn!ajorit;y 
of the soldiery. • • were more in favor of Hitl.er than ever. 1158 And e-
ven Halder, one of the principle military resisters, doubted the sup-
port of the armyr Gisevius writes that on several occasions, the Chief 
of Staff "referred to his four or five sons-in-law, all of whom were 
serving in the army as captains. Their attitude • ., .was fairly rep-
resentative of the temper of the corps of officers; and that temper 
56Hassell, p. 93. 
57Rundstedt is quoted in Deutsch, p. ~. 
58John, pp. 58-59. 
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• • • was pro-Hitler. 11 59 
Finally, there was the hindrance posed by the war itself. Briefly 
put, soldiers more than any other group are directly involved in the pros-
ecution of war. From them, it demands not only the performance of duty 
but also the willingness to give something extra--call it elan, or flair, 
or initiative. And officers working to the limits of their endurance on 
the battlefield or in the staff room seldom have much energy left to spend 
preparing and executing a coup d'etat. Thus, Halder writes that "military 
leaders cannot give political leadership when they are on duty eighteen to 
twenty hours a day; 116<\1anstein adds that "there were important considera-
tions· which we had to weigh ••• [such ai/ the responsibility for a heav-
ily engaged fighting front; 1161and Hassell's comment, that the "nerves ot 
the generals are suffering--Halder's for instance1162--are all indications 
of the pressures which had built up around the officers since the outbreak 
of fighting. Equally, there was the soldier's attraction to the art of 
war as such. Perhaps this is best illustrated by God's description of 
the battle horse to Job: "Hast thou given the horse strength? Hast thou 
clothed his neck with thunder?. • • The glory of his nostrils is ter-
rible •••• He saith among the trumpets, Ha, Ha?" Accordingly, Panzer 
General Guderian could claim that the Kesselschlacht in Poland "had fully 
proved the value of the armored formations ••• and the'work that had gone 
59Gisevius, p. 293. 
60Halder is quoted in Ritter, p. 22:J. 
6l11tetter of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, 11 July 2, 1965. 
62 Hassell, p. 75. 
into building them up; 1163Airforce G€neral Kesselring could assert that 
"without the Luftwaffe there would ha~,e been no Blitzkrieg; 1164and Hal-
der, upon whom the operational direction of the campaign had fallen, 
could summarize the three-week battle as 11planmassig. 1165or "out of the 
book," with the justifiable pride of an expert who has .fulfilled his 
responsibilities with a high degree of competence. 
Ot course, to the skilled eye of the professional, the fighting 
in Poland had revealed some serious flaws in the Wehrmacht. Guderian 
notes that while "the troops had fought brilliantly. • • the losses in 
officers had been disproportionately heavy ••• due to ine.xperience; 1166 
General Rundstedt reported that the "field artillery and infantry ve-
hicles were much too heavy for the poor roads; 11 6?and General Warlimont 
complained about the "lack of munitions, efficient heavy tanks, radio 
and telegraph units •• • [aniJ above all ••• a shortage of trained re-
serves, both officers and men. 11 68 
Understandably then, the generals looked upon the Feldzug im Polen 
as a limited engagement. For one thing, there wa.s the pact with Russia 
6Jueinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, trans., Constantine fl.tzgibbon 
{New York, 1967), p. 62. 
64Albert Kesselring, A Soldier's Record (Westport, 1970), p. 45. 
65Franz Halder, Kriegstagebuch I: Vom Polenfeldzug bis zmn Ende 
der Westoffensive 14.8.39-30.6.40, ed., Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Stuttgart, 
1962), p. 86. Hereafter abbreviated as War Diary. 
66G d . 53 56 u erian, pp. ; • 
67Rundstedt is quoted in Hanson Baldwin, Battles Lost And Won 
(New York, 1966), p. 489. 
68warlimont is quoted in Walter Goerlitz, History Of The German 
General Staff, trans., Brian Battershaw (New York, 1954), p. 348. 
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which secured th~ eastern frontier. For another, there was Hitler's as-
surance that Britain and France would not declare war.,69and while this 
had been proved wrong, there was the Sitzkrieg in the west which, if it 
did not indicate peace, at least left the officers with the impression 
that a further campaign., assuming one was necessary., would be fought on-
ly after the weaknesses of the military machine had been remedied. And 
finally, there was the time of year--the beginning of fall-when rain 
and fog would seriously impede the two most import.ant arms of the ser-
vice, the panzers and the air force. 
Unfortunately for the generals, the Fuehrer had a wholly different1 
impression of the Polish campaign. Elated by the swift. victory., unaware 
as yet of the technical problems disclosed by the fighting., impervious 
to the elements, convinced that the Allied Governments lacked the will 
to fight, secretly hopeful that they would reject his "peace proposals1 1170 
and fully aware that their elimination was the final prerequisite to his 
ultimate aim of carving out Germany's Lebensraum in the east, Hitler de-
cided to attack in the west. Thus, the stage was set for what Gisevius 
calls a "savage struggle ••• between the generals and their Fuehrer; be-
tween the worried civilians and the military ••• between the general's 
doubts and irresolution and their longing for glory-1171-the second crit-
ical moment in the drama of the German Resistance Movement. 
69!QA, iii, P• 483. 
70Proof of Hitler's real preference is Warlimont 1s report that on 
September 20, the Fuehrer secretly informed General Keitel of his deci-
sion to attack in the west, and this was more than two weeks before his 
October 6 peace speech to the Reichstag. See Walter Warlimont, Inside 
Hitler's Headquarters, 1939-45. trans., R.H. Barry (New York, 1964), 
pp. 36-37. 
71.oisevius, p. 378. 
On September 27, the same day- that Warsaw fell., the Fuehrer sum-
moned his military leaders to a meeting at the Reich Chancellery. In 
one of his long but not wholly unimpressive monologues, he offered them 
a list of reasons for an early offensive against Britain and France it 
the two Westem Powers should refuse to agree to his peace terms. While 
there are no ext.ant copies or the speech.,72Halder's stenographic notes 
and Brauchitsch's testimony at Nuremberg.,73indicate that among other 
things., Hitler claimed that the French and British would prove to be 
weaker adversaries than the Poles., that the neutral Low Countries 
should not be spared in the attack, that the preparations for the of-
fensive should be completed quickly, and that "If we tail to accOlllp-
lish this., we deserve to be whipped."' 
The use of a quid pro guo--or holding out the prospect of peace 
while urging the preparation or war--was a typical Hitler device in-
tended to confuse those who opposed his projects,74to weaken their re-
solve by giving them hope and tempting them into procrastination. In 
this case, however, it appears to have failed in its purpose. As word 
of the Fuehrer 1s position became known, the officers responded negatively 
72warlimont writes that as soon as Hitler finished speaking, he 
threw his notes into the fireplace in his study. Warlimont, p. J7. 
7JHalder., War Diaey. pp. 86-90; Testimony of Walter von Brauch-
itsch before the International Military Tribunal, August 9., 1949., Trial 
of the Major War Criminals., 42 Vols • ., (Nuremberg., 1947)., xx, pp. 573-
574. Hereafter abbreviated as TMWC. -
74Andre Francois-Poncet commented on this rhetorical tactic at 
the time o:f the Rhineland occupation and the Fuehrer•s simultaneous 
peace offensive. "Hitler struck his adversary in the race, and a.she 
did so declared: 1 I bring you proposals for peace. 111 Andre Francois-
Poncet., The Fateful Years, trans., Jacques LeClercq (New York, 1949)., 
p. 193. 
to a man. Hassell records Admiral Raeder, who was at the meeting, as 
"declarlJ.ni/ categorically that the Nav,r was not in .favor of a drive 
through Belgium and Holland; 1175warlimont (another participant), writes 
that "even Goering /;ai} clearly taken aback; n76B. H. Liddell Hart, who 
interviewed the generals arter the war, notes that 11all the top ones 
••• including Rundstedt ••• admitted that they were full of doubt a-
bout taking the offensive in the West," and he quotes General Blumen-
tritt as saying: "Hitler alone believed that a decisive victory was 
possible. 1177 
In opposition circles, the response was equally negative. John 
writes that at the Army High Comman~, Halder and Brauchitsch were a-
fraid 11an offensive b7 the Wehrmacht on the Westem Front might end 
in the position warfare of the First World War; n78General Thomas, 
Head of the Army's Economic Depart.ment, "was certain ••• his arma-
ment program could not provide for a lengthy war of attrition; 1179 
and Heinrich von stulpnagel, Halder's Quartermaster General, drew 
up a report in which he advocated a purely defensive stance along 
the "West Wall" with no possibility of an attack against the Maginot 
Line until the spring of 1942.80 These were largely technical 
75 Hassell, p. 37. 
76warlimont, p. e:,. 
77B. H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk (New York, 1948); 
p. 108. 
78John, p. 58. 
79Thomas is quoted in Gisevius, p. 383. 
80stulpnagel•s report is summarized in Goerlitz, pp. 361-362. 
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objections, however, and it was in the other resistance centers-the For-
eign Office and particularly the Abwehr-that initiatives were undertaken 
not only to avoid an offensive against France and Britain but also to o-
verthrow Hitler's regime and restore peace to Europe. 
We have already mentioned a few of the steps taken b;y Hans Oster, 
Abwehr Chief of Staff, to coordinate resistance operations during this 
period. Most important in this respect was the transfer of Lieutenant 
Colonel Helmuth Groscurth to Halder' s staff. As "canmunications fa.cil-
i tator11 of the resistance,81oster felt there needed to be a better chan-
nel between the Counter-Intelligence Service and the Army High Command. 
Distance alone made this neceasaey since the High Command had moved from 
Berlin to 11Maybach I, 11 its secret wartime headquarters at Zossen twenty 
miles away, and it was no longer an easy matter to get messages back and 
forth. Also, Oster was aware of the officer's change in attitude since 
the outbreak of war, and he needed a "clockwindertr82ror Halder in partic-
ular-someone who could wind the reluctant general up in the morning and 
make certain he struck the hours correctly for the rest of the day. Gros-
curth seemed ideal for the assignment. A friend of Halder•s as well as a 
confidant of Oster•s,83he had ready access to both men's agencies. Also, 
his basic optimism, which is suggested by the fact that aft.er the failure 
of the 1938 plot, he continued to acquire and store explosives for the 
81.rhis is how Oster described his role·to Gisevius, p. 424,. 
82Fabian von Schlabrendorff uses this term to describe Hanning 
von Trasckow's influence over Field Marshal Kluge~ They Almost, Killed 
Hitler (New York, 1947), p. 39. Deutsch has applied it, not inapprop-
riately, to the relationship between Groscurth and Halder. 
83Gisevius, p. 386. 
day when they might be used against Hitler,84meant that he could be de-
pended upon to lift falling spirits and provide a note of optimism when 
it was needed. 
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A second step taken by Oster was the appointment or Hans Dohnanyi 
to the Abwehr. With his legal background, Dohnanyi had the necessary 
expertise to take charge of the evidence on Nazi crimes and incorporate 
it into a "brief" for submission to officers the resisters hoped to per-
suade. In the last chapter, we discussed the collection of documents 
started in 1933. By now, the pile was beginning to reach considerable 
proportions. Most of the new material concerned SS activities in Po-
land such as the faked attack on the Gleiwitz transmitter ( which Hit-
ler had ordered and used as an excuse to launch the invasion}, and sub-
sequent atrocities against the Polish people. 
Historically, commanding generals had been responsible for areas 
in which they had troops, but under Hitler this policy changed and oc-
cupied territories were turned.over to civilian administrators and the 
SS as soon as the Fuehrer defined them as non-combatant. 85 At base, 
the reason for this reversal was Hitler's fear that his generals would 
not implement the darker aspects of his Weltanschauung, for which Po-
land was to be a kind of ballon d 1essai. Thus, Einsatzgruppen (special 
84neutsch quotes General Lahousen on this activity; p. 83. 
85Goerlitz notes this circumscribing of the general's influence 
and adds that in January 1940, Hitler issued his ''Basic Order No. 1, 11 
which laid it down that any person charged with carrying out an order 
should only be given such information as was absolutely necessary tor 
its execution, and that only at the last practicable moment." Goer-
litz, p. 356. Again, this is what Griffin calls a 11 symptom 11 of an 
order turning faulty, "an order marked by misunderstanding, the growth 
of absurdity and injustice, the increasing loss of communication and 
identification." Griffin, "Drama.tistic Theory., 11 pp. 450-460. 
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groups which were in effect 11murder squads 1'), were assigned to follow each 
of the armies, their mission being to start the extermination of social el-
ements which might be considered potential opponents of Germany's Lebans-
.lli!!! as well as asocial elements like Jews. 
As long as the fighting continued, friction between the SS and the ar-
my had been limited to isolated incidents,86in part because the total num-
ber of Einsatzkommandos was less than 600 men1 and in part because the SS 
leaders had the presence of mind to trim their sails carefully.87 But with 
the end of hostilities, the prospects for an increase in SS activities be-
came alarming. One sign of this was Reinhard Heydrich' s discussion on 
September 17 with Colonel Eduard Wagner, one of Halder's Quartermasters, 
in which the SS Chief talked about plans for the "housecleaning of /jol-
isi/ Jews, intelligentsia, clergy and nobility. 1188 Another was Heydrich I s 
letter of September 21 to the heads of the Einsatzgruppen (a copy enclosed 
to the Army High Command), informing them of initial steps to be taken for 
the "concentration o:f Jews :from the country to-the larger cities. 1189 
It does not speak well of Halder's conscience that his first response 
was to try to separate the military from these activities by insisting that 
86The best known instance was Rundstedt's order of September 20, 
expelling Einsatzgruppe Woyrisch from the operational zone of his army, 
an order to which the SS acceded. See Hohne, pp. 302-303. 
87The SS gave the military only the bare minimum of information 
while the campaign was going on. In an order of September 9, for ex-
ample, 8th Army described the task of its Einsatzgruppe as the "sup-
pression of all anti-Reich and anti-Gennan elements in rear of fight-
ing troops, in particular counter-espionage, arrest of potentially un-
reliable persons, confiscation of weapons, safeguarding of important 
counter-espionage materials, etc." !J2!g_., p. 298. 
88Halder, War Dia_!'l, p. 79. 
89NcA, iv, p. 97. 
"housecleaning be deferred until Army has withdrawn and t.he country has 
been turned over to civil administration. Early December. 1190 But it 
does speak well or Oster's foresight in detaching Groscurth to Halder's 
command and in assigning Dohnanyi to prepare what he called his "chron-
icle of shame. 1191 Thus, the Army- Chief of Staff was unable to deny his 
ethical responsibilities so easily. A stream of reports and protests 
flowed from the Tirpitzufer in Berlin via Groscurth to the Army- High 
Command in Zossen.92 To check the accuracy or this material, Halder 
sent one of his aides to Poland on a fact-finding expedition. This 
officer's report confirmed the Abwehr 1s worst accounts and Halder was 
thereby compelled to try and recover the army•s prerogatives for the 
sake of the army's honor. On October 17, he sent Colonel Wagner to 
Berlin to present a list of demands to Keitel. 11for t.he continuation 
of military administration. 11 Briefly, these called for (1) supreme 
administrative authority of the Army Commander-in-Chief, unlimited 
by any grant of special powers to other agencies; (2) appointment of 
civil administration officials by the C-in-C on nomination or the ap-
propriate ministries and of a chief administrator; and (3) transfer 
of populations to be made only in agreement with the C-in-C, giving 
due consideration to military needs.93 
90Halder, War Diary, p. 79. 
91Bethge quotes Dohna.nyi; Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer1 
trans., Eric Mosbacher, et. al. (New York, 1970) 1 p. 576. 
92Ritter writes that in addition to Dohnanyi's chronicles, pro-
tests were sent to-Halder and Brauchitsch by Goerdeler and Beck. Rit-
ter, p. 148fn. 
93 Deutsch, p. 183. 
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On the face of it, the Wagner report appeared to be a technical de-
mand for a return to the occupational policy of the pre-Nazi era. But 
Hitler correctly saw it as an effort to destroy his "New O:rder" in the 
east before it had actually been implemented. Thus, on the evening of 
the same day, Wagner was ordered to return to Berlin. Bad driving con-
ditions delayed him but Keitel was waiting with the Fuehrer's answer. 
The army's demand was categorically rejected. As Hitler had put it, 
' the military ought to be happy to avoid being charged with responsi-
bility for what he had in mind: 
••• increased se'verity of the racial struggle permits no legal 
restrictions; methods used will be incompatable with /jilitariJ 
principles ••• /J,he SS wil.!7 ensure that the Polish intelligent-
sia cannot throw up a new leader class ••• Jews, Poles, and sim-
ilar trash to be cleared from the old and new Reich territories.94 
Before the Fuehrer 1s horrifying vision of Poland's future, the of-
ficers of the High Command renounced any further political role for the 
army in the east. Although there would be several more repercussions 
over the treatment of Jews and Poles as helots and worse--once when 
General Blaskowitz, the nominal commander of the rump Polish state, 
sent Hitler a memorandum on SS crimes and earned for himself a tirade 
about the military's "childish ideas" and the difficulty of waging war 
with "Salvation Army methods; 1195and again when Himmler felt constrained 
to attend a military commander's meeting and defend the "strong" policy 
against the Poles and Jews, arguing that it was necessary for Germany's 
175. 
94An official summary, much of it in Hitler's own words, was pre-
pared by Keitel and appears in TMWC, .xxvi, pp. 378-383. 
95Hohne quotes Captain Engle, one of Hitler's aides, who was pre-
sent when the Fuehrer received the memorandum from Blaskowitz. Hohne, 
p. 306. 
surviva196 __ the Wagner-Hitler enjoinment represents the last time the 
General Staff as an agency would ever challenge its leader on exclu-
sively moral grounda,97a passivity which condemns it as an accessory 
after the fact and makes it "responsible for these acts" in the eyes 
of the world as Canaris wrote.98 
If the Abwehr's dossiers failed to achieve the intended effect 
with the older officers of the General Staff, the crimes they repre-
sented served as evidence to recruit other, younger military men who 
will play leading roles in subsequent acts. One of these was Helmuth 
Stieff, who became a member of Stauffenberg's circle. On November 21, 
Stieff wrote his wife: 111 am ashamed of being a Ge:nnan. This minority 
which sullies the name of Germany by murder, plunder and arson will 
prove to be the disaster of the whole German nation unless we put a 
stop to these people soon. 1199 Another was Henning von Tresckow, who 
would lead the attempt in 1943. A divisional staff officer in Poland, 
he was greatly affected by the crimes committed around him. As he said 
to a frierid, "You and I, also, will be counted among the guilty. 11100 
Finally, there was stauffenberg himself. Upon his return from the 
96Excerpts from Himmler's speech to the Supreme Army Commanders 
on March 13, 1940, appear in Roger Manvell & Heinrich Fraenkel, Himmler 
(New York, 1968)J pp. 95-96. 
97This interchange seems to be the type Cathcart is referring to 
when he writes: "The essential attribute ••• is the creation of dialec-
tical tension growing out of moral conflict. 11 Cathcart, 87. 
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98canaris is quoted in Karl Abshagen, Canaris, trans., Alan Brod-
rick {London, 1956), p. 1.44. 
99stieff is quoted in Zeller, p. 216. 
lO°'fresckow is quoted in Ibid. 
Polish campaign, he was visited by his uncle~ Grar Nikolaus von Ue.xkull 
and Fritz von der Schulenburg, both members of the resistance. They 
gave him an account of SS atrocities and told him it was his duty to 
act or at least to try and reach a position from which action could 
be taken.101 Promotion of that magnitude was impossible for such a 
junior officer, but Stauffenberg was so shaken by the conversation 
tha.t those around him noticed a change. His earlier willingness, to 
give Hitler and his 11New 0rder 11 the benefit of the doubtl02turned to 
criticism and frustration at his otm sense of impotence. For the pres-
ent, he lacked the means to act, but this meeting in the fall of 1939 
marked a reversal in his life. 
The third step taken by Oster was the mos:t, important and :probably 
the one which has led some writers to identify the Abwehr as the moti-
vating force of the opposition during this period.lOJ This was the cre-
ation of a permanent resistance organization or hierarchyo In a sense, 
the linking together of opposition groups which we have already discus-
sed was part of this process. Another was the nomination, at Oster'a 
urging, of Ludwig Beck to lead the resistance movement.l04 Beck's 
101stauffenberg 1 s meeting with Uexkull and Schulenburg is given 
in Joachim Kramarz, Stauffenberg, trans., R$ H. Barry (New York, 1967), 
p. 72. 
l02Rudolf Fahrner, one of Stauffenberg•s few close friends to 
survive the aftermath of July 20, notes that the young officer initially 
tried to judge Hitler's accession to power and the impact of his ideas 
wi~h fairness and objectivity; in Zeller, p. 184~ 
103 See for example, Rothfels, p. 77. 
104Giseviusj p. 435. Interestingly enough, neither Cathcart nor 
Griffin say ans~hing about the leadership of social movements. Another 
theorist, Herbert Simons, deals with the issue by :noting that the rhet-
orlcal requirements of a leader are: (1) to attract, maintain, and mould 
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election not only provided the opposition with an executive head--some-
one who could serve as final arbitrator for plans and actions, but also 
met the anticipated demands or the military--aomeone whom the officers 
could aclmowledge as leader. Gisevius writes that 11Beck was the only 
general with an unimpaired reputation, the only general who had volun-
tarily resigned. No one among the military men could surpass him in 
personal or soldierly capacity.11105 
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Given these high marks of character and competence, the suspicion 
remains that the choice was unfortunate in at least one vital respect. 
To explain, Beck's membership in the Wednesday Society was not based on 
his rank as a general but on his ability as a historian and his love of 
ancient Greece. Margret Boveri observes that Beck's 11 classicist11 deter-
mined in a real sense, everything he did during his last years. 11106 And 
personality sketches by his contemporaries, both within and outside the 
resistance, support the view that Beck was anything but a revolutionary. 
Guderian writes, 11 A man or this type was the very last person suited to 
workers (i.e., followers) into an efficiently organized unit; (2} to se-
cure adoption of their product by the larger structure (i.e., the estab-
lished order); and (3) to react to resistance generated by the larger 
structure. Herbert W. Simons, "Requirements, Problems, And Strategies: 
A Theory Of Persuasion For Social Movements, 11 Quarterly Journal Of Speech, 
LVI (February, 1970), 3-4. Simon's formulation seems inappropriate be-
cause his definition of movements "as an uninstitutionalized collectivity 
that mobilizes for action to implement a program for the reconstruction 
of social norms or values" ignores the notion of' agency as an instrument 
of change and has connotations of working within the system-an idea re-
flected, for example, in his second requirement for a leader; thus it is 
inapplicable to the revolutionary approach of the German Resistance Move-
ment. Nevertheless, the gap in the dramatistie model remains, and my-
hope is to fill part of it in with this study. 
105Gisevius, p. 435. 
l06Margret Boveri, Treason In The Twentieth Century, trans., Jon-
athan Steinberg (New York, 1963), p. 224. 
take part in a coup d'etat since he was ••• a philosopher. 11107 Schacht 
adds that Beck was "more or a scholar than a man or action. 11108 And 
Schlabrendorff recalls that Beck made him "think of a sage. 11l09 
These comments suggest that Beck was not the man of excess needed 
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to lead a revolutionary movement, especially in its climactic stages.llO 
"Thought and contemplation /Jn whic.b7 every step had to be weighed with 
careful reference to the general conditions obtaining, 11lllis the way Rit-
ter describes Beck's method. Hassell wrote in his diary that Beck was 
too soft and reserved at meetings and too weak as a leader, in view of 
the heated internal conrlicts.112 And Gisevius, who was with him on 
the afternoon of July 20, 1944, refers to Beck's self-control which, 
at first, was impressive. As the day wore on, however, and the head-
quarters of the conspirators degenerated to a scene of chaos, Gisevius 
repeatedly urged Beck to do something. Beck replied, 11A good general 
must be able to wait. 11 Gisevius concludes resignedly, "This mtght be 
all very well in the auditorium of a military academy, but uprisings 
could not be conducted according to the textbooks ••• they required 
arbitrary decisions, boldness, courage; they required leaders rather 
107Guderian, p. 240. 
lOSHjalmar Schacht, My First Seventy-Six Years, trans., Diana 
Pyke (New York, 1955), p. 389. 
109schlabrendorrr, p. 44. 
llOThis holds for Goerdeler too. Ritter writes: "Goerdeler as-
suredly did-not lack either self-confidence or belief in a mission, but 
he did lack the demonic ambition of a born revolutionary." Ritter, pp. 
153-154. 
lllillg_., p. 75. 
112aassell, pp. 282-283. 
than thinkers. 11113 
The final part of Oster's organizational plan included analyzing 
and preparing for the objections of the generals to resistance argu-
ments for action against the Fuehrer. Dchnanyi prepared a summary of 
these into four statements: (1) As long as Hitler appeared successful, 
the mass of German people would not support a coup and the rasult would 
be civil war; (2) France and Britain would exploit this opportunity to 
impose an intolerably harsh peace on Germany; (3} Whatever the outcome, 
a revolt would create a new stab-in-the-back myth in which the resisters 
would be labeled as traitors; and (4) The oath was an obstacle of con-
siderable proportions--there must be a proper chain of com.~and so the 
soldiers could act with a feeling of legitimacy.114 
113Gisevius, pp. 533; 566. This argument a.bout revolutionary 
movement leadership has historical roots and rhetorical implications. 
Simply put, most revolutionary movements begin in relative moderation 
and are frequently led by men of temperate character. Thus, Erasmus 
preceded Luther, Mirabeau came before Danton, Desmoulins, and Robes-
pierre, and Kerensky was the forerunner of Lenin and Stalin. In each 
case, the former were largely men of talk who did not always have the 
i-dll to execute the reforms they talked about, while the latter were 
men of deeds who did not shrink from the executinn of reforms, and of 
men too, if necessary. The parallel does not hold universally, as in-
dicated by a John Adams, or an Adolf Hitler, or a Fidel Castro. But 
it would seem to be applicable to Beck and Goerdeler and their suc-
cessors, Tresckow and Stauffenberg. In his dramatistic formulation, 
Griffin, extrapolating from Burke's discussion of changing orientations 
in A Grammar Of Hotives (Berkeley, 1962), p. 67, makes somewhat the same 
point when he suggests that ideally, "Every movement. • ohas .form. It 
is a progress from pathema through ooiema to mathema; from 1a suffering, 
misfortune, passive condition, state of mind, 1 through 'a deed, doing, 
action, act, 1 to 1 an adequate idea; the thing learned. 111 Grifi'in, 
11 Dramatistic Theory," p. 461. Bm:. he adds that the cr:_sis period of 
a movement may "mark the time when a. class ••• or rank of being that 
has represented the ••• /;ovement•i/ purpose ••• is no longer r~re-
sentative of the new conditions •••• It is a time when •• •Lthey 
may be replaced bi/ the few who /y,eri/ quickest to sense new ractors 
in their incipient stages." Ibid., pp. 466-467. 
114This swn.,na.ry is cited in Deutsch, Pa 176.. Dohnanyi I s ab-
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These were the problems which Oster, Dohnanyi, and the other re-
sisters in the Abwehr set about trying to resolve. Concerning the cli-
mate of public opinion, it was assumed that accounts of Nazi crimes in 
Poland, even though they had not succeeded in regaining military con-
trol of the occupied areas, might still serve to convince the ordinary _, 
citizen that the "successes" of the regime were being purchased at too 
high a price. Beyond this, there was the prospect of an attack in the 
west, and here too, the fears of those Germans who remembered the Marne, 
Verdun, the Somme, and Paaschendale, could be put to use in enlisting 
popular support. Finally, a memorandum was prepared by Otto John and 
Ernst von Harnak which placed special emphasis upon the fact that the 
socialists and trade unionists-Leuschner, Kaiser, and the others-
11stood shoulder to shoulder behind General Beck in order to overthrow 
the regime and so save the German people from a catastrophe in which 
the working class would be the principle sufferers as in the First 
World War. ull5 
In order to reassure the generals that the Allies would not under-
take offensive measures to exploit the revolutionary situation in Ger-
many, and at the same time, to assure themselves that the re-creation 
stract of objections comprises a "crystallization of fundamental is-
sues" by the conspirators. Further, the answers they developed to 
meet these objections as well as the presentation of these answers 
in reports and memoranda constitute the nemergence of argument /j..nrfl 
appeal ••• invoked by the rhetoricians 11 of the resistance. In the 
narrative which follows, the reader will be able to contrast these 
with Hitler's "counter-arguments /jn,f/ counter-appeals" as the di-
alectic interchange moves to its climax. Leland M., Griffin, nThe 
Rhetoric Of Historical Movements,n Quarterly Journal Of Speech, 
XX.XVIII (April, 1952), 186. 
115John, p. 59. 
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of a constitutional state would "remain a strictly internal affair, 11ll6 
Oster, with Beck's approval, devised a plan to enlist Pius IlI as an in-
termediary between the two sides, and equally important, as a sponsor 
for whatever terms could be worked out. The choice of the new Pontiff 
was ideal. As an Archbishop, he had served in Munich and Berlin from 
1917 to 1929, and his understanding of German affairs as well as his 
basic good intentions toward the German people were well-known. Also, 
in a situation where the smallest amount of leakage would be a disas-
ter, the Pope was recognized as a model of discretion and diplomatic 
skill. And the eminence of his post carried with it an impressiveness 
which even generals could appreciate. Finally, the Pope was acquainted 
with several opposition leaders,.notably Beck and Canaris, both of whom 
he had met while serving in Gemany.117 
The role of envoy fell to Josef Mueller, a Munich attorney and de-
fender of church interests in Bavaria. Mueller was a Catholic (which 
immediately made him a better choice than the conspirators in the A!?.-
wehr, most of whom were Protestants), and even more important, he had 
an old friend in the Vatican, a German Jesuit from Freiburg, Father 
Robert Leiber, who was secretary to the Pope.118 Oster contacted 
Mueller and asked him to join the Abwehr as a reserve officer, his 
sole assignment being to seek a line of communication to the Western 
Allies through the Holy See. Mueller agreed, a handshake sealing the 
116Goerdeler is quoted in Hassell, p. 108. 
ll7This summary of advantages is taken from Deutsch, pp. 108-
lll. 
118colvin recounts this list of factors from conversations with 
Mueller; p. 98. 
182. 
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bargain, and he was provided with passports and a cover story about uti-
lizing his connections in Rome to secure information about Italy's inten-
tions toward her alliance with Germany, a subject of some concern to the 
Nazi leadership since Mussolini had reneged on his promise of co-bellig-
erancy prior to the attack on Poland.119 Thus, in late September, Muel-
ler made his first trip to the Vatican where he sounded out Father Leiber 
on the possibilities of approaching the Pope and securing his consent as 
a go-between and guarantor.120 
Relative to the problem of the Dolchstoss, the resisters were some-
what better off than they ha.d been in 1938. Then.iii despite their warnings 
about Hitler's intentions toward the Sudetenland and their pleas to the 
British to stand firm, Chamberlain had capitulated at Muni.ch and the Nazi 
regime had achieved another bloodless triumph. Nov, however, both West-
ern Powers had declared war, and while this introdu.eed new factors which 
increased the hesitation of the generals to take part in a coup, it also 
raised their anxieties about the possibility of de.f'eat or at l.east a 
bloody stalemate in the west. For the leaders of the opposition, the 
problem was delicately balanced. On the one hand, they needed evidence 
to sho,1 the officers 11that the opposing armies wou1d not .fall upon Ger-
many at the moment ••• of civil war, 1112lthus freeing them .from their 
fears about a new stab-in-the-back myth. On the other, they needed 
ll9oeutsch cites these plans from conversati.ons with Mueller; 
pp. 115-119. 
120rbid., p. 119. 
121.aisevius, p. 379. 
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what Schacht called the prospect of a 11defeatnl22to sever their bonds of 
loyalty to Hitler, thus making them ready to lead a coup. For this alter-
native, the Western Allies did not carry any weight since their armies had 
been content to remain on the defensive since the invasion of Poland. In-
stead, it was the Fuehrer himself who would tilt the scales, depending on 
whether he ordered an attack against Britain and France and how the gen-
erals estimated their chances of success in such a venture. And here, as 
we have seen, the Fuehrer unwittingly aided his opponents by declaring, 
in the military conference of September 27, that the attack would prob-
ably take place, and if so, the sooner the better, in spite of all the 
professional and technical objections which the officers could muster. 
The last issue--the oath of allegiance--was closely related to the 
prospects of a widening war. For if the generals--particularly Brauch-
itsch and Halder-were convinced that there was no way to deflect Hitler 
from his proposed march on Paris, they would have no recourse but to march 
on Berlin. As Gisevius bluntly put it, "they would be face-to-face with 
the question of whether an outright overthrow of the government would not 
be cheaper than the otherwise inevitable carnage. 11123 And from the reso-
lution of this dilemma, it was assumed that orders would be issued from 
Zossen, properly headed, explicit, and signed, which required nothing of 
the recipients but mechanical obedience-apparently the proper kind of 
communication for a "military mentality which thinks with its hands on 
its trouser seams, 11124as Hassell once wrote in a moment of frustration. 
122schacht is quoted in Hassell, p. 82. 
123Gisevius, p. 378. 
124Hassell, p. 164. 
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Thus, the conspirators began importuning the generals to act. Groscurth 
and Etzdorf were already on the scene at Zossen. Halder testified at Nu-
remberg that Goerdeler and Beck were in contact with him on many occasions 
during this perioct,125and Gisevius notes that by October 31, the Army Chief 
of Staff "would no longer see Oster. 11126 Although no mention is made of 
what transpired at these ''meetings," the pressure on the army leaders 
must have been intense. 
\ 
On October 6, Hitler delivered his long-awaited and much-advertised 
"peace offer" before the Reichstag. For our purposes, what he said is 
not as important as why he said it. Bullock writes that his intent was 
to "convince the German people that, if the war continued, it was through 
no fault of his. 11127 Certainly, in keeping with the thrust of his remarks 
to his military commanders on September 27, the inference seems inescapable 
that the Fuehrer had already made up his mind on an offensive and was only 
waiting for his 11intuition11 to tell him the proper moment. 
In any event, on October 10, two days before Chamberlain replied, Hit-
ler summoned his military leaders to a second conference, and in what was 
going to be a fall and winter of memoranda production, read them one of 
his own detailing the political and military reasons for striking swiftly 
in the West.128 
497. 
814. 
I shall limit myself exclusively to ••• the necessity to continue 
the fight •••• The German war aim is the ••• destruction of the 
125NCA, Supp., B, p. 1568. 
126Gisevius, p. 358. 
l27Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study In Tyranny (New York, 1961), p. 
128The full text of Hitler's memorandum is in NCA., vii, pp. 801-
power and ability of the Western Powers·ever again to be able to 
oppose the state consolidation and further development of the Ger-
man people •••• 
Then, in whai may be interpreted as a reply to Stulpnagel1s report of 
late September advocating a defensive posture in the west until 1942, 
Hitler said: 
In the present situation ••• time may be reckoned more probably 
as an ally of the Western Powers than of ours •••• The suc-
cesses of the Polish campaign have made possible ••• a war on a 
single front •••• By no treaty or pact can a lasting neutral-
ity of Soviet Russia be insured with certainty. At present all 
reasons speak against Russia's departure from this state of neu-
trality. In eight months, one year, or even several years this 
may be altered •••• The greatest safeguard against any Rus-
sian attack lies in ••• a prompt demonstration ot strength. 
Time was important in regard to Italy and whether there were quick 
"German successes" to entice Mussolini toward the "future of a great 
imperial Roman Empire. • .Lwhictil is only to be rea.lized at the ex-
pense of France and England.n Also, with Belgium and Holland, time 
was of the essence because "both countries are interested in maintain-
ing their neutrality but are incapable of withstanding pressure from 
England and France." And so it went, whether the geographic area was 
Scandinavia, the Balkans, Japan, or the United States, 11time is to be 
viewed as working against Germany." 
When he reached the military part of his argument, Hitler sought 
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to stiffen the resolve of his generals by dwelling upon the superiority 
of German men and material as demonstrated by the Polish campaign. 11The 
German soldier is the best in the world ••• the weapons have just proved 
their war worthiness ••• the tank arm and air force have achieved tech-
nical heights unattained b;r any other state." But here too, 11the pass-
ing of every further month represents a loss of time unfavorable to the 
German power of offensive ••• speed of action betokens a momentum, not 
to be underestimated, which is favorable to Germany and terrifying to 
her enemies." And how could these enemies be gotten at most easily? 
Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland represented 11 the only possible area 
of attack /jy whic!:7' to engage and defeat the opposing forces" thus 
gaining positions on the channel coast for 11 the brutal employment of 
the GAF against the heart of the British will-to-resist." In his ea-
gerness to begin, the Fuehrer minimized the time needed to refit and 
retrain the forces used in Poland since "the advantages gained from 
all the training possible will be less owing to the lack of actual 
battle-usage." As for the time of attack, "It is to take place in 
all circumstances this autumn." .And if necessary, the offensive 
could continue "right into the severe winter. The weather endur-
ance of the French soldier is no better than that of the German." 
If any generals thought that the Allied reply to Hitler's of-
fer of peace would cancel the need for an offensive in the west, they 
were sadly mistaken. Speaking on October 12, Chamberlain termed Hit-
ler's proposals "vague and uncertain, 11 and noted that they ttcontained 
no suggestions for righting the wrongs done to Czechoslovakia and Po-
land. 11 Reliance could not be placed on the promises "of the present 
German Government." If it wanted peace, 11 acta--not words--must be 
forthcoming. 11129 Thus, just as the resisters anticipated, the of-
ficers were caught between the Scylla of organizing a campaign which 
they thought would be disastrous and the Charybidis of revolting 
129Chamberlain 1s reply is quoted in Roger Parkinson, Peace For 
Our Time (London, 1971), pp. 257-258. 
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against a man to whom they had sworn unconditional obedience. As can be 
imagined, they tried to navigate delicately between the two. 
On October 14, Brauchitsch and Halder held a lengthy meeting. Hal-
der1s diary lists the possibilities the two commanders saw for dealing 
with their problem: 11attack, await attack, basic changes. 11130 Both re-
jected the first; Brauchitsch rejected the third; thus, by a process of 
elimination, they agreed upon the second which would buy them some time 
to try to dissuade the Fuehrer from his oft-stated intent. And while 
such a choice meant literally what it said for Brauchitsch, for Halder 
the idea was beginning to take shape that if Hitler remained adamant, 
he would have to act against him and probably without Brauchitsch. 
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Brauchitsch saw the Fuehrer on October 16 and 19. Although the Ar-
my Commander made the most of the technical arguments which he and Hal-
der had devised--the problem of re-equipment, the risks of a winter cam-
paign, and the strength of the forces opposing them-the results were 
unsatisfactory. On the first occasion, Hitler tentatively set the date 
of attack for between November 15 and 20; on the second, he advanced it 
to the 12, although he did promise that the High Command would. receive 
a week's warning perioct.131 
At the same time, Halder quietly set about organizing a staff made 
up of himself, Stulpnagel, Wagner and Groscurth to work out 11a forceful 
solution 111321r one was necessary. Again, it speaks well of Oater's 
130Halder, War Diary, p. 105. Arter the war, Halder explained 
that "basic changes" meant the removal of Hitler. 
lJlibid., pp. 107-109. 
132NcA, Supp., B, p. 1568. 
foresight that Groscurth, who was privy to resistance thinking, was a-
vailable to serve as part of this group. Because time was running out, 
November 5 being the day Hitler would issue his final orders, the staff 
borrowed liberally from the 11 0ster Study" of the previous year which 
Groscurth had secured from the Abwehr. 
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There were, of course, some major differences between the two plans. 
One involved the military units to be used since Halder, who had control 
over the Army's Transportation Department, had ordered two reliable pan-
zer divisions to be held near the capital on the pretext of refitting 
them.133 A second dealt with the press and radio announcements to the 
nation. Here the material was basically new and largely drawn from the 
"chronicles" prepared by Dohnanyi. Also, a favorite idea of Gisevius' 
--that the coup be publicized as an attempt to protect Hitler from cor-
rupt party influences led by Himmler and Goering1.34--was included for 
the sake of those Germans who believed the best about their leader. 
And finally, because the strike was to be made before dawn (begin-
ning with the Reich Chancellery, the vulnerability of which Hitler 
had expressed fears about to Speer), the blackout would be lifted and 
lights would go on all over Germany to symbolize the end of the war.135 
The major similarity between the two plans was that Hitler would 
be captured and not killed. Beck and Goerdeler, whose opinions were 
decisive at this time, opposed assassination on ethical grounds,136 
l33aoerlitz, p. 364. 
l34oisevius, p. 309. 
l35oeutsch quotes Mueller on this feature; p. 202. 
·136For Goerdeler's view, see Ritter, p. 293. Beck, though op-
posed to killing Hitler at this time, would finally change his mind. 
and there was also the matter of Hitler's public trial, a carry-over 
from the earlier plan. Unfortunately, on this vital issue, the con-
spirators badly misjudged their audience. The key military figure 
was Halder, and he, perhaps more than any other of£icer, was deeply 
troubled by his oath.137 Although it seems like a hideous contra-
diction in tenns, his conscience would rest easier with a :murdered 
Hitler than a broken vow. Halder had spoken with the conspirators 
on several occasions about the possibility of the dictator suffering 
a fatal "accident. 11138 And it is no real answer to argue, as Gis-
evius does, that 11it was to be expected, above all., that he would 
openly stand by his act which his intelligence and his conscience 
made mandatory for him. 11139 Thus, as this scene progresses toward 
its climax, with Halder hesitant and confused, committed a.;ad uncom-
mitted, and running the gamut of emotions from determination to 
See Gisevius, p. 532. This early unwillingness to sanction assassina-
tion for moral reasons is another example of ethics and politics work-
ing at crosspurposes. See Chapter Two, page 106, ~ootnote 154. The 
cause for this state of affairs, as Griffin notes, lies in the dif-
ficulty in moving from pathema to poiema, in getting men "to •shift 
their coordinates,' 'acquire a new perspective,• 'see around the cor-
ner• ••• move ••• to the negation of the counter-negation; which is 
to say, to move to the rhetorical killing of the Kill. 11 Griffin, 
11 Dramatistic Theory," p. 464. 
l37The difficulty of Halder 1s position is underscored by one 
of his statements at Nuremberg. "May I make a personal remark. I 
am the last male member of a family which for JOO years were so1diers~ 
What the duty of the soldier is I know. I know too that in the dic-
tionary of a German soldier the term treason and plot against the 
state does not exist •••• You may be assured that this is1the 
worst dilemma that a soldier may be faced with." ~, Supp., B, 
p. 1563. 
138Gisevius, p. 295. 
139~., p. 296. 
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despair, it should be kept in mind that the blame .f"or what happened 
does not rest on him alone, but must be shared by opposition leaders 
who helped to sharpen his dilemma but failed to provide him wit.h what 
he conceived of as a real choice. 
On October 27, Hitler summoned his military leaders to a third 
conference. After a ceremony in which he invested t.wenty-four of 
them with decorations, he informed them that the time had come 1.o 
settle the business of an attack in the west. once and for all. In 
a last ditch effort, Brauchitsch and Halder argued that the army 
could not possibly be ready before November 26. The Fuehrer's re-
sponse was a curt: "That is much too late." The attack would def-
initely" begin on the 12 and final preparations were to be made ac-
cordingly. The two generals left the meeting defeated. As Halder 
put it, they were "worn out and depressed. 11140 
The mental state of the Ar-my Chief of Sta.f.f through the last 
half of October must have alarmed the conspirators. On October l.6, 
Groscurth wrote in his diary, "Admiral feanarii/ visits Halder. Re-
turns shaken. Complete nervous collapse. 11141 General Hanstein, who 
met with Halder three days later, described their conversation as "ex-
tremely" depressing. 11142 And Hassell noted, "Halder .... is not at his 
best-a matter or nerves. 1114.3 
140Halder, War Diary, p. 115. 
141Helmuth Groscurth, Tagebucher Eines Abwehroftiziers, ed., 
Helmut Krausnick and Harold Deutsch (Stuttgart, 1970), p. 218. 
142Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, trans., Anthony G •. 
Powell (London, 1958), p. 71. 
143Hassell, p. 90. 
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In an effort to steady Halder and, at the same time, encourage 
him to make a decision for revolt, the resisters decided to bring 
their strongest argumentative guns to bear. The first of these per-
suasive attacks was a memorandum from the Foreign Office.drawn up by-
Etzdorr and Kordt.144 It opened with a review of the current situa-
tion, described as a "threatening catastrophe," and projected that a 
stalemate was the best that could be hoped for in the west, and that 
only in the shortrun. Ultimately, the attack would harden the resolve 
or the Allies to carry on the war to the bitter end, and reinforced b7 
the United States, which would 11send not only material but also men 
filled with a crusading spirit," the inevitable result would be the 
total defeat or Germany. The argument then shifted to politica1 con-
cems. Hitler could no longer achieve a compromise peace: it was onl7 
le.ft to him "to burn his boats, blow his bridges, and force his wa7 
f'orward. 11 And what would he leave behind? At home, there was :moral 
and religious degradation and the prevalence of tyranny and corrup-
tion. Abroad, to talce on~ the most recent case, the partition ot 
Poland 11has succeeded in handing over twenty million people to Bol-
shevism." Nor did the paper hesitate to deal with the oath., which., 
it argued, had lost its validity "because Hitler, forgetting his own 
obligations., is prepared to sacrifice Germany to his diabolic aims." 
And while it was conceded that a revolt could not count on immediate 
1J..4Kordt, p. 359ft. Internal evidence suggests that while this 
document was delivered to the headquarters of the High Command at the 
end of October, it was wri~ten before the middle of the month since it 
contains no reference to November 12 as the date of attack, and more 
importantly, no mention of Mueller's retum from his second trip to 
the Vatican on October 18. 
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popular support, that should not deter those who possessed the nec-
essary civil courage. Finally-, a section titled "honorable peace" 
pointed out that only so long as the army was intact was a political 
solution possible, and that with Hitler removed, the Allies would 
have every reason to be moderate, probably- along the lines of the 
Munich Agreement with some additional concessions made to bridge 
the Polish Corridor. 
At approximately' this same time, reports arrived a:t Zossen 
from the three Army' Commanders on the Westem Front, the result 
of an earlier request by- Halder for a military- round robin. All 
expressed strong opposition to the offensive on technical grounds, 
and one, from General Leeb, went a step further and added moral ob-
jections to an assault on neutral Belgi~ by- a German Government, 
~~ich only a few weeks before, had solemnly- promised to respect it. 
The cl?sing passage was the important one: "I am prepared in the 
coming days to stand behind 7ou fully with my person and to draw 
every desired and necessary conclusion."145 
This combination of documents fina.lly appears to have pushed 
Halder to the sanctuary or a firm decision. On October 31, he 
talked with Groscurth and declared his readiness to act if Hitler 
remained wedded to his attack schedule. November 5 was the cru-
cial day. On it, the Fuehrer was to confirm his final orders and 
Brauchitsch had arranged for a private meeting with him for one 
la.st attempt. If' the Army- Commander failed, plans for the coup 
would be initiated. Beck and Goerdeler were to hold themselves 
1451eeb1 s reply is quoted in Deutsch, PP• 210-211. 
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in readiness. Maps of the government quarter were to be re-examined. 
And final checks were to be made of the new Chancel.lery blueprints so 
that all possible underground exits could be sealed offol.4,6 
Halder and Brauchitsch were scheduled to make, one last. tour of 
the Western Front on November 2-3. It was not, as. some commentators 
have alleged, to drum up support for the coup, which Brauchitsch, for 
one, did not even know about.147 Rather, they were looking for addi-
tional testimony to reinforce Brauchitsch's arguments in his meeting 
with Hitler on the 5. In any event, the Army Commanders cannot have 
been disappointed by what they learned since Halder summarized the re-
sponses of the various headquarters as wholly nega.t.ive: 11The attack 
ordered by OKW is not believed by any high command center to have a:ny 
prospects of success. 11148 Thus, the Army Chief of Staff was in a re-
ceptive mood on November 4 when the resisters in the Abwehr mounted 
their own paper offensive to make certain he would 11strikeu properly. 
This was a memorandum prepared by Dohnanyi and Gisevius on November 1, 
but only delivered to Zossen three days later because of Hald'er's ab-
sence. In his memoirs, Gisevius writes that the document "showed why 
an offensive in the West would constitute a. politically irrevocable 
mistake. The deliberate violation of the neutral countries would dis-
credit the generals forever. 11 And then, in an iJnportant departure from 
the earlier Foreign Office memorandum, the authors added that a way to 
l.4.6'rhis account of Halder•s instructions has been culled from 
Gisevius, p. J86; and Groscurth, p. 222. 
14?william L. Shirer, The Rise And Fall Of The Third Reich (New 
York, 1960), p. 650. 
148Halder, War Diary. pp. 117-118. 
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a negotiated settlement still existed. Josef Mueller had just returned 
from his second trip to the Vatican and ''on the basis of /Ji.ii/. o .re-
ports the Allies were willing to consider the question of peace. 11149 
General Thomas, who delivered this second memorandum, and who but-
tressed it with economic objections to the attack, must have felt like 
the bearer of an idea whose time had come. Not only did Halder use the 
"most energetic phrases" in reference to the coup, but he even asked 
Thomas to have Oster meet with him that same day so they could coordi-
nate final arrangements. Such a request was a significant departure 
from the Army Chief of Staff's behavior only a week earlier when he 
would no longer allow Oster to visit Zossen,15°probably because he 
suspected the Abwehr leader as the source of much of the pressure 
being exerted on him. In any case, Gisevius, who talked with Oster 
later in the evening, reports that the meeting went extremely well. 
Stulpnagel "gave him full details and even mentioned the name of the 
general whose panzer corps was to take care or the most urgent tasks 
in Berlin," and Halder 1s resolve had "profoundly impressed" Oster, who 
thanked the general for coming to a "strong and noble resolution. 11151 
In a high state of excitement, then, the conspirators gathered on 
the morning of November 5. Goerdeler, according to Gisevius, was al-
ready draw:ing up lists of cabinet ministers. Beck was more reserved, 
but Popitz and Hassell were almost as optimistic as Goerdeler. Only 
149Gisevius, pp. 384-385. 
l50ibid., p. 383. 
l5lrbid., pp. 385-386. 
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Schacht remained cynical: "Just you watch," he said, "Hitler will smell 
a rat. 11152 
There was, as John Wheeler-Bennett observes, "very little rat to 
smell. 11153 At twelve, Brauchitsch went into his meeting with Hitler, 
accompanied as far as the reception room by Halder. After first pre-
senting the Fuehrer with memoranda and reports-the results of the 
trip to the Westem Front--the Army Commander began to recite the 
well-known litany of technical objections to the attack: the problem 
of re-equipnent, the strength of opposing forces, and the effect of 
bad weather on offensive movements. "Neither is the French Army- e-
quipped with umbrellas against bad weather," was Hitler's grim re-
tort. Sensing a stalemate, Brauchitsch turned next to the issue of 
the Fuehrer's interference with the direction of operations during 
the Polish campaign. Would it be possible in the future for Hitler 
to limit his activities in military affairs? This question merited 
' 
only silence. In desperation, Brauchitsch advanced an objection as 
yet unknown to the Fuehrer. The fighting in Poland had revealed the 
aggressive spirit of the infantry to be low, many had been reluctant 
to advance under fire, a number of officers had been needless}¥ kil-
led trying to rally them, and carried away by his own momentum, the 
Army Commander added that there had been breaches of discipline, sim-
ilar to those in the last war. At this, Hitler "flew into a rage." 
Brauchitsch's argument was a slur against the fuhrertreu German 
152nisevius, pp. 386-387. 




youth. He demanded evidence. Exactly which units had been involved? 
What action had the Army High Command taken? How many death sentences 
had been carried out? As far as the troops in the west were concerned, 
he himself would fly there tomorrow to investigate the situation and 
provide for proper correctives. And then, Hitler turned his attack on 
Brauchitsch and gave vent to a rancor that had been building up for a 
long•time-a rancor doubtless aggravated by the events or the past few 
months. The army had never been loyal! It had never had con.fidence in 
his genius! It had deliberately sabotaged his rearmament program! It 
was afraid to fight! He was at the end of his pa~ience with the "spirit 
of Zossen," which he was going to ruthlessl;y 11dest.royl" Bluntly, he for-
bade Brauchitsch to,go on with the report and dismissed him.154 
It was a stunned Anny Commander who left the Reich Chancellery only 
twenty minutes after entering it. On the road back to Zossen, Halder 
tried to make some sense out of Brauchitsch's incoherent account. A-
bove all, one phrase had an ominous ring-that Hitler knew about the 
"spirit of Zossen" and would "destroy" it. To the Chief of Staff, 
that could only mean that the plot had been discovered and that if 
the SS was not at headquarters already, they soon w;ould be. Such a 
thought may well have conjured up memories of the Roehm Purge of 1934 
when those whom Hitler had marked as traitors were lined up against 
the wall and dispatched whol~sale. Understandably then, Halder moved 
like a man with retribution at his heels. Upon returning to Zossen, 
154.rhe account of this meeting has been reconstructed from the 
following: Brauchitsch, TM\rlC, xx, p. 575; Gisevius, p. 388; Groscurth, 
p. 221; Halder, War Dian:, p. 126; Halder.,~, Supp., B, p. 1568; 
John, p. 61; and Warlimont, p. 58. 
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he gave Stulpnagel orders to destroy all traces of the plot, and Stulp-
nagel, in turn, gave Groscurth orders to burn everything.155 Thus, the 
plans for the coup went up in smoke: Chancellery blueprints, maps of the 
city, reports, proclamations, and orders. 
For the next few hours the atmosphere at Zossen was extremely tense. 
Hitler's order confirming the attack was received on teletype at mid-a~-
ternoon, but other than that, no evidence of his threat appeared to be 
forthcoming, and as the day wore on, some of the officers gradually be-
gan to regain their composure. Even Brauchitsch, who had been the ob-
ject of the Fuehrer's diatribe, was feeling resentment over the way he 
had been treated. Gisevius quotes him as telling Halder that "the of-
fensive would be fatal and must be prevented at all costs." What these 
costs might be were not his concern: "I myself shall do nothing, but I 
will not oppose anyone who does do something. 11156 
To a committed resister like Groscurth, this declaration sounded 
like the signal to act. In spite of the fact that the plans lay in ash-
es, nothing was lost if Halder could be rewound so that he would issue 
the orders to strike. But there was the rub. The tensions of the past 
month--of organizing a campaign which he opposed and a plot which ran 
against his convictions, of being whipsawed between the importunings of 
the conspirators on one side and the demands of the Fuehrer on the other~ 
and above all, of listening to Brauchitsch during the emotionally shat-
tering ride back to Zossen--had left the Army Chief of Staff with a 
broken mainspring. All desire to lead a revolt against the living 
155Groscurth, pp. 224-225. 
l56Gisevius, p. 389. 
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Hitler had been destroyed and he retreated to his defense of being will-
ing to act only if someone would assassinate the dictator, specifically 
Canaris and his lieutenants in the Abwehr,157a suggestion motivated in 
part no doubt by his resentment at the ceaseless pressures from the 
Tirpitzufer,158but one which Canaris, who also opposed murder for eth-
ical reasons, rejected that same evening.159 Thus, the day which saw 
the climax of a dialectic battle between the Fuehrer and his opponents 
ended with Hitler in full possession of the field. Not only had he o-
verwhelmed the Commander-in-Chief of the Army by the sheer clangor of 
his voice, but he had also paralyzed the Army Chief of Staff at one-
remove and left him incapable of further action except on grounds of 
tyrannicide. Taken together, it was no mean accomplishment for a man 
without formal training in the arts of advocacy. 
The weeks which followed the crisis of November 5 represented an 
almost unbroken series of blows to the hopes of the resisters. The on-
ly good news came at the outset. On November 7, partly because or un-
favorable weather forecasts and partly because of embarrassing offers 
of peace mediation by the Belgium and Dutch monarchs, the Fuehrer post-
poned the date of the attack for three days--the first or fourteen 
157Groscurth, pp. 224-225. 
1581n discussing the period of a movement's consummation, Griffin 
writes that "the central problem of the rhetoricians of any cause •• • is 
to move the public to the desired action before the point of alienation 
is reached and reaction develops .. " Griffin, 11Rhetoric Of Historical Move-
ments," 186. While this period does not represent the climax of the drama, 
there does seem to be a parallel between the amount of pressure which the 
resisters brought to bear on Halder and his negative reaction. 
l59Gisevius, p. 389. For Canaris' view on assassination, see~., 
p. 443. 
200. 
postponements which he would order throughout the· rdnter of 1939-40, and 
which would keep alive the plans of the resisters as they worked against 
the calendar in an effort to rally the defeated geoerals to action before 
the offensive destroyed all chances of a negotiated peace. 
Typically, it was Oster who made the first att.empts. For one thing, 
he secretly called on an old friend of his, Major G. J~ Sas, a military 
attache at the Dutch Embassy, to give him the firs;t of many warnings a-
bout the date of Hitler's proposed attack on Holla.nd.160 Unfo,rtunately, 
Sas 1 s account of these warnings was not believed at the Hague, probably 
because the Germans had avoided Dutch territory in the First World War, 
and more likely, because the Fuehrer kept postponing the attack date and 
with each cry of "wolf," Sas 1s credibility as well. as that of his informer 
went down accordingly. 
For another, Oster and Gisevius made a hurried trip to the Western 
Front in an effort to persuade General Witzleben, then corrimanding the 
First Army, to come to Zossen and try to get Halder to "strike." As 
Gisevius puts it, 11Witzleben was a refreshingly unc:omplicated man. He 
had no bent for that kind of political finesse so dear to a bureaucrat-
ic general such as Halder. 11161 Perhaps his directness would provide the 
motivation needed by the Army Chief of Staff. Unfortunately, Witzleben 
was in no condition to "motivate" anyone. Physicall.y, his health left 
much to be desired and in fact, he was taking the 1ocal curative waters 
when the two emissaries arrived. Also, he was mentally depressed and 
160sas 1s account of his meetings with Oster is in Roger Manvell 
& Heinrich Fraenkel, The Canaris Conspiracy (New York, 1969), pp. 120-
126. 
l61<zisevius, p. 304. 
"did not believe there was any chance ••• to influence Brauchitsch and 
Halder. The two were hopeless cases now.nl62 Besides this negative 
result, the meeting with Witzleben involved an incident which gave Hal-
der another opportunity to express his anger at the pressures to which 
Oster had subjected him. The Abwehr leader had carelessly left some 
papers lying around First Army Headquarters which included copies of 
Beck's proclamations and lists of prospective ministers in the pro-
visional government. The officer who found them did not report his 
discovery to the Gestapo but sent them instead to Halder, since some 
of the material might have compromised him. As can be imagined, the 
Chief of Staff was extremely angry and gave Groscurth orders to take 
the severest kind of reprimand to Oster and to tell him in effect that 
his presence was no longer appreciated at Zossen.163 
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Oster's final move was to try and free the officers from their ob-
ligations to the oath. Although Beck and the other resistance leaders 
were opposed to killing Hitler on moral grounds, the Abwehr Chief of 
Staff had no such reservations. Thus, as he watched the generals "re-
treat to their oath which ••• was sworn on the living Hitler, 11164he be-
gan to look for an "assassin." Such a search was not easy. Of all the 
members of the resistance, he could find only one who possessed the nec-
essary requirements: access to the Fuehrer and no qualms of conscience 
about killing him. This was Erich Kordt, Ribbentrop's Chef de Cabinet, 
who sometimes went to the Reich Chancellery on diplomatic business. 
l62Gisevius, p. 392. 
l63Groscurth, pp. 228-229. 
164Kordt quotes Oster, p. J60. 
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Kordt could not expect to gain admittance to Hitler's private study, but 
the Fuehrer occasionally made appearances in the reception room to call 
in visitors or give orders to aides.165 In these moments, it might be 
possible for a person with a bomb hidden in his clothing to trigger the 
mechanism, move close to Hitler, and both perish together. Kordt was 
willing to make this sacrifice and Oster arranged to get materials to-
gether for a bomb which would be ready on November 11. Meanwhile, Kordt 
would visit the Chancellery as often as he could in order to accustom the 
guards, who already knew him by sight, to his preaence.166 
On November a, Hitler, as was his custom, visited the site of his a-
bortive putsch of 1923, and in the evening, delivered his annual commem-
orative speech to the 11~ Kampfer11 who had gathered at the Hofbrauhaus 
in Munich. A dozen or so minutes after he had finished speaking, a bomb 
which had been planted in a pillar directly behind the lectern exploded, 
killing seven and wounding sixty-three. The historical controversy over 
whether Georg Elser, the would-be assassin, was solely responsible for 
setting off the infernal device, or whether the whole affair had been 
arranged by the Gestapo as a morale booster with Elser playing the part 
of catspaw, need not concern us here except to note that for Kordt and 
Oster, the result was the ruin of their own assassination plan. When 
Kordt met with Oster on the 10, the Abwehr Staff Chief did not have the 
bomb. All laboratories that handled explosives were under surveillance 
and there was no way to get the material without arousing suspicion. 
Kordt volunteered to use a pistol instead. Oster argued against it: 
165For a description of the room arrangements in the Chancellery, 
see Speer, esp., Chapter Eight, 11The New Reich Chancellery.," 
166Kordt, p. 370. 
11You do not have one chance in a hundred. You cannot see Hitler alone. 
And in the anteroom in the presence of adjutants, orderlies, and visi-
tors, you would hardly get a chance to shoot. n167 Anyway, the offen-
sive had been postponed a second time and when the hue and cry died 
down, it would be possible to get another bomb and try again.168 Un-
fortunately, by then, the man and the moment had passed from the stage. 
In early January, Ribbentrop, who had grown suspicious of Kordt, had 
him transferred to the diplomatic wilderness of Nanking where he re-
mained until the end of the uar. 
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The day after the attempt in Munich, a second event occurred which 
was to prove equally ruinous to resistance plans. This was the Venlo in-
cident in which two British intelligence officers, Captains. Payne Best 
and Major R.H. Stevens, were lured to the German frontier by Nazi agents 
posing as conspiring generals, seized by an SS detachment, and dragged in-
to Germany. In this affair, it is a matter of conjecture as to how much 
the Gestapo knew about the particulars of resistance activities and how 
much was good guess work. Walter Schellenberg, the security officer re-
sponsible for the kidnapping, provides only hints in his memoirs, but e-
ven these are enough to suggest that the defeatism of the High Command 
was well-known in the upper-levels of the Nazi hierarchy.169 And cer-
tainly, Himmler's minions could not have been deaf to the fears which 
167Kordt, p. 374. It is difficult to understand Louis Namier•s 
objections to "curiously dramatic conversations ••• even accepting their 
historicity." Louis B. Namier, In The Nazi Era (London, 1952), p. 97. 
Perhaps the dramatic element was inherent in the subject matter. 
168Kordt, p. 374. 
169walter Schellenberg, Hitler's Secret Service, trans., Louis 
Hagen (New York, 1971), p. 78. 
the Fuehrer himself had expressed about Beck,170or to some of the dan-
gerous indiscretions into which the optimistic Goerdeler was always 
blundering,17lor even to the "divergent views" of a man like Hassell, 
who was unable to secure a new foreign service post for that very rea-
son.172 In any event, whatever their degree of consciousness, the Se-
curity Service was sufficiently alive to what was going on to have been 
in contact with Best and Stevens for more than a month. And Schellen-
berg, who had assumed the identity of a Major Schaemmel, was able to 
talk quite plausibly about the 11 forcible removal of Hitler ••• the 
setting up of a new regime ••• Land the possible termi/ of a secret 
agreement ••• which would lead to a peace treaty. 11173 Then came the 
assassination attempt at Munich. The Fuehrer insisted that the Brit-
ish Secret Service was behind it, that the two officers were directly 
involved, and that they should be kidnapped and brought to Berlin for 
interrogation.174 
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For the resisters, the Venlo incident was damaging in two respects& 
First, they were not certain how much Stevens and Best knew or how much 
the Gestapo might extort from them. Canaris, who was fully aware of 
the Abwehr's central role in anti-Hitler activities at this time "took 
soundings with Heydrich as to whether any German intelligence officers 
l70see Chapter Two, p. 120. 
l7libid., p. 97. 
172Hassell, p. 20. 
173schellenberg, p. 80. 
174rbid., p. 89. 
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were compromised by the affair." The SS chief said no, but added that 
the "loyalty of some senior generals was questionable, 11175and with this 
ambiguous response, the resisters had to be content. Second, the kid-
napping delayed the Mueller negotiations in Rome for almost six weeks. 
Deutsch quotes the British Ambassador to the Vatican, Sir Francis d 1Arcy 
Osborne, expressing to the Pope the fears of the Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Halifax, about the credentials of Mueller: "Your Holiness, can you be 
sure of the matter? Can we rely on this? 11176 Fortunately for the con-
spirators, they had a staunch ally in the Pontiff, who vouched for Mueller 
and the men who stood behind him. But the delay, in a period when Hitler 
was making only short-term postponements, must have been a severe strain, 
and more importantly, by the time the terms of the negotiations were fi-
nally hammered out at the end of January, other changes had taken place 
which made the British offer less attractive to its intended audience 
than it might have been earlier. 
Whatever his degree of responsibility for the attempt at Munich or 
the affair at Venlo, Hitler was quick to take advantage of them and drive 
home his victory over the reluctant generals, and by implication, the con-
spirators. Guderian writes that "a series of lectures was organized in 
Berlin ••• in order to strengthen the political attitude of the officer 
corps." The speakers were Goebbels and Goering, and the Panzer Leader 
summarizes the theme of their addresses: "The Luftwaffe generals, under 
the purposeful leadership of party comrade Goering, are entirely reliable; 
the admirals can be trusted to follow the Hitlerite line; but the Party 
175colvin, p. 97. 
l76neutsch, p. 137. 
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cannot place unconditional trust in. • • the army commanders. nl.77 
The climax of the series came on November 23 with a speech by the 
Fuehrer himself. In many respects, the arguments he used were similar 
to those he had advanced on October 10, but now he was much more cer-
tain of himself and he scored telling points off his adversaries. Thus, 
he mocked the anxious "prophets" who had seen only catastrophe in all the 
decisions he had taken since becoming Chancellor, and he recited the en-
tire list of them, from the "hard choice" to leave the League of Nations 
to the "pressure" involved in deciding to attack Poland. The goal for 
which he strove was Lebensraum: "the increasing number of people requires 
a larger living space." And the instrument which would make it possible 
was the Wehrmacht; 11 1 did not organize the armed forces not to strike • 11 
The air force and the navy had performed excellently in Poland and so 
had the army. But he was "most profoundly pained that. the troops would 
advance only if the officers led the way." The arm:, was the best any-
where and every German grenadier was superior to his French counterpart. 
Sarcastically, he praised the officers for being better than in 1914-
a very bad year as far as military leadership was concerned:17811The of-
ficers must give an example of fanatical unity from above. There would 
not be any failures if the leaders always had the courage a rifeman must 
have." And he demanded that they 11 pass on the spirit of determination 
to the lower ranks. 11 As for himself, he would "shrink from nothing and 
••• destroy everyone who is opposed to me •••• I shall stand or fall 
l77auderian, p. 76. 
178During the drive on Paris in Augugt 1914, General Helmuth von 
Moltke, Army Chief of Staff, suffered a nervous collapse, and some of 
the field commanders were not too far removed from the same condition. 
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in this struggle." But there would be no defeat: 11we shall come through 
victoriously--our age will enter into the history of our people. • • • 
No capitulation to external forces, no revolution from internal forces. 11179 
The effect of the speech was almost everything the Fuehrer could have 
hoped for. The taunt of faintheartedness was the kind of challenge meant 
to rally generals to their guns. As Oster put it, 11The charge of coward-
ice ha.s made the brave cowards again. 11180 And the threat against inter-
nal revolt-"! will shrink from nothing and destroy everyone who is op-
posed to me"-must have given a few of the officers-Brauchitsch and Hal-
der in particular-some anxious moments. In case they missed the point. 
Hitler kept the two Army Commanders behind after the meeting was over and 
gave them a further lecture on the "spirit of Zossen. 11181 And whatever 
their inward thoughts, from that moment on, their outward show was sup-
port for the attack in the west. 
When word of the Fuehrer 1s speech reached the resistance leaders, 
they held a series of urgent conferences to see what could be done.182 
The result appears to have been to send General Thomas, armed witb the 
most factual objections which could be made against the offensive, to 
see Halder. On November 27, Thomas met with the Chief of Staff and 
spoke about the risks of an attack in the west leading to a limitless 
war, about the inadequacy of German resources to support such a war. 
91-95. 
179~, iii, pp. 572-580. 
180oster is quoted in Kordt, p. 377. 
l81Halder, War Diary:. p. 132. 
182Hassell notes meetings with Popitz, Goerdeler, and Beck; pp. 
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and about the necessity of removing Hitler before these evil circumstances 
came to pass.183 
From several sources, we learn that Halder was not wholly unmoved by 
what he heard. Stulpnagel was dispatched on a hurried trip to the West-
ern Front to sound out the field commanders once more. The results were 
discouraging. Although Leeb and Witzleben were still ready to help, none 
of the other generals would act without proper orders. As one of them 
said, 11We could give commands, but we have no idea whether they would be 
carried out. 11184 Stulpnagel was not to be deterred. Upon his return to 
Zossen, this "magnificent soldier and Prussian nobleman11185put the issue 
squarely to Halder: 11If Brauchitsch cannot make a decision ••• then you 
must play the game across him ••• present him with a fait accompli. 11186 
But the Chief of Staff was not willing to act alone. Launching a revolt 
would be difficult enough if Brauchitsch cooperated; without him, it would 
be impossible. Frustrated over how to short-circuit the Anny Commander's 
influence with Halder, Stulpnagel exclaimed: 111 111 lock him in his room 
and throw the key into the W. c. 11187 
Halder himself had taken soundings closer at hand. Because he no 
longer had any forces (the two panzer divisions having long since been 
released to the Western Front), he inquired of General Fritz Fromm, the 
183NcA, Supp., B, p. 1569. 
184Ritter, p. 155, 
185This is Halder 1 s description of Stulpnagel, quoted in Deutsch, 
p. 208. 
186NCA, Supp., B, p. 1570. 
187stulpnagel is quoted in Deutsch, p. 208. 
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Head of the Replacement Army, about the possibility of troop support for 
a coup d'etat. Fromm is a character whom we shall meet again before the 
drama of the resistance movement runs its course, and already the most 
salient feature of his personality-a desire to protect his flanks--is 
evident. He told Halder that 11 0n his own initiative he would take no 
such action, but if Brauchitsch would give such an order, he would ex-
ecute it. 11188 
It thus came down to the Army Commander once more, and in his case, 
Hitler's speech had completely nullified even those pangs of resentment 
which he had felt on the afternoon of November 5. Far from agreeing to 
issue orders for a revolt, Brauchitsch (perhaps with Halder's assist-
ance)189drew up a list of six arguments which deserve to be included in 
this study if only to show the type of objections with which the resist-
ance leaders had to contend. The rather lengthy quotation comes from 
Hassell's diary. The first sentence after each number is the military 
argument; the remaining sentences are Hassell 1s rejoinder8 
(1) Ludendorff had also made a last desperate effort in 1918, and 
had not thereby damaged his historical reputation. One can ha1~ly 
believe one's ears. Of what importance to us is the historical 
reputation of a general! Besides, it is dal!'.aged, and above all, 
the effort did fail. 
(2) There is no great man available. Such a ~an can only reveal 
himself in the course of action, and if he doesn't show up it sim-
ply can't be helped. One cannot, for that reason, let a crime be 
committed that would plunge Germany into catastrophe. For even if 
we are victorious it would necessarily be a Pyrrhic victory, quite 
apart from the necessity of putting a stop to the inner destruction, 
188 s NCA, upp., B, p. 1570. 
189rn his interrogation at Nuremberg, Halder prefaced these same 
objections with phrases like, "Brauchitsch very rightly always emphasized 
that. • • • 11 Ibid., p. 1571. Thus, the reader is left with the impres-
sion that at the least, Halder associated himself with these arguments. 
the demoralization, and the unspeakable bestialities in Poland, 
which are a disgrace to the name of Germany and for which the 
Army must share responsibility. 
(3) We ought to give Hitler this last (sic!) chance to deliver 
the German people from the slavery of English capitalism. How 
propaganda has affected the guileless Germans! Now they want 
to pursue a Realpolitik because their former policy was too 
"sentimental. 1t Just like a certain type of officer who l.eft 
the service in 1918, completely ignorant of business methods, 
and, upon becoming a merchant, thought he had to cheat, al-
though previously he had never so much as stolen a pin. In 
just this way we have now come to think that a 11realistie 11 
policy means we must ignore all decencies and principles~ and 
we do not even see that in doing this we are destroying our own 
foundations. 
(4) One does not rebel when face to face with the enemy. But it 
is not the Army which is facing the enemy in this age of total 
warfare, but the entire people, and the issue is whether or not 
the nation shall be ruined. 
(5) Opposition has not yet matured enough. It is interesting, by 
the way, that the leaders of armies always use this argument. There 
is some truth in it. But can one wait for this when everything is 
at stake? Of course, theoretically, it would be better to wait a 
while, but practically speaking we cannot. 
(6) One cannot be sure of the younger officers. This may be par-
tially true. But if the generals are united and give out the cor-
rect orders the people and the Army will obey.190 
As with most dialectic exchanges, this one is a mixture of Dtrengths 
and weaknesses. Certainly, Hassell destroys t.he badly-drawn parallel to 
Ludendorff and the nonsense about giving Hitler a last chancea Also, he 
rightly concedes the partial inadequacy of the resistance position rela-
tive to its immaturity as a movement and its belief that a 11united 11 
l90Hassell, pp. 92-93. This interchange is typical of a "rhetor-
ical pattern inherent in the movement" which we will meet again .. That 
is, the objections of the generals and the rejoinders of the resisters 
represent a dialectic within a dialectic--a kind of micro-argu!IHmt with-
in the framework of the larger macro-argument between Hitler a.i."1.d the re-
sisters. While Griffin and Cathcart do not refer to such a pattern, it 
would seem to be inherent to any totalitarian scene in which a secret, 
revolutionary movement is attempting to persuade agents of a power a-
gency to revolt and overthrow the existing hierarchy. 
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officer corps could expect to be obeyed (although in both cases, the gen-
erals had evidenced a willingness to act on other occasions when the same 
disadvantages obtained). In any event, there was nothing further to be 
said on either count, Brauchitsch and Halder having already been informed 
of the resistance movement's new labor support, 191and the risk of deciding 
whether their orders would be obeyed being an action they themselves would 
have to take. Interestingly enough, Hassell skirts the argument of the 
"great man," probably because he was unaware of Oster's attempt to can-
cel the Nazi advantage by assassinating Hitler. Thus, within the realm 
of the possible, the issue appeared to hinge on the one remaining point 
--"that one does not rebel when face to face with the enemy." 
As Goerdeler and Hassell reviewed the situation in early December, 
they posed the problem as a question: "How, without changing Germany's 
tactical situation for the worse, could the generals get a guara.~tee 
that a decent peace was still obtainable, but could no longer be had 
after marching through Belgium and Holland? 11192 Neither man knew any-
thing about the Vatican exchanges (which were also stalled at this time), 
and while Hassell would be let in on the secret in March, Goerdeler would 
not-a lack of knowledge which was to have unfortunate consequences as we 
shall see in the closing scene of this act. At any rate, the only answer 
seemed to be to establish contact with the Western Powers and to work out 
in some detail the terms on which peace could be negotiated. 
The basic ideas for such terms had been broadly formulated by Goer-
deler in October 1939. They included a return to a rule of law in Germany, 
191This was the otto John-Ernst von Harnak memorandum; seep. 181. 
192Hassell, pp. 93-94. 
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a call for general disarmament, a restoration of trade relations, and 
most importantly, a claim for keeping Austria, the SudeteI!lland, and the 
German-speaking parts of Poland.193 Viewed in isolation, there is some 
truth to Wheeler-Bennett's charge that the conspirators "were aiming at 
the retention by a non-Nazi Germany of the greater part of Hitler's con-
quests. 11194 But placed in a wider context, the foreign policy claims of 
the resistance appear less sinister. For one thing, the Nazis were not 
the only Germans who believed that the territorial provisions of the 
Versailles Treaty were unjust. Goerdeler•s secret conversations with 
Sir Robert Vansittart., which we discussed in the last chapter, is one 
example.195 Another is Hassell 1s diary entry at the time the Fuehrer 
finally eliminated the remainder of Czechoslovakia in March 1939: 11The 
point has now been reached beyond which Tallyrand left Napoleon. rrl96 
Put differently, there is no doubt that the conservat:tves in the resist-
ance wanted to restore Germany to a position of prominence among the na-
tion states of Europe, and further, that they were attracted to some of 
Hitler's conquests., like the Sudetenland, which had never been part of 
the Kaiserreich, but to which they believed Germany had honest rights. 
But such similarities should not imply an absence of differences be-
tween the foreign policies of Hitler and his opponents. C'erta.inly, 
the spirit governing resistance visions, even at their most expansive, 
was not identical with the nightmare of Hitlerian supremacy {a subject 
l93Hassell, p. 76. 
194Wheeler-Bennett., p. 485. 
195 See Chapter Two., pp. 95-97. 
196Hassell, p. 38. 
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to which we shall revert in the next. chapter). Moreover, at no time did 
the men of the "decent Germany" ever suggest that the destiny- of the Reich 
be achieved through force of arms. Finally, Wheeler-Bennett ignores the 
fact that many of the formulations contained in resistance documents can 
be ascribed to rhetorical exigencies-to the need to win the support of 
the generals, without whom a coup d'etat was impossible. Brauchitsch, 
Halder, and the other officers, had to be persuaded that an uprising a-
gainst Hitler was not only necessary, but would also cost little in terms 
of foreign policy, and might even be profitable, as witness by the Etz-
, 
dorf-Kordt memorandum in which reference was made to territorial conces-
sions to bridge the "Polish Corridor. 11197 
As December turned to Januacy, the resisters mobilized for one last 
effort. Hassell instructed his son-in-law, Detalmo Biroli, to be on the 
alert for opportunities to make contacts with Allied representatives in 
Ita1y,198aoerdeler, through the Wallenberg family in Stockholm, sent a 
message to Vansittart inquiring about the possibility of peace terms on 
the basis of the 1914 eastern frontier of Germany,l99and in Berne, Theo 
Kordt used the connections of former Chancellor Josef Wirth to get a lel;-
ter through to the British Foreign Offi.ce.200 Not all of these attempts 
were productive. Vansittart answered that Goerdeler 1s conditions would 
197see pp. 192-193. 
198Biroli became acquainted with the Hassella when they were in 
Rome. He married Fay, the youngest of the Hassell children. The evi-
dence of Hassell 1s instructions is quoted in J. Lonsdale Bryans,~ 
Victory (London, 1951), pp. 39-40. 
l99n1tter, p. 157. 
200ibid., pp. 157-158. 
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be difficult to accept.201 In Switzerland, two Foreign Office represent-
atives met with Wirth and brought a tentative offer in writing, a copy of 
which they declined to hand over, but did explain orally. In essence, it 
gave assurances that the British would not take advantage of the internal 
German crisis by attacking in the west, expressed a willingness to work 
out peace terms with the new government (although these were not speci-
fied), and warned that no terms could be considered binding without the 
approval of France.202 This was an improvement over Vansittart 1s nega-
tive response, but it still left the resisters without a document which 
clearly outlined peace conditions. Thus, when Hassell 1s son-in-law in-
formed him about a series of meetings which he had had with a private 
contact, a certain Lonsdale Bryans, who was interested in effecting a 
liaison between opposition groups in Germany and the British Government, 
and who had access to Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, Hassell took 
a chance and agreed to see him.203 
Arranged by Biroli, the Bryans-Hassell meeting took place at Arosa 
Switzerland on February 22-23, 1940. To provide cover for Hassell 1 s move-
ments, his wife first took their asthmatic son to Arosa, thus giving him 
an excuse to visit there. As can be imagined, Hassell began the discus-
sions cautiously, but once convinced that Bryans was "safe," he told him 
as much as security would allow.204 Thus, he stressed the need for an 
201Ritter, p. 158. 
202!.e!.g. 
20JBiroli 1s letter to Hassell, telling him about Bryans, refers 
to some forty conversations which the two men had before Biroli consid-
ered Bryans a safe and useful channel. Hassell, pp. 115-116. 
204Hassell 1s statement to Bryans is in Ibid., pp. ll6-118; see 
11 authoritative English statement" on peace terms because the resisters 
could never approach the generals with empty hands. Also, he insisted 
that the statement not be tied to demands for a cc.:up d I etat-that 11this 
must be an exclusively German affair. 11 And he was astute enough to re-
main indefinite as to when the uprising would take place, saying only 
that he understood that any assurances would be valid only "be.fore ma-
jor military operations are undertaken. 11 To Bryans 1 request .for the 
names of the men involved, Hassell declined to com:ment except to say 
that an important general was associated with the ~onspiracy and that 
Sir Nevile Henderson, the last British Ambassador to Germany, would 
know who he meant. Finally, he presented Bryans with a written state-
ment on the kind of terms which would be acceptable to the resistance 
movement as well as a covering letter signed by hiraself as a testimony 
of good faith. 
"The purpose of peace," as Hassell wrote in the memorandum, 11ought 
to be the permanent pacification and restablishment. of Europe on a solid 
base and a security against a renewal of warlike tendencies." The con-
tinent did not mean a "chessboard of political or military action or a 
base of power." Rather, it had "la valeur d'une patrie /fhe meaning of 
individual countrie.§.7 in the frame of which a healthy Germany in sound 
condition of life is an indispensible factor." To .achieve this struc-
ture, it was necessary "to leave the union of Austria and the Sudeten 
with the Reich" and to establish a German-Polish frontier along the 
also, Bryans, pp. 65-66. The written memorandum accompanying it is an-
other example of what Griffin calls "the announcement of a stand ••• a 
constitution, manifesto, covenant, program, proclamation, declaration, 
tract for the time, statement, or ccunterstatement. 11 Griffin, 11Drama-
tistic Theory," pp. 462-463. 
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lines of 1914. Apart from this, however, there was no intent to hold on-
to Hitler's conquests. Based upon the "principle of nationality," an "in-
dependent Poland and Czech Republic" should be re-established and no claims 
were to be made in the west. Finally, from a program which Hassell had 
drawn up with Goerdeler and Popitz, there was appended a list of princi-
ples upon which the new government would be founded, including Christian 
ethics, justice and law as fundamental elements of public life, social 
welfare as a lietmotif, control of state executive power by the people, 
and liberty of thought, conscience, and intellectual activity.205 
The story of Bryans' difficulties after he returned to London need 
not greatly concern us here. Suffice to say that despite his earlier 
contacts with Halifax, he was not invited to see the Foreign Minister, 
but had to content himself with handing over Hassell 1s statement and 
covering letter to Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Undersecretary. 
Undoubtedly, part of the reason for this reluctance on the part of the 
diplomats at Whitehall was their annoyance with an amateur who had pre-
sumed to intrude into the field of foreign affairs, and what was worse, 
had succeeded. But part of the reason, as Cadogan rightly told Bryans, 
was that "something similar had already been transmitted by means of 
.official agents to the same sort of people on the other sid.e. 11206 
Thus, while Bryans was allowed to return to Arosa on April 15, it was 
205The complete program is included in Hassell1 pp. 368-372. It 
is difficult to understand Shirer 1s characterization of the8e ?rinciples 
as 11wooly. 11 Shirer, p. 693. While they are only summarized in the memo-
randum to Bryans, the full program is included in Hassell 1s diary, a fact 
of which Shirer ought to be aware. 
206Bryans, p. 73. 
only to "leave no frayed ends. 11207 And though he felt let down and de-
ceived, he may have been somewhat encouraged when Hassell told him that 
he knew about the messages "transmitted through official channels. 11208 
The "official channels" which Cadogan had mentioned and which Has-
sell knew about was the Mueller contact at the Vatican. As we noted ear-
lier, these negotiations had been stalled at the time of the Venlo inci-
dent. But by late January, the series of questions which the resistance 
leaders had sent to the British Government through the offices of the 
Pope had been answerect.209 On all previous occasions, nothing was writ-
ten down for security reasons, but this one time, because so much seemed 
to depend upon the credibility of the document, a draft was made on Vat-
ican notepaper, and as a further mark of genuineness, Father Leiber at-
tached to it one of his own visiting cards on which he had written: 11 Dr. 
Josef Mueller, the bearer of these proposals, enjoys the full confidence 
of His Holiness. 11210 
Mueller returned to Berlin during the first week of February, and 
the paper he carried with him formed the basis for the 11X-Report, 11 so-
207sryans, p. 74. 
208rbid., p. 80. 
209neutsch, who quotes Father Leiber, notes that the Vatican 
exchanges were not "negotiations in the usual sense." At no time did 
Mueller ever meet the Pope, much less the British. Instead, he would 
bring memorized questions, described by Leiber as "usually short and 
specific," which Leiber would then write down and take to the Pontiff. 
Beyond Pius, the channel led to Sir Francis Osborne, the British Ambas-
sador to the Holy See, and from him to Whitehall. Answers, both writ-
ten and oral, were brought back from London by Sir Francis. In most 
cases, these could be summarized as "yes" or "no," or in brief replies 
under the numbered headings of the German questions. On every occasion 
but the last one, Leiber delivered the replies orally to Mueller, who 
then returned to Berlin with them. Deutsch, pp. 123; 146-147. 
210colvin, p. 99. 
called because he was designated in it as 11Mr .. x .. i, Briefly, this docu-
ment, which was prepared by Oster and Dohnanyi, summarized the trips to 
the Vatican, presented a series of reasons as to why the officers should 
revolt, and most importantly, listed the British conditions for peace. 
As Mueller remembers them, they were that 
(1) Germany must rid herself of all Nazis in the government and 
make an end of their political system. 
(2) A German government must take over that is able and willing 
to adhere to its obligations. 
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(3) A settlement could then be reached which would leave Germany 
in possession of Austria and the Sudeten area..2ll 
These were the most precise terms yet obtained by the conspirators. 
And they were quite favorable. As Hassell wrote, non the whole the de-
sire to make a decent peace is evident. 11212 Finally, they were the on-
ly terms which carried the authority of a figu.re like the Pope as surety 
for their implementation. Thus, it remains a mystery as to why the re-
sistance leaders in the Abwehr, who had the report in early February, 
delayed until early April in presenting it to the generals, especially 
when we recall how they were fighting against time and how their hopes 
were riding on the impact of this particular document. Since all the 
principals are dead, executed in the reign of terror which followed the 
failure of the July 20, 1944 Attentat, there is no sure way to probe 
their motives. Still, by examining some of the records, it is possible 
to reconstruct that crucial period and advance a hypothesis which places 
the blame on rhetorical errors. 
2l½iueller is quoted in Colvin, p. 99. 
212Hassell, p. 125. 
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Some of the gap can be attributed to preparation--to discussing and 
composing the report made from Mueller's draft copy. More of it--perhaps 
three weeks--can be ascribed to the diplomatic intrusion of Sumner Welles, 
the U. s. Undersecretary of State, who visited Germany and Italy between 
late February and mid-March, in an effort to determine what chances of 
success were likely to attend an American effort at mediation.213 But 
this still leaves two periods unaccounted for: that from March 16, when 
Hassell was first approached and asked to deliver the report, until A-
pril 4, when General Thomas actually did so; and the period from the end 
of the first week in February, when the report should have been ready, 
until the third week of that month when the Welles trip was announced. 
For the explanation behind these two gaps, it is necessary to look at 
the activities of other resistance figures--activities which worked a-
gainst conspiracy plans to make the report the climax of their winter-
long argument, and which left them with a minimum of emissaries who 
were persona grata at Zossen. 214 
Oster was already out of the running. As we observed earlier, his 
carelessness in leaving documents lying around First Army Headquarters 
had rendered him hors de combat as an envoy to Halder. 215 The second 
to go was Beck. In January, he had a meeting with Halder in the Berlin 
213For Welles account of his trip, see Sumner Welles, A Time For 
Decision (New York, 1944), pp. 73-147. 
214For the reader interested in the mysteries of German military 
hierarchy, a word of explanation is in order. Gisevius writes, "Anyone 
familiar with the German military machine knows how difficult it is for 
like-minded officers to come in contact with one another unless they hap-
pen to be of the same rank. In the German Army, direct relati:_or;ships ex-
isted only between superiors and their own subordinates. Private rela-
tionships ••• were strictly tabu. 11 Gisevius, p. 283. 
215see p. 201. 
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suburb of Dahlem. For the sake of privacy, the two men walked the streets 
at an early hour of the morning. Beck's arguments for a coup were essen-
tially the same ones which the resisters had been using since they first 
learned of Hitler's intentions to launch an attack. The inventive well 
was running dry. Even worse, when Halder responded with the stock mil-
itary counter-arguments about lack of popular support and fears that or-
ders would not be obeyed, Beck made a tactical error. Instead of limit-
ing himself to the issues as such, he questioned Halder's courage by 
pointing out that as an experienced horseman, the Army Chief of Staff 
ought to know that at the hurdles, one threw one's heart over first. 
This implication of cowardice did not go down well. Although Halder 1s 
actions might properly be characterized as irresolute during this act, 
he still saw himself as a staff officer who understood the need for 
proper planning. As he had tried to tell Beck and the others1 a re-
volt without the necessary pre-conditions-without solutions to the 
problems of Hitler's popularity with the soldiers and civilians-was 
bound to fail. It was easy enough for the conspirators, who carried 
no weight of responsibility, to demand action willy-nilly, but he had 
had to consider the consequences. Also, Beck himself had no right to 
make such a reproach. After all, he had merely resigned his post, but 
Halder had tried on two occasions to implement a coup. 216 As the per-
ipatetic exchange ended, an open breach gaped between the two officers 
216The information for the meeting between Halder and Beck has 
been taken from three sources: Fabian von Schlabrendorff, who probably 
got his information from Halder; They Almost Killed Hitler (New York, 
1965), p. 107; Deutsch, who also recounts Halder's version1 based on 
a personal interview; pp. 275-276; and Ritter, whose source is prob-
ably Beck via Goerdeler, and who uses the term "open breach" to des-
cribe the result of the meeting; p. 155fn. 
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--a breach which would remain unbridged until Beck's death four years lat-
er, although after the war, Halder would speak honestly and warmly about 
his relationship with his fonner chief. 
The third to fall from contention was Groscurth. In late October, a 
circular fr~m Himmler--the 11Lebensborn Decree," in which the Reichsfuhrer 
asked for an unlimited increase in the population, arguing that because 
war was a form of bloodletting in which the best blood was often dissi-
pated, it was the duty of married women, whose husbands were in the field, 
not to deny themselves to members of the SS--caused enormous resentment 
at the front. 217 This was followed on January 4 by an article in the SS 
paper, 11Das Schwarze Kcrps," which stigmatized as deserters those women 
who withheld themselves from contributing to population growth.218 Un-
derstandably, Groscurth thought he saw a chance. ~1thout pernission, he 
toured the western commands, trying to drum up support for a coup, carry-
ing with him copies of the decree and the article as well as evidence of 
SS crimes in Poland. Such an act was an infraction of regulations in sev-
eral respects. Besides lacking authorization, his use of the Abwehr's 
"chronicles" implied a criticism of Halder and Brauchitsch for failing 
to regain military control of occupied territories. Also, Himmler had 
heard about the trip and Brauchitsch had some difficult hours with the 
Reichsfuhrer, trying to explain away the activities of a subordinate, 
and this at a time when he was trying to get the SS Chief to back away 
from his decree. 219 While the axe did not fall at once, Groscurth only 
217NCA, Supp., B, p. 1564. 
218Hohne, p. 157. 
219llis!., p. 125. 
being dressed down for his improprieties by HalderP 220the trip suffi-
ciently cooled the close relationship between the two men to end the 
"clockwinder' s 11 effectiveness. Finally, in early February, Groscurth 
was dismissed. Brauchitsch had requested a positi.on paper on the SS 
circular and Groscurth was made responsible for wr1.ting it. His lan-
guage choice, including such statements a:.s npa,st conceptions about the 
unassailability of marriage retain their full validity_,} 11 or 11 He is a 
criminal who invades a marriage and destroys it, 1122lcould not have been 
well-received by an Army Co~@ander who was both divorced and remarried, 
and Groscurth's removal from the High Command was demanded shortly there-
after. Thus, another actor passed from the scene, ultimately to share 
in the greatest tragedy of German anns--the encirc1e~ent and surrender 
of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad, and the subsequent captivity and death 
of most of its members. 
The last figure to undermine the resistance plan was Goerdeler. Per-
haps because of his tendency to talk too freely, the men who were privy to 
the Vatican exchanges had not let him in on the secret .. 222 Nevertheless, 
this conspirator with the need for action had not been idle. During the 
second half of March, he had been to see F..alder on three occasions. And 
Hassell writes that according to Goerdeler., 11Halder., who had begun to 
weep during the discussion of his responsibilities~ gave the impression 
220Groscurth, p. 241. 
221Deutsch, who has a copy of Groscurth's paper, quotes these ex-
cerpts; p. 286. 
222This inference is based on Ritter, Goerdeler•s biographer, who 
makes no mention of the former Mayor being involved in or knowing about 
the negotiations at the Vatican. 
of a weak man with shattered nerves11223-a. description which suggests 
that the former Mayor's importunities must have been severeo In any 
event, these solitary trips to Zossen, at a time when the Abwehr cir-
223. 
cle was looking for an envoy to carry the nx-Report" to Halder, is an 
indication that, despite Oater's best efforts~ the resistance .movement 
was not as well organized as it might have been. Moreover, Goerdeler•s 
visits must have strengthened the Chief of Staff's resolve to avoid fur-
ther attempts at opposition influence because when Oster and Dohnanyi fi-
nally arranged with Hassell to serve as emissary, Halder refused to see 
him, 22½.n spite of the fact that he himself had earlier suggested the 
meeting.225 
Thus, the conspirators were reduced to using someone who did not 
require an invitation to visit Zossen, and their last minute choice was 
General Thomas, who, once again, undertook the role of messenger.226 
Such a decision, while necessitated by circumstances, was unfortunate. 
For Thomas, who was Head of the Army's Economic Department and quite 
competent in financial matters, was the wrong person for a mission 
which required a man familiar with the history of the Vatican negoti-
ations--someone like Beck or Oster; or a man who was on good terms with 
Halder--someone like the now-departed Groscurth; or even a man who un-
derstood the intricacies of foreign affairs-a diplomat like Hassell. 
223Hassell, p. 130. 
224Ibid., p. 132. 
225Ibid., p. 127. 
226neutsch paraphrases Halder to the effect that he was told 
by Thomas that he only learned what was expected or him when Oster 
and Dohnanyi briefed him about it on the way to Zossen; p. 309. 
At any rate, Thomas dutifully carried the report to Army Headquar-
ters on April 4, s~~s expertise or even any preparation. Halder, who 
could not have been in the most receptive of moods after his sessions 
with Goerdeler, was prepared to be a critical audience, especially of 
anything originating from the Abwehr, the agency responsible for much 
of the 11winter of his discontent. 11 Deutsch quotes him as reca.l.ling 
that the report \tas too repetitive in some places and too vague in 
others,227this last being a critical error in the rhetorical conven-
tions of the document, since Oster and Dohnanyi had in fact composed 
it without heading, date, or signature. Moreover, it did not name 
the German envoy, who was identified only as "Mr. X," and most im-
portantly, it lacked any signs of authenticity such as the Vatican 
notepaper on which the terms had been written originally, or Father 
Leiber's visiting card. 
Looking back, it is possible to assume that the conspirators in 
the Counter-Intelligence Service were motivated by the fear of dis-
covery. The Pope, after all, had far exceeded the limits of neutral-
ity by consenting to serve as an intermediary between a resistance 
movement in one belligerent state and the government of another. 
But Halder, who had been a member of the resistance almost since 
its inception, ought to have been judged trustworthy, particularly 
where internal evidence was of paramount importance, as in the case 
of this report. Finally, Thomas was in no position to provide the 
Chief of Staff with any explanations since he too was uninformed a-
bout the background of the document. 
227neutsch, p. 311. 
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The results were anticlimactic. Halder, who mistrusted the report, 
was less than enthusiastic when he took it to Braucbitsch that same eve-
ning. In his account, he makes a careful distinction between "present-
ing" it to the Army Commander /yortragen7, and merely "bringing" it to 
him /£ragen7 and asking him to read it.228 Thus, when Brauchitsch spoke 
angrily to him about it the next morning, demanding to know who had writ-
ten it, describing it as treason to be in contact with a foreign power, 
and insisting that its author be arrested., Halder replied: "If you want 
to arrest someone., then you had better arrest me. 11229 But significantly., 
the Chief of Staff accepted Brauchitsch's rejection with no further argu-
ment, in part because the report lacked those marks of genuineness which 
would have made it an effective piece of rhetoric, and in part because 
it came too late. And while Halder sent a letter to the conspirators 
in which he wrote: 11The Army will do its patriotic duty even against 
Hitler., if the circumstances make that necessary, 11230the message was 
largely proforma because the Chief of Staff did not envision such 
circumstances arising. 
This brings us to the last consequence in the delay over getting 
the report to the generals-the change in circumstances for an attack 
in the west since the Fuehrer had first ordered one in the fall, and 
the effect of that change on Halder and the other officers. Simply 
put., the dilemma upon which the resisters had depended in October and 
November--that the military leaders would choose to overthrow Hitler 
228Deutsch, p. 312. 
229John quotes the Brauchitsch-Halder exchange., based on con-
versations with both officers after the war; p. 63. 
230Quoted in Hassell, p. 130. 
before launching an offensive which they believed must fail--no longer 
held. As month followed month with no attack, the striking power of 
the Wehnnacht grew more and more imposing. General von Thoma, Inspec-
tor of the Mobile Forces, reports that instead of the six panzer divi-
sions available in Poland and barely re-quipped by November 10, there 
were now five others, each of which was considerably above its nonnal 
complement of tanks.231 General Warlimont writes that against fifty-
two regular divisions ready at the end of the Polish campaign, there 
were now one-hundred others.232 And even the postponements themsel-
ves--fourteen in all--had honed the soldiers to a fighting edge. As 
Halder put it, "The perennial state of alarm put the troops in the 
best fighting shape. 11233 In addition, there was a new plan, designed 
by Manstein, which placed the weight of the attack in the Ardennes ra-
ther than leaving it on the right flank a la Schlieffen. This impor-
tant change had come about in the first months of 1940, as a result 
of the old plan falling into the hands of the Allies when a German 
courier plane mistakenly landed in Belgium on January 10. And many 
of the generals, who reri.embered the hecatombs of World War I, which 
resulted when the sweep through Belgium failed to envelop the French 
and British left wing, could not help but be impressed with a bold 
plan which proposed to amputate the Allied forces at the shoulder 
and surround them as they extended into Belgium to meet an attack 
23Lrhoma is quoted in Hart, pp. 93-94. 
232warlimont, p. 59. 
233Halder is quoted in Peter Bor, Gesprache mit Halder (Wies-
baden, 1950), p. 50. 
that was no longer coming from that direction. Finally, there was the 
fact that the winter months were nearly over and the seasonal disadvan-
tages no longer obtained. Revealing in this respect is a comment by 
Gisevius about General Hoepner: 
Hoeppner [sii/ had been with us in the conspiracy of 1938. He 
had also been one of the revolting panzer generals in November 
1939. But in the spring of 1940, when the soil of Flanders was 
no longer muddy swamps and decorations, laurels, and military 
glory could be won so easily there, Hoeppner was unable to re-
sist the allure.234 
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From the perspective of the civilian anti-Nazis, Gisevius' criticism is 
accurate. But he loses sight of the fact that for the officers, the ex-
citement of forging a really formidable instrument of war was certain to 
have an effect on political attitudes. As we observed at the beginning 
of this act, generals are not unlike the old warhorse in the book of Job 
which could not resist the trumpet call to battle. And insofar as deco-
rations are concerned, it is apparent that Gisevius was a civilian; other-
wise, he would have understood Napoleon's reply to a critic who ridiculed 
decorations of the Legion of Honor: "You call these toys--I tell you men 
are governed by toys. 11 Finally II for failing to seize the moment of ~-
sis when the impact of the Vatican report might have made a difference, 
the conspirators have no one but themselves to blame. As Griffin puts 
it, "there is always the danger ••• that the rhetors of the unfolding 
movement--confronted by retrograde or recalcitrant factors in the grad-
ually shirting Scene--will fail to revise their strategies. 11235 
With the coming of spring came a corresponding rise in the pros-
pects of war. On April 9 Hitler ordered the invasion of Scandinavia 
234aisevius, pp. 519-520. 
235Griffin, 11 Dramatistic Theory," p. 465. 
and within three weeks Denmark and Norway were in German hands. To the 
resisters, it was plain that the attack on the Allied Powers could not 
be far off and with it, the last moment for tying up loose ends in Rome 
and London by stating clearly that all attempts to persuade the generals 
had failed. Opposition credibility was at stake, and it was feared tha\ 
with the offensive in the west, Mueller's negotiat.ions would be regarded 
as a sham, just like the meetings of Schellenberg with Stevens and Best 
at Venlo. As Beck said, 11We must be able to establish contacts again 
some day, and for that these people /J,he Vatican and the Britis.b7 must 
know whom they are dealing with; that there is a decent Germany that is 
capable of negotiations. n236 So in late April, f!.fueller again went to 
Rome to break the news that no revolution was pos,sible and that the 
feared offensive was to be expected short1ye He recalls the message 
as follows: 
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The discussions cannot continue with any prospect of SU£Cess. Un-
fortunately the generals cannot be persuaded to act. LAt this potnt 
there was a parenthetical reference to the unfortunate influence of 
the successful Norwegian adventure, as well as an indignant repudi-
ation of the approaching attack on the Low Countries.:/ Hitler will 
attack and this action lies just aheado2J7 
In the event, the warning came too late and was to land the Abwehr re-
sisters in trouble. During the first week of' May, Goering's "Investigation 
Office 11 (Forschungsamt) managed to decipher two intercepted radio communica-
tions between the Belgium Ambassador to the Vatican and his government, in 
which the diplomat stated that Germany would shortly undertake an offensive 
in the west and violate the neutrality of both Belgium and Holland.238 
236Beck is quoted in Bethge, p. 579. 
237Mueller is quoted in Deutsch, p. 336. 
238The events surrounding the intercept are in Abshagen, P• 179. 
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Hitler, upon learning about the intercepts, would demand the sharpest in-
vestigation which, as we shall see, would lead in time to the destruction 
of the resistance agency on the Tirpitzufer. 
On May 10, with the opening of the cannonade, the avalanche of total 
war began to move and with it, the second critical moment in the drama of 
the German Resistance crone to an end. The hope that a negotiated peace 
might be had died in a campaign that destroyed a great many illusions 
with the startling swiftness of its German victories. On May 15, only 
five days after launching the offensive, the Dutch Army capitulated, to 
be followed on the night of May 27-28 by the surrender of the Belgium 
Army. By June 3, the British Expeditionary Force, admittedly with the 
glory of Dunkirk, had been forced to evacuate the continent. Paris was 
occupied by the Feldgrauen on June 14, and less than a week later, the 
Bordeaux Government sued for an armistice. 
At the conclusion of these events, the scene is dominated by the 
protagonist, Adolf Hitler. William Shirer found him on June 21 at Com-
piegne, just outside the historic railway car where Marshal Foch had 
laid down the armistice terms to representatives of the German Empire 
twenty-two years earlier. The Fuehrer had just finished reading the 
inscription on a granite marker which commemorated that event: 
HERE ON THE ELEVENTH OF NOVEMBER 1918 SUCCUMBED THE CRIMINAL 
PRIDE OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE--VA1QUISHED BY THE FREE PEOPLES 
WHICH IT TRIED TO ENSLAVE. 
Hitler reads it ••• standing there in the June sun and the si-, 
lence. I look for an expression on his face. I am but fifty 
yards from him and see him through my glasses as though he were 
directly in front of me. I have seen that face many times at 
the great moments of his life. But today! It is afire with 
scorn, anger, hate, revenge, triumph. He steps off the monu-
ment and contrives to make even this gesture a masterpiece of 
contempt. He glances back at it, contemptuous, angry--angry 
you almost feel, because he cannot wipe out the awful, provok-
ing lettering with one sweep of his high Prussian boot. He 
glances slowly around the clearing and ••• suddenly, as though 
his face were not giving quite complete expression to his feel-
ings, he throws his whole body into harmony with his mood. He 
swiftly snaps his hand on his hips, arches his shoulders, plants 
his feet wide apart. It is a magnificent gesture of defiance.239 
Not all Germans, however, share the Fuehrer 1 s mood of triumph. At his 
home in Ebenhausen, Ulrich von Hassell writes in his diary: 
Nobody can contest th~ proportions of the success achieved by 
Hitler. But that does not alter the real nature of his deeds 
or the cruel dangers now threatening all our higher standards. 
A demonic Spartacus will wreak nothing but destruction if the 
opposition does not act in time. It is tragic not to be able 
to rejoice in such achievements •••• I am of the opinion 
that, however discouraging the prospects are for the present, 
we must not throw in the sponge; we must prepare to fight on 
against Hitler under changed conditions.240 
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And on July 1, at the high tide of Hitler's victory, Carl Goerdeler pre-
pares a memorandum for the officers, in which he quotes Baron vom Stein's 
call to Fredrick Wilhelm III for resistance to Napoleon: 
For the honest man there is no salvation save in the conviction 
that the wicked are capable of wickedness. To trust a man of 
whom it has been truly said that he has hell in his heart and 
chaos in his head is more than mere blindness; when there is 
nothing to expect but misfortune and misery, the more willingly 
does one take a stand which is right and honorable.241 
239William L. Shirer, Berlin Diary (New York, 1941), P• 422. 
240Hassell, pp. 143-144; 1.41. 
241Goerdeler 1s memorandum is quoted in Ritter, PPo 171-172. 
CHAPTER IV 
HEERESGRUPPE MITTE AND THE THIRD ATI'D!PT: l.940-1943 
"It was never a question of imposing one party programme in preference 
to another, of ambition, or spoils, but always of saving Germany. o ... 11 
Eugen Gerstenmaier 
Hitler's triumph over the Western Powers meant; defeat for the Ger-
man Resistance Movement. As we have seen, the hope that the Allied Gov-
ernments would meet opposition overtures halfway ended with the first 
clash of arms, and perhaps more importantly]) with t-he change of polit-
ical leadership in Great Britain. The appeasing Chamberlain was gone, 
replaced by a resolute Winston Churchill who left n~ doubt as to his 
program: "What is our policy? I will say: It is to wage waro •• with 
all our might and all the strength that God can giwe us .. • • 0 What is 
our aim? I can answer in one word: Victory-victory at all costs, vic-
tory in spite of all terror; victory however long and hard the road may 
be.111 
The same defeat could be postulated for the hope that the General 
Staff would act to overthrow the Fuehrer, standing at the pinnacle of 
his success. For years, Beck in the mill tary field and Goerdeler in 
the economic field had been forecasting the bankrupcy of Nazi strategy 
and finances.2 Now these Cassandra-like prophecies were swept away in 
lwinston Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Boston, 1949), pp. 25-26. 
2Beck' s warnings had started as early as 19:Jl.~ when he protested 
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the magnitude or Hitler's swift victories and in the spoils of war plun-
dered from defeated nations. Why should the generals listen to men who 
had been proved wrong time after time?3 Moreover, there were the prizes 
or conquest-decorations and marshal's batons-which a grateful Fuehrer 
bestowed on his valient warriors with a largess unparalleled in German 
military annals.4 Understandably, Gisevius could complain that he "no 
longer expect[ei/ anything from the highest generals; they are being 
fattened on titles, decorations, and gi.fts. 11 5 
Finally, there was the Zeitgeist--the heady atmosphere of public 
opinion in a victorious Reich. Otto John writes that "psychologically 
my friends and I lived in a curious sort of isolation from our fellow 
men; since Hitler's lightning victories ordinary folk had increasingly 
abandoned all scruples about the oppression of Europe by his regime of 
violence. 116 But it was not only the Burgertum. Hassell adds: 11Among 
the upper strata in Berlin, I found some who were indulging in unre-
strained triumph accompanied by plans for dividing up the world in 
against Hitler's rearmament program. See Wolfgang Foerster, Ein General 
Ka.mpft gegen den Krieg (Munich, 1953), pp. 22-23; Goerdeler's warnings 
began in 1935 when he objected to the inflationary spending in the mil-
itary sector. See Gerhard Ritter, The German Resistance, trans., R. T. 
Clark (New York, 1958), pp. 33-34, 
Jaeneral Blumentritt writes: 11The great military victories up to 
and including 1940 ••• naturally raised Hitler's reputation in the eyes 
of the military •••• Suddenly, Hitler was always right and his crit-
ics always wrong." "Letter of General Blumentritt," September 5, 196.5. 
40n June 19, 1940, Hitler created twelve Field Marshals and one 
Reichsmarshal 
5Gisevius is quoted in Ulrich von Hassell, The Von Hassell Diaries, 
trans., Hugh Gibson (Westport, 1971), p. 147. 
60tto John, Twice Through The Lines, trans., Richard Barry (London, 
1973), pp. 68-69. 
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great style. 117 And Eberhard Bethge recalls a day in the summer of 1940 
when he and Dietrich Bonhoeffer attended a Nazi function which was punc-
tuated by many Hitler salutes. Bethge was distressed to see Bonhoeffer 
saluting vigorously with the rest. Bonhoeffer said: 11Raise your arm. 
We shall have to run risks for very different things now, but not for 
that salute. 118 
Alone and with little hope of winning support, the easiest path 
for the resisters would have been to identify themselves with Hitler 
and his triumphant "New Order." But they did not consider it. Their 
opposition, based as it was in a revolt of conscience, sustained them.9 
And they continued to organize and expand their movement, a fact which 
makes the continuity of the resistance all the more striking and should, 
if the drama of the struggle to this point has not already done so, give 
the lie to later criticism that their opposition was motivated solely by 
fears of defeat.10 
7Hassell, p. 141. 
8Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, trans., Erich Mosbacher, 
et. al. (New York, 1970), p. 585. 
9The diary entry of Ernst Junger, one of the resisters, seems 
particularly appropriate here: 11 0ne can see, too, that it is the moral 
substance, not the political, which spurs to action. 11 Quoted in Hans 
Rothfels, The German Opposition To Hitler, trans., Lawrence Wilson 
(Chicago, 1962), p. 13. 
10Many critics hold that the German Resistance Movement was based 
on expediency alone. Space limitations preclude quoting all of them, 
but perhaps one can serve as an example. Hanna Arendt writes: 11These 
men who opposed Hitler paid with their lives, and their courage was ad-
mirable, but it was not inspired by a crisis of conscience ••• they were 
motivated exclusively by their conviction of the coming defeat and ruin 
of Gennany. 11 Hanna Arendt, Eichmann In Jerusalem {New York, 1963), p. 
91. This criticism strikes at the heart of the rhetorical fonnulation. 
For if there is no "dialectical enjoinment in the moral arena," there 
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The interval between the fall of France :in the sur,nmer of 1940 and 
the Stalingrad winter of 1942-43 was spent in planning. This time, the 
preparations were not so much for the overthrow o~ Hitler and his Nazi 
dictatorship (although attempts continued to ba made), but for the so-
cial order that would follow it. Until now, such plans had been left 
for the most part to an ad hoc arrangement as the situation demanded. 
But with the rapid expansion of the political scene abroad and the si-
multaneous lowering of moral values at home, a basic reappraisal seemed 
necessary. Also, the later inception and growth of a second opposition 
center--the Kreisau Kreis-and the advocacy of its own ideas meant a 
serious dialogue which, combined with changes in the Zeitgeist~ reori-
ented the thinking of both groups. Thus, while it. is ai."1 intrusion upon 
chronology, let us put aside resistance attempts to effect a coup d'etat 
and deal in a. unified way with the problems they dealt ·with-the recon-
struction of Germany and Europe. 
In a movement study, such an examination is legitimately rhetorical 
in several respects. For one thing, these plans were dialectical in the 
sense that the resisters were, in part, responding tot.he "New Order" 
is no precondition for a movement in the dra.matistic sense-no motive to 
produce a "rhetoric proclaiming ••• the new order, the more perfect order, 
the desired order." Robert S. Cathcart, 11New Approaches to the study of 
Movements: Defining Movements Rhetorically, 11 ~s,tgrn S;pSie.c.h, XX.XVI (Spring, 
1972), 87. Thus, the struggle between Hitler and the men of the "decent 
Germany" becomes a mat,ter of the basest sort of poll tics--of thieves fall-
ing out, or, to use a metaphor more appropriate to the dramatistic model, 
of a debate between two political opponents who are merely trying to score 
cheap points off each other. There is no intent to, counter this criticism 
in a footnote. Rather, the genuineness of the resi.-ster is convictions can 
be g..iaged by the fact that they continued to oppose at a time when all the 
talk was of victory, and, as this chapter will show, spent the period mak-
ing plans for the future of Germany and Europe quite unlike those which 
Hitler conceived$ 
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which the Fuehrer and his cohorts were imposing on the Reich and an ev-
er-increasing part of Europe.11 For another, these plans were synthetic 
in the sense that the ideas of the resisters evolved--that from their in-
ternal tensions there eventually emerged a higher synthesis which repre-
sented a partial compromise among the various factions.12 And finally, 
llThis is an example of conditions not fitting categories precise-
ly. Cathcart and Griffin only refer to enjoinment between two opposing 
movements. Yet, the resister's plans reveal that they were not only re-
acting to National Socialism but to their own antecedents, to other re-
sisters, and later to the Allied Governments. 
12This use of the merger of the resister's plans to establish 
their antithetical position to Hitler's ideology represents another de-
parture from Griffin's formulation. To explain, he uses Kenneth Burke's 
concept of the "representative anecdote" in A Grammar Of Motives {Berke-
ly, 1962), pp. 59-61, to justify his argument that "the enactment of the 
Negative may be taken ••• as a 'representative anecdote, 1 a moment that 
embodies, implicitly or explicitly, the key terms and equations of the 
movement. With these ••• the study of a movement begins. They identify 
1t1'::ll.t equals what. wh1.t opposes what, follows Nh.at.. They identify 
the 'heaven' of tne movement, as well as its 'hell'; its gods, or god, 
as well as its devils ('faulty principles,' scapegoats, 'vile beasts'). 
And thus they suggest, however darkly, an answer to the question ltb;t, 
the ultimate question of motive. For the key terms prefigure ••• the 
lineai~ents of the 'perfecting myth' that draws the movement futuristi-
cally, a f;o;m:t_e.,. • • • And thus, the I perfecting myth' becomes like 
the originator of the order it perfects. 11 Leland M. Griffin, 11A Dra-
matistic Theory of the Rhetoric of Movements," in Critical Responses 
To Kenneth Burke, ed., William H. Rueckert (Minneapolis, 1969), p. 463. 
Doubtless, some of the resister's positions could be inferred from look-
ing at their initial negative statements, and certainly, their motives 
are easily explained by examining their repudiation of National Social-
ism's immorality and evil policies. But to extrapolate the whole re-
sistance program from these early declarations is unnecessaryo Theo-
retically, Burke himself does not equate his concept of the "Negative" 
with the "representative anecdote1•--Griffin I s merger of them is strictly 
his own interpretation. And while Burke does write that the "anecdote 
••• contains in~ the terminological structure that is evolved in 
conformity from it, 11 (Grammar. p. 60), it is significant that his own 
anecdote of the 11 act of creation" is not identified until Grammar, his 
seventh book, and not fully explained until The Rhetoric Of Religion 
(Berkeley, 1970), his tenth book. Practically, it should be noted 
that men speak at particular times and in particular scenes., and that 
utterances can be assessed best in their most recent context. Thus, 
to the extent that plans from the period 1940-1943 have survived, they 
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even though these plans were never wholly agreed upon or widely dissemi-
nated, the ideas contained within them come as close as we are ever like-
ly to get to the resister's "dream or salvation ••• state of redemption 
.ideal Order ••• Utopia. 1113 • • 
To set the scene, it is necessary to remember that at the outset of 
this period, the major opposition center was still the one led by Beck, 
Goerdeler, and the conservatives. In the last two chapters, we traced 
some or the main lines or their thinking in regard to foreign policy: 
their opposition to the Versailles Treaty,1.4.t,heir hopes for the recon-
struction of a German Reich which would be enhanced by territorial ad-
ditions from Austria, the Sudetenland, and the Polish Corridor,15their 
criticism of Britain's appeasers for dealing with Hitler instead of them-
selves,16and their unwillingness to obtain their foreign policy aims by 
force of arms.17 In short, this group's internationalism was concerned 
represent a more mature reflection of resistance thinking than state-
ments made in 1937-1938. And Burke himself suggests something of this 
ongoing nature of programs when he writes: "if you organize a conflict 
among spokesmen for competing ideas or principles, you may produce a 
situation wherein there is no one clear choice. Each of the spokes-
men, whose ideas are an extension or special interests, must remain 
somewhat unconvinced by any solution which does not mean the complete 
triumph of his own particular interests. Yet, he may have to compro-
mise to allies •••• 11 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric or Motives (New York, 
1955), p. 187. This notion or mutual concessions across time-of a mer-
ger which is less than ultimate but more than dialectic (which "would 
leave the competing voices in jangling relations to one another"), ap-
pears to explain best the pattern followed by the groups within the re-
sistance. 
1.3Griffin, 11 Dramatistic Theory," p. 460. 
14see Chapter Three, pp. 211-212. 
15Ibid., p. 193. 
16see Chapter Two, pp. 95-97. 
l?~., PP•' 109-115. 
largely with healing the wounds inflicted on the German national spirit 
and with peacefully restoring, strengthening~ and expanding Germany's 
place in Europe. 
A new element was introduced by the rapid conquest of France and 
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the Low Countries. As we have mentioned, even though the conservatives 
refused to identify themselves with a triumphant, Hitler, they would have 
been less than patriotic if they saw the victory in the west as something 
other than a German success.. As Meinecke put. it, the .fall of France had 
filled him with "profound emotion, prides and joy:i even though he was un-
able to align himself with the Third Reich.18 Thna, in the summer of 1940, 
we find for the first time in Goerdeler's memoranda, reference to Europe 
under "German leadership, 1119and later, specific cl.aims made to Alsace-
Lorraine and the South Tyro1, 20areas which had not been part of earlier 
resistance foreign policy plans, but which now came with;n the range of 
Goerdeler's view as a result of the victory over France and the evidence 
of Italy's weakness. 
Popitz was even more imperialistic. In December 1940, he delivered 
a lecture to the Wednesday- Society on "The Idea of the Reich," in which 
he argued that the medieval concept of the Reich was a "romantic day--
dream" because claims of supremacy at that time had only aroused the 
antagonisms of other states which recognized the ttreality of a weak 
Germany." What was needed was a modern and.viable Reich concept pred-
icated on the strength of a "politically unified country" which would 
18Meinec:ke is quoted in Percy Schrannn, Hitler: The Man and the 
Military Leader, trans., Donald Detweiler (ChicagoJ; 1971), p. 42fn. 
19aoerdeler is quoted in Ritter, p. 171. 
20ibid., pp. 213-214. 
238 .. 
exert a "determining influence" on neighboring states and enjoy "special 
rights" with thern.21 
Hassell, who described Popitz•s lecture as 11brilliant, 1122was more 
practical in regard to Germany's place in the sun, but even he was part-
ly seduced by visions of a Great German Reich which dominated the con-
tinent. Thus, he talked about the "West tmder German leadership," and 
after the Balkan Campaign and the attack on Russia in 1941, of' a 11Gross-
~" ( "greater area") which covered Central Europe and includ,ed within 
its sphere of influence the Baltic States as well as the Balkans, Fin-
land, Scandinavia, and the Low Countries.23 
Perhaps the height of conservative ambitions was reached with Goer-
deler's memorandum, 11 Das Ziel," parts of which were written int.he last 
half of 1941.24 During these months German military power reigned su-
preme, the Russians having suffered crushing defeats from the Baltic to 
the Black Sea. Goerdeler 1s draft reflected this situation in its call 
for a crusade against Bolshevism-a crusade which presupposed the co-
operation of other states under the "strong military protection of Ger-
many." Certainly, there was no intention to 11 coordinate 11 the others to 
German will. Each was to be free to organize politically according to 
its own wishes. But in time, Goerdeler argued, it would be possible to 
21popitz is quoted in Hermann Graml, et. al., The German Resist-
ance To Hitler (Berkeley, 1970), p. 22. 
22Hassell, p. 161. 
23Hassell is quoted in Graml, p. 22. 
24u~ Ziel11 ( 11The Goal") was a series of fourteen separate pro-
posals made by Goerdeler. The earliest is dated June 15, 1940, the 
la~t November 1944. In all, these memoranda totaled slightly more 
than 350 pages and represented Goerdeler•s thinking on a host of po-
litical and moral issues. 
develop a European federation led by Gennany modeled along the lines of 
the British Commonwealth, "provided [wiJ do not let [oui/selves be cor-
rupted by immoderate ambitions or mad lust for power. 1125 
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Karl Bracher writes that the conservative's "foreign policy ideas 
,Lbetween 1938 and 194i/ ••• seem particularly problematical~ •• and dif-
fer from the Greater German hegemonic pretensions of the National Social-
ists only in scope and method, not in principle. 1126 The first accusation 
is partly justified but means little. To assert that resistance proposals 
were uncertain of realization is hardly an inherent chargeo Most utopian 
plans can never be consummated, though some of these had a better chance 
than others of their kind. Thus, while conservative expectations were il-
logical in the period 1940-42, they were considerably less so in the per-
iod 1938-39, when, as we have seen, Gennany 1s clailns had good prospects 
or being fulfilled since there was an increasing inclination on Britain's 
part to scrap the territorial provisions of the Versailles Treaty.27 The 
second accusation is more serious but false. To assert that the principle 
governing conservative foreign policy thinking, even at its most imperial-
istic, was identical with Hitler's dreams of world supremacy, is to badly 
misread the dialectic. Certainl~, the Fuehrer too had a blueprint for the 
place of Germany relative to the rest of the world. But his foreign policy, 
as Alan Bullock writes, was founded on the "exaltation of the Machtstaat, 
25Ritter, pp. 215-216. 
26Karl Bracher, Th_e German Dictatorship. trans., Jean Steinberg 
(New York, 1972), p. 436. 
27see Chapter Two, pp. 129-135. 
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the P..ower State, u28a difference in degree if not in kind from these ex-
pansive conservative notions of a 11Grossdeutscher Reich." And Hitler's 
11New Order" for Europe, in which the Herrenvolk would rule while the Un-
termenschen-Jews, Slavs, and to a lesser extent, all other subject peo-
ples-would slave,29had nothing in comm.on with conservative projections 
for a federation of European states led by Germaey. 
At this point it is necessary to break off the discussion of con-
servative foreign policy ideas because our inquiry has carried us to the 
end of 1942, just before the climax of the dialogue with the Kreisauers, 
and the explanation of that interchange would make little sense if it 
dealt with international affairs and failed to examine those political 
and social issues relating to Germany itself. Therefore, let us tum 
back once again and look at the conservative resister's positions on 
national reforms prior to the winter of 1942-43. 
As we noted in the last chapter, the first detailed resistance 
program on domestic policy was written in January-February 1940 by 
Hassell in cooperation with Popitz and Goerdeler.30 Briefly, it pro-
posed an interim regency of three members who were to remain in power 
"until it is possible to re-establish a constitutional way of life. 11.31 
The task of preparing for this eventuality was given to a nominated 
269. 
28Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study In Tyranny (New York, 1961), p. 
29rrypical was Hitler's plan for Russia's place in the 11New Or-
der:" "first: conquer it; second; rule it; third: e:xplo'it it. 11 Quoted 
in Nazi Conspiracy And Aggression (Washington, D. c., 1946), vii, pp. 
1086-1093. Hereafter abbreviated as .!Q!. 
JOsee Chapter Three, p. 154. 
31Hassell, p. JOO. 
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council whose directive was 11to organize the German state along political 
and economic lines that take special cognizance o-f historic tradi~ion. u32 
Meanwhile, executive power was vested in a Reichs statthalter or Regent 
(probably Beck), who delegated authority to the commanders of the mili-
tary- districts. Important for our purposes are the countermeasures to 
be taken to nullify the evil policy of Hitler's regime-"a policy calcu-
lated to kill the soul of the German people. 1133 A series of decrees were 
drawn up which outlawed the Nazi Party and many of its worst agencies, a-
bolished its administrative hierarchy, and revoked the laws passed since 
Hitler took power, "especially the legislation with regard to the Jews. 1134 
Goerdeler, whose ideas were only- in partial agreement with those ot 
Hassell and Popitz, thought of putting this interim government on a pop-
ular basis. According to the former Ambassador, he wanted to hold an e-
lection immediately after the coup was over-a suggestion which Hassell 
' 
and Popitz rejected.35 Popitz in particular was less concerned with the 
votes of the people than with the protection of the government during the 
transition period, and the suggestion that the country be placed under 
martial law is said to have been his.36 Similarly, provisions tor which 
Hassell was responsible-censorship of press and literature for example,37 
were not in keeping with individual rights. Still, this early proposal 
32Hassell, p. 371. 
33llis!,., p. 368. 
34Ibid., p. 372. 
35.Il?.i'!., p. ll?. 
3&rhis according to Eberhard Zeller, The Flame Of Freedom, trans., 
R. P. Heller and D.R. Masters (London, 1969), p. 62. 
37 Hassell, p. 372. 
was never intended as more than a temporary expedient. Although there 
is no reference to it, the decision to entrust supreme power to a re-
gency implies the restoration of a monarchy, and this is confirmed by 
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one of Hassell 1a diary entries from the same period: 11A monarchy is ver-
y much to be desired, but that would be a problem for the next stage. 1138 
Also, while there is no denying the authoritarian features of the plan, 
it should be noted that the conservatives were most concerned with the 
pernicious effect of seven years of Hitler's rule--a problem whfoh Has-
sell stressed when he wrote: "The regency is aware that its task., • .is 
scarcely calculated to win popularity quickly. It is called upon to liq-
uidate a system which has laid heavy burdens upon the German people for 
a long time. 1139 
The question of the proposed monarchy brings us to Goerdeler•s plans 
for domestic reform.,40plans which he began to write in 1941, and which 
were to remain the basic conservative statement of principles until af-
ter the compromise reached with the Kreisau Kreis. Beginning with the 
head of state, it is not surprising that Goerdeler favored the restora-
tion of the monarchy. For the former Mayor--indeed, for all the con-
servatives, the era of the Kaiserreich was a natural inheritance and 
they turned to it as a matter or course. Somewhat more surprising was 
the acceptance of a monarchy by the men of the left, Leuschner and Kaiser. 
38Hassell, p. 117. 
39Ibid., p. 372. 
40rn preparing these plans, Goerdeler sought help from many peo-
ple. Ritter, for example, prepared a draft on social reforms; see Graml, 
p. 67. And Bonhoeffer helped with a statement on the relations between 
church and state; see Bethge, p. 656. 
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In their case, agreement was based less on fond remembrances of Imperial 
Germany than on the fact that Goerdeler meant for the monarchy to be lim-
ited, functioning only within the framework of a constitutional system. 
As he put it, "the monarch is not intended to govern but to watch over 
the constitution and represent the state. 1141 
In attempting to effect a restoration, Goerdeler met with insur-
mountable difficulties. One was the choice of a suitable pretender. 
Space limitations preclude listing the many- objections raised by var-
ious proponents to other people's candidates. Suffice to say that e-
ven when the conservatives finally- came to agree on Louis Ferdinand, 
the second son of the Crown Prince, his father refused to allow him 
to risk his life and perhaps the fortunes of the Hohenzollem .family' 
on anything as uncertain as a coup d'etat against Hitler.42 More de-
cisive was the opposition or the Kreisauers who adamantly rejected any-
thing resembling a monarchy. Hassell records an encounter with Adam von 
Trott zu Soltz, a spokesman for the Kreisau, in December 1941, and quotes 
him as arguing passionately against "any semblance of •reaction,• •gen-
tlemen's club,' 'militarism. 1 Therefore ••• we should under no circum-
stances have a monarchy ••• for a monarchy would not win the support ot 
the people and would not win confidence abroad. 114.3 In the face ot these 
obstacles, Goerdeler backed away, although he continued to hope that a 
restoration might be possible in the future, a hope which is suggested 
by the fact that as late as 1944, his notes still contain references to 
41Goerdeler is quoted in Rothfels, p. 101. 
42John, p. 67. 
4.3Hassell, p. 230. 
members of the royal houses whom he considered to be potential candi-
dates for the throne.44 
In addressing himself to the problem of domestic reform, Goerdeler•s 
thinking tumed mainly to a force which we discussed in the first chap-
ter: the need for social order in an age of the mass man. To summarize 
briefly, what was involved here was the dislocation caused by industrial-
ization and technology-the loss of a traditional sense of community, co-
herence, and stability, made worse by the demoralization of defeat, and 
followed by the inability of the Weimar democracy to resolve the problem 
-the partisan governments whose concern with special interests had onl.7 
deepened the divisions between classes, and whose anonymous representa-
tives, elected from lists, were so far removed from their constituents 
that they could not impart to them a sense of common purpose. 
Hitler had originally made use of this force to help create his 
Third Reich and Goerdeler proposed to do the same in constructing its 
successor. Unlike Hitler, however, the former Mayor did not intend to 
gloss over the problem with the sham identity of the Volksgemeinschatt 
-to substitute a real say in the government and its activities with 
massed paradesJ frenzied propaganda, officially fostered attitudes of 
reverence to a Leader, and stereotyped social behavior encouraged under 
the hortatory device of "comradeship. 11 Nor did he intend to create an-
other Fuhrerstaat-to erect a hierarchy which professed to be "monolith-
ic" and "pyramidal," but which was actually undifferentiated for the 11 ev-
eled" mass, and higher up, behind the facade, a confusion of rival leaders., 
each with his own followers and patronage, and each competing for the·tavor 
44Ritter, p. 19.3. 
of the Leader who alone determined -policy and ruled the state on the 
basis of "Divide 21 impera. 1145 
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Instead, Goerdeler planned for a social order which would on the 
one hand provide for the "de-massing of the Masses 11--t.o borrov1 the ti-
tle of the draft l-rhich Ritter prepared, and on the othar create the con-
ditions necessary for the emergence of capable leaders--an expert group 
of men who could govern the state. And he felt that the realization of 
both these goals depended upon constructing a system stable enough to 
ensure a maximum of self-government and, at the same time, favor those 
individuals who had proven themselves in politics or some other prac-
tical fiela.46 
Predictably, for a man trained in city administration, Goerdeler 
began with the smallest common denominator, the town or village com-
munity, the "cells from which the state is formed. n47 Local government 
45Goebbels' complaint reveals the dialectic difference: nwe are 
liYing in a form of state in which jurisdictions are not clearly de-
fined." Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, ed., and trans .. ,, Louis 
P. Lochner (New York, 1948), p. 346. Or there is Speerls description 
--one of many--of Hitler's principle of dividing power: 11It was char-
acteristic of Hitler's double-track way of running things that the~-
leiters in their capacity of party functionaries were under Bormann but 
in their capacity as Reich Commissioners for Defense they were under the 
Ministry of the Interior. 11 Albert Speer, Inside The Third Reich9 trans., 
Richard and Clara Winston (New York, 1970), p. 404. 
46Goerdeler's program for a constitution, as well as the later 
Kreisau. plans, reveal two of the moti yes which Griffin identifies aa 
central to rhetorical movements: order and the secret. The order ia, 
of course, the socio-political re.forms of the resisters: 11 a. cooperative 
system. .of necessity hierarchical ••• a la4der of authority that ex-
ists from lower to higher." Griffin, 11Dramatistic Theory," Pa 4580 The 
secret is the mystery that "arises ••• where different kinds of beings 
are in communication. In any good system ••• relations between the 
classes are harmonious, cooperative, symmetrical; and the communication 
between classes is beneficent and benign." ~. Later in this act, 
the third motive--the kill--will be discussed. 
47Ritter, p. 184. 
was the best level at which to protect isolated mdi vi.duals from the de-
personalizing forces of industrialization and tec·llmnology and to involve 
them in the act of making decisions whieh most directly affected their 
own lives. Also, it was the level at whi.ch t.o discover those potential 
leaders whose success in solving the practical problems of daily exist-
ence and whose close relationship with ·the members of their cormnunit;r 
made them ideal candidates for greater responsibility.48 
From the local level, the way led up through t.he provincial and re-
gional councils to the Reichstag and its lower chamber., the R.eichsstand-
~- Admittedly, the path was somewhat oblique.. With his preference 
for those who had established themselves in eormnunity elections, Goer-
deler stipulated that only the local councils and half the Reichsstand-
haus were to be filled by direct ballot. For the rest, as well as for 
the entirety of the Diet, the upper chamber or the Reichstag, he pro-
posed an indirect, three-stage process in which the representatives of 
the local councils served as electors for the next, highest body and so 
on to the top. Also, there could be free appointments of fifty promi-
nent people-11respected Germans, 1149as Goerdeler called them, who would 
serve at the federal level. Later, he wrote, "part..ies can develop ••• 
conservative, liberal, socialist, communist, 115°although he was opposed 
to more than three, remembering the multiplication of parties which 
helped to paralyze the Weimar Republic. 
At the federal level, Goerdeler aimed to create a strong but limited 
48Ritter, p. 183. 
49Ibid., p. 185. 
50rbid., p. 186. 
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political authority-. The government was to be led by a Reichs Chancellor 
who, together with his cabinet, was appointed by the Regent. Typically-. 
Goerdeler considered himself best qualified for the executive post, and 
in fact he was so designated on nearly all ministerial lists prepared by 
the resisters. Checks and balances between the executive and legislative 
branches tilted in favor or the former. While the Chancellor was answer-
able to the Reichstag, which could demand his dismissal by- a two-thirds 
vote, it is doubtful whether the Reichstag, consisting as it did in e-
lected representatives and executive appointees, would have been able 
to muster sufficient strength to oppose the Chancellor too frequently-. 
Still, Goerdeler made the judiciary independent (in contrast to Hitler 
who called himself the 11Supreme Justicar·or the German People 1151); he 
was careful to keep the federal powers limited to specific areas--de-
fense, foreign affairs, education, Justice, and finance; and in regard· 
to revenue, he proposed dividing the authority- to ra.ise taxes between 
the local communities and the Reich. Also, he favored tree enterprise. 
Economic life was to be disturbed as little as possible by the state 
and only those financial leaders were to be expelled from the business 
community who had "debased their economic responsibility and degraded 
themselves to become spiritless tools or political bosses. 11 52 Most im-
portantly, however, Goerdeler was flexible in his thinking. As he put 
it, "Nothing can be dogmatically- laid down, 11 53and as we shall see, he 
51.rhe sr;eches of Adolf Hitler, ed., Norman H. Baynes, 2 Vols., 
(New York, 1942, i, p. 290. 
52Goerdeler 1s quoted in Rothfels, p. 106. 
53Ritter, p. 186. 
tried to follow this policy in his negotiations with resistance factions 
whose thinking differed from his own. 
An early indication ot this was his proposal concerning the role of 
trade unions in the new state. By virtue of his background, Goerdeler 
should have been opposed to any strengthening of the unions, but his 
plans reveal just the opposite. Undoubtedly, this was the result of in-
fluence by Leuschner and Kaiser. They wanted to integrate the workers 
into the state on an equitable basis while Goerdeler wanted to give the 
workers civic responsibility. Thus, a compromise was struck through the 
agency of a single 11German Trade Union." It was to be central.:cy- control-
led and self-governing, membership was to be compulsary, and it was to be 
responsible for negotiating wage agreements, working conditions, and oth-
er benefits. From Goerdeler•s standpoint, the advantage of a single un-
ion lay in the area of social and political involvement. Leuschner had 
long held the view that the unions were best placed to undertake the re-
sponsibility of educating the workers so they could assume joint control 
for running th~ factories.54 From here, it was no great leap tor an op-
timist like Goerdeler to envision a future in which both labor and manage-
ment would nominate candidates for election at the local and federal lev-
els, thereby merging traditional antagonists in the cooperative task of 
helping to run the state. 
It was inevitable that Popitz would object to the new powers accru-
ing to the unions. For the conservative Finance Minister, the idea ot 
employees having some sort of equity with employers was not only unsound 
54Zeller quotes Leuschner as saying that the unions should have 
11elected representatives on the boards of management ••• of all major 
economic undertakings. 11 Zeller, p. 71. 
economically but treasonable socially.55 Also, Popitz felt that Goer-
deler was arrogating to himself too much of the responsibilit7 for po-
litical planning. Thus, he tried to form a common front against the 
proposaltby enlisting the support of Hasse11,56and later some of the 
Kreisauers who saw the creation of a single union as contrary to their 
plan of extreme decentralization. Judging f'rom Hassell' s diary- and 
John's memoirs, the infighting must have been severe. To take just 
one instance, John records Popitz as saying that "be had expected 
21..,9. 
that Goerdeler would discuss everything with him. • • • ffiuiJ he was 
tagging along behind the socialists and trade unionists and he now re-
fused to accept the advice of men like Ambassador Hassell and Graf von 
Moltke {.co-leader of the Kreisaif • 11 57 In the final analysis, however, 
Goerdeler and his allies on the left carried the ia.sue, largely because 
of practicality. As the ex-Mayor put it, nmany questions or social pol-
icy could not be dealt with from. the standpoint of separate unions, but 
only from the standpoint of a single union embracimg the whole Reich.n5S 
Some final aspects of Goerdeler•s plans need to be mentioned since 
they reveal the ethical premise from which he worked. Perhaps the best 
characterization for them is the one he used-11reneva1. 11 .59 At base, 
Goerdeler was convinced that the moral fiber of the nation was sound; 
.55popitz•s objections are cited in the prosecution's indictment 
against him; see Allen Dullea, Germany's Underground (New York, 1947), 
p. 155. 
56Hassell, p. 214. 
57John, p. 117. 
58Ritter, p. 189. 
59zeller, p. 54. 
if that was not so, there could be no reason for resistance, nothing 
worth saving. But years of Nazi rule had covered this fiber with a 
shell or conformity and lethargy. More important, the agencies re-
sponsible for guiding people in the "practice and persistence of pi-
ety" had been 11gleichgeschaltet 11 to the demands of race, blood, and 
soil--hardly the most edifying of themes. Goerdeler 1s solution was 
to free them from the restraints with which they had been bound and 
to let them return to their traditional taska.6° Family life was the 
place to begin: 
An end must be made to the separation of families, to frivo-
lously contracted marriages, and to State premiums for ille-
gitimate children ••• people must be brought to understand 
that happy families, lasting matrimonial bonds and healthy 
children can exist only where externally valid law are ob-
served.61 
The churches and schools too must be made independent: 
All religious communities are to be free of State tutelage 
••• schools of all types shall be free at once of the role 
so contradictory to their purpose of serving to falsify fa~t, 
of offending young people's instinct for truth, of teaching 
them phrases instead of knowledge, hypocrisy instead6or no-ble courage, brute strength instead of real ability. 2 
2.50 .. 
And the majesty of the law must be recovered: "Law must be :testored as 
the basis of all decisions. The judges, freed from bias and police dic-
tation, must become undismissible servants of the community in accordance 
6°'1'his feature of Goerdeler's plan is pietistic both in the sense 
of religious duties and in the sense of loyalty and devotion to parents, 
family, law, and the like. Griffin writes that a "good order is one ••• 
marked by the practice and persistence of piety. 11 Griffin, 11Drama.tistic 
Theory," p. 459. 
61a-oerdeler is quoted from the draft of a radio speech which he was 
to deliver after becoming Chancellor. The full text appears in Fabian von 
Schlabrendorff, They Almost Killed Hitler (New York, 1947), pp. 83-90. 
62Ibid., pp. 86-87. 
with justice and equity. 1163 In this same context, it should be added 
that Goerdeler saw the law as an instrument for re-educating the peo-
ple. Through the courts, Jews and other former "enemies of the state" 
were to receive redress for their losses and suffering, while those re-
sponsible for crimes at home and abroad would be brought to the bar of 
justice, tried, and punished, without respect to persons and by German 
courts. This last was very important. Goerdeler thought that the Ger-
mans themselves ought to be responsible for "washing clean the German 
name so often dishonored."64 Such an act would have moral results no 
Allied court could obtain, and the cathartic nature of the task would 
be an important first step in reawakening the national conscience. 
It has been alleged that the conservatives were hindered in their 
planning because they could not develop alternatives to Hitl.er•s 11New 
Order" which would rally the people to their side.65 Specifical.q, 
George Romoser argues that 
The conspirator's analysis or the situation ••• together wi.Ul 
their own elitist political views, caused them to reject [a. 
popular uprising ani/ inaugurate a putsch "from above" with 
the goal of establishing a regime which should be based on a-
voidance of party-parliamentary democracy as well as Nazism.66 
This objection needs to be answered carefully because it strikes at the 
heart of the dialectic formulation as well as at the resister's abili-
ties to tum their secret plans into a popular movement. Certainly, 
63schlabrendorrr, p. ss. 
64Goerdeler is quoted in Rothfels, p. 104. 
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65See for example, George K. Romoser, 11The Politics Of Uncertain-
ty: The German Resistance Movement," Social Research, XXXI (Spring, 1964); 
and J.C. G. Rohl, From Bismarck To Hitler (New York, 1970). 
66Romoser, 84. 
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the argument contains a measure or truth, as witnessed by the authoritar-
ian features or the first conservative program, or Popitz's opposition to 
Goerdeler's plan for a single trade union, or Hassell and Popitz's rejec-
tion or Goerdeler's earlier proposal to hold a referendum immediately af-
ter the interim government had assumed power. But these admissions do not 
imply acceptance of Romoser 1s thesis, the burden or which is that the con-
servatives, because or their antecedents, were. unable to construct an ac-
ceptable alternative to National Socialism-an alternative which Romoser 
identifies as party-politics and which he appears to think would have mo-
bilized public support. For one thing, such an argument. minimizes the 
fact that the conspirators were compelled to renounce any "levee fill masse 11 
by the very nature of the Nazi police state, a fact which has been docu-
mented by every resister, conservative or otherwise.67 For another, it 
assumes a rather static view of man by denying him the power to break 
away from his political background. And the "either-or» nature of the 
argument excludes the possibility that other choices existed besides 
National Socialism and conservatism. Taking these last two points to-
gether, it should be emphasized that to a great extent, Goerdeler had 
succeeded in freeing himself from elitist political thought and had 
moved to the more equalitarian position of liberalism68-a political 
67Typical of the conservative view is Schlabrendorff's statement 
taken from his post-war account: 110nly the army had the weapons and the 
power to overthrow the firmly entrenched Nazi regime, which was supported 
by hundreds of thousands of SS troops. Civilian initiative was fettered." 
Schlabrendorff, p. 14. Typical of the socialist view is Carlo Mieren-
dorff Is remark to Professor Alfred Weber during the war: uwe are obliged 
to act without the masses and leave the initiative to the generals." 
Quoted in Dulles, p. 108. 
68Goerdeler 1s political change from conservatism to liberalism, 
the result of his contacts with socialists, is what Griffin refers to 
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tradition in Germany marked by its stress on individual freedom and 
state authorit7--a kind of mixture of John Stuart Mill and F.dmund 
Burke.69 This is attested to in Kaiser's statement made after the 
war: that if Goerdeler had survived, he would have been "on the side 
of the progressive forces of the people. 1170 Or there is the structure 
of his proposal itself. With its balance between local self-government 
and federal strength, the former Mayor's plan accords with the best tra-
ditions of German liberalism-a tradition which can be traced from Goethe» 
Kant, Humboldt, and Stein, to the leading figures of the Revolution of 
1848. This tradition, as embodied in Goerdeler 1s domestic reforms--not 
the earlier quasi-authoritarian proposal, or Popitz's demand for a re-
tum to an economic class system-won the approval of Beck and the oth-
er conservative leaders and became their basic statement of principles.71 
Finally, there is the uncertain question of how pop~lar this program 
would have been. And here, Goerdeler's optimism might have stood the re-
sisters in good stead. For in his unswerving desire to obtain a popular 
mandate, the former Mayor had blundered into a possible first step in 
when he writes about "progress from pathema through poiema to ma.them.a. 
••• from auscultation through creation to revision ••• to a 'modifica-
tion of the expression in the light of more complicated afterthoughts.'" 
Griffin, 11 Dramatistic Theory," pp. 461-462. This would also apply to 
Beck and Hassell's approval of Goerdeler's liberal program. Only Pop-
itz remained unreconstructed politically. 
69An excellent illustration of this mixture can be found in an 
essay by Heinrich Treitschke, written in 1861. In discussing Mill's 
11Essay on Liberty," Treitschke praises Mill's desire to give the high-
est degree of liberty to the individual, but he rejects Mill's ~heory 
of the state as not giving sufficient recognition to the state as the 
source of the individual's creative energies and rights. Treitschke: 
His Life & Works (London, 1914), pp. 294-320. 
70i<aiser is quoted in Rothfels, p. 102. 
71Hassell notes his and Beck's agreement, p. 230. 
gaining mass support-that of an extremely divergent messageo72 Rit-
ter records him on many occasions as saying that "the truth needs on-
ly to be known for twenty-four hours •• • /Jo makiJ the German people 
realize how they had been sinned against. 1173 And Stauffenberg., who 
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by nearly all accounts was the most audience-oriented of the resist-
ance leaders,74adopted the same strategy prior to the July 20, 1944 
Attentat. In ordering the text of the first 11General Valkyrie Orders" 
to be expunged of subtleties and equivocations, he was in effect argu-
ing that the attention of the people could be redirected with messages 
antithetical to what they had heard for years from Goebbels. Truth and 
a spirit of reform would provide the necessary- means, when contrasted 
with the lies and hatred which had been the mainstay of Nazi propaganda. 
As we observed earlier, the period 1942-1943 marked the climax of 
the dialogue between the conservatives and a somewhat different kind of 
72Admittedly, there is a mass of contradictory evidence in the 
psychological literature concerning discrepant messages. See James o. 
Whittaker, 11Resolution Of The Communication Discrepancy Issue In Attit-
ude Change," in Thomas D. Beisecker and Donn W. Parson., The Process Of 
Social Influence (Englewood Cliffs, 1972), pp. 367-391. However, no 
less an authority than Hitler suggests the strategy. In Mein Kampf, 
he argues that the fun.Q.tion o.f...,Propaganda "consists of catching the 
masses attention •• • Lnot with/ half measures which might give cause 
for doubt ••• _Lbut with7 its own truth ••• no matter how apparently 
crazy. • • the impudence of its assertions." Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, 
trans., Ralph Manheim (Boston, 1962), pp. 182-185. In a political 
scene where lies were the norm, the most "impudent" approach would 
have been to tell the truth. 
73Ritter, p. 241. 
74There are many testimonials to Stauffenberg's sensitivity to 
audiences, but space limitations preclude £,iting more than one9 A fel-
low officer in a panzer division wrote: 11LStauffenberi/ was revered and 
admired by his comrades, collaborators and subordinates, esteemed by his 
superiors whom he faced without a trace of subservience, fully aware of 
his own value and dignity, always and in every situation able to choose 
the right tone and manner." Quoted in Zeller, p. 179. 
resistance center--the Kreisau Kreis, and this dia:l.ogue, combined with 
the change in the political Zeitgeist, reoriented the thinking of both 
groups in certain important respects. Because this interchange played 
no small part in the drama., let us examine the origins of the Kreisau, 
for it is in the forces which helped to shape its 1eading members no 
less than in their political programs that much of -the cause for the 
tensions between the two groups can be found. 
The Kreisau circle had its beginnings in the friendship formed be-
tween Helmuth James von Moltke and Peter Yorck von Wartenburg in the 
first half of 1940 when both were on military duty, in Berlin, Molkte 
as a legal advisor to the Armed Forces High Command, Yorck as a staff 
member in the office of the Reich Price Commissioner. 
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The two men had much in common, and even their differences, which 
were considerable, made their relationship complementary-.. Both were de-
sended from famous ancestors. Moltke was the grea~-grandnephew of the 
Field Marshal in Bismarck's time. Yorck came from t.he family of the 
Prussian general whose act of disobedience led to the war of libera-
tion against Napoleon.75 Both belonged to the generation whose form-
ative years followed World War I. Moltke was born in 1907; Yorck three 
years earlier. And while this generation was often, dismissed as 11lost, 11 
some of its members attempted to combat their own alienation as well as 
the alienation of others with new forms of social identification. Moltke 
helped to organize voluntary work camps which brought together people of 
75rn opposition to King William III, General Yorck von Wartenburg 
signed the Treaty of Tauroggen in 1812, breaking connections with the 
French and placing his troops at the Czar's disposa1, a political act 
which set off the war of liberation against Napoleon. 
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all ages and classes in the hope that shared experiences would lead to 
a shared life.76 Yorck was also interested in the camps, and though his 
basic shyness prevented him from joining, his conscience led him to work 
for improved social conditions on an individual basis.77 Both had family 
estates in Silesia, an area where the problems of coexistence between Ger-
mans and Poles was especially acute since the Versailles Treaty had divid-
ed the province with little regard for ethnic considerations. Molkte was 
part of a group which tried to separate national from cultural factors in 
orcfer to make it possible tor minorities on both sides of the frontier to 
live in peace.78 Yorck was more profoundly German and did not like the 
thought of Polish domination in Silesia, although the exigencies or the 
scene made him, as he put it, "an unhappy rebel in the cause of human 
dignity, freedom and right. 1179 
Moltke po3sessed the more fo:nnidable personality and presence (he 
was six feet seven) and he combined this with a habit of mind and speech 
that was all attack and moved directly to the facts of a case.80 Yorck 
was much less imposing (he was small and extremely slender) and he had 
7~oltke I s part in the work camps is recounted in Ger van Roon, 
German Resistance To Hitler, trans., Peter Ludlow (London, 1971), pp. 
6-7. 
77Ibid., p • .31. 
78An account of Moltke's work with minorities, including his stud-
y of Polish, is in Michael Balfour and Julian Frisby, Helmuth von Moltke 
(London, 1972), pp. 36-37. 
79yorck is quoted in Zeller, p. 98. 
80i3alfour and Frisby write: 11/ji.oltki} could analyze soundly and 
fast and pick up the essence of any question in a short time •••• LBui/ he was also prone to the clever man's fault of supposing that, 
because he bas seen something to be self-evident and drawn appropriate 
conclusions, everyone else will have done so too." Balfour and Frisby., 
P• 46. 
a more tactful way of going about things, a method which made him much 
more effective with those of differing views.Bl Moltke had studied for 
the law and had a broad outlook, in part the result of his Anglo-Saxon 
heritage which he got from his English mother, and in part the result 
of his education at Oxford where he specialized in international law. 
Yorck had also studied for a legal career but he found a narrower if 
more satisfying education in his own home which had a large library 
of German history, philosophy and literature, a course of study which 
led him to be moved far more by national interests. The most striking 
difference between the two men, however, was moral. Moltke was con-
vinced of the inevitability of defeat and believed it was more impor-
tant to prepare for the post-Hitler period than to hasten it with a 
revolt, particularly one involving assassination. 82 Yorck agreed with 
the need for preparations, but he found it less easy to stand by while 
Gennany was destroyed together with Hitler, and though he was carried 
along at the beginning by the sheer strength of Moltke 1s personality 
and arguments, the time finally came when Moltke was in prison and un-
able to press his views. Then Yorck and some of the other Kreisauers 
81see Eugen Gerstenmaier 1s description of Yorck 1s strength as 
a "moderator" in Erich Boehm, We Survived (New Haven, 1949), p. 178. 
82Molkte 1s views are fairly represented in two statements. To 
General von Falkenhausen, he said: "Let ffiitle.!:7 live. He and his par-
ty must shoulder responsibility for the terrible fate which they have 
brought to the German people. This is the only way to eradicate the 
ideology of National Socialism. 11 Quoted in Ritter von Schramm, Con-
spiracy Among Generals, trans., R. T. Clark (New York, 1956), p. 23. 
And in a letter to a British friend, Lionel Curtis, Moltke argued that 
it was the task of the opposition 11to visualize Europe after the war. 
We can only expect our people to overthrow this reign of terror and 
horror if we are able to show a picture beyond the terrifying and 
hopeless immediate future. 11 Helmuth von Moltke, A German or the 
Resistance (London, 1948), p. 28. 
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joined Stauffenberg--but this is part of the next act. 
When Moltke and Yorck first met, they already led small opposition 
groups. As early as 1938, Yorck had assembled a circle of friends to 
discuss the future of Germany. Included were Fritz von der Schulenburg 
and Berthold von Stauffenberg, brother of Claus von Stauffenberg. These 
men came together under the impact of the "Kristall.nacht11 when the great 
majority of Gennans stood by silently while government directed terror-
ists ravaged Jewish communities and Goebbels called it spontaneous out-
bursts of popular feeling. Not unnaturally, their major concern was how 
to instill the concept of "Zivilcourage" into the apolitical Germans and, 
at the same time, prevent the government from gaining such power that it 
could order immoral acts with impunity. Their pro:posals, developed over 
the course of the next two years (and with frequent interruptions for mil-
itary- duty}, included a state structure that was-democratic but which left 
room for leadership, a federal government whose powers were limited, ex-
tensive local self-government, and decentralized social and economic in-
stitutions.83 
Moltke's group had grown out of the Munich crisis., In his work at 
the High Command, he had learned something of the officer's plot to over-
throw the regime and he decided that the time had come to consider the 
form of government that would follow Hitler. As a matter of course, he 
turned for help to those with whom he had been associated in the organ-
ization of the work camps. One was his cousin,. Dietrich von Trotha. An-
other was Trotha 1s friend, Horst von Einsiedel. A third was Adolf Reich-
wein, whose work in the camps had led him. to a brilliant career in adult 
83These plans are summarized in Van Roon, p~ l.06. 
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education and innumerable contacts with the socialists before the Nazis 
transferred him to a one-room village school. A fourth was the lawyer 
Eduard Waetjen, who was introduced to Molkte by Einsiedel. This group's 
records do not seem to have been preserved, but van Roon reports that 
Einsiedel and Trotha, both of whom worked in the civil planning sector 
of the government, favored tight economic controls to prevent the kind 
of imbalances that were always plaguing the Nazis, and that Moltke, who 
was strongly international, argued for a system of European economic co-
operation in place of Hitler's autarky.84 
It was Molkte's intention, if he could find common ground, to link 
up his group with Yorcks'. Meetings and correspondence between the two 
through the first half of 1940 stren~hened his resolve,85and in August 
he invited Yorck, Einsiedel, and Waetjen to spend a weekend at Kreisau, 
his family estate in Silesia. Here plans were laid for what later be-
came known as the Kreisau Kreis. 
Briefly, it was decided to enlarge the circle by bringing in ex-
perts to work on particular features of a new order, to discuss their 
findings at preliminary meetings, and then to place them before general 
sessions. In this, the men were partly influenced by their own inade-
quacies at making constitutions. Moltke, for example, had been reading 
Goethe, Kant, and the papers and letters of the Prussian reformer vom 
Stein, and George Kennen has left a description of him immersed in the 
Federalist Papers: 
84These plans are summarized in Van Roon, p. 102. 
85Typical is a line from one of Moltke's letters in this period: 
"At midday, I lunched with Peter Yorck •••• I believe we found our-
selves ve-ry much in agreement and will see a lot of each other." Quoted 
in Balfour and Frisby, p. 110. 
The picture of this scion of a famous Prussian military family 
••• employed by the German general staff in the midst of a 
great war, hiding himself away and turning ••• to the works of 
some of the Founding Fathers of our democracy for ideas as to 
how Germany might be led out of its existing corruption and be-
wilderment has never left me.86 
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Also, security demanded a strict division. By keeping people apart, there 
was some assurance that if one or two individuals were arrested, they could 
give only a little away. No lists of members were ever drawn up, sometimes 
participants were not even introduced to each other at meetings, and most 
of the papers were destroyed immediately after a discussion, with only the 
most important ones being hidden away (in a bee-hive at Kreisau where Molt-
ke's wife recovered them after the war). Moltke and Yorck alone knew all 
the aspects of the planning, and Christabel Bielenberg, the wife of one of 
the members of the circle, writes that the government poster, "Beware an 
enemy may be listening, 11 was displayed in Moltke 1s Berlin apartment.m 
For the next two years, the Kreisau leaders were occupied chiefly with 
expanding their circle, a process that was inevitably slow and cautious, be-
set as it was with danger at every step. Ultimately, more than fifty peo-
ple would be drawn into the work of preparing for a new Germany, some of 
them nobles and landowners like Moltke and Yorck, but many of them social-
ists and churchmen. 
The left was represented by Theodore Haubach and Carlo Mierendorff, 
both introduced to the circle by Reichwein. Haubach and Mierendorff were 
"young Turks" from the radieal wing of the Social Democratic Party, which 
meant that they were less interested in top-heavy union organizations than 
86George Kennen, Memoirs 1925-50 (New York, 1968), p. 121. 
87christabel Bielenberg, Ride Out the Dark (New York, 1968), p. 247. 
261. 
in achieving social and economic equality for the workers, a point which 
accorded well with Yorck's belief that the workers had been cheated in 
their legitimate claims by both the Nazis and the conservative elite.88 
Also, Haubach and Mierendor.ff had emancipated themselves from the social-
ist dogma or free thought and this made them idea1 collaborators in a 
group which Moltke hoped would bridge the gap between the churches and 
the left.89 Mierendorff in particular would be instnimental in creating 
the Kreisau symbol of a socialist ring linked with a cross "as a token ot 
the unbreakable unity" of the circle's diverse forces. 90 Foreign policy 
was Haubach's specialty and he opposed the notion of militant nationalism 
with the socialist ideals of European reconciliation and federation, con-
cepts not unlike Moltke's transcendent internationalism. 
Among the Kreisau's church representatives, the most active Catholic 
was Father Alfred Dolp, a young Jesuit whom Moltke had recruited through 
the Father Provincial of Munich. Trained as a sociologist., Delp•s main 
interest lay in the relationship between man and society, and he was pri-
maril;y responsible for the Kreisau's approach to social order., 11.!Y:!, Dritte 
Ml!!." as he called it in his position paper., which avoided the extremes of 
capitalism and totalitarianism. According to Delp., free enterprise had 
left the individual at the mercy of the technical., scientific., and econ-
omic worlds whose demands were too great to bear. Conversely, totalitar-
ianism had collectivized man into a regimented mass which protected him 
88 8 Van Roon, p. 11. 
89Ritter, an unsympathetic source, concedes t.hat the Kreisau's 
greatest achievement "was to bring together representatives of the rad-
ical Left and members of the aristocracy and the churches in close and 
friendly cooperation." Ritter, p. 198. 
90rhe S3'lllbol is prominently mentioned in Mierendorffts 11Social-
while denying him any individuality. What was needed was a third way: 
11It is essential that the individual's right to life, freedom and prop-
erty should be associated with far reaching socialization of the econ-
omic system. But this should not create a system of state capitalism. 
The social reconstruction must be executed by the people themselves and 
be protected by state laws. 1191 
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Delp also thought that the churches were partly to blame for modem 
man's problems. By withdrawing to an otherworldliness,92organized reli-
gion had abandoned the world of men to any Weltanschauung strong enough 
to seize it. Whether it was capitalism or totalitarianism made no dif-
ference. One "idol of the state" had merely replaced another. It a 
God-imaged man was to triumph over the brute man, the churches would 
have to re-enter the world of men, minister to their needs, and give 
them an ethical ideal worth striving for. In this belief., Delp was 
joined by the Lutherans in the Kreisau. One of the most important was 
Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier from the Evangelical Church's Foreign 0£fice. 
After the war broke out., Gerstenmaier was made responsible for the wel-
fare of the foreign workers in the Reich, many or whom had been imported 
to Germany as slave laborers. Zeller writes that the job required less 
an introverted theologian than a militant preacher of the social gospel., 
and he notes that those who came in contact with Gerstenmaier at this 
ist Action Proclamation11 of June 6., 1943. See Van Roon, p. 328. 
9lnelp is quoted in~., p. 131. 
92This was particularly true of the Lutheran Church with its doc-
trine of two realms, a religious and a secular; but it was also true of 
the Catholic Church after the Concordat, which, while it guaranteed free-
dom of religion to the church, did so at the cost of restricting Catholic 
political and social agencies in Germany. 
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tims were 11 shocked 11 by his increasing radicalism.93 It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that Gerstenm.aier 1s work would lead him at last to dis-
agree with Moltke over the need for action. True to his beliefs, he 
joined Stauffenberg on July 20, a bible in one pocket, a pistol in the 
other.94 And though he was arrested that evening and his membership in 
the Kreisau became known, he was able to defend himself successfully be-
fore the "People's Court," receiving a sentence of seven years instead 
of the death penalty.95 
Another Lutheran who agreed with Delp was Harald Polechau, the chap-
lain at Tegel Penitentiary, where many of the resisters were imprisoned. 
Polechau was a religious socialist, partly because of his upbringing in 
a working-class parsonage, and partly because of his studies under Paul 
Tillich. Polechau believed in a church in action, a church that minis-
tered where there was a need. Unfortunately, the Evangelical was not 
such a church: "the church is L"'iieithei] a living nor ••• an essential 
element in the life of the individual," was the way he put it.96 His 
work in prison, where he attended increasing numbers of men and women 
in their last hours, not only made Polechau a firm opponent of capital 
punishment but also provided him with an activity to replace the inac-
tivity of his church. :Equally important for the Kreisauers was his po-
sition on the relationship between church and state. In a review, he 
93zeller, p. 99. 
94This is Gerstenmaier's description, in Boehm, Ps 187. 
95rnterestingly enough, Gerstenmaier•s defense consisted prima-
rily in maintaining an otherworldly image, a task made easier by the 
existing stereotypes which even the Nazis believed. 
96Polechau is quoted in Van Roon, p. 57. 
wrote that God's mercy must operate in politics as well as religion, 
that there is, to use Tillich's expression, an "affinity" between the 
Christian understanding or God and some forms of society: "political 
decisions must be made in such a way that through them or behind them 
God's character can be perceived-the God who not only makes men aware 
of their limits, but who also reveals himself as the Father of Mercy. 1197 
The last Kreisau representatives who need to be mentioned are two 
young diplomats, Hans Bemd von Haeften and Adam von Trott zu Soltz. 
Of the two, Haeften is perhaps the less important because his senior 
rank made it necessary- for him to be so circumspect. that he rarely at-
tended meetings.98 Trott•s "passionate" temperment,99however, would 
have driven him to meetings whatever the difficulty, and he is known 
to have participated in sixty-two, the second highest number for any-
one except Moltke and Yorck.loo 
Trott resembled Moltke in many ways-in physical appearance, in 
age, and in his ability to see a world outside Germa.DT• He, too, had 
English blood, from his mother's side of the family, and like Moltke, 
he had studied at Oxford, beginning what his biographer calls his love 
affair with that institution,10lan affair which endured many ups and 
downs. Unlike Moltke, however, Trott was also pulled by German ties 
-his love of his country home in Hesse, his preoccupation with Hegel, 
97Polechau is quoted in Van Roon, p. 58. 
98christopher Sykes, Tormented Loyalty ( New York, 1969)., p. 347. 
99This is Hassell's description, p. 230. 
lOOBalfour and Frisby, p. 193. 
lOlsykes, p. 35. 
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and his will to work for a better Germany. Unfortunately, this made him 
appear increasingly suspect to many of his British friends who equated 
the growing excesses of the Nazis with all things German. Men like A. L. 
Rowse and Maurice Bowra had difficulty reconciling Trott•s opposition to 
Hitler with his patriotism, and Trott, for his part, was too sensitive 
to foreign criticism of his country. Also, the burden of his argument 
in the years just prior to the war-that Britain should accommodate her-
self to Germany's legitimate claims in order to deny Hitler his justifi-
cation and gain time for the opposition to strike-was misconstrued in 
an atmosphere hardening against Germany. 
The many moves Trott made during his trips to Britain ended in fail-
ure and need not concern us here except as they highlight a difficulty ex-
perienced by men of good will on both sides.102 Rowse, writing in retro-
spect, contrasts Trott•s philosophy with his own, and the difference is 
revealing, not only for what it says about Trott (and by- implication, man-
y of his co-conspirators), but also for what it says about Rowse and the 
Oxford Fellows of his generation who helped form the intellectual spirit 
of Churchill's wartime government.103 "With Adam black was never black 
l02Trott•s visits to Great Britain and the United States have been 
selected as "representative anecdotes" because they clearly illustrate the 
nature of the dialectic between the resistance movement and what has been 
called "third level hierarchies" in the methodology. The reader without. 
a knowledge of German will find perhaps the most complete account in Eng-
lish of an opposition attempt to identify with the Allies in Dietrich Bon-
hoeffer and Hans Schoenfeld 1s trips to Sigtuna and Stockholm where they 
met with Dr. G. K. A. Bell, Bishop of Chichester in May-June, 19~2. See 
Bethge, pp. 661-676; and Bishop of Chichester ffir. G. A. K. Bely, "The 
Background of the Hitler Plot," Contemporary Review, LXVIII (September, 
1945), 203-208. 
l03or Rowse's generation of Fellows who were in public life, the 
most notable was Leo Amery (who gave Chamberlain the order to resign by 
quoting Cromwell•s speech to the Long Parliament: "You have sat too long 
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and white white; black was always in the process of becoming white, white 
of becoming black ••• with me black was black and white was white; what 
was true was true, what was not was untrue. 11104 
By such distances are the Idealists of this world separated from the 
Realists and thus unable to enter into what Maurice Natenson calls philo-
sophic argument, a genre of discourse in which personal reality is at 
stake~l05 To Rowse, whose metaphysics were formed by traditional logic, 
Trott's attempt to demonstrate that Germany contained both good and evil 
forces must have sounded like Hegelian synthesis; while to Trott, Rowse•s 
insistence upon strict definitions must have seemed like a return to Ar-
istotelian universals. It is not surprising, therefore 1 that the disa-
greement over fundamentals extended to politics. 11At a certain point," 
Rowse writes, 111 decided the relationship should end. Though I am a-
shamed to say so, I wae not sure Adam was not reporting back to Berlin 
what our opini~ns and attitudes were. 11106 
Even more damaging was the role played by Bowra. In late 1939, un-
der cover provided by Weizsacker, Trott was sent to the United States, 
ostensibly to take part in a conference on the Far East, but actually 
to make contact with the Roosevelt Administration. Weizsacker wanted 
to sound out the American Government on its attitudes toward a moderate 
here for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have 
done with you. In the name of God, go!"). Others included Quintin Hogg, 
Richard Pares, Geoffery Hudson, A.H. M. Jones, A.H. Campbell, Ian Bowen, 
Isaiah Berlin, and Douglas Jay. 
l04A. L. Rowse, Appeasement (New York, 1961), p. 94. 
l05Henry W. Johnstone and Maurice Natenson, Philosophy, Rhetoric 
And Argumentation (University Park, Pennsylvania, 1968), p. 15. 
l06Rowse, p. 96. 
post-Hitler peace and to inform its officials about elements in Germany 
which would be helped by such a peace. To this end, Trott helped to 
draw up a memorandum, the key part of which read: 0 a timely clarifica-
tion of war aims ••• would reassure and consolidate opposition in Ger-
many and thereby contribute to the discrediting a:n.d undoing of Nazi dom-
ination. 11107 For awhile, things appeared to be going well. Trott met 
with Assistant Secretary of State George Messersmith who told him that 
the memorandum had been sent to President Rooseve1t and read ldth ap-
provai.108 However, Messersmith neglected to add that he had also dis-
tributed copies to influential New Dealers, including Felix Frankfurter, 
and that he had disapproved strongly. The reason is not hard to find. 
Frankfurter, too, was a graduate of Oxford, and more importantly, a good 
friend of Bowras'. When the Oxford don learned that Trott was visiting 
the United States, he wrote to friends here (Fran.tr.furter among t.hem), 
warning against Trott.109 It is impossible to make a direct link be-
tween Bowra•s letter, Frankfurter's negative respo1~se, and the fact 
that Roosevelt swung around to Frankfurter's position and finally re-
jected the memorandum.110 The conclusion seems inescapable; however, 
that Bowra's influence at least contributed to the suspicions which 
gradually dampened Roosevelt's initial interest in Trott•s specific 
proposal and the German resistance movement generallyc 
107The memorandum is quoted in Sykes, p. 298. 
l08Ibid., p. 306. 
109c. M. Bowra, Memories 1898-1939 (Cambridg;e, 1967), p. J06. 
110other contributing factors included Roosevelt's own indecision 
about America's role in the conflict and the tendency for non-Germans to 
assume that no one could officially represent Nazi Germany unless they 
were Nazis themselves. See Sykes, pp. 303-305. 
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After July 20, Rowse and Bowra would apologize for their error.lll 
But how much better it would have been if Bowra had lent his considerable 
prestige to seconding Trott 1s efforts to secure a declaration publicly 
committing the United States to tenns that held out some hope for the 
resisters, and this at a time when hostilities were barely underway-. In-
stead, his negative act contributed in important respects to a mood of 
heightened mistrust which before long expressed itself in the Atlantic 
Charter, the last point or which was a thinly-disguised demand for Ger-
man disarmament, 112and after that, in the doctrine of Unconditional Sur-
render, a policy which specifically effaced distinctions between Germans 
regardless of the dialectical position to which they subscribed. 
Ironically, Hitler himself would benefit most from this unsuccess-
ful dialogue. The Fuehrer was accustomed to taking evecy opportunity of 
convincing foreigners that he enjoyed the full support of the German peo-
ple. As he said to Sumner Welles in the spring of 1940: 111 am aware that 
the Allied powers believe a distinction can be made between National So-
cialism and the Gennan people. There was never a greater mistake. The 
German people are united as one man and I have the full support of every 
German. 11113 Trott was uniquely- placed to see where these misconceptions 
111For example, Bowra writes: "Trott was not only against Hitler, 
but after the failure of the plot or 20 July 1944, he was arrested and 
hung with a horrifying brutality on a wire cord. When I heard this, I 
saw how mistaken I had been, and my rejection of him remains one of my 
bitterest regrets." Bowra, p. J06. 
112Hassell makes this point: "paragraph 8 in the Churchill-Roose-
velt declaration ••• would certainly be interpreted by our generals as 
proof that England and America are not fighting against Hitler but also 
want to smash Germany and render her defenseless." Hassell, p. 208. 
113Sumner Welles, A Time For Decision (New York, 1944}, p. 108. 
would lead and his anxieties about them strengthened his resolve to go 
back to Germany and do what he could. Upon his return, he described 
the problem to Christabel Bielenberg: "It is a matter of persuading 
the powers that be that Hitler and all he stands for is as much our 
enemy as theirs and that if its Hitler they are out to destroy, in 
that battle we are on their side, and I don't think we are allies to 
be ignored. 11114 As we shall see, Trott never stopped hoping that. he 
could convince the other side of that, and when Molkte invited him to 
join the circle (oddly enough, they had been first introduced by Rowse), 
Trott agreed at once. 
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The main ideas of the Kreisau circle are set forth in a number of 
documents, 115the dates of which correspond roughly to three weekends 
when Moltke invited members of the group to his estate in Silesia: once 
in the spring, and again in the fall of 1942, and finally in the spring 
of 1943. At these meetings, preliminary findings were discussed and 
formulated into position papers, although not without vigorous debate 
and, on occasion, less than unanimous consent. Since they were largely-
self-contained, the first and second meetings dealing with domestic pol-
icy and the third with foreign affairs, we shall be able to treat them 
separately and, at the same time, deal somewhat chronologically with 
the dialogue between the Kreisauers and the conservatives, the climax 
of which occurred between the second and third meetings and revealed 
economic policy and foreign affairs as the substantive areas of dis-
agreement and change. 
114Bielenberg, p. 66. 
115These appear as an appendix in Van Roon, pp. 329-357a 
The first meeting was devoted to the rela:tionshlp between church 
and state and the role of education. Such subjects may seem .like un-
usual starting points for working out constitutional reforms, but the 
choices make sense within the context of the scene~ For one thing, 
Moltke and his friends were greatly concemed with countering the mor-
al havoc wrecked by the Nazis and they were convinC'.ed that this could 
only be done on a religious basis. The first conference paper declared: 
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"We see in Christianity the most valuable source o.i:' strength £or a reli-
gious-ethical renewal of the nation. ull6 In h.agin11.L1..ng thus s t.11.e Krei-
sauers were projecting for everyone what they themsielves had discovered 
individually: that to oppose a false god like· llitler, it was necessary 
to have what Moltke called the "sheet anchor" of Cll'..uristianity .. 117 Typ-
ical in this respect is a statement by Mierendorff:, 11 I have long lived 
without relieion. But I have reached the conrictiom that Christianity 
alone is capable of imparting meaning and strength to l.ife .. 11118 Or there 
is a line in one of Moltke I s letters, smuggled to a friend in England in 
1942: ''Perhaps you will remember that, in discussio,ns before the war, I 
maintained that a belief in God was not essential. Today, I h-now that I 
was wrong, completely wrong, 11119 
116 Van Roon, p. 329. 
117Moltke, p. 40. 
ll8~uerendorff is quoted in Constantine Fitzgibbon, July 20 (New 
York, 1956), P~ 103. 
119Moltke, p. 28. These reactions to a pers..onal exigence or change 
in the self is what makes Dan Hahn and Ruth Goncha,F'~ s definition of a move-
ment as nsocially shared activities and belief's directed toward the demand 
for change in some aspect of the social order11 unsatisfactory in part. Dan 
F. Hahn and Ruth M. Gonchar, "Studying Social :Movements: A Rhe.t.orical Meth-
odology, 11 Speech Teacher, XX (January, 1971), l.:i,4; a~ cited from Joseph R. 
Beyond a sense of personal commitment, however, the Kreisauers were 
attempting to bridge the deep divisions that had done so much to weaken 
the nation and prepare it for Hitler's Weltanschauung. Protestants and 
Catholics must end their hostility toward each other as well as toward 
the socialists. The socialists, too, must'give up their .one-sided em-
phasis on this-worldliness and materialism. If the Nazis common perse-
cution of the churches and the left had one lesson, it was that more u-
nited than divided them. Thus, Reichwein and Polechau proposed creat-
ing an ecumenical lay organization in the hope that it would overcome 
differences between faiths and provide religious support in the secular 
realm. Major emphasis was placed on joint church work at the local lev-
el. And the conference paper speaks of freeing the churches from state 
control, of guaranteeing freedom of belief and conscience, of lifting 
censorship on religious ptiblications, and of 11 two bishops, each repre-
senting one of the great Christian confessions, with the object of es-
tablishing a common position on the aspects of the Christian world-view 
that effect the structure of public life. 11120 
Because the schools had helped to institutionalize Nazi ideology, 
part of the meeting dealt with educational reform. At the elementary 
Gusfield, ed., Protest, Refonn. and Revolt: A Reader in Social Movements 
(New York, 1970), p. 2. For the Kreisauers, this change was largely a 
matter of discovering that the total claims of the state could only be 
overcome by equally total spiritual claims. For the conservatives, it 
was more a matter of progressing from initial agreement with National 
Socialism to the strongest possible repudiation of its evil methods. 
In either case, however, the personal exigence corresponds to Griffin's 
argument that men who make movements must change, must "progress from: 
pathema through poi em.a to mathema. 11 Griffin, 11Dramatistic Theory, 11 p. 
461. 
12<\ran Roon, p. 329. Even more than Goerdeler•s proposal, these 
plans suggest that the Kreisau was preparing an order "energized and sus-
tained by the motive of piety." Griffin, 11Dramatistic Theory," p. 459. 
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level, Moltke and the others proposed turning over the public schools to 
the churches and making religious instruction in both confessions a re-
quired subject to be taught when possible by clergymen. The object was 
11to arouse and strengthen the moral powers" of the child and "shape his 
character for life. nl21 With the secondary schools, the immediate con-
cern was over textbooks, particularly those in history which were incul-
cated with a nationalistic ethos. The socialists in particular placed 
great importance in banning such texts and undertaking instruction with-
out them until new ones were available. Moltke went even further and 
argued that the language, which the Nazis had despoiled and corrupted, 
needed basic revaluation. 11The means of expression.," he wrote, 11have 
been destroyed. Words have lost their meaning •••• It is no exag-
geration to say that everything that ought to be absolute has become 
relative ••• /j.ni/ those things like state, race and power that are 
entirely lacking in absolute values have become absolute. 11122 In high--
er education, the aim was to reverse current trends in scientific and 
practical training which the Kreisauers equated with the growth or tech-
nology and big business. Technical schools were to be retained» but they 
were to be separate and below the universities, the task of the one being 
to specialize, of the other to relate various fields of knowledge to one 
another. Reichwein advocated a liberal course of study for prospective 
121van Roon, p. 319. 
l22lli.!i. Although Moltke was no rhetorical theorist, his desire 
to revalue language is somewhat reminiscent of the symbolic interaction-
ists position that the restructuring of words will result in a restruc-
turing of consciousness. Referring to education, Kenneth Burke writes: 
11 how overwhelmingly much of what we mean by 1realityi has been built up 
for us through nothing but our symbol ~stems. Take away our books and 
what little do we know about history Lani/ biography ••• ?11 Kenneth 
Burke, 1§.nguage As Symbolic Action (Berkeley, 1968), p. 5. 
teachers to guard against one-sidedness in the,ir oom instruction, and 
Moltke added that university graduates 11were intended to be the knowl-
edge and conscience of the state. 11123 
The second meeting focused on the organizatio-fi of the state and 
the economy. In these areas, the problem as they :saw it from Kreisau 
was with countering the dominant trend toward centralization begun by 
Bismarck and accelerated by Hitlero This was a process common to all 
states in the Western world where power had become increasingly' con-
centrated in the hands of a few administrators and' bureaucrats.. But 
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it was particularly acute in Nazi Germany where one man determined pol-
icy not only in traditional areas of responsibility but often in aes-
thetic matters like art, music, and literatureo I~ such an order, the 
average citizen counted for little. He was a number, a cog in a machine, 
something to be manipulated for the greater glory ct: Fuehrer and Reich, 
but without responsibility, except to obey, and without any sense of 
participation in the decisions affecting his own liE>e. 
Part of the Kreisau response, as we have seen1 was to reawaken the 
individual to an awareness of his spiritual importar~~e and to redirect 
organized religion to man as the focus of church life.. In the S'ecular 
realm too, Moltke and the others were concerned that power should exist 
in human, not numerical terms, and though they diff®red as to the extent 
of the changes necessary to achieve it, they were all agreed on building 
an order in which people could administer their own affairs and thus be-
come responsible members of the community.124 Also, this concept of 
12Jvan Roon, p. 224. 
124Ibid., p. 332. 
community implied the idea of leadership and a selection principle to 
place the best in the communities at the head of the state. 
They began from below. Through decentralization, power was to be 
returned to communities "open to the inspection of the individual. 11125 
In parishes and towns people could practice self-government in familiar 
surroundings and elect representatives whose character and expertise 
could be judged at first hand. But the Kreisauers wanted more than 
simply getting' the man on the street to vote. A preliminary paper 
states: "Everyone must have the possibility of doing something use-
ful for the community; 11126that is, public service work in social in-
stitutions, labor camps, church boards, and the like, which were de-
signed to draw people from every strata of society, thereby overcoming 
the mystery of class differences as the Volksgemeinschaft had never re-
ally done.127 Additionally, these agencies were intended to serve as 
125van Roon, p. 332. 
126Ibid., p. 325. 
127rn a preliminary paper, Moltke used a metaphor to describe the 
philosophy underlying the various orders: "individuals a:re small pieces 
of metal •••• In the center there is a powerful magnet towards which 
all are oriented regardless of whether •• eseparatist tendencies exist 
among them: both friendship and enmity are dominated and regulated by 
the shared orientation. 11 Ibid., p. 318. The shared orientation was, 
of course, the common behef in Christianity, the morter that held the 
various hierarchies together. This is very similar to Griffin1 s argu-
ment that 11 Any system that endures implies an 'adequate I understanding, 
a dynamic understanding (the understanding which is active in that it 
performs the act of unification). It is the understanding ess~ntial 
to the ultimate success of integration (ideal unity; 1a complete and 
perfect whole 1 }. For it provides the basis for communication and men 
must communicate. 11 Griffin, 11 Dramatistic Theory, 11 p. 458 For the di-
alectical significance, compare this "shared orientation" to Hitler's 
11 New Order. 11 Albert Speer writes: "Worse still was the restriction of 
responsibility to one's own field. That was explicitly demanded. Ev-
eryone kept to his own group--architects, physicians, jurists, tech-
nicians, soldiers, or farmers. The professional organizations to which 
274. 
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counterweights against potential domination by institutions at higher le-
vels. And their very diversity, when added to family and work ties, would 
' prevent any one of them from totally dominating a person's life. Finally, 
they were to be nurseries for leadership--places where civic minded indi-
viduals could demonstrate their ability and thus merit the votes of their 
neighbors for election to local councils. 
From the comm,mities, the hierarchy moved upward to the districts, 
provinces, and Reich. For election to these higher levels, the method 
was indirect, the community councils voting for the district councils, 
and so on to the top, though the documents stipulate that half the pro-
vince and Reich representatives were to be non-electors so as to preclude 
anyone from serving in too many legislative bodies at once. The provinces 
or Lander were the most important of these larger political units.. Schulen-
burg, who had more administrative experience than the others, divided them 
on the basis of economic and cultural factors as well as ease of communica-
tion, the aim being to make each Land big enough to be self-sufficient bqt 
small enough for its citizens to know what was happening. This meant break-
ing up 11artificial11 states like Prussia and taking away traditional powers 
from Berlin. Moltke in particular was opposed to the idea of state au-
thority which he thought led to manifest destiny and war. From his po-
sition at the High Command, he had been able to establish contact with 
11christian groups in the various occupied territories," and with the 
everyone had to belong were called chambers (Physicians' Chamber, Art 
Chamber), and this term aptly described the way people were immured in 
isolated, closed-off areas of life. The longer Hitler's system lasted, 
the more people's minds moved within such isolated chambers~ • o. The 
disparity between this and the Volksgemeinschaft (community of people) 
proclaimed in 1933 always astonished me. For this had the effect of 
stamping out the promised integration •••• Wbat eventually developed 
was a society of totally isolated individuals." Speer, p. 65. 
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"exception of France," he had found them equally agreed that the prob-
lem of contested frontiers needed to be solved with something more last-
ing than treaties dictated by the victor of the most recent war.128 I-
dealistically, but with a certain foresight, Moltke argued that there 
should be no sovereignty save that vested in a transcendental federa-
tion of small European states: 11The free and peaceful development of 
national culture is no longer compatible with the retention of absolute 
sovereignty by individual states. Peace demands the creation of an or-
der which embraces all the individual statesa.nl29 This was the crux of 
his position, and despite the objections of Yorck and Trott, who had 
deeprooted feelings for the Fatherland and a better grasp of political 
realities, Moltke largely carried the issue with the help of the social-
ists whose natural tendency was to think along supranational lines. 
Thus, the Reich was stripped of many of its powers, retaining some 
control only in the areas of foreign affairs, national defense, and fi-
nance,130while all other responsibilities devolved to the Lander. The 
importance of the Lander was further underscored in the construction of 
the Reich government. Its upper house (Reichsrat) consisted wholly of 
Commissioners whose duty was to select the head of state. He, in 
128Moltke, p. 28. Van Roon recounts clandestine meetings between 
Moltke and resistance leaders in Norway, Holland, Belgium, Poland, and 
Austria. Van Roon, pp. 201-215. 
129Ibid., p. 349. 
130rt is difficult to detennine with any precision just what the 
Kreisau circle had in mind regarding federal powers. Ritter writes that 
"The loosening of the fabric of the state is carried very .far. How far 
is hard to tell, for the Moltke document is couched in vague, and from 
the juridicial point of view completely unclear, terms ••• .," Ritter., 
p. 210. And Van Roon is forced to place question marks behind his e-
numeration of federal responsibilities in the Kreisau programo Van Roon, 
p. 233. 
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turn, nominated the chancellor and his cabinet with the consent of the 
lower house (Reichstag) whose member~ were elected by the Land Councils .. 
And although the chancellor was given responsibility for initiating leg-
islation, the Reichstag could demand his dismissal by a two-thirds vote 
of no confidence. Finally, all the Kreisauers were agreed that there 
should be no centralization of authority through the symbol of the mon-
arch, constitutional or otherwise, and as we noted earlier, they suc-
ceeded in imposing this view upon the conservatives. 
It was in the area of economic policy that the first real division 
occurred between the Kreisau circle and Goerdeler and his allies.131 
Part of it involved the role of trade unions which Molkte and the others 
intended to break into factory units or 11works unions" as they called 
them.132 And part of it concerned monopolies, cartels~ and combines 
which they were determined to regulate "in the interests of the com-
munities," preferably at the Land level or below.133 In point of time, 
the argument over the unions took place before the climax of the dia-
logue between the two sides so we can take it up now without intruding 
upon chronology. 
Within their own group, the Kreisauers were agreed in opposing big 
labor since it tallied with their opposition to authority whatever form 
it took. But when they solicited outside opinions, the results were 
131.csriffin writes: "there is the danger that the movement, as its 
ranks increase, will •splinter'--fail to achieve solidarity, merger; that 
the m,yth which prefigures the Purpose of the movement, imperfectly con-
veyed or received (whether consciously or unconsciously), will yield in 
the minds of a crucial number of converts ••• to an impious new vision 
of Order~" Griffin, 11 Dramatistic Theory-," pp. 465-466. 
1J2van Roon, p. 336. 
133Ibid., p. 335. 
mixed. Popitz sided with them, but his support was questionable because 
he was known to harbor elitist views fundamentally different rrom their 
own. The agreement of Leuschner was more important and less suspect 
since he was an acknowledged leader of the left. In May 1942, Mieren-
dorff showed him a copy of the economic proposal, and while Leuschner 
concurred with its emphasis on small communities, he refused to admit 
the need for factory unions, maintaining instead that a single union 
was the workers best guarantee of social and economic equality-in 
short, the agreement he had made with Goerdeler. Despite this, the 
Kreisauers set about to win him over, and after several preliminary 
discussions, Leuschner agreed to nominate Hermann Maass, his secre-
tary and former socialist youth leader, to represent him in further 
talks. Maass was a 11 tough person to talk to 11 and "extremely well-
versed in his own special sphere, 11134qualifications which 1ed to long 
bargaining sessions but little in the way of results. Molkte described 
one such meeting in a letter and it deserves to be included because, un-
wittingly perhaps, it reveals both sides at their worst. 
The rest of us slept through long stretches of the lecture. Pe-
ter {Jore~? and I shamelessly while /feierendorff'i/ extinct cigar 
kept dropping out of his mouth, at which he woke up, looked at me, 
smiled, and put it back in his mouth and went to sleep again. But 
these ninety minutes made us realize that here was a man who really 
had something to say about the position of the workers and the nine-
ty minutes included some high points where we all listened witb fas-
cination while several pearls were concealed among the banalities.135 
The upshot, as can be imagined, was almost total failure. Although 
Maass went to several other meetings that summer and even attended the sec-
ond Kreisau gathering in the fall of 1942, his insistence on a single labor 
134These are Moltke 1s assessments, quoted in Van Roon, p. 122. 
l35Moltke 1s letter is quoted in Balfour and Frisby, p. 197. 
movement and the Kreisauers equally adamant demand for factory unions, 
led to several unpleasant clashes and delayed the Einal draft or the 
economic proposal until the spring of 1943. By then, Moltke and his 
friends had given some ground, as indicated by an annex in the text 
which concedes the existence of a 11German Trade Union" and allows for 
its "continuance" if conditions so requireol36 But. their basic posi-
tion remained unchanged. As Moltke wrote later in the year: "Mieren-
dorff will see to it that the comrades come over to us with him and 
leave /J,euschnei} isolated. 11137 Unhappily for the Kreisauers, this 
hope would never be realized. The labor resisters refused to give up 
their allegiance to Leuschner, and he, for his part 3 would not_break 
his agreement with Goerdeler. Then in December 1943, tragedy struck. 
Mierendorff was killed in an air raid on Leipzig, burned to death in 
the celler of his aunt's house. He was replaced b7 Julius Leber, one 
of the more militant deputies of the outlawed Social. Democratic Party 
and a contributor to some of the early Kreisau plans. But Leber was 
quite different from Mierendorff. Though sympathetic with many of the 
circle's aims, he saw merit in Leuschner's position too, 138and he was 
particularly critical of Moltke's theorizing,139pre£erring to fight a-
gainst the Nazis here and now, even if it meant joining forces with 
l36van Roon, p. 337. 
l37Moltke 1s letter is quoted in Balfour and Frisby, p. 286. 
138Thus a passage from one of Moltke's letters: 11Leber has gone 
off on lines which are not dissimilar to those of ff,euschneiJ. 11 Quoted 
in Ibid. 
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l39van Roon quotes Moltke on Leber's attitude,: 11 He is a compelling 
good man but he has very one-sided interests in the purely practical and, 
attaches much less importance than I do to the spiritual and intellectual 
powers." Van Roon, p. 125. 
Goerdeler whose program he described as "not constructive enough. 11140 
Later he would discover in Stauffenberg that combination of action and 
ideas he sought, but the discussion of their alliance belongs to the 
next act. 
As noted earlier, the climax of the dialogue between the group a-
round Goerdeler and Moltke and his friends took place during the inter-
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im between the second and third Kreisau meetings. Of course, there had 
been previous contacts. Moltke refers briefly to a dinner engagement with 
Yorck and Beck in the fall of 1941,141Popitz's indictment mentions a se-
ries of undated meetings between himself and Schulenburg,142Leuschner and 
Maass' talks with Moltke and Mierendorff have already been recounted, and 
so has Hassell's encounter with Trott in December 1941, when Hassell de-
fended the restoration of the monarchy while Trott attacked it.143 But 
these were largely impromptu affairs which dealt with a single issue and 
frequently left the participants with something less than a favorable im-
pression.144 Still, there were members of both groups who wanted to es-
tablish a common front and so it is not surprising that before long they 
would make an attempt. 
The initiative came from Ha!sell on the one side and Yorck, Trott, 
p. 162. 
140teber is quoted in Rothfels, p. 120. 
14¾1oltke's reference is in a letter quoted by Balfour and Frisby, 
142Popitz's indictment in in Dulles, pp. 151-152. 
143see p. 243. 
144Thus Hassell's reaction to his meeting with Trott in 1.941: "In 
general I am against Trott•s theoretical and illusionary outlook." p. 232. 
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Schulenburg and Haeften on the other.145 Moltke was opposed, but gave 
way in deference to his friends, calling them "much more positive" than 
himselt.146 The meeting was held at Yorck 1s house in Berlin on the eve-
ning of January 8, 1943, with both groups fully and evenly represented, 
the conservatives by Beck, Goerdeler, Popitz, Hassell, and Jessen; the 
Kreisauers by Moltke, Yorck, Trott, Gerstenmaier, and Schulenbur.g. On-
ly three accounts remain: a letter by Moltke,147a diary entry or Has-
sells 1 ,,148and a. report by Gerstenmaier, the sole survivor, written im-
mediately after the war.149 From these, it is possible to reconstruct 
the pattern of the dialogue and suggest some reasons for its short term 
failure and longer range success. 
According to Gerstenmaier, the Kreisauers had been preparing for 
weeks beforehand and led off the discussion.150 Trott spoke on for-
eign affairs, Yorck on administration and Reich reform, Moltke on the 
cooperation between the churches and the left, and Gerstenmaier o.n the 
relations between church and state and social policy.151 Arter this 
145Hassell, p. 278. 
14~oltke 1s reference is in a letter written art.er the meeting, 
quoted in Balfour and Frisby, p. 121. 
147Ibid., pp. 206-207. 
148Hassell, p. 283. 
149aerstenmaier I a report is printed as an appendix to the German 
edition of Hassell 1s Diaries (pp. 379-380), but is omitted from the Eng-
lish edition. Hereafter it will be referred to as Anhang. the title giv-
en to it in the original. 
150o-erstenmaier, Anhang, p. 379. 
151Ibid -· 
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"united front, 11 as Hassell calls it, l52Goerde.ler followed with the pres-
entation of the conservative position, a statement 1>1hich Moltke later de-
scribed as "really idiodic ••• flabby and totally ].a.eking in imagination, 
etc. 11153 Nor did the Kreisau leader keep his objections to himself~ Ger-
stenma.ier writes that "Moltke became very polemic t..hrough his interruptions 
••• as Goerdeler set forth his state and social pr.ograms,. 11154 For his 
pa.rt, the fonner Mayor tried to minimize the di£fer~nces by diverting the 
argument into what Moltke dismissed as "issues, on 1',i?hlch agreement was eas-
y. 11155 But his attempts only succeeded in prc..,;rokil'lilg Gerstenmai.er into a 
rebuttal "which formulated our points o.f view :i!.:n a. manner sharply anti-
thetical to his own, 11156and led Hassell to conclude that 11Goerdeler is 
really something of a reactionary. n157 By now the :hour was late (11: 35 
PM) and Moltke was unhappy because the discussion had taken so long to 
get down to what he considered "fundamentals~n158 Still, there was time 
for a parting shot, and he took it, calling Goe:rdeler 1s program a "Keren-
sky solution, nl59the implication being that any group which aimed to take 
power after the Nazis must be prepared to pursue a radical policy unless 
it wanted to find itself quickly superseded& Iie notes that the shot 
152Hassell, p. 283. 
l53Moltke 1 s letter is quoted in Balfour and Frisby, p. 207. 
154Gerstenmaier, Anhang, p. 380. 
l5~oltke 1 s letter is quoted in Balfour and Frisby, p. 206. 
156Gerstenmaier, Anhang, p. 380. 
157Hassell, p. 283. 
l58Moltke 1s letter is quoted in Balfour and Frisby, p. 206. 
l59Ibid., p. 207. 
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"quite obviously went home and with it the affair endect. 11160 
Looking back, it is plain that the approach taken by the two sides 
was wholly different and contributed materially to the unsuccessful out-
come. Gerstenmaier 1s reference to lengthy preparations and the sequence 
of opening reports suggest that the Kreisauers had come to the meeting 
ready to debate basic principles, and their frustration at Goerdeler's 
attempts to minimize differences is understandable. Yet, the conserva-
tive spokesman also had his method of bargaining. As Gisevius puts it, 
"he endeavored to divert the thoughts of men with whom he negotiated 
from disputes about persons and programs and impress them instead with 
the need for action. 11161 Such an approach was particularly distasteful 
to Moltke who, as we have seen, was less concerned with overthrowing 
Hitler than with determining the kind of political and social order 
that would follow him. Also, the Kreisau leader frankly preferred 
direct attacks and usually carried his point. As his biographers, 
Balfour and Frisby write, Moltke "was inclined to believe that, if 
only a man would stick to his convictions and argue with cogency ••• 
he would get his way. 11162 Thus, in Goerdeler 1s efforts to "conceal 
differences, 11163and Moltke's attempts to highlight them, the proceed-
ings broke down in an atmosphere that was one part suppression of argu-
ment and one part verbal boxing match. 
16~oltke 1s letter is quoted in Balfour and Frisby, p. 2CQ. 
l61Hans Gisevius, To The Bitter End, trans., Richard and Clara 
Winston (Boston, 1947), p. 347. 
162Balfour and Frisby, p. 207. 
163This is Hassell's characterization, p. 283. 
Beyond this, there was the obstacle of a generation gap. Hassell 
begins his account by distinguishing the "youngsters" from the 11older 
members of our group, nl64and though there was some overlap, the core 
of the Kreisau was composed of men in their thirties whose formative 
years encompassed the rapid change from Weimar to Nazi Germany, while 
the political leaders of the conservatives were in their late fifties 
and had been moulded by the stable life before World War I. Theim-
plications of this age difference cut both ways. On the one hand, it 
sometimes prevented Goerdeler and his allies from recognizing the dis-
solution of old forms, as witnessed by their earlier hope of reintro-
ducing the monarchy, an idea which received extremely short shrift 
from the Kreisauers who were young enough to talk of 11a new era. 11165 
On the other, it meant that Moltke and his friends were without much 
experience in public office and therefore vulnerable to Hassell's 
charge that they lacked political realism,166which is another way of 
saying that they underestimated the extent to which politics depends 
upon compromise. Fortunately, this bias did not follow age exactly-. 
Popitz was as obstinate as Moltke, although on most issues they.were 
poles apart. Hassell and Schulenburg were less intransigent and con-
tinued to work as peacemakers.167 But it was Goerdeler who, as sub-
sequent discussion will show, was the most amenable to change. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there were differences 
164Hassell, p. 283. 
165 Van Roon, p. 325. 
166Hassell, p. 336. 
167Hassell notes this in Ibid. 
between the two programs, or more accurately, the differences perceived. 
For when we make a comparison, besides the differences, a considerable 
number of similarities are revealed. Both sides were reacting not only 
to National Socialism but to the forces that had made it possible--in-
dustrialization, technology, and the resulting los:s of social order. 
Both wanted to affirm the dignity of man through Christian faith and 
mould the character of his children through education ( and if Moltke 
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and his friends emphasized faith more, perhaps that was because the 
older men had never lost theirs•). Both built their ideal order from 
the bottom upwards, stressing local communities as the best context for 
encouraging people to manage their own affairs (in fact, Goerdeler went 
much further than the Kreisauers in the matter of direct elections, al-
though he went less far in the question of decentralization). Both made 
similar provisions for selectL~g leaders possessed of civic abilities 
and neither was interested in returning to the party system of Weimar 
(Goerdeler by delaying it and reducing the number or parties to three; 
the Kreisauers by deliberately avoiding any mention of political par-
ties). 
These common features hardly deserve Moltke's characterization of 
them as "issues on which agreement was easy,n since they extended across 
a broad range of domestic reforms. And in fact, the problem lay not so 
much with the proposals themselves as with the Kreisauer's belief that 
they were making a new beginning, a clean break with history. This is 
suggested by Delp 1s statement: 11It is time the twentieth century revol-
ution was given a definite theme, and the opporturdty to create new and 
lasting horizons for humanity. 11168 Or there are the references in the 
Kreisau documents to a 11new point of view, 11169and "thinking afresh. 11170 
Reinforcing this belief was Goerdeler 1 s use of the term "restorationn 
and its frequent occurrence in his program as well as his dependency 
upon the tradition of liberalism-ties to the past which may well have 
led Hassell to call him "reactionary." Yet, the Kreisauers too were 
relying upon this tradition, as indicated by our earlier picture of 
Moltke hard at work on the writings of Goethe, Kant, and vom Stein. 
And Goerdeler's use of "restoration" did not mean so much a return 
to the past as a renewal of values that remain essential at all times. 
Finally, the Kreisauers seem to have regarded their program as defin-
itive, perhaps because they had debated matters through to first prin-
ciples, and this inclined them to look somewhat disparagingly at Goer-
deler•s more practical plans.171 But Goerdeler, as we have seen, was 
not unwilling to change, and this flexibility, combined with his con-
version to a liberal philosophy, may have caused him to rethink some 
of his ideas. 
The first clear evidence of Kreisau influence can be seen in his 
domestic policy. Briefly, the younger men's insistence upon regulating 
big business must have convinced Goerdeler that his plan for a laissez 
faire economy was at variance with his more fundamental desire to protect 
16Boelp is quoted in Graml, p. 67. 
l69Yorck is quoted in Van Roon, p. 293. 
17~oltke is quoted in Ibid., p. 290. 
171Moltke is quoted as referring to Goerdeler•s program as some-
what "dilettantish" in comparison to that of the Kreisau; in Ritter, p. 
205. 
the individual from the forces of industrialization and technology. Also 
he must have sensed that there was nothing inconsistent between bis new 
found liberalism and a policy of economic regulation. In any ewnt, he 
subsequently chose Paul Lejenue-Jung as his Minister of Economics 1n the 
shadow cabinet and approved his position paper on the economic preroga-
tives or government, which laid down among other things the claim ot the 
state to mineral deposits and water rights.172 And a radio speech which 
Goerdeler prepared in 1944 states: 11We are determined to obviate all pos-
sibility of the abuse of cap~talism, in whatever form, for monopolistic 
or other purposes, 11173a warning which suggests the extent to which the 
former Mayor had changed his mind. 
It was in foreign affairs, however, that Moltke and the others had 
the greatest impact on Goerdeler•s thinking. As we have noted, the heart 
of the Kreisau position was the reordering of European relations so that 
the continent might become an integrated community of states ready to ad-
judicate conflicts in a spirit of conciliation rather than a collection 
of individual powers whose competing national interests led to war. This 
was certainly different from Goerdeler 1s earlier hope for a 'Ellropean fed-
eration led by Germany, to say nothing of Hassell•s 11Grossraum11 or Popitz's 
imperialistic Reich. Yet, again, the younger men's arguments, c0111bined 
w.ith the change in the military situation, must have convinced Goerdeler, 
for by May of 1943, less than four months after the dialogue, the former 
Mayor was writing that the peoples of Europe "must find their way freely 
172A copy of Lejenue-Jung•s paper, "Basic Law on Economic Prerog-
atives of the Reich," is in Germans Against Hitler, ed~, Erich Zimmerman 
and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, trans., Allan and Lieselotte Yahraes (Bonn, 1964), 
pp. 35-36. 
l73Goerdeler is quoted in Graml, p. 88. 
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and independently toward a lasting, peaceful federation in which neither 
Germany nor any other state would claim supremacy a nl74 With character-
istic energy, he was soon preparing memoranda for European ministries 
of economics, defense, and foreign affairs.175 And b~ the time of his 
arrest and imprisonment, he was meditating on whether nationalism had 
any role to play: 
Pursuing these thoughts, I stumbled upon the fact that in His 
commandments God binds man to Himself, to his parents~ to his 
neighbors, to the truth, to property, but by no injunction does 
He bind man to his nation. Have we not erred in calling upon 
the aid of God for national purroies, even those of us who be-
lieve firmly and deeply in Him? 7 
The impact of Goerdeler's thinking upon Moltke and his friends is 
also evident, although less pronounced. At the third Kreisau conference 
held in June 1943, the areas of discussion included law-, punishment of 
war criminals, and foreign policy. Taking the first two together, the 
Kreisauers agreed that under the Nazi regime, justice had become an in-
strument of the totalitarian state. It was, therefore, importa.:nt that 
the law should be made independent and that free judges be appointed. 
11The Law which has been trampled upon must be restored and given auth-
ority over all orders of human existence," states the p:i~otocol of the 
text.177 Also, war criminals were to be punished, and here Moltke and 
the others remained true to their principles and advocated proceedings 
174Goerdeler is quoted in Graml, p. 42. 
l75These plans are cited in Ritter, p. 222. 
176Goerdeler is quoted in Dying We Live: The Final Messages And 
Records of the Resistance, ed., Helmut Gollwitzer, Kathe Kuhn, and Rein-
hold Schneider, trans., Reinhold C. Kuhn {New York, 1956), p. 90e 
177van Roon, p. 339. 
before an international court, although they did accede to Goerdeler's 
plans to the extent that they dlvided the judges to include not only 
three from the victorious powers and two from neutral states but one 
from the defeated nations. Finally, in foreign affairs, the documents 
make it clear that the younger men still based their hopes on a Euro-
pean community transcending individual states: "Peace demands the cre-
ation of an order that spans the separate countries. 11178 But another 
passage adds: "The special responsibility and loyalty that everyone 
owes to his nation of origin, his language and the intellectual and 
historic traditions of his people must be protected and respected.,ul79 
And in a summary of conclusions prepared in August 1943 under the ti-
tle, 11Basic Principles of Reconstruction,rr there is this significant 
declaration: "The Reich remains the highest authority of the Germ.an 
people. 11180 Although this is followed by a statement that the Reich 
must be "integrated into the community of European nations,n181the 
adoption of a federal concept--a basic tenet of Goerdeler's position 
--represented a shift in Kreisau thinking. It had acquired, as it 
were, some nationalistic balance for its transcendent international-
ism. 
The Kreisau ceased to exist with Moltke's arrest in January 1944. 
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He, along with Yorck, had held everything together, providing the stim-
ulus and taking the initiative. Without him, Gerstenmaier f:Says, nnobody 
178van Roon, p. 339. 
l79This!., P• 338. 
180Ibid., p. 349. 
181Ibid$ 
290. 
made an at tempt to organize the Kreis au once more. 11182 Nevertheless, the 
impact of the group had been considerable. In making themselves think, 
these younger men had compelled others to think as well. And if they had 
been unnecessarily blunt with Goerdeler on the occasion of their inter-
change, they had provided the former Mayor and his fellow conservatives 
with needed correctives, to a lesser degree in economic policy and to a 
greater degree in foreign affairs where the older men had tended to look 
at Europe through the perspective of Germany. 
It is one of the tragedies of the dialogue that the plans it produced 
were condemned to remain unrealized without a revolt~ For as we noted at 
the beginning of this act, the only group that could make one--the generals 
--had refused to do so in the wake of Hitler's triumphs. They might change 
their minds when they saw that the war was not going to be a succession of 
victories, but by then the bargaining power of the resisters would be weak-
ened to such an extent that they would be unable to obtain the conditions 
necessary to implement their proposals. 11 It is the old dilemma, 11 Hassell 
wrote. "If we wait until the impossibility of victory becomes clear to 
the whole world we shall have lost all chance for a passable peace. 11183 
It was not for lack of effort that nothing had been accomplished. In 
the spring of 1941, when Hitler decreed his infamous 11Kommissar Befehl," 
making it mandatory for the army to execute commissars who were captured 
and depriving civilians of any legal status in military zones of operation, 
Beck protested to Brauchitsch and helped pressure him into issuing an order 
l82Gerstenmaier is quoted in Germans Against Hitler, p~ 380 
183Hassell, p. 220. 
which allowed the field commanders to circumvent Hitler j) but t,he Army 
Chief would go no further. 184 Again, in the late autu.,m or 19411 hopes 
were raised that Brauchitsch might do something when it became apparent 
that the drive on Moscow was breaking down., but Hitler dismissed Brauch-
itsch in December along with four army commanders and dozens of corps 
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and division heads; for General Hoepner, the tank commander who had 
figured in earlier resistance plans, the Fuehrer reserved the special 
disgrace of having him cashiered.185 Then, in the summer of 1942, when 
the Russian front was stabilized, Goerdeler visited the ea.stern commands, 
trying to persuade the marshals there to refuse to obey orders from Hit-
ler, while Hassell made plans with Witzleben, the Commander-in-Chief in 
France, to lead an army on Berlin.186 With the exception of Guenther 
Kluge, who commanded Army Group Center, Goerdeler's efforts were unavail-
ing, and the Fuehrer himself removed Witzleben rrom the scene by retiring 
him on the pretext of ill health. Finally, when the Sixth Army was sur-
rounded at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-1943, the resisters decided 
to make it a symbol for revolt. A personal appeal £rom Beck was flown 
into General Friedrich Paulus, asking him to read a declaration calling 
for the overthrow of a leader who had sacrificed needlessly one-hundred 
thousand men. Arrangements were also made with Kluge and Hanstein, the 
commanders of the nearest army groups, to fly to Fuehrer Headquarters 
as soon as the declaration was made public and demand that control of 
184Hassell, p. 202. 
185The despair of the resisters over Brauchitsch 1s dismissal can 
be judged by Hassell 1s diary entry: 11 'fhe work of many months has come to 
nothing. 11 lli.9,o, p. 233. 
186For Goerdeler•s part, see Ritter, p. 233; for Hassell's part, 
seep. 227. 
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the eastern front be turned over to them. But Paulus received a marshal 1 s 
baton and surrendered in silence (though not in suicide, as the Fuehrer had 
hoped), 187and while Kluge and Manstein went to see Hitler1 the Fuehrer a-
dopted a conciliatory tone, flattering their vanity and allowing them more 
control over their own fronts.188 
Giving vent to his frustration, Hassell was led at one point to call 
the generals "hopeless sergeant majors, nl89and after the failure at StalL,-
grad, Beck bitterly commented: 11 These cowards make an anti-militarist out 
of me, an old soldier. ul90 However, if the resisters were unhappy with 
the generals, so too was their opponent, Adolf Hitler. The Fuehrer rec-
ognized as well as they that the military--the agency which he depended 
upon to achieve his "New Order," harbored doubts as to his genius, trai-
torous thoughts about his ideology, and worst of all, power to overthrow 
him. Throughout the winter of 1941-1942, and even more thereafterj Hit-
ler began in public to treat his officers with a mixture of decorations 
and gifts if they obeyed him and implacable severity if they did not--
l87upon hearing that Paulus had chosen to live, Hitler said: 11 What 
hurts me most, personally, is that I still promoted him to field marshal. 
I wanted to give him this final satisfaction. That's the last field mar-
shal I shall appoint in this war. You mustn't count your chickens before 
they're hatched." Quoted in Felix Gilbert, Hitler Directs His War (New 
York, 1950), p. 22. 
188This attempt is recounted in Gisevius, pp. 466-4670 Hanstein, 
one of the Field :Marshals involved, describes the tactics on tbis occa-
sion. "Hitler opened the talks ••• with an unqualified admission of his 
exclusive responsibility for the fate of the Sixth Armye e • This ges-
ture ••• struck a chivalrous note. Whether deliberately or unconsciously, 
he had thus shown considerable psychological skill in the way he opened 
our discussion. He always did have the masterly knack of adapting his 
manner to his interlocutor." Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, trans., 
Anthony G. Powell (London, 1959), pp. 406-407. 
189Hassell, p. 199. 
l90Beck is quoted in Dulles, p. 66. 
a tacit recognition on his part of the dialectical struggle in which he 
was engaged.191 
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Earlier, we discussed some of the decorations he bestowed and later 
there will be occasion to examine gifts, but during this period, the Fueh-
rer•s punishments are more in keeping with his disposition, so let us look 
briefly at them. His dismissal of Brauchitsch and dozens of other gener-
als as well as the degradation of Hoepner has already been noted. In the 
spring of 1942, Hassell recorded the court martial and death sentence of 
General Graf Sponeck, who had ordered a retreat against Hitler 1s explicit 
command to the contrary.192 Halder would be retired in the autumn of 1942 
along with several other high ranking generals. And Hitler would assume 
the position of de facto Chief of Staff as well as Commander-in-Chief of 
the Army .193 
l9lariffin refers to the leaders of a new movement ninfus/J.ni/ in-
creasing numbers of hearers ••• with attitudes of rejection toward the 
hierarchy ••• /Jherebi/ impellL.ing the 'priests' of the existing ordei} 
to an act of opposition--to the organization of a countermovement •••• " 
Griffin, "Dramatistic Theory," pp. 463-464. While the theoretical form-
ulation and the actual interchanges are not precise fits, the resister's 
efforts to win the military to opposition and Hitler's equal determina-
tion to prevent it, constitutes an example of the kind of dialectic ex-
change Griffin is writing about. 
192Hassell, p. 242. Sponeck's disobedience may not have been the 
only reason for Hitler's severe treatment of him. During Fritsch's trial, 
Sponeck had testified on the Army Commander 1s behalf, and though he was 
only scheduled as a character witness, he began to make allusions about 
"forces that set themselves above the state," his intent being to unmask 
Himmler and Goering as having illegally conspired to arrange for the fall 
of Fritsch. Unfortunately, Goering was presiding judge and quickly cut 
Sponeck short by calling him to order and labeling his testimony as "ir-
relevant." For a more complete account, see Harold C. Deutsch, Hitler 
And His Generals (Minneapolis, 1974), pp. 346-3470 While Sponeck was 
not executed immediately, Hitler reducing his sentence to six years, he 
was shot three days after the failure of the July 20 Attentat. 
l93Hitler's comment when he assumed the position of Commander-in-
Chief of the Army is revealing. Halder quotes him as saying: nThe task 
In private, the Fuehrer was even more negativ~ in his attitude to-
ward the military and more determined to make it an agency of his will. 
Goebbels' diaries are replete with Hitler'ls reproaches against "faith-
less generals," generals who were "undependabJl..e.iJ" and "generals opposed 
to National Socialism~ 11194 More importantly, Hitler bad made up his 
mind to go to all lengths to make his military- fuhtrertreu.. He praised 
the foresight of Stalin, who had liquidated hi.s ofiicer corps before 
undertaking the risk of war195--something he h:imsel.f would do with a 
vengeance after the failure of the July 20 ploti he inter£erred more 
extensively in the conduct of operations~l96he planned new selection 
procedures as a way of advancing officers who reflected his 01-m think-
ing,197and, as we shall see, he determined upon a program of political 
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of the Commander-in-Chief is to educate the arm.yin the id~a of National 
Socialism, and I know of no general who could do ttri.s in the way I want 
it done. So I have decided to take over command of' the army myself." 
Franz Halder, Hitler As Warlord, trans., Eric Bors {London, 1950), p. 
45. 
194Goebbels, 
195rb· d _1_., p. 
p. J06ff. 
406. 
l96Goerlitz recounts the time when Rund;sted;t,, requested permission 
to withdraw his troops from Rostov during the winter of 1941. Hitler re-
fused, and when Rundstedt replied that the Russians would' soon force them 
out anyway and that the responsibility for such a retreat belonged to 
those who had devised the campaign, Hitler seemed !!."eady to hurl himself 
on Rundstedt and tear the Knight 1s Cross from his uniform~ Later, the 
Fuehrer calmed down somewhat and allowed Rundstedt to resign rather than 
allow him the freedom of action he had request,edo But,. Goerlitz has Hit-
ler conclude, "he would not consider any more requa.sts by generals for 
retirement. After all, he himself could not g,o to «11.s immediate super-
ior who was Almighty God, and just tell Him that he was fed up and wanted 
to quit." Walter Goerlitz, History Of The Gernan General Staff, trans., 
Brian Battershaw (New York, 1954), p. 403. 
l97Goebbels lists political trustworthrness as opposed to tech-
nical proficiency; p. 333. 
indoctrination to re-educate his army.198 
While Hitler brooded over his counter-moves, and Hassell and Beck 
complained about the lack of support from the older officers, Goerdeler 9s 
"circuit riding" on the eastern front had put the civilian resisters in-
to closer touch with a younger generation of military men--Lieutenant 
Colonels and Colonels like Henning von Tresckow, GSO I to Field Marshal 
Kluge, and a group of like-minded officers that Tresckow had assembled 
in key staff positions at Amy Group Center. And there was Friedrich 
Olbricht, the new Chief of Staff to the General Army Office in Berlin, 
whose friendship with Goerdeler dated from the time of Olbricht 1 s ser-
vice with the IV Army Corps in Leipzig.199 These men had come to be-
lieve that against a tyrant like Hitler, no warnings and no second 
chances would be effective--only action and a willingness to accept 
responsibility for killing him would free the ar.my and the people 
from his "spell. 11200 And that is the second tragedy of the dialogue. 
For at a time when the leaders of the resistance had at last found a 
group of officers determined to revolt, an event in Casablanca was to 
make their political plans utopian in every sense of the word. 
In January 1943, at almost the same time that Goerdeler and the 1 
Kreisauers were at Yorck's house in Berlin debating the respective mer-
its of their programs, and the officers at Army Group Center in Russia 
were laying plans to dispose of Hitler, in Casablanca, President Roose-
velt and Prime Minister Churchill were announcing their detennination 
198Goebbels, p. 406. 
199see Chapter Two, pp. 83-84. 
200This is Schlabrendorff's description, p. 47. 
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"to accept nothing less than the unconditional surrender of Germany, Ja-
pan and Italy. 11201 Presently, we shall discuss the attempt mounted from 
the eastern front, the drama of which provides the frame for this act. 
For the moment, however, the diplomatic initiative of the Anglo-American 
leaders is more important because it had a greater impact on resistance 
plans. 
There is not space to detail the many reasons for the policy of un-
conditional surrender. In part, it represented a natural extension to 
the mood which we described earlier in connection with Trott's visit to 
Britain and America. The Zeitgeist of mistrust had hardened under the 
blows of Hitler's policy of 11Weltmacht," and indeed, Churchill offers 
his reading of a public that would settle for nothing less as his only 
justification for the policy.202 However, it should be added that there 
were other reasons. For one thing, the German failure to make good after 
the Vatican exchanges had left the British with the notion that the re-
sistance movement was not genuine.203 For another, the doctrine of un-
conditional surrender accorded with the American concept of moral war 
and final victory which Roosevelt had begun to articulate after Pearl 
Harbor.204 Also, the declaration was intended to pacify the Russians 
201The declaration is quoted in Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and 
Hopkins (New York, 1950), pp. 693-694. 
202winston Churchill, The Hinge Of Fate (Boston, 1950), p. 689. 
203Even an appeaser like Lord Halifax, Chamberlain's Foreign Sec-
retary, felt compelled on occasion to ask "whether there are any good Ger-
mans." Quoted in Lonsdale J. Bryans, Blind Victory (London, 1951), p. 67. 
However, in view of the resister's efforts to explain what had gone wrong 
during the attempt of 1939-1940 (See Chapter Three, p. 228), official Brit-
ish reaction is difficult to justify. 
204Typical is a line from Roosevelt's annual Message to Congress, 
January 6, 1942: 11The militarists in Berlin and Tokyo started this war. 
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who viewed the campaign in North Africa as somethi:ng less than a "second 
front. 11205 And finally, it freed Roosevelt .from the possibility of re-
peating Woodrow Wilson's mistake of making definite promises to which an 
enemy could later hold him. 206 
These may seem like sufficient warrants for the policy, and yet, it 
has been widely criticized. Secretary of State Hu1l, for example, feared 
that the demand would inspire the Germans into a "resistance of despera-
tion11 and require the Allied Powers "to take over every phase of national 
and local government in the conquered countries.rr207 Stalin made his po-
sition clear by creating the 11Free Germany Committee, n a J.eague of anti-
Nazi war prisoners and emigres to whom he guaranteed a Reich with 1937 
frontiers (including Austria) if they succeeded in getting the armed for-
ces to act against Hitler, and in whose name he authorized manifestos 
which declared: "Hitlers come and go but the German people and the Ger-
man state remain. 11208 And Allen Dulles, who had just taken up his post 
in Switzerland as head of OSS writes: 11at Casablanca offica.l Allied policy 
But the massed, angered forces of common humanity will finish it. 11 War 
Messages of Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 8, 1941 to Aprill;, 1945 
(Washington, D. C., nd), p. 14. 
205c1ark Kerr, British Ambassador to Moscow, warned his government 
only a few weeks before Casablanca, that the Soviets were threatening to 
withdraw from the war unless the Anglo-Americans c0!:i1Jllitted themselves to 
a second front 1.n France 1.n early 1943. ArtQ.ur Bryant, The Turn of the 
Tide (New York, 1957), p. 463ff. 
206This is James Byrnes I opinion, in Soeaki:ng Frankly (New York, 
1947), p. 186. 
207cordell Hull, Memoirs, 2 Vols., (New York.;, 1948), ii, p. 1570 
208The committee, the guarantee, and the slogan are detailed in 
Budo Scheurig, Free Germany, trans., Herbert Arnold {Middletown, 1969), 
pp. 32-77. 
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toward Germany was frozen into the formula of unconditional su.rrender. 11209 
These criticisms have implications for this study since they help to 
"isolate the rhetorical movement within the matrix of the historical move-
ment.11210 To explain: from a recruitment standpoint, the policy made it 
much harder for the resisters to rally reluctant generals to their sideo 
Admiral Canaris' comment to Lahousen--11 Unconditional Surrender., no, our 
generals will never swallow that11211--is borne out by any number of vi-
gnettes, of which the one between Goerdeler and Guderian is typical. In 
April 1943, the Panzer Leader writes that he was visited by the former 
Mayor who 
described to me in detail his program of government and reform; 
this program showed high idealism and the social adjustments en-
visaged would undoubtedly have been most desireable •••• ["Buy 
in view of Germany's dangerous situation as a result of the Sta-
lingrad catastrophe and the demands for unconditional surrender 
to all its enemies ••• I came t~ the conclusion that Dr. Goer-
deler1s plan would be harmful. 2 2 
In addition to generals like Guderian, there were the waverers--Marshals 
like Kluge who vacillated between throwing in their lot with the resisters 
and remaining loyal to Hitler. In the course of this act, and again in the 
next, we shall have an opportunity to watch Kluge as both sides contend for 
his allegiance, but a scene from July 20 needs to be recounted now because 
it bears upon the impact of the policy of unconditional surrender. Genera1 
209 Dulles, p. 132. 
210Leland M .. Griffin, 11The Rhetoric Of Historical Movements," Quar-
terly Journal Of Speech, XXXVIII {April, 1952), 185. 
211canaris is quoted in Ian Colvin, Chief Of Intelligence (London, 
1951), p. 163. 
212Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, trans., Constantine Fitzgibbon 
(New York, 1967), pp. 239-240~ 
Blumentritt, Kluge's Chief of Staff, writes that on that day, Kluge was 
prepared to order ~he immediate cessation of V-1 attacks on England and 
to establish contact with the Allied field comm.anders preparatory to an 
armistice.213 "Then crune in rapid sequence the contradictory reports 
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and commands. According to one Hitler was dead, and according to another, 
he was alive." For several critical hours Kluge hesitated, torn between 
orders. In the end, however, he sided with Hitler, and Blumentritt notes 
that runong the reasons for his decision was "the business of tUnconditional 
Surrender. 111214 Finally, it can be argued that the policy even affected 
officers who were members of the resistance. On June J, 1944, ju.st a few 
weeks before the Attentat, some of the leading members of the conspiracy 
met to hear a report from Trott concerning his final attempt to win some 
committment from the British and .Americans regarding a peace settlement. 
Trott said that he had received only one answer: Unconditional Surrender. 
At this, Field Marshal Witzleben jumped up and exclaimed: 11Now, no honor-
able man can lead the German people into such a situation. 11 The plans 
could have disintegrated then and there had not Beck remained firm: for 
moral reasons, he said, the attempt must go forward, regardless of con-
sequences.215 
From a dialectic standpoint, the policy made it easier for the Nazis 
to identify all Germans with Hitler's 11 New Order. 11216 Ten months before 
2l3Blumentritt is quoted in B. H. Liddell Hart, The German Gen-
erals Talk (New York, 1948), p. 262. 
214 111etter of General Guenther Blumentritt, 11 October 22, 1965. 
215"Letter from Baron Hermann van Lunick to Pater Max Pribilla, 11 
January 19, 1950. 
216rn a manner similar to one of Kenneth Burke's three forms of 
identification: the unity based on a "foe shared by all.n Kenneth Burke, 
JOO. 
Casablanca, Goebbels had written in his diary- of tbe ndangerous fix" the 
party leadership would be in 11if British propaganda respected the German 
will to live and the German conception of honor. 11217 After Casablanca, 
Goebbels had delivered into his hands a propaganda weapon of incalculable 
power. He soon twisted "Unconditional Surrender" .into "Total. Slavery, 11218 
and his ministry was responsible for editorials like the one in the "Volk-
ischer Beobachter" of April 12, 1943: 
The Enemy at Casablanca proclaimed the Uncondd.tional Surrender of 
the Axis and made it clear that their aim must be the total destruc-
tion of the German, Italian, and Japanese peoples. It goes without 
saying that great people acknowledge only one unequivoca1 answer to 
such infamy: the total mobilization of all the vital forces they 
possess to achieve total victory.219 
Later, as the Allies issued new demands such as reparations, fforced labor, 
or the Morgenthau Plan, Goebbels used them to wield people and party even 
closer together: 
The enemy press is devoting more space to discussing reparations. 
The English are set on handling the problem on a commercial basis 
while the Bolsheviks are more concerned with man powera There is 
no more terrible prospect for the German peopl.~ than to £all into 
the hands of Bolshevism. That's why this news -will frighten our 
people.220 
In circumstances like these, it would have taken a remarkably keen percep-
tion to distinguish between the cause of Nazism and the fate 0£ Germany; 
and while some did distinguish, as witnessed by the number of death 
"The Rhetoric of Hitler's Battle," in The Philosoph,7 Of Literary: Form 
(New York, 1957), p. 165. 
217Goebbels, p. 172. 
218This is Dulles' interpretation, p. 132. 
219This editorial entitled 11Kompromisslos, 11 f'rom the 11Volkischer 
Beobachter, 11 April 12, 1943, is cited in Anne Armstrnng, Unconditional 
Surrender (New Brunswick, 1961), p. 214. 
220Goebbels, p. 172. 
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sentences which doubled every year of the war,22lthe mass of Germans, as 
Christabel Bielenberg notes, perservered to the end, consolling themselves 
with the phrase, 11 wir mussen wohl musharren11 ( 11we may as well be hung for 
a sheep as a lamb. 11 )222 
From a political standpoint--and this is perhaps the most important 
result for our purposes--the policy made resistance plans meaningless. 
This is the burden of State Secretary Weizsacker's testimony after the 
war: "that the Allies had deliberately abandoned the idea of ending the 
war by political means. 11223 Or there is Trott's complaint to Dulles in 
1944: uconstructive ideas ••• for rebuilding postwar Germany constantly 
come from Russia ••• jyhili7 the democratic countries offer nothing con-
structive concerning the future of Central Europe. 11224 For the resisters 
--indeed, for any German government, the only political responsibility left 
to them as far as Washington and London were concerned was the one involv-
ing total capitulation, a prospect which, as Rothfels writes, 11 pointed log-
ically to a vacuum.11 225 
In the epilogue to this tragedy, we will discuss the implications of 
demanding unconditional surrender in terms of lengthening the war, but for 
our immediate purposes, the point to be made is that the policy effectively 
221Total death sentences in Germany were 99 in 1939, 926 in 1940, 
1391 in 1941, 2610 in 1942, and 5336 in 1943. See The Struggle For Demo-
cracy In Germany, ed., Gabriel A. Almond (Chapel full,,1949), p& 41,,.. 
222B· 1 b 143 ie en erg, p. • 
223Ernst von Weizsacker, Memoirs, trans., John Andrews (Chicago, 
1951), p. 274. 
224Trott is quoted in Dulles, p. 137. 
2.25Rothfels, p. 1.44. 
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denied the resisters any political ground in the dialectical arena.226 
Certainly, the opposition leadership tried to avert this as long as they 
retained the capacity to act. "Man is a being designed for striving, 11 
as Griffin writes, "endowed for struggle. 11227 Thus, Goerdeler in his 
optimism would go on producing reruns of memoranda and through the sum-
mer and fall of 1943 he would send a series of counter-proprosals to 
London, seeking alternatives as opportunity for tactical, let alone 
strategical, manoeuvre dwindled.228 Hassell, the experienced diplomat, 
would attempt to use the threat of Communist domination in Central Eu-
rope as an inducement for identification between the Western Powers and 
the German Resistance Movement, 229but the only response he ever received 
was the one transmitted to him from Dulles through Gisevius: "that it 
was 'one' war and that there would be 'one' peace-with the West and the 
East. 11230 And Trott, and later stauffenberg "'1.th his very similar views, 
would go on to the end, trying to effect a workable but not merciless 
peace with the British and American governments for whom they felt a 
sense of common purpose.231 But in reality, there was no hope for suc-
cess. The doctrine of unconditional surrender had left the resisters 
226The dramatistic formulation, as noted previously, assumes that 
movements are both moral and political. Griffin, 11 Dramatistic Theory, 11 
p. 456. 
227Ibid., p. 457. - , 
228Ritter, pp. 221; 225-226. 
229Hassell, pp. 315; 330. 
230nulles, p. 133. 
231For Trott's attempts, see Sykes, p. 396ff; for stauffenberg's 
see Joachim Kramarz, Stauffenberg, trans., R.H. Barry (New York, 1967), 
p. 166ft. 
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with nothing, as Karl Bracher writes, except 11 the moral certainty of be-
ing right. 11232 
On March 13, 1943, Fabian von Schlabrendorff telephoned Ludwig Gehre 
in the Abwehr and said: "the spark is lit. 11 233 This was the code for "Auf-
bau Flammen, 11 or "Operation Flash," the attempt we mentioned earlier, which 
had been worked out by Colonel Henning von Tresckow and some of the staff 
officers of Army Group Center in Smolensk, and General Friedrich Olbricht, 
Chief of Staff of the General Army Office in Berlin. 
The impulse for this attempt is important since it goes to the ques-
tion of motive.234 Friedrich Olbricht has been described by one contem-
porary as a "deeply religious man, 11 235and by another as having a "dispo-
sition ••• toward prudence, kindness and consideration. 11236 Taken to-
gether, these are qualities which, as we shall see in the next act, do 
232Bracher, p. 41~5- The discussion on the implications of uncon-
ditional surrender is important not only to the rhetoric and politics of 
the German Resistance Movement but also to Griffin and Cathcart 1s drama-
tistic formulation. Briefly, neither theorist provides for the possibil-
ity of more than two orders being involved in dialectic struggle simul-
taneously. Yet based upon the analysis above, it seems plain that com-
peting orders do not act in isolation from the rest of the world. At 
the time of our own revolution, for exarrtple, the colonists sought help 
from France, just as insurgent groups have done before and since. The 
irony of the scene surrounding the conflict between the resisters and 
Hitler's "New Order" lies in the fact that the Western Powers, for what-
ever reasons, politically crippled the movement with which they had the 
closest ideological ties and strengthened the movement they opposed. 
233schlabrendorff, p. 58. 
234Griffin writes: "To study a movement ••• is to study the Agents 
that make the Act; for men are the acters, the makers of movements •••• 
And the purpose of all such study is to discover the motive, or motives--
the ultimate meaning, or Purpose--of the movement." Griffin, 11Dramatis-
tic Theory," p. 462. 
235schlabrendorff, p. 47. 
236Annedore Leber, quoted in Germans Against Hitler, p. 225. 
not make for an ideal revolutionary, but did bring Olbricht into oppo-
sition with the Nazi regime. In 1940, Olbricht was posted to the Gen-
eral Army Office as deputy to Fritz Fromm, Commander-in-Chief of the 
Reserve Army. This was a key position since the Reserve Army had au-
thority over all troops stationed in the Reich, and as Gisevius ex-
plains, 11it had become a kind of mania within the Opposition to hunt 
for the general ••• and then determine ••• the actual force of sol-
diers he commanded. 11237 Admittedly, Olbricht was not in direct com-
mand; that responsibility belonged to Fromm alone. But practically 
speaking, Olbricht could issue orders in Fromm's name and, for a few 
hours at least, that would be enough. Also, the General Army Office 
had direct liaison with the Army District Commands and that allowed 
for the possibility of unified action. Through Goerdeler, Olbricht 
was introduced to Hans Oster, the resister's technical coordinator, 
and the two officers set about building up a shadow military resist-
ance organization in Berlin, Munich, Cologne, Vienna, and Paris which 
would be ready to take over in case of a revolt. 238, The task was fa-
cilitated somewhat by the fact that General Hase, who had been part 
of the Munich Plot of 1938, still commanded the Berlin garrison, and 
more importantly, General Stulpnagel, who had been Balder's deputy 
during the first two attempts, was the new military commander in 
Paris. 
The spark for the revolt was to be lit by Henning von Tresckow 
and a group of anti-Nazi officers who he had succeeded in placing on 
237Gisevius, pp. 435-346. 
238Schlabrendorff, p. 47. 
the staff of Heeresgruppe Mitte, among them Bernd von Kleist, Rudolf von 
Gersdorff, Carl von Hardenberg, and Fabian von Schlabrendorff. Tresckow 
is one of the most attractive persona+ities in this drama. More humani-
tarian than soldier, he had been outraged by what he saw in Poland in 
1939.239 During the crisis preceeding the attack on France, he had sup-
ported Halder's attempted coup.240 In 1941, Tresckow was attached to 
Army Group Center as first staff officer to his uncle, Field Marshal 
Bock. Tresckow became Bock's conscience, forcing that reluctant of-
ficer to protest against Hitler's 11Kommissar Befehl11241and personally 
seeing to it that the order was not enforced within the army group's 
operations zone.242 This success prompted Tresckow to sound out his 
uncle on the possibility of leading a putsch against Hitler. However, 
Bock would not hear of it. Trembling with rage, he interrupted Tres-
ckow: "I do not allow the Fuhrer to be attacked. I shall stand before 
the Fuhrer and defend him against anyone who does attack him.n243 As 
Schlabrendorff observes, "To understand ffiock'iJ 'character' one had 
to subtract all that was already mortgaged to vanity and egotism; what 
remained was insignificant. 11244 
Bock was replaced in January 1942 by Field Marshal Guenther von 
239see Chapter Three, p. 176. 
240Harold c. Deutsch, The Conspiracy Against Hitler In The Twi-
light War (Minneapolis, 1970), p. 251. 
241zeller, p. 157. 
242schlabrendorff, p. 35. 
243Ibid., p. 36. 
244Ibid. 
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Kluge, an officer described as a 11waverer" by Gisevius.245 Tresckow made 
it his responsibility to push the Marshal to the sanctuary of a firm de-
cision. For nearly two years, he battled for Kluge's allegiance, waging 
an intensive, clever and wearisome campaign against his vacillation. For 
the most part, it was a labor of Sisyphus: no sooner would Tresckow think 
that he had brought Kluge to the point of resolution than Kluge would slip 
back into uncertainty. In time, Tresckow succeeded in establishing a meas-
ure of personal influence over Kluge, but it was only personal. Whenever 
Tresckow was present, Kluge was a firm anti-Nazi, but when Tresckow was 
out of sight, Kluge 1 s resolution falterect.246 
Tresckow's influence over the Field Marshal did not depend upon per-
sonality alone. Hitler was accustomed to binding his officers to him not 
only with the oath, batons, decorations, and threats, but also with gifts 
of cash.247 Thus, on the occasion of Kluge's sixtieth birthday, he re-
ceived a letter of good wishes from the Fuehrer, a check for 250,000 marks 
{which were tax free), and permission to use the money to make improvements 
on his estate.248 General Blumentritt writes that "Endowments were no in-
novation as such. In Germany victorious politicians and generals received 
either money or land as a reward after a successful war, but always after 
a successful war. 11249 Since Kluge's Army Group had been engaged in a 
ical. 
lyzed 
245Gisevius, p. 449. 
246schlabrendorff, p. 39. 
247within the dramatistic formulation, money is defined as rhetor-
Burke writes: "The 'pecuniary motive 1 , we contend, should be ana-
as a special case of the linguis_tic motive. 11 Rhetoric, p. 129. 
248schlabrendorff, p. 40. 
249111etter of General Guenther Blumentritt," September 5, 1965. 
holding action for almost a year, the only possible conclusion is that 
Hitler intended the gift as a bribe and that Kluge accepted it as such.250 
Certainly, this was the interpretation that Tresckow gave it, and he told 
the Field Marshal that he could only "justify the acceptance of the check 
if he were able to show before history that he had accepted it in order 
••• to maintain himself in a position from which he could undertake ac-
tion against Hitler. 11251 
Schlabrendorff was Tresckow's political confidant and contact with 
the resistance leadership in Berlin. Hassell records meeting the young 
officer in October 1941 and notes how gratified he was since this was 
the first time the initiative had come from the military. 252 Schlabren-
dorff himself writes that in the same period he established contact with 
Weizsacker, Oster, Olbricht, Beck, and Goerdeler, furnishing them with 
information about the eastern front and inquiring into conditions in Ger-
many.253 Through Schlabrendorff, Goerdeler was able to visit Army Group 
Center in August 1942 where he met with Tresckow and had a two hour con-
versation with Kluge, during which he attempted to draw the Field Marshal 
into active participation in a revolt. In his enthusiasm, the former May-
or thought he had won Kluge over, and upon his return to Berlin, he said 
250Hitler 1 s intentions were made clear after the failure of the 
July 20 plot in which Kluge was sufficiently implicated to commit sui-
cide. 11 I personally promoted him twice, 11 the Fuehrer complained. "I 
gave him the highest decorations, gave him a large estate so that he 
could have a permanent home and gave him a large suppiement to his pay 
as Field Marshal. Therefore I am as disappointed as I could possibly 
be. 11 Quoted in Gilbert, p. 102. 
25lschlabrendorff, p. 40. 
252Hassell, pp. 219-220. 
253schlabrendorff, pp. 42-47. 
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as much to Beck and the others. But Kluge's indecision had overcome him. 
Even before Goerdeler left Smolensk, the Marshal had sent a letter to Beck 
complaining about what he called a "surprise assault" and noting that he 
wished to avoid possible "misunderstandings. 11254 
Kluge's lack of strength was one of the reasons Tresckow decided upon 
assassination--a fait accompli would make things easier for him. 255 Another 
was the military's oath of allegiance sworn to the living Hitler, a vow 
which Tresckow believed had long since lost its validity, if for no other 
reason than Hitler's failure to honor his own pledge to the army. 256 But 
these were practical or narrowly legalistic consjderations, and Tresckow's 
own motive went far beyond them. In 1939, at the time of the Gestapo mas-
sacres in Poland, Tresckow is quoted by Gersdorff as saying: "You, and I 
also, will be counted among the guilty. 112 57 And when Hitler I s 11 Kommissar 
Befehl11 was promulgated, Gersdorff records him again: "Remember this hour. 
If we do not succeed in ••• get/J,ini/ these orders countermanded, Germany 
will have finally lost her honor, and that will be felt for hundreds of 
years to come. Not only Hitler will be blamed, but you and I, your wife 
and my wife, your children and my children. 11258 
Taken together, these statements suggest the first movement in the 
2 54Gisevius, p. 463. 
2 55schlabrendorff, p. 54. 
2 56This refers to Hitler's letter of August 20, 1934 to Blomberg, 
in which the Fuehrer promised that he would "stand for the existence and 
the unimpeachability of the armed forces ••• and establish the army as 
the sole bearer of anns in the nation. 11 The full text is in Germans A-
gainst Hitler, pp. 289-290. 
257aersdorff is quoted in Zeller, p. 1.48. 
258 rbid. 
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dialectic of the scapegoat, 11 an origlnal state of merger in that the in-
iquities are shared by both the iniquitious and their chosen vessel. 11 259 
During 1942, Gersdorff recounts Tresckow 1 s words as the two men walked 
near Smolensk: 11 Is it not monstrous that here are two Colonels of the 
General Staff of the German Army talking about the best way of killing 
the Head of State? 11260 This suggests the second movement in the dia-
lectic, 11 a principle of division, in that the elements shared are be-
ing ritualistically alienated. 11261 Finally, after the failure of the 
July 20 Attentat, Tresckow spoke to Schlabrendorff: 11my conviction re-
mains unshaken--we have done the right thing. Hitler is not only the 
archenemy of Germany, he is the archenemy of the whole world. 11262 And 
except for the narrow margin of the Fuehrer's escape, this is the fi-
nal movement in the dialectic, 11a new principle of merger, this time 
in the unification of those whose purified identity is defined in di-
alectical opposition to the sacrificial offering. 11263 
All told, the pattern of Tresckow's remarks reveals a state of 
initial synthesis between himself, the German nation, and Hitler-a 
consubstantiality in guilt. This is followed by a state of antith-
esis, a tragically symbolic division in the sense that Tresckow and 
Gersdorff were imagining it and thus symbolically committing it.264 
259Burke, Grammar, p. 406. 
260Gersdorff is quoted in Zeller, p. 159. 
261 Burke, Grammar, p. 406. 
262schlabrendorff, p. 120. 
263Burke, Grammar, p. 406. 
264Burke, Literary Form, p. 41. 
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And finally, there is a new state of synthesis in which a redeemed Ger-
many and the rest of the world are identified as one half of the dialec-
tical equation and Hitler as the other. In the last act, we shall dis-
cuss yet another variation of this dialectic--what Kenneth Burke pun-
ningly calls the 11 imbiguity of sacrifice and kill11265 __ but the point 
to be made now is that the third and final motive £or a rhetorical 
movement--the kill--has been established. As Grif.fin puts it, 11To 
study a movement is to study a striving for salvation ••• a progress 
that is grounded in Guilt--but 1Guilt 1 needs Redemption; and Redemp-
tion needs ••• a Victim, a scapegoat, a Kill. 11266 
There were a series of interlocking problems which had to be mas-
tered if the attempt was to succeed. First was getting access to Hit-
ler. By the fourth year of the war, the Fuehrer had become a recluse, 
seldom venturing from his well-protected headquarters near Rastenburg, 
Ea.st Prussia. Nevertheless, Tresckow managed to make arrangements with 
a friend of his, General Rudolf Schmundt, P.itler's Army adjutant, for 
the Fuehrer to pay a "front-line" visit to Army Group Center. Schmundt, 
who was one of Hitler's most devoted followers was, of course, unaware 
of Tresckow's real purpose, although the Fuehrer himself, with his sus-
picious nature, postponed the visit several times before he finally a-
greed to come by air on March 13, 1943.267 Second was the method of 
killing Hitler. For a time, Tresckow and his fellow-officers consid-
ered shooting him, but because the Fuehrer was always surrounded by 
265Burke, Literary Fonn, p. 40. 
266Griffin, "Dramatistic Theory," pp. 460-461. 
267schlabrendorff, p. 53. 
his SS guards, they decided on a bomb instead. German explosives were 
not very satisfactory. Schlabrendorff reports that 11 they worked on a 
fuze that made a low hissing noise which might lead to discovery. 11268 
Through Oster, several explosives of British manufacture were obtained 
and Tresckow experimented with them in the fields near Smolensk. These 
bombs had many things to recommend them. They were noiseless-breaking 
a small bottle released acid which corroded a wire holding back a spring 
and striker; once the wire was destroyed, the striker would spring forward 
striking the detonator and exploding the bomb. Also, the wires served as 
timing fuses; depending upon their thickness, a choice could be made as to 
the moment of explosion (ten minutes, thirty minutes, two hours). And the 
bombs were small; Schlabrendorff says hardly bigger than a large book, 269 
and their charges were putty-like, which meant that they could be moulded 
into any shape. Third was coordinating Hitler's death with the seizure 
of important military installations throughout the Reich and occupied Eu-
rope. This was undertaken by Olbricht and Oster who asked £or six weeks 
to make preparations. Gisevius, who was working with Olbricht, has de-
cribed how difficult it was to discover the location of SS strongpoints 
in Gennany. At last, an ingenious plan was devised: "the police vice 
squad was persuaded to make a map of newly-established brothels. Wher-
ever the SS was established in force, such institutions for their phys-
ical well-being had been set up. By this roundabout method we obtained 
an accurate picture.11270 
268schlabrendorff, p. 55. 
269Ibid. 
270Gisevius, p. 465. 
At the end of February a final conference was held in Smolensk. 
From Berlin came Canaris, Oster, and Dohnanyi, ostensibly for an in-
telligence meeting. But late at night, the three resisters from the 
Tirpitzufer met with Tresckow and Schlabrendorff to coordinate plans. 
Oster had brought some more explosives and a set of time fuses which 
he gave to Tresckow. The conspirators agreed that the bomb should be 
placed on the Fuehrer's aircraft so that his death might appear acci-
dentai.271 Schlabrendorff, who had obtained a detailed plan of Hit-
ler's Focke-Wulf 200 from otto John at Lufthansa,272notes that even 
though the plane was divided into separate compartments and Hitler's 
own was iron-plated and had a mechanism for descent by parachute, 
Tresckow 1 s computations had indicated that two sticks of explosives 
would be more than enough to blow up the whole machine. 273 To get 
the bomb on board, the conspirators decided to shape j_t like a pack-
age of cognac bottles and ask someone in Hitler's entourage to carry 
it back to Fuehrer Headquarters as a gift to a frienct. 274 
On the morning of March 13 Hitler arrived at an airfield near 
Smolensk and was driven to Central Army Headquarters~ His meeting 
with Kluge was unexceptional, but two discoveries by Schlabrendorff 
are significant since they further suggest the Fuehrer's awarness of 
his own importance as protagonist of the Third Reich and the difficul-
ties involved in trying to kill him. The first concerns his military-
27lcolvin, p. 160. 
272John, p. 106. 
273schlabrendorff, pp. 58-59. 
274Ibid., pp. 57-58. 
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style hat which he took off as he entered Kluge's personal quarters. 
With no one watching, Schlabrendorff "impulsively reached out to pick 
it up. I was startled to find it heavy as a cannonball., On examina-
tion, I saw why. Our dauntless dictator, who professed to be beloved 
by all Germans, had his cap lined with fully three and a half pounds 
of steel plating for his protection. 11 275 The second discovery was 
made at lunch: "Hitler touched only food specially- prepared by the 
cook he had brought with him, and it had to be tasted before his eyes 
by his own personal physican, Professor Theo Moren.u276 
It was during lunch that Tresckow approached Colonel Heinz Brandt 
(another of Hitler's aides) and got him to agree to take a small pack-
age of brandy to a friend at Fuehrer Headquarters- Af~er lunch, Hit-
ler returned to the airfield. As the Fuehrer was about to board his 
plane, Schlabrcndorff, who was carrying the package, broke the bottle 
of acid with a key hidden in his hand, and at a sign from Tresckow, 
gave it to Brandt, who took it and entered the plane behind Hitler. 
The fuse was set for half an hour, which meant that the explosion 
should occur somewhere over Minsk. Hurrying back to army headquar-
ters, Schlabrendorff immediately called Gehre, his contact in Berlin, 
and gave him the code: nthe spark is lit. 11277 
There were a number of conspirators who paid close attention to 
the time for the next half hour. In Berlin, Gehre .bad borrowerl Otto 
275Schlabrendorff, pp. 56-57. 
276Ibid., p. 57. 
277Ibid., p. 58. 
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John 1s watch to follow the progress of the attempt,278while in Smolensk, 
Tresckow and Schlabrendorff anxiously watched the movement of the minute 
hand on the clock in Tresckow's office. They had tuned the shortwave ra-
dio to the Luftwaffe frequency because they thought that the first news 
of the accident would come from one of the fighter planes accompanying 
Hitler's aircraft. Thirty minutes passed; then an hour; then an hour 
and a half; then two. Finally, a routine report was received announc-
ing the Fuehrer•s safe return to Rastenburg.279 
The knowledge that something had gone wrong was overshadowed by the 
fear that the explosive might be discovered. Schlabrendorff called Berlin 
and gave Gehre the code indicating failure. But a more serious decision 
impended: what to do about the faulty bomb? With remarkable sang-froid, 
Tresckow telephoned Brandt at Fuehrer Headquarters and asked him if he 
still had the package. When Brandt said yes, Tresckow told him to keep 
it, that there had been a mistake, and that Schlabrendorff would come to 
Rastenburg the next day with the'right one.280 On the 14 Schlabrendorff 
flew to Fuehrer Headquarters and exchanged a package containing genuine 
brandy for the one with the explosive. He recalls with horror how Brandt, 
who was unaware of the danger, shook the false brandy package in returning 
it. 281 Later, in the privacy of a railway sleeping compartment, Schlabren-
dorff dismantled the bomb to find out what had gone wrong: the explosive 
charges were still intact, the bottle containing the acid was broken, the 
278John, pp. 106-107. 
279schlabrendorff, p. 59. 
280Ibid., pp. 59-60. 
281Ibid. 
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fluid had eaten through the wire, the striker had hit--but the detonator 
had been defective.282 
The failure of the March 13 bomb plot as well as a similar attempt 
only a week later283were severe psychological blows to the civilian re-
sisters. otto John writes that nit was difficult to pacify those who 
had now twice been warned by code-word to hold themselves in readiness 
for a coup d'etat; 11 however, because of the need for secrecy, "they could 
not be told that attempts had actually been made, and it fell to Dohnanyi 
to give them semi-plausible reasons.n284 
Popitz, in his frustration, now began to make overtures to Himmler 
through Dr. Carl Langbehn, a neighbor of the Reichsfuhrer in Dahlem.285 
Himmler encouraged these approaches, in part because he was hedging his 
bets in case Hitler's unshakable belief in final victory proved illusory, 
and in part because Popitz and Langbehn circled cautiously around the 
subject of revolt, talking instead of the "Fuehrer's resignation" and 
of a change in Gerrf'.any I s political structure "that would not impair the 
power and authority of the ss. 11286 Two conversations (Popitz with Him-
mler and Langbehn with Karl Wolff, Himmler's adjutant), led to Langbehn 
282schlabrendorff, pp. 59-60. 
283Gersdorff volunteered to hide two bombs in the pockets of his 
coat and tngger them during Hitler's annual visit to the Berlin Armory 
on Hero I s Memorial Day (March 21). But the Fuehrer cut short his an-
nounced schedule from thirty minutes to eight, and Gersdorff had just 
enough time to extract the detonators from the bombs in a nearby lav-
atory. See John, p. 108; Schlabrendorff, p. 61. 
284John, p. 108. 
285For an account of Langbehn's anti-Nazi activities, see Bielen-
berg, another of his neighbors in Dahlem; PPo 83-88. 
286These phrases are taken from Popitz's indictment, in Dullea, 
pp. 157-158, 
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visiting Switzerland in September 1943 where he met with Gero von Gaver-
nitz of Dulles' office and told him of Himmler's interest.287 But word 
of the contact leaked out. Himmler's own agency forwarded the news to 
Fuehrer Headquarters without first showing it to Himmler, and the Reichs-
fuhrer, anxious to cover his tracks, broke off the negotiations. He had 
I.angbehn sent to a concentration camp; Popitz he allowed to remain at lib-
erty, although he placed him under such close surveillance that his use-
fulness to the resistance was, for all practical purposes, over.288 
Goerdeler had opposed Popitz's initiative, but he too was equally 
frustrated by the lack of action.289 In May he wrote a letter to 01-
bricht complaining about the delays and offering to see Hitler himself 
and demand his resignation if there was no other way. 290 In June he 
wrote to Kluge asking him for the last time to lead a revolt against 
the Fuehrer and promising on his own responsibility to conclude a fa-
vorable peace if the Field Marshal would act.29l The nature of both 
arguments suggests the depths of the former Mayor's depression. After 
287Dulles, p. 162. 
288Hassell, pp. 320-321. From a moral standpoint, it is just as 
well that Popitz's initiative failed. Any contact with Himmler would 
have hopelessly compromised the resistance for many individuals. Even 
though Popitz never intended to continue the rnerger--indeed, once the 
Re1chsfuhrer 1 s usefulness was over Popitz planned to out-maneuver him-
the subtlety would have been lost. Schlabrendorff reports that the anti-
Nazi officers at Kluge 1 s headquarters once told Canaris that they would 
refuse to shake hands with him if he made good his plan to have a confi-
dential talk with Himmler. They could not shake the hand which pressed 
that of such a swine. Schlabrendorff, p. 52. 
289Hassell, p. 293. 
290The full text is in Gisevius, pp. 456-471. 
291Ibid., pp. 471-472. 
reflection, he decided not to send the letter to Olbricht; 292from Kluge 
he received no answer.293 
Beck had played no role in Popitz's 11divide and conquer" strategy 
or in Goerdeler's desperate letter writing. In mid-March, the head of 
the resistance movement underwent a serious operation for cancer, and 
while it was successful, it incapacitated him for many weeks.294 Then 
Weizsacker, who had provided important support from the Foreign Office, 
was removed from the scene and made Ambassador to the Vatican. 295 But 
worst of all, the Gestapo raided the Abwehr and arrested Hans Dohnanyi, 
Josef Mueller, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. 
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The Tirpitzufer had been under surveillance as a center of anti-
Nazi activity since the time of the Vatican exchanges. Walter Schellen-
berg writes that in May of 1940, he and Heinrich Mueller (Head of Reich 
Security and colloquially known as "Gestapo Mueller") were called into 
Reinhard Heydrich's office where the Gestapo Chieftain told them of his 
suspicions about Josef Mueller and his many trips to Rome. On direct 
orders from the Fuehrer, they were to make an investigation of inter-
cepted wireless messages from the Belgium Minister at the Vatican to 
his own government. These messages had given the exact date and time 
of the attack in the west thirty-six hours before Hitler had issued the 
orders. Unfortunately, Heydrich continued, the Fuehrer had also assigned 
the Abwehr to the investigation-it was like nmaking your goat your 
292Ritter, p. 244. 
293Gisevius, p. 472. 
294Hassell, p. JOO. 
295weizsacker, p. 277. 
gardener 11 296--so the Gestapo would have to cooperate. But they were to 
secretly prepare a dossier on the circle around Canaris and Oster-he 
gave it the code name 11 Schwarze Kapelle" (from the Black Chapel in Rome) 
--to use as ammunition to bring down these enemies of the state at the 
earliest possible moment. 297 
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As Heydrich said, Canaris too was at work on the investigation. When 
the Fuehrer demanded a full inquiry into the Vatican leak, the Abwehr lead-
er had suggested Josef Mueller for the job since he had excellent connec-
tions at the Holy See. Mueller was sent post-haste to Rome, not only to 
cover his own tracks but to concoct a story plausible enough to satisfy 
Berlin. To Father Leiber, his Vatican contact, Mueller insisted that 
the Belgium Ambassador--the real source of the wireless intercepts--
must be induced to disappear for a time inside the Holy City. Also, it 
was going to be necessary to find someone on whom the blame for the af-
fair could be placed. Did Father Leiber have any ideas? In a moment 
of inspiration, Leiber suggested a priest from Belgium who fortunately 
enough had just been sent on a missionary trip to the Congo. That took 
care of the question of Vatican involvement, but an explanation was still 
needed to explain how the news reached Rome in the first place. Here it 
was decided to put the onus for the leak on Ribbentrop via the Italian 
Foreign Minist.er Ciano. He was known to have a strong dislike for Rib-
bentrop; he was known to have opposed the campaign in the west; and the 
combination just might have induced him to ferret out information from 
296Heydrich is quoted in Walter Schellenberg, Hitler's Secret 
Service, trans., Louis Hagen (New York, 1971), p. 343. 
297Ibid., pp. 342-344. 
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Ribbentrop's entourage and pass it on to his Belgium friends in the Vat~ 
ican.298 (Surprisingly enough, this scenario was no less than the trutho 
Ciano had been responsible for a series of warnings to the Belgium Gov~ 
ernment, both directly and indirectly through the Holy See).299 In any-
event, this was the story prepared by Mueller, and while it satisfied 
Hitler, the same could not be said for Heydrich, who placed Schellen-
berg and Gestapo Mueller in charge of a continuing investigation of the 
Abwehr.300 
For two years the case lay dormant. Then in October 1942, a part-
time Abwehr agent in Munich, Dr. Wilhelm Schmidthuber, was arrested on 
charges of smuggling foreign currency across the frontier. Schmidthuber 
had expected the Abwehr to engineer his release, or failing that, to pro-
tect him from the Gestapo. But because his case had no political impli-
cations-indeed, it was strictly criminal, the leadership at the Tirpitz-
ufer refused. At that, Schmidthuber began to talk, "persuaded" no doubt 
by his interrogators. He knew nothing a.bout the Vatican exchanges but he 
had kept his eyes and ears open and he suspected a great deal. The gist 
of his revelations was that Josef Mueller had had some strange business 
in Rome and that he took his orders from Dohnanyi. For good measure, 
Schmidthuber threw in the fact that Dohnanyi had placed his brother-in-
law, Dietrich Bonhoeffer in a "reserved occupation" at the Abwehr, and 
that at a time when the Fatherland needed all the able-bodied men it 
298Mueller's "scenario" is in Deutsch, Conspiracy In The Twilight 
War, pp. 342-346. 
299Galeazzo Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, ed., Hugh Gibson (New York, 
1946), pp. 167; 169; 183; 186; 197. 
300schellenberg, p. 346. 
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could get.301 
When this confession reached SS Headquarters in Berlin, its impli-
cations were not lost on Schellenberg and Gestapo Mueller. Heydrich was 
dead--assassinated in Prague earlier in the year--but the Abwehr dossier 
was still active and the circumstances appeared right for liquidating the 
agency. Legally, the Abwehr was off-limits to the Gestapo because it was 
a military organization, but since the Gestapo had turned up the evidence, 
Field Marshal Keitel, who had the final word, might be induced to give his 
consent, if not to a Gestapo investigation, then at least to a Gestapo in-
vestigator being appointed to observe. This was in fact what happened, 
and Kriminalkommissar Sor.deregger was appointed to the staff of the in-
vestigating officer, Judge Advocate Dr. Manfred Roeder, who had just dem-
onstrated his ability as an investigator of anti-Nazis in the case of the 
' 1Rote Kapell~11 espionage ring.302 
It cannot be said that the resisters at the Tirpitzufer lacked warn-
ings that a countermove was in the offing. As early as the beginning of 
1942, Dohnanyi had been told that his telephone and mail were being kept 
under surveillance.JOJ Then in October, shortly after Schmidthuber's ar-
rest, Artur Nebe from the Reich Security Office, who had for a long time 
secretly collaborated with the opposition, warned Dohnanyi that he and 
301schmidthuber's confession is in John, pp. 110-111. 
302Roeder was known as the "bloodhound" for the persistence of his 
investigations, and perhaps, for the fate of his victims. For the best 
accounts of the "Rote KaPelle" Case, see Heinz Hohne, Codeword: Direktor, 
trans., Richard Barry (New York, 1971); and Gilles Perrault, The Red Or-
chestra, trans., Peter Wiles (New York, 1970). 
J03Bethge, p. 686. 
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Bonhoeffer had been incriminated by Schmidthuber.304 And as late as April 
4 (the day before the Gestapo struck), Canaris told Dohnanyi to make cer-
tain that the papers in private safe were "in order. 11305 
It should, then, have come as no surprise on the morning of April 5 
when Roeder and Sonderegger presented themselves at the Tirpitzufer with 
an arrest warrant for Dohnanyi and permission to search his office. Never-
theless, when the two Gestapo investigators, accompanied by Canaris and 
Oster, appeared in Dohnanyi's office, he was caught unprepared. Some 
slips of paper were still on his desk--Abwehr commissions, including 
one authorizing Mueller and Bonhoeffer to go to the Vatican and explain 
the failure of the March bomb plots, and it bore Beck's initialled ap-
proval--the letter 11 0 11 which stood for 11Eye of the Needle" ( 11 Nadelohr 11 ). 
While Roeder was searching the safe, Dohnanyi showed the slip to Canaris 
and asked him if he still might be allowed to finish this particular 
piece of business. Oster, seeing the slip and knowing its contents, 
assumed that Dohnanyi viewed the paper as incriminating, and was trJ-
ing to bring it to Canaris' attention in order to get it out of the 
room officially. This was reinforced seconds later when Dohnanyi 
whispered to Oster, "send my wife the slip." Later, Dohnanyi would 
claim that all he meant by the statement was for Oster to warn his 
wife306(although his choice of words seems somewhat strange). In any 
case, Oster interpreted it to mean that he should take possession of 
J04Bethge, p. 686. 
305Gisevius, pp. 476-477. 
J06Bethge makes this argument based on a deposition by Dohnanyi•s 
wife which he quotes in full; pp. 691-692. 
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the paper if he could. At a moment when he thought no one was watching, 
he picked up the slip to hide it. But Sonderegger had seen him and cried 
out.J07 
Within a few hours, Oster was relieved of his post and ordered home 
under house detention. Dohnanyi was arrested on the spot and taken to a 
military prison. Mueller and Bonhoeffer would foll.ow him shortly. And 
the slip of paper upon which so much turned might have passed muster as 
Abwehr business since the instructions it contained were ambiguously 
worded and Beck's initial could have been represented as Oster's. (This 
was, in fact, precisely the line of defense taken by the t~ro Abwehr re-
sisters during their interrogations).308 
Through the intervention of Dr. Carl Sack, the Judge Advocate-Gen-
eral and another anti-Nazi, the arrested men were kept in military cus-
tody and beyond the reach of the Gestapo, thereby delaying their inter-
rogation by torture for more than a year.309 But the resistance move-
ment had been deprived at one stroke of many of its leading members: 
Dohnanyi, its judicial chronicler and planner; Mueller, its contact 
with the Vatican; Bonhoeffer, its preacher militant-all behind bars; 
307The scene in Dohnanyi's office has been pieced together from 
three sources: John, p. 112; Gisevius, p. 477; and Bethge, pp. 691-692. 
The accounts vary as to blame: Gisevius faults Dohnanyi, .E!:ill! Dohnanyi, 
Bethge 1s main source, faults Oster; and John is somewhat neutral. How-
ever, in view of Dohnanyi 1 s strangely worded whisper, the weight of ev-
idence would appear to point against him. 
308Bethge, p. 706. 
J09John quotes Dohnanyi as saying: 11 No one can say how long he 
can hold out once the Gestapo has him in its powers." John., p. 113. 
In an effort to avoid the inevitable, Dohnanyi would finally infect 
himself with diptheria bacilli, but it would not save himo In the 
last days of the warJ he together with Canaris, Oster, Bonhoeffer, 
and Sack, would be tried by a drumhead Gestapo courtmartial., con-
victed, and hanged at Flossenburg Concentration Camp. 
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Oster, its technical coordinator, now under house arrest and soon to be 
placed on inactive reserve; while Canaris, still in office but with great-
ly diminished influence, continued to fight to protect his subordinates 
and even managed to get Gisevius transferred to Switzerland when the Ge-
stapo began looking into his connections with the Tirpitzufer.JlO But 
the Abwehr, the agency which the resisters had used as their chief means 
of opposing Hitler's dictatorship, was damaged almost to the point of use-
lessness, and as we shall see, would soon be totally destroyed.311 
Thus ended the performance of one band of conspirators who had begun 
to act against Hitler as soon as his evil designs became apparent. Others 
would take their places--new actors, some with better technical skills and 
one at least with the fanatical determination of a born revolutionary. But 
something was lost when these men were seized from the ranks of the oppo-
sition--call it ties to the inception of a movement, or a broken thread 
of continuity, or a striving toward salvation which begins when those 
whose 11No!" first signals the dramatistic (dialectic) struggle between 
the forces of good and evil. 
3lOGisevius, p. 477. 
311The blow against the Abwehr is another example of Cathcart's 
"reciprocating act." He writes: 11there must be a reciprocating act from 
the established or counter rhetors, who perceive the demands of the agi-
tator rhetors ••• as direct attacks on the foundations of the existing 
order. 11 Cathcart, er,. Unlike earlier instances--Hitler' s dismissal of 
Beck after the Army Chief of Staff protested against plans for invading 
Czechoslovakia, or Hitler's denial of Halder•s memorandum removing Po-
land from Gestapo control, or Hitler's tirade against Brauchitsch when 
th~ Army Commander tried to argue against the attack on France-the Ge-
stapo's arrest of Oster, Dohnanyi, Mueller, and Bonhoeffer, is more "a 
logomachy, a waging of war not only through the use of persuasive words, 
but also by means of rhetorical deeds of deterrence. • o • '' Leland M. 
Griffin, 11The Rhetorical Structure Of The 'New Left' Movement: Part I, 11 
Quarterly Journal Of Speech, L (April, 1964), 113. 
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As the third critical moment in the drama of the German Resistance 
Movement comes to an end, Henning von Tresckow learns of the arrests, and 
recognizing the magnitude of the disaster, requests two months sick leave 
to come to Berlin to try and repair the damaged He has always had some 
doubts as to whether, in the event of Hitler's assassination, the plans 
would have ensured a seizure of power. So he will prepare new plans him-
self, on general staff lines, with detailed orders and ordinances. This 
will be "Operation Valkyrie," measures ostensibly framed to cope with in-
ternal unrest and approved by the Fuehrer~ but actually designed to fa-
cilitate the resistance take over of Hitler I s "New Order. 11 And while 
Tresckow is working on these plans, he will meet a new and most important 
conspirator in this drama--Claus von Stauffenberg. 
CHAPTER V 
ALLGEMEINES HEERESAMT AND THE FOURTH ATTEMPT: JULY 20, 1944 
"If, by the instrument of government power, a nationality is led to its 
destruction, then rebellion is not only the right o.f every member of such 
a people, it is his duty. 11 Adolf Hitler 
When Henning von Tresckow arrived in Ber].jin in July 1943, what he saw 
there may have spurred his work of preparing for a coup d'etat* The first 
heavy Allied bombing raids had struck the city- in the preceeding months 
and the results were devastating. Landmarks like St o Hedwig's Cathedral 
and the Botannical Gardens were completely destroyed,1the downtown sec-
tion was heavily damaged, particularly the areas around the railway sta-
tion and the marshalling yards, 2and in the out1:;ring districts, each street 
had its burned-out,houses and gaping ruins3-the beginning of a pattern 
whose sum of destruction would finally be tota1~ 
Expanding the scene, there was also the specter of defeat on two 
fronts o In the east, the Russian counter-stroke following the German 
failure at Kursk was launched against Army Group South, an attack which 
would liberate Kharkov and Kiev, isolate the German defenders in the 
1ulrich von Hassell, The Von Hassell Diaries, trans., Hugh Gibson 
(Westport, 1971), pp. 289-290. 
2Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries,_ ed., and trans., Louis P. 
Lochner (New York, 1948), p. 311. 
3Albert Speer, Inside The Third Reich, trans., Richard and Clara 
Winston (New York, 1971), p. 376. 
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Crimea, and by the end of the year drive a wedge across the Dnieper.4 In 
the west, the Anglo-American conquest of Sicily breached the last outpost 
of 11 Festung Europa," prepared the way for an attack upon Italy, and helped 
to create the conditions for the fall of Mussolini. 
These events were to prove a mixed blessing to the German resisters. 
On the one hand, otto John recalls how he and his brother Klaus celebrated 
the end of the Italian dictatorship with a bottle of champagne and told 
each other that "it would be absurd if 5hei/ could not do what the Ital-
ians had apparently succeeded in doing quite easily. 11 5 Allen Dulles writes 
that the bombing attacks in the summer of 1943 "coincided with a sharp de-
cline in German morale which followed the fall of Mussolini. 116 And most 
importantly, in September, Field Marshal Kluge visited Berlin and had a 
long private talk with Beck and Goerdeler, during the course of which he 
expressed his concern about the "military situation" and declared his 
readiness to act on condition that Hitler was dead.7 
On the other hand, the fall of Mussolini made the Nazi leadership 
more alive to the potential of internal revolt. Goebbels wrote in his 
diary for July 27: "Knowledge of ffeussolini's dismissa.!7 might conceiv-
ably encourage some subversive elements in Germany to think they could 
put over the same thing here. 118 In September Hitler spoke a public word 
4For a full account of the Russian counter-offensive, see Alex-
ander Werth, Russia At War 1941-45 (New York, 1964), pp. 539-680. 
5otto John, Twice Through The Lines, trans., Richard Barry (Lon-
don, 1972), p. 1199 
6Allen Dulles, Germany 1s Underground (New York, 1947), p. 169. 
?Gerhard Ritter, The German Resistance, trans., R. T. Clark (New 
York, 1958), pp. 246-247. 
8Goebbels, p. 469. 
of warning to the "defeatist Upper Stratum" and called upon his "field 
marshals, admirals, and generals" to show their loyalty to him and dash 
the enemy's hopes of finding in the German o,f'ficers corps 11traitors like 
those in Italy. n9 And in October, Heinrich F.immler told an audience of 
Gestapo officials what opponents of the regime could expect: 
Another question is that of defeatism~ •• You will have read 
in the papers that Herr Regierungsrat so-and-so, waiter X or fac-
tory owner Y, who spoke in defeatist terms, were condemned to death 
by the People's Court and that the sentences have already been car-
ried out •• & • And we will publish such information ••• so that 
thousands of others ••• can be taught a lesson. For that reason 
I am always in favor of hard and merciless punishment •••• 10 
In this scenellthat was one part threat and one part promise, Tresckow 
9Hitler 1s speech is quoted in Joachim Fest, Hitler, trans., Richard 
and Clara Winston (New York, 1973), p. 698& 
10Himmler's speech is quoted in Trial of the Major War Criminals, 42 
Vols., (Nuremberg, 1947), xxxvii, p. 698ff. Hereafter abbreviated as TMWC. 
11Each act has opened with a description of the scene because, as 
Griffin writes, "To study a movement. • • is t.o study the Scenes that brack-
et the Act. • • for any movement is a sequence of 'moments between the lim-
its of before and after. 111 Leland M. Griffinjl 11 A Dramatistic Theory of the 
Rhetoric of Movements," in Critical Responses To Kenneth Burke, ed., William 
H. Rueckert (Minneapolis, 1969), p. 465. However, this scene, perhaps more 
than any of the others, illustrates the intimate relationship between the 
climate of opinion and the rhetoric of Hitler's opponents. For as we shall 
see, not only were they forced to act-to plan and recruit under the con-
straints imposed by an increasingly suspicious dictatorship ( with the cor-
responding loss of effoctiveness that that ent.ails), but the scene itself, 
as the staging suggests, was in its very substance rhetorical--what Grif-
fin calls "a logomachy, a waging of war not only through the use of per-
suasive words, but also by means of rhetorical deeds of deterrenceo" Le-
land M. Griffin, "The Rhetorical Structure o:f the 'New Left I Movement, 
Part I," Quarterly Journal Of Speech, L (April, 1964), 113. Extending 
the discussion a bit further, what we shall find here is something very 
similar to Lloyd Bitzer 1 s definition of a rhetorical situation--one con-
taining an exigence which invites discourse to an audience who, in spite 
of their attitudes, beliefs, traditions, etc., are capable of being in-
fluenced and possess the power needed to modify the exigence. Lloyd F. 
Bitzer, 11The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy and Rhetoric, I (January 
1968). While Bitzer goes too far and argues that some scenes cannot be 
changed rhetorically, or that some kinds of discourse-specifically po-
etic--are not rhetorical (a point to which we shall revert shortly), 
there is no doubt that the scene is of major importance. 
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set about preparing for a coup. The problems as he saw them were three-
fold: first, the seizure of power in Berlin and other cities of the Reich 
and occupied Europe had to be worked out in detail; second, the effort to 
win support of high-ranking officers had to be intensified; and third, a 
new attempt to assassinate Hitler had to be organized.12 
The first two problems were related. Tresckow was astute enough to 
realize that even if some officers were recruited to the movement, there 
were still enough 11Nfil: Soldaten11 and outright Nazi sympathizers to make 
it necessary to formulate the plans in such a way that they would not a-
rouse suspicion. Fortunately, there was an existing "Fuhrer Befehl" to 
help camouflage matters. In 1942, when the number of war prisoners and 
foreign workers in Gennany reached several millions, Hitler had agreed 
to a plan proclaiming a state of emergency and mobilizing the Reserve 
Army to put do"-Tl. ir1ternal disorders .13 It was giv·en th~ code name 11Val-
ruie," and in May and again in October 1942, Olbricht had drafted orders 
which were to be issued to the commanders of the various military districts. 
To fit this plan to resistance purposes, Tresckow made a number of sub-
stantive changes, the most important of which involved broadening the de-
finition of internal unrest to include a putsch by the SS-something the 
military had always considered a possibility, and announcing the death of 
the Fuehrer and a consequent state of emergency in which all executive 
12Fabia.."l von Schlabrendorff, They Al.most Killed Hitler (New York, 
1947), p. 63. Schlabrendorff includes a fourth problem: clarifying the 
political aims of the resistance; however, even if Tresckow considered 
this one of his tasks, the evidence suggests that the resisters did not 
compromise their political differences until the winter 1943-1944, long 
after Tresckow had retuFned to the Russian front. 
13wa.1ter Goerlitz, Histor} Of The German General Staff, trans., 
Brian Battershaw (New York, 1954, pp. 434-435. 
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powers were to be placed in the hands of the army. Two additional orders 
were written to incorporate these changes. The first, which was signed by 
Field Marshal Witzleben {who was to become Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces),14announced the death of Hitler, proclaimed a state of military e-
mergency, delegated all powers to the army, and subordinated the Nazi mil-
itary and paramilitary organizations to the army.15 The second, which was 
to be issued over General Fromm's name in his capacity as Commander of the 
Reserve Army (but was not actually signed by him since Tresckow did not con-
sider him "verschworungsfahig" or "plot worthy"),16transferred executive 
power to the commanders of the military districts, ordered the seizure ot 
key positions like government buildings, power stations, broadcasting fa-
cilities and communications centers, placed under arrest all party leaders, 
Gestapo chiefs, and officials of the Propaganda Ministry, and called tor 
the occupation of concentration camps and SS strongpoints with orders to 
kill any guards or SS men who resisted.17 
The focal point of "Operation Valkyrie" was Berlin itself. Here, one 
difficulty concerned the relative strength or the forces each side could 
muster. Tresckow began with the assumption that the conspirators would be 
outnumbered by the SS, but he planned to offset this with surprise and the 
14schlabrendorff writes that Tresckow "submitted this order to Witz-
leben, who, after listening to his brief explanation, put his signature to 
it without hesitation." Schla.brendorrr, p. 71. 
15'rhe f'u.11 text of the order is in Germans Against Hitler, ed., Er-
ich Zimmerman and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, trans., Allan and Lieselotte Yahraes 
(Bonn, 1964), pp. 131-132. 
16Schlabrendorrr, p. 70. 
17The f'u.11 text of the order is in Germans Against Hitler, pp. 132-
lJJ. 
support of Count Helldorf•s Kriminalpolizie.18 A related difficulty in-
volved calculating the number of forces available for a coup. Tresckow 
believed that the first few hours would be critical. If the SS were con-
tained even briefly, there would be time to bring up military reinforce-
ments from other parts of the Reich. The trouble was that the army dis-
posed very few units in the capital. The Reserve was a conduit to the 
front and troops were being constantly shifted to replace losses in com-
bat formations. Investigation revealed only three units permanently- sta-
tioned in Berlin: the Watch Battalion Great Germany (Wachbatallion Gross 
Deutschland), the Army Ordnance School, and two territorial brigades. Of 
these, the Watch Battalion was the most effective since it was reinforced 
to the strength of a combat regiment.19 Accordingly, Tresckow gave it the 
important responsibilities of protecting the War Ministry on the Bendler-
strasse--the Headquarters of the Reserve Army and the nerve center of the 
conspiracy, seizing the government quarter, arresting party officials, and 
occupying specified objectives like the press and newspaper offices.20 
Outside Berlin, more troops were available: the Infantry Training School 
at Doberitz, the Cavalry School at Krampnitz, the Panzer School at Wuns-
dorf, and the Artillery School at Juterbog.21 To these, Tresckow gave 
the assignments of blocking the SS, particularly the garrisons at Lich-
terfelde and Lankwitz, reinforcing the Watch Battalion, and most important, 
l8schlabrendorff, p. 69. Helldorf had been a member of the resist-
ance since the Fritsch crisis of 1938; see Chapter Two, p. 98. 
19Ibid., p. 67. 
20rhese plans are outlined in Eberhard Zeller, The Flame Of Free-
dom, trans., R. P. Heller and D.R. Masters (London, 1969), p. 240. 
21schlabrendorff, p. 67. 
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occupying the radio stations, the telephone exchanges, and the communica-
tions transmitters at Koenigwursterhausen and Zeesen, both south of the 
city, Tegel in the north, and the tower in the Masurenalle.22 
A third difficulty concerned the attitude of the soldiers. No one 
could predict the extent to which National Socialist ideology had per-
meated the rank and file, to say nothing of the officer corps. Hitler 
was certainly sparing no effort to make the army fuhrertreu. In addi-
tion to the oath, rewards, and punishment, he had recently created the 
National Socialist Leadership Organization.23 The Fuehrer had been im-
pressed by the way the commissars indoctrinated the Russian Army and he 
wanted the German Army to be equally well-indoctrinated, from the com-
manding generals dm·m to the last grenadier.24 Thus, 11 leadership 11 of-
ficers were attached to each military unit with orders to imbue the sol-
diers with the proper spirit and report laggards, and in the course of 
this act, we shall meet such an officer who played an important role~ 
To nullify the effects of political indoctrination, Tresckow de-
pended in part on the military system of command. Orders with proper 
heading, reference, file number, and signature require nothing of the 
recipients except mechanical obedience.25 As we shall see, there were 
22zeller, p. 245. 
23Goerlitz, pp. 420-421. 
24Goebbels records Hitler's thinking~ "The introduction of po-
litical commissars ••• has greatly enhanced the striking power of the 
Red Arrny. 11 Goebbels, p. 406. 
25.rresckow's confidence in the system was at least partially 
justified. In his study of coup d I etats, Edward Luttwa.k writes: 11The 
apparatus of the state is ••• to some extent a 'machine' which will 
normally behave in a fairly predictable and automatic manner. A coup 
operates by taking advantage or this machine-like behavior: during the 
some dangers here. If someone had second thoughts or failed to respond 
properly, the whole operation could be jeopardized. Also, if the plot-
ters came to depend too heavily on the plan--say, if they failed to ac-
count for discretion or the unexpected, the operation could lead them. 
straight to disaster. 
Much, therefore, depended upon the second factor which Tresckow 
counted on--the reliability and initiative of the men who were priVT 
to the plot. There were anti-Nazis in many parts of the military es-
tablishment. Some were on Olbricht 1 s staff at the General Army Office. 
Others were in Tresckow's circle at Anny Group Center. Still othera 
were in what remained of the group at the Abwehr. Also, there was the 
network that Oster and Olbricht had begun to build in Berlin, Cologne, 
Munich, Vienna, and Paris. And finally, there were officers in the Ar-
my High Command, men whom Beck, and after him Halder, had selected to 
fill key staff positions.26 They might not be enough-indeed, Tresckow 
proposed intensive recruitment, but for the time being, the important-
thing was to organize them into a conspiracy that could help with plans 
for taking over Berlin and other key cities. 
3.32. 
Until Oater's dismissal from the Intelligence Service, that respon-
sibility would have been his, and as we noted at the end of the last act, 
coup ••• it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling 
levers. 11 However, Luttwak adds one qualification: "some states are so 
organized that the •machine• is sufficiently sophisticated to exercise 
discretion according to a given concept of what is 'proper' and what is 
not, in the orders it executes." F.dward Luttwak, Coup d'Etat (New York, 
1969), p. 6. 
26rn a letter to Joachim Kramarz, Stauffenberg's biographer, Hal-
der notes that he attempted to secure the appointments of men "in whom 
the spirit of resistance to Hitler was more or less inborn." Joachim 
Kramarz, Stauffenberg. trans., R.H. Barry (New York, 1967), p. 84. 
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one or Tresckow•s reasons for coming to Berlin was to try and repair the 
damage done at the Abwehr. Thus, he asked Olbricht about a candidate to 
replace Oster, and Olbricht suggested Claus von Stauffenberg, a thirty--
seven-year-old Colonel who had served under Hoepner and later under Hal-
der, and who was in a Munich hospital recovering from serious wounds suf-
fered in North Africa.27 According to Stauffenberg•s biographer, he came 
secretly to Berlin in August and met with Tresckow and Olbricht and agreed 
to become the "coordinator" for the coup.28 His first task, for which he 
was particularly suited, was to draw up a. sta.f'.f study for the military oc-
cupation of Berlin, and then to condense it into written orders and mar-
tial decrees which should convey to the individuals involved precisely 
what they should do when they received the "Valkyrie Befehl.t129 
The final problem which Tresckow dealt with was the assassination 
of Hitler. He had delayed making any arrangements in this regard until 
at least one of the front-line marshals was won over. It was not only 
a matter of the prestige which rank carries but also of coordination be-
tween the combat troops and the reserves.JO These preconditions were 
fulfilled with Kluge 1s affirmative declaration to Beck and Goerdeler in 
27Schlabrendorff, p. 64. 
28Kramarz, p. 121. 
29The chronology of Tresckow•s preparations and Stauffenberg•s 
part in them is confusing. Schla.brendorff, whose evidence forms the 
basis for the narrative, places Stauffenberg in Berlin at the outset 
of the planning. But since he had been seriously wounded in late A-
pril and, according to Kramarz, was hospitalized for three months, he 
could hardly have been in the capital until early August, by which time 
much of the preliminary work had already been completed. 
30schlabrendorff, p. 74. 
September, a declaration motivated in part by 'l'resckow 9s reasserted in-
fluence.31 
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Shortly ~hereafter, Tresckow returned to Army Group Center and with 
his fellow-officers discussed the possiblity of getting Hitler to make an-
other visit to the front. This time there would be no bomb in his air-
plane. Instead, sLx of them agreed to use their revolvers to put an end 
to him.32 Unfortunately, the Fuehrer could not be persuaded to repeat 
his earlier trip. Even worse, Kluge was seriously hurt in a car acci-
dent soon after he returned to his headquarters, and that removed him 
from the scene for many months. His replacement, Field Marshal Ernst 
Busch, had a moral blindness against which even Tresckow could not pre-
vail.33 Nor was he any more successful with Erich von Manstein, the 
Commander of Army Group South and a friend of long standing. Through 
the autum..~ of 1943, Tresckow waged an unceasing campaign to recruit 
Manstein to the resistance. Schlabrendorff writes that on one occa-
sion the Field Marshal was so moved by Tresckow 1s insistence upon the 
responsibility that he would bear before history that he trembled with 
emotion.34 In the end, however, Manstein became afraid of Tresckow's 
influence. Late in 1943, when Tresckow proposed through Hitler's ad-
jutant, General Schmundt, that he should become Manstein 1s Chief of 
3lschlabrendorff, p. 74. 
32Ibid ~, p. 75~ 
33symptomatic of Busch I s "ethical standarctsn was his reaction 
to an adjutant's announcement that men and women were being shot by 
the SS outside his headquarters. Busch responded with a military or-
der: "Draw the curtains." Quoted in Richard Grunberger, The 12-Year 
Reich (New York, 1971), p. 150. 
34schlabrendorff, p. 75. 
Staff, the Marshal declined to accept him. He wrote to Schmundt and 
while he praised Tresckow's abilities as a staff officer, he noted 
that his attitude toward National Socialism was negative.35 For all 
intents and purposes, that was the end of Henning von Tresckow's mi1-
itary career and, to a large extent, his active participation in the 
resistance. In the months ahead, he would send some of his fellow of-
ficers to assist in the coup, and as we shall see, at a critical moment, 
his answer to a question of Stauffenberg's, would reveal more clearly 
than any other the moral basis of the July 20 Attentat. But for the 
rest, he was condemned to watch from the wings as the drama was played 
out, and at its end, he would take his own life rather than face the 
vengeance which Hitler had prepared for his adversaries. 
The principle character of this act---Gisevius calls him the 11nev 
dynamism" of the German Resista.,ce Movement36--was Claus, Count Schenk 
von Stauffenberg, a man who would at last confront the evil genius of 
Hitler with talents equal to his own: determination, strong nerves, 
revolutionary zeal, power over men, and a willingness to throw these 
assets into the balance in the struggle 11to purge the nation of its 
guilt and break the fetters of the tyrant. 1137 
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35schlabrendorff, p. 75. In fairness to Manstein, his exception 
should be noted. He writes that he turned down Tresckow because another 
officer on his staff deserved the promotion, and he denies that he stig-
matized Tresckow as an unreliable National Socialist. Erich von Manstein, 
Lost Victories, trans., Anthony G. Powell (Chicago, 1958), p. 68. After 
the war, otto John tried to resolve the differences between Manstein and 
Schla.brendorff but was unable to do so. John, p. 186. 
36<zisevius, p. 483. 
37stauffenberg sometimes quoted this line from Stefan George's po-
em, "Return of the Dead," to explain his position to his fellow-officers." 
Zeller I p. 191. 
J.36. 
By nearly all accounts, Stauffenberg was possessed of exceptional 
abilities. He was tall and strikingly handsome (not by chance was he 
nicknamed the Bamberger Reiter after the famous statue of the beautiful 
young knight in the cathedral of his native city). A professional sol-
dier, he had little of the narrowness often associated with that caste. 
His interests included architecture, literature, and music; he had stud-
ied foreign languages (he was fluent in English, and a student of his-
tory and philosophy); he was concerned with social and political prob-
lems; and he had a passion for poetry.JS These are hardly subjects for 
the officers• mess, but Stauffenberg talked about them,39and his knowl-
edge, his enthusiasm, his ready smile, and his capacity to make others 
feel at ease, not only made him veey popular with his fellow soldiers,40 
but marked him for a position of authority.41 
Stauffenberg•s passion for poetry is relevant to our purposes since 
it brings us to one of the most dominant forces in his early life-his 
38rhis list or interests, and it is by no means complete, has been 
culled from Kramarz, p. 38; and Zeller, pp. 174-179. 
390n the basis of interviews, Zeller writes: 11Stauffenberg often 
discussed historical, political, social and artistic matters." llig,., 
p. 177; and Kramarz quotes one of Stauffenberg 1 s fellow officers: 11 His 
talk was principally of political problems with a pronounced social 
tinge. 11 Heinz Greiner, in Kramarz, p. 4.2. 
4ot(argret Boveri quotes an unnamed soldier whose description is 
typical: "He was always smiling when he talked, and he _was never alone. 
Everywhere he went, in an instant, a group of devoted followers would 
appear and join him. 11 Margret Boveri, Treason In The Twentieth Century, 
trans., Jonathan Steinberg (New York, 196.3), p. 284. 
41aoerlitz writes: 11Men began to speak or him quite seriously- as 
the future Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and it went so far that ca-
reerists took pains to get in touch with him in the secret belief that 
he was 'the coming man. 111 Goerlitz, p. 434. 
association with Stefan George, the poet, and his acceptance, together 
with his brother Berthold, into George's circ1e.42 George's philosophy 
was one of ac~ion; he wanted to build the young men who surrounded him 
into an elite-an order of nobility founded not on birth or wealth but 
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on the mind and a willingness to act. To these chosen few, George proph-
esied a vision of ~eroea-divine-like men who, in their understanding and 
courage would seize the moment (he called it stasls, after the Greek 
kairos) to serve others for the betterment of society, even to the point 
of self-sacrifice.43 
Sta.uffenberg was deeply moved by George' a, teaching, and he gave ev-
idence of the poet's influence throughout his life. For one thing, the 
idea of calling the resistance movement "secret. 11 or 11 hidden" was stauf-
fenberg•s, from a poem by the same name in George's anthology, The New 
Reich.44 For another, George's sense of hierarchy would find its way 
into Stauffenberg 1s plans for a new order in Germany--plans which for 
the most part were very similar to the Kreisauers, and which again re-
veal the socio-political differences between the resisters and Hitler.45 
42The decisive influence of Stefan George is affirmed in Kramarz, 
pp. 29-35; and Zeller, pp. 173; 184. 
43These features of George's philosophy have been taken from Ul-
rich K. Goldsmith, 11Stefan George," in Columbia. Essays on Modern Writers 
(New York, 1970); and Peter Viereck, Dream and Responsibility (Washing-
ton, D. c., 1953). 
44Kramarz, p. 29. 
45An oath drafted by Stauffenberg in the last weeks before the At-
tentat indicates his conflict with Hitler's system as well as the influ-
ence of George's teaching. "We want a new order which makes all Germans 
responsible for the state and guarantees them justice and right; but we 
despise the lie that all are equal and we submit to rank ordained by na-
ture. We want a people with roots in their native land, close to the pow-
ers of nature, finding happiness and contentment. in the stat.us to which 
Finally, the title of George's poem, 11Anti-Christ 11 was the name Stauf-
fenberg gave to the Fuehrer,46and, as John Wheeler-Bennett writes, its 
last lines served to express his "barely- containL-;iJ contempt for those 
who would not act: 111•7 
The Master of Vermin far stretches his realm, 
No treasure that fails him, no luek that foresakes. 
Destruction take all other rebels! 
You clamour, enticed by his devilish show, 
Lay waste what remains of the sap from the spring 
And feel you need first when the end comes. 
• • 
Then you hang out your tongues o'er the emptying trough, 
Stray like herds without aim through the courtyard in flames, 
And fearfully rings out the trumpet.48 
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Stauffenberg had not always urged men to oppose Hitler. In the be-
ginning., he had tried to give the Fuehrer and his 11 New Order" the benefit 
of every doubt. According to Rudolf Fahrner (one of Stauffenberg•s few 
close friends who survived the July 20 aftermath), the young officer in-
itially saw in Hitler the type of political leader who is able to simpli.fy 
ideas and make them effective, thereby inspiring the masses to devotion 
and sacrifice. Also, the concept of the Volksgemeinschaft, with its 
they have been called, and overcoming in freedom and pride, the base in-
stincts of envy and jealousy. We want leaders who, drawn from all the 
sections of society, are in harmony with the divine powers and set an 
example to others by their noble spirit, discipline and sacrifice. 11 
Quoted in Zeller, p. 395. 
46 i lb ct., p. 393. 
47without giving a source, Wheeler-Bennett draws a striking pic-
ture of Stauffenberg, after his injury, quoting George's 11 Anti-Christ." 
11 He would recite it with fervour, his great frame striding up and down 
the room and his maimed claw of a left hand gesticulating fiercely; his 
one remaining eye, gleaming a vivid blue, a black patch covering the· 
empty socket of the other. 11 John Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis Of Pow-
£! (New York., 1954), p. 582. 
48rbid. The translation is by Maurice Bowra. 
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principle of equality and its promise that able men could ascend to the 
top of the hierarchy, seemed at last to break through the crust of bour-
geois tradition that had extended from the last century, and drew to Hit-
ler people with ability and high idealism. And in foreign policy, the 
Fuehrer appeared as the-champion of the nation, rebelling against the 
Treaty of Versailles and insisting on Gennany•s legitimate claims.49 
For Stauffenberg, the reversal began with the 11Kristallnacht 11 of 
November 1938 (when Goebbels organized the burning of Jewish synagogues 
and businesses).50 A fellow officer recalls that this event "drew from 
Stauffenberg, always particularly insistent upon justice, decency, and 
morality, a savage condemnation. 11 51 Through the spring and summer of 
1939 he watched the approach of the German-Polish conflict with serious 
misgivings, and Fahrner quotes him as saying appropos to Hitler: "The 
fool is bent on war. 1•52 But it was only during the course of the cam-
paign that Stauffenberg came face to face with the inherent evil of the 
Third Reich. As a staff officer,with Hoepner•s Sixth Panzers he could 
see the Einsatzgruppen at work as they liquidated Jews and Poles, the 
beginning of the Fuehrer•s racial policy in the east.53 And as we 
49Fahrner 1 s discussion of Stauffenberg 1s early views is in Zeller, 
pp. 183-186. 
50stauffenberg 1 s reversal from an objective, if not tolerant ob-
server of National Socialism, to one of its foremost opponents, is less 
like the traditional peripety of the theater and more like Griffin's ar-
gument that the "enactment of the Negative ••• will be precipitated by 
some. • .cluster of events. • • that symbolize the unacceptable." Grif-
fin, 11Dramatistic Theory," p. 462. 
51werner Reerink, quoted in Kramarz, p. 71. 
52Fa.hrner is quoted in llli• 
53The most infamous of all the SS murder squads, Einsatzgruppe 
Woyrisch, worked in the operations zone of Army Group South, the same 
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noted in the third act, when Stauffenberg returned to Germany, he was 
visited by his uncle, Count Nicholas von Uexkull and Fritz von Schulen-
berg, who showed him Dohnanyi •s "chronicle of shame" and urged him to 
intervene or to seek a post from which intervention might be possible.54 
Terence Prittie asks why Stauffenberg did nothing to oppose Hitler 
in the next few years, and answers his own question by saying that. "World 
War II was a titanic struggle which put matters of lesser importance out 
of mind. 11 55 Such a response does an injustice to Stauffenberg's efforts 
to resist. For while it is true that to his last day he conscientiously 
carried out the obligations or his position (and they were anything but 
inconsiderable,56a fact to bear in mind when we come to July 20 and find 
some of the officers with frayed nerves)57it is also true that in'the 
army to which Hoepner's Sixth Panzer Division was attached. See Heinz 
Hohne, The Order of the Death's Head, trans., Richard Barry (New York, 
1970), pp. 302-303. 
54see Chapter Three, p. 177. 
55Terenee Prittie, Germans Against Hitler (Boston, 1964), p. 231. 
561ndicative of Stauffenberg 1s normal work load is a description 
by Karl von Thungen, an officer who served with him on the General Staff: 
11 ! never opened Claus's door without finding him on the telephone, moun-
tains of paper in front of him, a pencil between his fingers •••• De-
pending on who he was talking to, he would be laughing (that invariably 
came somewhere in the conversation) or cursing (that generally happened 
too), or giving an order, or laying down the law •••• His clerk was 
usually with him, and whenever there was a pause would take down post-
haste notes for files, letters, or circulars •••• When I used to 
visit him he was generally at the end of a twelve-, fourteen-, ore-
ven sixteen hour day. • • • 11 Quoted in Kramarz, pp. 78-79. 
57To this can be added Schlabrendorff's description of the even 
greater burden borne by the conspirators: 11 The ever-present fear of spies 
and the possibility of being under surveillance by the Gestapo were a pa-
ralyzing burden which every member of the resistance had to bear day after 
day, month after month, without a moment's relaxation or relief. Shaking 
off this weight anew each morning was in itself an effort that sapped much 
of our energy and stamina. 11 Fabian von Schlabrendorff, The Secret War A-
gainst Hitler, trans., Hilda Simon (New York, 1965), pp. 266-267. 
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period 1939-1943, Stauffenberg made repeated attempts--over and above his 
regular duties-to initiate military action against Hitler. There are, 
for example, several accounts by General Halder-the first as early as 
June 1940, of Stauffenberg, who had been posted to the Army High Command,, 
exploring ways and means of overthrowing the Nazi dictator: 
For hours at a time we would mull over the possible methods of re-
moving this monster, without in the process seriously damaging the 
army, now in contact with the enemy in fulfillment of its duty to 
defend the Fatherland, and without destroying the entire structure 
of the state.58 
Halder, as we have seen, was no longer willing to go beyond private 
criticism-of Hitler, so Stauffenberg turned to the field commanders, sound-
ing them out about the possibility of action. Schlabrendorff reports that 
he visited Field Marshal Kluge in the swmner of 1941,59a faint hope in view 
of that officer's infirmity of purpose; he is known to have written General 
Paulus in June 1942, shortly before the opening of the German offensive on 
Stalingrad;60and during the winter of 1942-1943, he traveled to Army Group 
South where he obtained an interview with Field Marshal Manstein.61 All 
of these approaches ended in failure, but it may well be that a remark ot 
Manstein•s led to a resolve that would have its effect on the planning of 
July 20& For the Marshal told Stauffenberg that a coup could not be under-
taken without a definite order from above-an observation which was meant 
58Halder is quoted in Kramarz, p. 85. 
59schlabrendorff, They Almost Killed Hitler, pp. 65-66. 
60stauffenberg 1s letter, in which he discusses the possibilities of 
action and indirectly chides Paulus by noting that the highest ranking gen-
erals seem to be more interested in quarreling about their prestige than in 
steeling their courage to act, is included as an appendix in Kramarz, pp. 
203-204. 
61The details of the Manstein-Stauffenberg interview are in~., 
pp. 108-109. 
to be sarcastic. But it seems reasonable to assume, as-Goerlitz writes, 
that Stauffenberg and Tresckow 1s later decision to usurp authority to 
give orders had its beginnings in part with Manstein•s comment, and in 
part with the unwillingness of the field marshals to act upon their own 
responaibility.62 
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For our purposes, it is also important to trace Stauffenberg 1s pro-
gress through what Griffin calls "the moments of his drama, which are al-
so the moments of his movements 116J __ Order, the Negative, Guilt, Victimage 
and Mortification, Catharsis and Redemption.64 We have already noted 
Stauffenberg•s initial tolerance of National Socialism, and of course, 
there was the matter of the oath he swore to Hitler, a covenant between 
ruler and ruled that had to be upheld if order was to be maintained. 
Further, we saw how the Nazi system demonstrated its corruptness-the 
persecution of the Jews, the military conquest of other countries, the 
exterminations in the east--an accumulation of events which alienated 
Stauffenberg and impelled him to say 11 No ! 11 In this scene, guilt has 
been at least part of the motive, as indicated by a speech he made in 
October 1942 to a group of officers at Vinnitsa in the Ukraine. Ac-
cording to one source, Stauffenberg spoke for half an hour, condemning 
Hitler's policy in Russia and warning of its consequences: 11We are sow-
ing such hatred in the east that our children will reap the reward of 
62Goerlitz, pp. 428-429. 
63Griffin draws upon Burke's "interlocking moments" in the B:h21-
oric of Religion (Berkeley, 1970), pp. 4-5, when he describes man's pro-
gress through 11 the moments of his drama which are also the moments of his 
movements." Griffin, 11Dramatistic Theory," p. 457. 
64The order of the two terms, Negative and Guilt, have been re-
versed. However, the change is permissible since each of the tenns im-
plies the others. 
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it one day11 65-an argument strangely reminiscent of Kenneth Burke's dis-
cussion of guilt from the familial point of vi.ew.66 Or there is Stauffen-
berg's decision, in January 1943, to seek a command at the front-an ex-
pression of guilt in the sense that he was evading his responsibility to 
stay in the High Command and continue to oppos·e Hitler.67 As this act 
moves toward its climax on July 20, we shall have occasion to identify 
the other moments-Victimage and Mortification3 Catharsis and Redemption 
--but for the present, the point is that Stau~fenberg went to North Af-
rica where he was seriously wounded and nearly died (he lost his right 
hand, part of his left, and his left eye), and that traumatic experience 
taught him that men cannot flee from the resolution of their guilt.68 As 
he said to his wife while still in the hospital.: 11We General Staff officers 
65zeller quotea a member of the audience, otto Schiller; pp. 189-190. 
66Burke treats familial change in identity as pa.rt of the moment of 
rebirth. Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy Of Literary Form (New York, 1957), 
p. 36. But he also notes that it is possible to presuppose the guilt of a 
person from the type of rebirth he claims: 11 The order can be reversed, for 
the terms in uhich we conceive of redemption can help to shape the terms 
in which we conceive of the guilt that is to be• red-eemed. 11 Burke.,,, Rhet-
oric of Religion, p. 218. 
67Earlier, Stauffenberg had tried to prevent other officers from 
giving up potentially influential staff positions: 11What is this sham 
heroism, going and getting yourselves shot like hundreds of thousands of 
others 'in the faithful performance of duty.' This is nothing but coward-
ly evasion, no better than the Field Marshals who make the excuse of their 
duty to obey •••• When, by reason of his of~ice or his upbringing, a man 
reaches high rank, a moment arrives when the man a.nd the job are identical 
and no second thoughts can weigh with him; it is his duty to be responsible." 
Quoted in Kramarz, PPo 107-108. 
68Both Kramarz and Zeller note the change in Stau.ffenberg after his 
inJuries. Kramarz writes, 11Many who met him at. this period were struck by-
the fact that his entire outlook on life seemed1 to be more sharply focus-
sed •••• 11 Ibid., p. 122. And Zeller quotes him as saying: 11I 1 ve got 
to do something now to save the Reich." Zeller, p. 183. 
must carry our share of responsibility. 1169 A little later, he told a 
friend: 11! could never look the wives and 'children of the fall.cm in the 
eye if I did not do something to stop this senseless slaughter. n70 And 
when Olbricht offered him a post on the staff of the Reserve Army and 
the chance to take part in the plans, then already underway, for a coup 
d'etat against Hitler, Stauffenberg agreed at once. 
Having committed himself to become "coordinator" for the coup, Sta.u.r-
fenberg set about organizing existing cadres of anti-Nazi officers and re-
cruiting new ones.71 With men like General Olbricht and his group of re-
sisters at Reserve Army Headquarters, it was principally a matter of mak-
ing assignments for the parts each would play in the capitai.72 So too 
for the officers on the staff of General Hase, the City Commandant.73 
For contact with the training schools, it was necessary to win new re-
cruits, and Stauffenberg did so, initiating into the conspiracy liaison 
officers for each school.74 Berlin Police President Wolf Helldorf and 
SS Gruppenfuhrer Artur Nebe promised the support of the K~iminaleolizie.7S 
69stauffenberg 1s statement to his wife is in Zeller, p. 183. 
70icramarz quotes Peter Saurbruch, p. 122. 
71zeller writes that "one-hundred or more men ••• worked with stauf'-
fenberg for the coup d I etat. 11 Zeller, p. 233. Obviously, space limitations 
preclude naming all of them, but some have been listed because they played 
key roles on July 20, and others are included to provide some idea 0£ what 
Griffin means by 11the accumulation of individual conversions ••• the organ-
ization of an opposition ••• the achievement of solidarity, merger, in the 
ranks of the converted." Griffin, "Dramatistic Theory," p. 462. 
720fficers and assignments are listed in Zeller, pp. 212; 221-223. 
73~., pp. 224-225. 
741!?!~-, pp. 222; 225. 
75~., p .. 224. 
And while the Commander of Wehrkreis III (Berlin-Brandenburg), General 
Korzfleisch, was known to be a 11 Nur-Soldaten, 11 Stauffenberg managed to 
reach an understanding with his deputy, General Rost, and another con-
spirator, General Thungen, agreed to replace Korzfleisch on the day of 
the coup. 76 
The unknown quantit7 in Berlin was a man we have met before-Gen-
eral Fritz Fromm, Commander of the Reserve Army. Fromm had been ap-
proached by Halder at the time of the abortive coup during the winter 
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of 1939-194o,77and Hermann von Witzleben, one of Fromm's staff officers, 
writes that he had had a general knowledge of resistance activities ever 
since.78 But Fromm was a "weather vane 1179who turned with the prevailing 
winds. Tresckow had not trusted him;80olbricht had attempted repeatedly 
to recruit him, only to be rebuffed;8land Stauffenberg, who tall<ed with 
Fromm after joining the Reserve Army, told him candidly of his own views, 
to which Fromm replied that his ideas were very similar and that if there 
was going to be a putsch, would stauffenberg please include Keitel in the 
"clean out. 1182 Understandably, the resister's impressions were somewhat 
mixed. Stauffenberg was of the opinion that Fromm would go along once 
76Zeller, pp. 224-225. 
77see Chapter Three, pp.· 208-209. 
7811Letter of General Hermann von Witzleben," May 23, 1966. 
79This is Hassell 1s characterization, p. 285. 
80See p. 329. 
81Kramarz reports that on one occasion Fromm dismissed Olbricht 
with the words: 11That was very interesting. Heil Hitler." Kramarz, p. 
171. 
82 Zeller, p. 2ll. 
Hitler was dead, but he took no chances and contacted the commander of 
his old panzer division, General Erich Hoepner, who agreed to take over 
Fr~mm's position if the need arose.83 
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For the group left at the Abwehr, Stauffenberg•s assignment was to 
procure a supply of explosives and to make various experiments with them 
to determine their effectiveness.84 From Tresckow 1s staff at Army Group 
Center, little in the way of active support could be expected, but Tresc-
kow sent Major Ulrich von Oertzen, a close friend, to assist Stauffanberg, 
ha detailed another officer, Lieutenant Heinrich von Lehndorf-Steinort, to 
serve as the link between the army group and the reserves,85and somewhat 
later, Schlabrendorff would travel to Fuehrer Headquarters where he ob-
tained a detailed account of Hitler's daily routine.86 
Although Berlin was the focal point, an equally important center was 
the Army High Com.-nand near Ra.stenburg. As we have noted, Beck and Halder 
had succeeded in appointing some anti-Nazi officers to the General Staff, 
and Stauffenberg now reaped the results of their efforts. Among the re-
cruits were General Eduard Wagner, the First Quartermaster-General, Colo-
nel Alexis von Ronne, Head of the Foreign Armies Section, General Fritz 
Lindemann, Head of the Army Ordnance Department; General Erich Fellgiebel, 
Chief of the Army Signal Corps; and General Helmuth Stieff, Head of the 
Organizational Department.87 
83K ramarz, p. 191. 
84Wheeler-Bennott, p. 589. 
85zeller, pp. 210; 233. 
86schlabrendorff, They Almost Killed Hitler, pp. 101-102. 
87schlabrendorff lists th~se officers, p. 74. 
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Fellgiebel and Stieff typify a problem that will become increasingly 
apparent as this drama reaches its penultimate moment: the uneven quality 
of human material with which Stauffenberg had to work. Stieff, for exam-
ple, had been a moral opponent of Hitler's since the time of the SS exter-
minations in Poland,88and extracts from his subsequent letters indicate 
that he experienced a growing sense of alienation as the FUehrer•s racial 
policy spread across the Balkans, the Baltic States, and Russia.89 How-
ever, this moral impulse did not mean that Stieff was prepared to became 
an assassin or even a particularly determined revolutionary. In his post 
at the Army High Command, Stieff was summoned occasionally to the Fuehrer•e 
daily military briefings, and stauffenberg had repeatedly urged him to use 
this opportunity to kill Hitler. Finally, Stieff "agreed to smuggle a bomb 
into the meeting of October 12 or 14 •••• However, after some considera-
tion he decided not to do it ••• his conscience wa.s not eaay. 1190 
For practical reasons, Stauffenberg, who was the motivating force ror 
the coup, should have been in Berlin on July 20, directing things from the 
War Ministry. But because co-conspirators like Stieff could not aceomodate 
their moral standards to the political necessity for murder,9lstauffenberg 
88see Chapter Three, p. 176. 
89Quotations from Stieff's letters also reveal a continuing gull~ 
motif: 11All of us have brought so much guilt upon ourselves-for we are 
after all co-responsible"--runs a typical passage in Zeller, p. 217. 
90schlabrendorff, quoted in Germans Against Hitler, p. 120~ Stieff 
was not the only conspirator whose rigid interpretation of morality pre-
cluded tyrannicide. General Georg Thomas, a resister from the earliest 
period, would not kill Hitler because, he maintained, his religious be-
liefs made such an act impossible. Georg Thomas, 11Gedeanken und Ereig-
nisse,11 Schweizerische Monatschefte, Heft 9 (December 1945), 548. And 
Werner von Haeften, Stauffenberg 1s aide, also refused to make the attempt 
on religious grounds. Kramarz, p. 151. 
91This extension of Griffin and Cathcart's formulatien has been 
himself would 'finally have to go to Fuehrer Headquarters and play the 
part of assassin. It was as though in a great battle the commanding 
general fought, rifle in hand, in the firing line. 
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Fellgiebel, by contrast, showed himself to better advantage. As 
Chief of the Signal Corps, he was in charge or all military communica-
tions in the Reich; that is, the major switching centers at Fuehrer 
Headquarters, Mauerwald (near Rastenburg), Zossen (the Arm7 High Can-
mand), and the multi-storied bunker at the War Ministry. Because the 
conspirators intended to implement their coup through the mechanical 
transmission or orders, Stauffenberg and Fellgiebel discussed the pos-
sibility of blocking the centers at Fuehrer Headquarters and Mauerwald 
so that Nazi loyalists would not learn what was going on, while keeping 
open the centers at Zossen and the War Ministry so that the conspirators 
would have clear phannels for their own orders.92 Also, because Stauf-
fenberg was going to have to kill Hitler, there would be a three hour 
delay between the assassination and his return to the capital ( the dis-
tance between Fuehrer Headquarters and Berlin was about the same as be-
tween Budapest and Berlin). This time gap was critical since it would 
mentioned before (See Chapter Two, p. lCYl, fn. 154; and Chapter Three, 
pp. 189-190, .fn. 136). Briefly', Griffin writes: ''movements are essen-
tially' political, concerned with governance or dominion ••• and move-
ments are essentially moral-strivings for salvation, perfection, the 
'good. 111 Griffin, 11Dramatistic Theory," p. 465. Both theorists seem 
to assume that moral and political impulses are positively related to 
what Cathcart calls "the creation of dialectical tension. 11 Robert s. 
Cathcart, 11New Approaches to the Study or Movements: Defining Movements 
Rhetorically," Western Speech, XXVI (Spring, 1972), er,. While this as-
sumption may be accurate if each impulse is considered separately, it 
says nothing about the possibility that the two impulses may be incom-
patible in relation to each other, as witness the analysis of Stieff. 
92Kramarz, p. 177; Zeller, pp. 244-245. 
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provide the conspirators with a head start against moves by the SS for 
a countercoup, the nemesis of any conspiracy. Together with two of his 
senior staff officers, General Fritz Thiele and Colonel Kurt Hahn, Fell-
giebel agreed to take charge at Fuehrer Headquarters, flash the word of 
Hitler's assassination to Hahn at Mauerwald, who, in turn, would relay 
the message to Thiele at the War Ministry and General Wagner at Zossen. 
Then Fellgiebel and Hahn would block all further transmissions into or 
out of Fuehrer Headquarters and Mauerwald.93 
'Wheeler-Bennett charges that 11Fellgiebel ••• failed lamentably 
the execution of his task, 11 and without providing a source, includes 
therein the responsibility not only for transmitting the message but 
also for the destruction of the communications center at Fuehrer Head-
quarters.94 Besides the fact that the center was too large and too 
well protected by SS guards to permit its physical destruction, the 
weight of evidence suggests that the Signal Corps Chie~ accomplished 
most of his mission, and under extremely nerve-wracking conditions. 
The shock he must have felt when he saw Hitler emerge all ve from the 
ruins of the shattered 11Lagebaracke 11 (the buil.ding in which military 
conferences were held), can only be guessed at. But Fellgiebel acted 
as though the Fuehrer was dead, flashed the message to Hahn, and with 
the unexpected help of Hitler himself (who naturally wanted no word of 
the attempt to get out), succeeded in blocking the communications cen-
ter-for more than two hours.95 
93zeller, pp. 244-245. 
94wheeler-Bennett, p. 643. 
95aestapo interrogation reports indicate that at 1:00 PM (eight-
een minutes after the bomb exploded), Fellgiebel transmitted the follow-
Stauffenberg's final task of military organization involved build-
ing up the network begun by Oster and Olbricht in the major cities of 
the Reich and occupied Europe. In Paris, the work was simplified be-
cause General Stulpnagel, the City Commandant, was a staunch anti-Nazi 
who had gathered around himself officers of like persuasion. Included 
were Lieutenant-General Hans von Boineburg-Langsfeld, and Lieutenant-
Colonels Friedrich von Tuchert and Caesar von Hofacker--this last named 
a cousin of Stauffenberg•s who served as the contact between Paris and 
Berlin. Later, Stulpnagel would add Eberhard Finckh, the Quartermaster-
General of the Gennan Army in France, and the group would continue to 
grow until it embraced General Alexander Falkenhausen, the Military Com-
mander of Belgium, General Hans Speidel, Field Marshal Rommel's Chief of 
Staff, and Rommel himseu.96 
With the other military districts, the work was not so easy. Some 
of the Wehrkreise Commanders were non-political, or even worse, outright 
Nazis. Also, there was the problem of frequent personnel changes, neces-
sitated by deteriorating conditions at the fronts. In ,these circumstances, 
ing message to Hahn: 11 Something frightful has happened. The Fuehrer is a.-
live. Block everything." Spiegelbild einer Verschworung, ed., Karl Peter 
(Stuttgart, 1961), pp. 63; 329. If it is kept in mind that the lines were 
tapped by the SS, the message appears to be the best Fellgiebel could have 
managed under the circumstances. Further, Hahn succeeded in sending a sim-
ilar message at 1:15 to Wagner at Zossen (who relayed it to Paris; for cor-
roboration, see Wilhelm von Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, trans., R. 
T. Clark (New York, 1956), p. 23.), and to Thiele at the War Ministry. Cor-
roboration for this second message comes from Gisevius, who was in the War 
Ministry, and reports the transmission of the message 11 a few minutes after 
the explosion." Gisevius, p. 544. Undoubtedly, the wording gave some riae 
to second thoughts, but after the attempt had once been made ( "something 
frightful has happened"), it was no time for hesitation or indecision on 
the part of anyone involved. 
96•rhe best account of Stulpnagel I s resistance circle and events in 
Paris on July 20 is Schramm. 
Stauffenberg tried, whenever possible, to recruit men who were in a po-
sition to see if the "Valkyrie" Orders were being carried out, or fail-
ing that, to report any trouble. Ultimately, he would find liaison of-
ficers for thirteen of the seventeen military districts,97although not 
all these men had close relationships with their respective commanders, 
a problem that contributed marginally to the £ailure of the plot. 
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Since many of these recruits were new to the resistance movement, 
it might be instructive to examine Stauffenberg 1s method of winning them 
over.98 One of the officers he talked to describes their conversation: 
We discussed the hopeless military sit~ation, the fact that a 
coup d'etat could do nothing to improve it but would at least 
avoid further bloodshed and the final ghastly chaos. The stig-
ma of the present government must be removed. With particular 
seriousness he added that it was questionable whether the coup 
would succeed, but even worse than failure would be the shame 
of submitting taraely to oppression and allowing oneself to be 
paralyzed by it. Freedom, both internal and external, could 
only be wou by action.99 
From other accounts, it appears that Stauffenberg•s technique was often 
the same, using the worsening military situation as a starting point and 
proceeding from there to compel the potential recruit to draw the obvious 
political conclusion.100 As such, it was less a matter of rhetorical 
97zeller provides a listing and notes that only two or the thir-
teen survived. Zeller, pp. 246-247. 
98This is in keeping with Griffin's suggestion that the critic's 
"task is to isolate the rhetorical movement within the matrix of the his-
torical movement ••• and be able to say this was the pattern of discussion, 
the configuration of discourse ••• peculiar to the movement. 11 Leland M. 
Griffin, 11The Rhetoric Of Historical Movements, 11 Quarterly Journal Of 
Speech, XX.XVII (April, 1952), 185. 
99Kramarz quotes R---- K---, p. 154. 
lOOsee for example, the accounts of Finckh and Hosslin of their 
meetings with Stauffenberg, in Zeller, pp. 221; 222. Or there is Gis-
evius' description of Stauffenberg' s "bent for dialectic." Gisevius, 
p. 510. 
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appeal than a. dialectic search, "forc[f.ni/ the man opposite," as Peter 
Sauerbruch writes, ninto a pitiless examination of the factual position~ 11101 
Occasionally, an officer trould raise an objection, as for instance, when 
Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Bernardis remarked that the fault was not so 
much Hitler's as the men around hi.mo Then Stauffenberg would become an 
interlocutor, advancing an argument which directed the inquiry on to its 
logical conclusion: "Bernardis, it is not the staff; it is the Fuehrer 
himself. 11 l02 
Kramarz notes that Stauffenberg could be utterly candid when neces-
sary, but equally, when he was convinced that the dialectic was going to 
be unproductive, he could turn the discussion into other areas.10J Also~ 
he kept conspiracy groups carefully separated; thus, if anyone should fall 
into the hands of the Gestapo, they would not be able to give away enough 
to endanger the whole plot.104 And Stauffenberg adopted a 11 need to know" 
policy: only a few men were let into all the secrets, such as the proposed 
use of explosives or the assassination of Hitler; more were informed about. 
the need for force-the staging of a coup d'etat; and still more were made 
aware of the seriousness of the situation and the po3aibility of deeiaring 
lOlsaurbruch is quoted in Kramarz, p. 153. 
102The Bernardis-Stauffenberg exchange is quoted in Ibid., p. 153~ 
l03Ibid., p. 154. 
l04Meinecke recounts a meeting with Hermann Kaiser, a Captain in 
the Reserve Army and a member of Stauffenberg's group. Kaiser was inter-
ested in the secret political leagues at the time of the War of Liberation 
against Napoleon, and he asked about the German League of 1812-1813. Al-
though Meinecke did not realize the significance of the question, he told 
Kaiser that the league had been a chain of small cells, each composed of 
three or four like-minded individuals of whom only one lmew anything a-
bout the next cell and its members. Friedrich Meinecke, The German Ca-
tastrophe, trans., Sidney B. Fay (Boston, 1950), pp. 98-99. 
a military emergency.l05 
Such insistence on security had its advantages and disadvantages. 
On the one hand, it meant that the Gestapo never came to suspect the 
growing circle of soldier-conspirators around Stauffenberg, a lack of 
awareness reflected by Himmler's own willingness, in early July 1944, 
to help the severely-handicapped resistance leader carry his heavy 
briefcase--the same one in which he would later place the bomb with 
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which he intended to kill Hitler--into a conference at Fuehrer Head-
quarters.l06 On the other, it meant that the rest of the conspirators, 
military and civilian, were often frustrated by Stauffenberg 1s secrecy.107 
Hassell 1s diaries reveal that he did not even meet Stauffenberg until Nov-
ember 1943, and then the ex-Ambassador's first notation concerns the warn-
ing Stauffenberg g,9.ve him about being "extremely cautious in making state-
ments and meel:.ing people. 11108 Or there is Goerdeler's complaint that 
Stauffenberg would not keep him informed about preparations for the 
l05This is the way Fritz von der Schulenburg described it to Ge-
stapo investigators after the failure of July 20. S2iegelbild, p. 521. 
Interestingly enough, Stauffenberg's system paralleled an order of Hit-
ler's, promulgated in December 1940, in which the Fuehrer laid it do~m 
that no officer could be told more of any plan than was absolutely nec-
essary for its execution. As noted on several previous occasions (Chap-
ter Two, pp. 89-90, fn. 91 and 92; and Chapter Four, p. 245, fn. 46 and 
47, and pp. 274-275, fn. 127), this is one of the ways in which Hitler 
heightened the mystery of Fuhrerprinzip and deepened the divisions be-
tween the various parts of the state hierarchy--divisions that led to 
"misunderstanding, the growth of absurdity and injustice, the increas-
ing loss of communication and identification." Griffin, 11 Dramatistic 
Theory," p. 460. 
106rhis incident is recounted in Hohne, p. 531. 
l07Gisevius reports Helldorf 1 s complaints and describes Stauf-
fenberg as behaving "like a sphinx." Gisevius, PPo 497-498; and a Ge-
stapo interrogation report quotes Hofacker as voicing the same objec-
tion. SEiegelbild, p. 521. 
l08Hassell, p. 336. 
coup.109 And unwittingly, Gisevius discloses the reason for Stauffen-
berg•s security arrangements when he writes of an argument between the 
two of them over his proposed visit to his friend Hans Oster, stil1 un-
der house arrest and close supervision by the Gestapo.110 
The tensions, however, extended beyond Stauffenberg 1s attempts to 
curb the indiscretions of Goerdeler, Hassell, Gisevius, and the others. 
Until Stauffenberg joined the resistance movement, there had been a di-
vision of authority between the soldiers and the civilians, the former 
concentrating on technical preparations for the Fuehrer•s overthrow, 
while the latter concerned themselves with plans for a post-Hitler gov-
ernment.111 But Stauffenberg changed this arrangement. As we have said, 
he was not the average soldier, and his interests in political and social 
problems led him to demand a voice in decisions effecting the future of 
Germ.any. Moreover, while he acknowledged Beck 1s leadersn:i.p and kept him 
informed about plans for the coup,112the older man•s recent illness and 
his preference for thought instead of action,113led him to relinquish 
more and more of the actual leadership to the younger man. Finally, 
Stauffenberg was not without his own contacts in the civilian sector. 
Rudolf Fahrner has been mentioned already, as has Fritz Schulenburg, 
l09Goerdeler 1s criticism is recorded in Kramarz, p. 150. 
llOGisevius, p. 511. 
lllrbid., p. 483. 
112zeller, p. 200. 
113Hassell writes in June 1944: 11Beck was really his old self a-
gain, but this 'old self• has indeed, in the course of time, proved to 
be more a pure 1Clauswitz, 1 without a spark of 1 Blutcher 1 or 1Yorck. 511 
Hassell, p. 347. 
who would arrange tor Stauffenberg to meet Julius Leber.114 And Peter 
Yorck, who was stauffenberg 1s cousin, introduced him to members of the 
Kreisau Circle, among them Alfred Delp, Eugen Gerstenmaier, and Adam 
von Trott.US 
Together with Leber, Trott, Yorck, Fahrner, and his brother Ber-
thold, Stauffenberg forged a new political alliance. In part, this 
merger was due to the similarity in their ages; and in part it was 
the result of their common political views. None of them had any in-
tention of returning Germany to the status quo ~. stauffenberg, 
for example, appears to have thought in terms of a social order in 
which "people fit to govern {.couJ.il be recruited from all sections 
of the population. 11116 This corresponded with Lel?er's view, for 
while he was a socialist, he rejected the dogma ot mass rule, set-
ting against it his doctrine of "fighting personalities," who, no 
matter what th~ir station, should have the right to struggle to the 
pinnacle of the hierarcey.117 Stauffenberg also considered replacing 
the national party system with the "political reality of local com-
munites, vocational groups or associations or common interests which 
should be given a public voice.118 This was not only similar to the 
114Kramarz, p. 126. 
115Gerstenmaier notes stauffenberg•s connection with the Kreisau in Erich H. Boehm, We Survived (New Haven, 1949), p. 183. 
116Fahrner quotes Stauffenberg, in Zeller, p. 196. With the ex-ception of the oath (seep. 337, fn. 45), Stauffenberg•s own writings on foreign and domestic polic7 do not seem to have survived. 
.355. 
117Leber•s position is explained in Willy Brandt, My Road to Ber-l!n ( New York, 1960), p. 40. 
118Fahrner, in Zeller, p. 196. 
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Kreisau principle of decentralization,119but also to Leber's long-standing 
condemnation of the "dead apparatus of political. parties.. • .{:rith theii/ 
outdated formulas and slog ans. 11 l20 Moreover., Sta.uff e:nberg a.ffirmed that 
"even in political life, man cannot prosper without a.llegiance to Goct,nl21 
a position not unlike that of the Kreisauers who insisted that the churches 
influence be felt in every sphere of life, 122and while Leber distrusted 
clerical ambitions, he was the only deputy of the Social Democratic Party 
who had refused to leave the church and he supported religious education 
for the young.123 
As a soldier, Stauffenberg favored maintaining Germany's military es-
tablishment which he deemed necessary for the preservation of national se-
curity, though he urged the formation of an alliance between the nations 
of Europe.124 This was in keeping with Trott and Yorek's proposal-de-
feated at the second Kreieau conference-for a supra..~ational £ederation, 
but with restricted authority, which would allow the individuals members 
to fulfill their functions as sta.tes.125 And surpri.singly enough, Leber, 
unlike so many of his fellow socialists, was not opposed to a standing ar-
my since, as,he put it, a sovereign state could not remain defenseless.126 
ll9see Chapter Four, pp. 273-277. 
120teber is quoted in Brandt, p. 40. 
121Fahrner, in Zeller, p. 195. 
122see Chapter Four, pp. 270-271. 
123Ritter, p. 201. 
124zeller, pp. 206; 195. 
125see Chapter Four, p. 276. 
126Leber 1s position is in Brandt, Po 40. 
Concerning the place of industrialization and technology, Stauffenberg 
argued that "notwithstanding their importance, they must serve the com-
munity and ••• not become men's masters, 11127a statement which accorded 
with the Kreisau concern over finding ways to protect the individual 
from being overwhelmed by impersonal forces, whatever their name.128 
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But most of all, what drew these men together was their resolve to act. 
Stauffenberg•s determination in this respect has already been discussed. 
Trott, who was offered asylum on several of his visits to neutral coun-
tries, always gave the same answer: "Germ.an honor would never recover 
unless it could be said that there were men with resolution and courage 
to rise against the worst of their tyrants. 11129 Leber is recorded as 
saying: "To bring about a coup, I'd be willing to make a pact with the 
devil. 11130 And after the failure of the attempt, Yorck would write his 
wife: 11We meant to kindle a torch. ,,l3l 
The Gestapo interrogation reports stress the tensions caused by 
Stauffenberg's move into the political side of the resistance.132 His 
main opponent was, of course, Goerdeler. Since the movement's incep-
tion, the former Mayor had rationalized it, uniting its various factions 
127Fahrner, in Zeller, p. 196. 
128see Chapter Four, pp. 273-277. 
129Albrecht von Kessel paraphrases Trott•s response in Christopher 
Sykes, Tormented Loyalty (New York, 1969), p. 422. 
13°teber is quoted in Zeller, p. 232. 
131Yorck 1s farewell letter to his wife is in Dying We Live: The Fi-
ne_l Messages and Records of the Resistance, ed., Helmut Gollwitzer, Kathe 
Kunn, and Reinhold Schneider, trans., Reinhard C. Kuhn (New York, 1956), 
p. 134. 
132spiegelbild, pp. 177; 179; and 211. 
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and providing it with a political program which, especially after the di-
alogue with the Kreisauers, was anything but reactionary. Thus, he re-
sponded with hostility as Stauffenberg staked out his claims, and he is 
reported to have said that the young officer was an "obstinate fellow 
who wanted to play politics. 11133 
The fault, however, did not lie entirely with Stauffenberg. For 
example, Goerdeler 1s new "progressive" image was not enhanced when he 
raised one of his favorite ideas with Stauffenberg--that of restoring 
the monarchy--for which, needless to say, he found no support.134 Also, 
there was Goerdeler's continuing opposition to assassination, a stance 
which, narrowly conceived, had all the merits of the moral high ground, 
but which equally failed to account for the fact that no activity is au-
tonomous; that each is part of a larger field of action--in this case, 
political necessity. Nor did Stauffenberg lightly approach the need 
for tyrannicide. His widow writes that it was a question of conscience: 
he had to struggle with himself before he found moral justification.135 
More than Goerdeler, however, Stauffenberg understood that a coup had 
little chance of succeeding while Hitler was alive. With many of the 
soldiers, the Fuehrer 1 s "spell" had scarcely diminished, and there was 
the problem of the oath--a vow made "before God" which pledged them to 
"unconditional obedience" until death. Finally, the very atmosphere 
that each man created contributed to the tension between them. Stauf-
fenberg, as we have seen, preferred a dialectic approach, he wrote very 
133aoerdeler is quoted in Ritter, p. 249. 
134Kramarz, p. 159. 
135111etter from Grafin Nina von Stauffenberg," November 12, 1965. 
little, he was extremely reserved, and when he was deeply moved, he 
would give vent to his feelings late at night, alone or with his near-
est friends, by quoting poetry.136 Goerdeler, by contrast, was tire-
less in his search for collaborators, frequently speaking to more peo-
ple about the "decent Germany11 than was neceS'sa.ry, he wrote reams or 
memoranda, some of which would prove to be his undoing,137he is not 
known to have had an aesthetic bent, and as John writes, he was 11apt 
to tum a discussion into a lecture. 11138 
The strife between the two resistance leaders could have splin-
tered the movement at a critical moment if thsy had not been willing 
to search for common ground.139 With Goerdeler, it was the effort, 
once his initial hostility had passed, to try and eliminate misunder-
standings. He asked Joseph Wirmer to contact Stau:ffenberg in the hope 
that, being Im .. ,ch the same age, Wirmer would be a.ble to explain that his 
plans looked not to the past but to the future.140 Jacob Kaiser and 
Wilhelm Leuschner also exercised a conciliatocy in:f'luence, mediating 
l36see Grafin Stauffenberg's account oC her husband reciting po-
etry late at night after an air raid~ in Zeller, p. 425. 
137Goerdeler once forgot a briefcase full of' resistance material 
at a hotel, and the Gestapo was helped immeasurably when they found it 
after July 20. Boveri, pp. 196-197. 
l38John, p. 78. 
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l39Griffin warns that "there is a danger that the movement, as its 
ranks increase, will 1splinter'--fail to achieve solidarity, merger; that 
the myth which prefigures the Purpose of the movement, imperfectly convey-
ed or received ••• will yield in the minds or a crucia1 number of converts 
••• to an impious new vision of Order. 11 Grit.fin, 11 Dramatistic Theory, 11 
pp. 465-466. 
140icramarz, pp. 160-161. 
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between the two men.141 And Beck took a hand in smoothing out troublesol.42 
With Stauffenberg, it was not only the discovery that Goerdeler•s program 
was very similar to his own, but also that the former Mayor was an equally 
strong advocate of action. Hassell notes that Goerdeler had his faults-
he was too sanguine and too imprudent: "It is a relief, though, to speak 
with a man who wants to act. 11143 Goerdeler 1s tragedy consists in the fact 
that given his temperament, he was always condemned to urge others, to act 
at one-remove. But that did not diminish his resolve, and combined with 
Stauffenberg's lack of ideological rigidity--"! know no ideas," he once 
said, 11 only men 11144--the tension was reduced to such an extent that Has-
sell, late in 1943, was able to characterize the movement, optimistically 
perhaps, as a "band of brothers. 11145 
An indication of the new solidarity was Beck's request that Goerdeler, 
together with Leber, Leuschner, and Kaiser, draw up a final list of minis-
ters for a provisional government. Cabinet making can be an extremely par-
tisan enterprise, especially when each participant is convinced of the mer-
its of his own nominees, and-it is really rather extraordinary, as Ritter 
writes, that the building of a united front by men of such diverse politi-
cal views was possible.146 There was, of course, general agreement that 
Beck be named Head of State. More controversial was the choice of 
141zeller, pp. 272-273. 
142 6 Kramarz, p. 11. 
143Hassell, p. 58. 
144stauffenberg is quoted in Boveri, p. 283. 
145 Hassell, p. 327. 
146 Ritter, p. 253. 
Goerdeler as Chancellor, but Leber, the only other candidate, withdrew 
his name from consideration because he thought it would not look right 
for a socialist to appear in the forefront of a post-Hitler government, 
and he took the post of Interior Minister instead.147 Leuschner was 
nominated as Vice Chancellor, Hassell as Foreign Minister, Winner as 
Minister of Justice, Paul Lejeune-Jung as Minister of Economics, Eu.gen 
Boltz as Minister of Culture, Andreas Hennes as Minister of Agriculture, 
General Hoepner as Minister of War, and General Fellgiebel as Minister 
of Posts.148 
361. 
This government represented the entire spectrum of the resistance 
movement, from the conservative right to the socialist left. But to a-
void any suspicion of political bias, Goerdeler and the others named as 
administrative assistants to each cabinet minister men of different po-
litical persuasions. Thus, Theo Haubach was nominated as State Secre-
tary to Goerdeler, Peter Yorck to Leuschner, Fritz Schulenburg to Leber, 
Stauffenberg to Hoepner, and so on. As one of his last '·circuit rides," 
Goerdeler undertook the responsibility of visiting all of those involved 
and securing their consent. For most, an affirmative answer meant a 
death sentence, since the Gestapo discovered the list after the failure 
of the coup and only five of the thirty-five survived.149 
Another important undertaking was the drafting of emergency proc-
lamations, radio speeches, and special decrees for the period immediately 
147Kramarz, pp. 159-160. Undoubtedly, part of Leber•s motivation 
was fear of creating another "Dolchstoss, 11 as the socialists had done in 
1918. 
148.rhe entire list of ministers is in Zeller, ppQ 250-251. 
149J.lli., p. 250. 
following the overthrow of Hitler.150 Nearly everyone contributed: Beck, 
Stauffenberg, and Witzleben prepared appeals to the armed forces, while 
Goerdeler, Hassell, Leber, Leuschner, and Wirmer wrote statements tor 
the civilian population. As with the cabinet nominees, it was not al-
ways easy to reach a consensus. Goerdeler,, for example, corrected Staur-
fenberg1s proclamations in order to show how unusable they were,151.and 
Leber is reported to have said that he lacked the patience to listen to 
the end of some of Goerdeler's drarts.152 But the intent behind each or 
the declarations was the same. The nation had to be told the truth about 
Hitler's tyranny-his mass murders, his reign of terror, his blasphemous 
delusions, his obsession with conquest: "You shall learn the truth about 
the criminals and their crimes •••• You will then be in a position to 
realize that monstrosities have taken place." Also, the motives of the 
resisters had to be made clear: 11We would be unworthy of our fathers, and 
would earn the contempt of our children, if we lacked the courage to do 
everything conceivable to achieve self-respect once more." Then, the 
line had to be drawn between decent Germans and the others: 11No one with 
a clear conscience need be afraid. We are not dealing with the question 
of members of the party or members or the peopl.e. Away with these dis-
tinctions. • • • We are dealing with the question of decent or indecent." 
l50rn English, the most accessible copies of these appeals are in 
Germans Against Hitler, pp. 162-169 (from which all of the excerpts used 
in this narrative have been taken); Schlabrendorff, They Almost Killed 
Hitler, pp. 83-90; and Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 724-743. These appeals are 
yet another example of what Griffin means by ria_ stand, a •standing to-
gether,' an understanding. It may be called a ••• proclamation, declar-
ation, tract for the times, statement, or counterstatement. 11 Griffin, 
11 Dramatistic Theory," pp. 462-463. 
151Ritter, p. 256. 
152Ibid. -
And finally, the people had to know what the future held: 
Our goal is a true community ••• based upon respect, readiness 
to help, and social justice. We seek fear of God ••• justice 
and freedom ••• truth and cleanliness. We want to restore our 
honor, and thereby our reputation in the community of peopleso 
We want to contribute our best strength to heal the wounds 
that this war has inflicted on peoples everywhere, and to re-
vive trust among them •••• The task is enormously difficult. 
We will have to work hard •••• But we shall travel this road 
as a free people in decency, and we shall find peace of con-
science once more. 
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The final political task (and it was a hopeless one) involved mak-
ing yet another effort to determine whether there existed any possibility 
of an understanding with the Western Allies. On this question, Stauffen-
berg in his inexperience, and Goerdeler in his illusions, were fundamen-
tally agreect.153 Great Britain and the United States, by virtue of their 
cultural and spiritual heritage, were much closer to the thinking of the 
anti-Nazis than the Soviet Union. Also, there was the seemingly endless 
problem of the generals, for whom agreement with the Allied Governments 
was essential if they were to overcome their patriotic scruples.154 Yet~ 
as we have seen, neither of the Western Powers had made any attempt since 
l53Kramarz, p. 160. 
l54These reasons for attempting to reach a modus vivendi seem so 
compelling that surprise can be expressed when a critic like George Ro-
moser suggests that the resisters were politically mistaken in trying to 
ascertain Allied attitudes; that they should have acted without seeking 
assurances. George K. Romoser, 11The Politics Of Uncertainty: The German 
Resistance Movement," Social Research, XXIl (Spring, 1964), 78. In the 
last analysis, the resisters did act without any prior agreements. But 
more importantly, the charge of unrealistic politics could be properly 
lodged against them only if they had made no efforts, given the exigen-
cies they faced. This is not to say that the Allied Governments were 
without their own concerns, perhaps the greatest of which was ending 
the Fuehrer I s claims to "die ganze Welt. 11 But the duty to commit po-
li tical suicide cannot be postulated of any incipient movement, even 
if the existing order is led by Adolf Hitler. 
1940 to give assurances on which the opposition could have counted.155 
Thus, the resistance leaders prepared to play their last political card: 
their fear, which they hoped the Anglo-American Governments shared, of 
Russian domination in Central Europe-a domination which still might be 
countered by a strong Germany; or failing that, to threaten dealings with 
the Soviets who, in their public statements at least, appeared to indicate 
a willingness to meet opposition overtures halfway.156 
Envoys were dispatched: otto John to Madrid, Trott to Sweden, and Gis-
evius, who was already in Switzerland, to explain these alternatives to the 
Western representatives in the hope that it would impel them to negotiate. 
In every case, the answer was the same. John writes that he was told by 
a member of the British Embassy that "instructions had been received from 
l55see Chapter Four, pp. 265-269; and 301-303. 
l56For the Soviet position, see Ibid., p. 297. Since the end of 
the Second World War, Gisevius has argued that Stauffenberg, Leber, and 
Trott were not employing the threat of negotiations with the Russians as 
a tact,ical manoeuvre, but that they seriously intended "all political ac-
tivity to be directed to the East. 11 Gisevius, pp. 486-487; and 508-5ll. 
In part, Gisevius' interpretation is attributable to his dislike for 
Stauffenberg, whose increasing importance necessarily lessened the role 
of Gisevius' friend Goerdeler; and in part it is the result of Gisevius 
having been in Switzerland where he was not fully informed about resist-
ance decisions. That the threat to treat with the Russians was a bluff 
is attested to by any number of sources. Hassell, for example, writes: 
"I see in this new game of playing with both sides the only real oppor-
tunity for the new regime, but not in the sense of double-dealing. The 
manifestation of fairness toward England is vital. 11 Hassell, p. 327. 
Leber, who was the most realistic, is reported to have said that it was 
illusory to imagine that Gennany could drive a wedge into the enemy co-
alition, and that it was wrong to attempt to win by some clever tactic 
the support of one side or the other. Brandt, p. 139. After his visit 
to Sweden, Trott came to the conclusion that the 11 Free Germany Committee" 
was no more than a vehicle for Soviet propaganda. Sykes, p. 427. And 
Kramarz states that 11 Stauffenberg never considered compromlsing with the 
Soviet Union." Kramarz, p. 16J. 
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London forbidding any further contact with emissaries of the German op-
position. 11157 In Sweden, Trott was informed that 11any contact with the 
Germans who might seek to get rid of the Nazis and shorten the war was 
forbidden. 11158 And in Switzerland, Allen Dul.les told Gisevius "that it 
was 'one' war and that there would be •oneg peace-with the West and the 
East. 11159 
When this uniformly- negative answer reached Berlin, it dashed the 
hopes of even the most optimistic. 11Unconditiona1 surrender, uncondi-
tional surrender, like a broken gramophone record," Trott said. "That 
is the only echo which comes back across our border from the West. Bllt 
we have to face it. 11160 Leber, who had expected n.othing else, agreed, 
although he argued that a coup still might alter the political situation 
to the extent that the Allies would recognize the resistance leadership 
as worthy, if not equal partners in negotiations.161 Surprisingly e-
nough, stauffenberg was the most unwilling to accept these pessimistic 
forecasts, and as we shall see, after the Anglo-American invasion of 
Normandy, he laid plans with Rommel and Kluge for opening up the west-
ern front while holding in the east, an act which would! secure essen-
tially the same results militarily that had been denied politically.162 
157John, p. 134. 
l58sykes quotes Ewan Butler, a member of the British Legation; p. 415. 
159nu11es, p. 133. 
l60rrott is quoted in Christabel Bielenberg, Ride Out the Dark (New York, 1971), p. 142. 
l6l1eber' s position is stated in Kramarz., p. 166s 
162zeller, pp. 273-274. 
From this time on, however, a different note begins to enter the 
rhetoric of the resisters--a note at once fatalistic and yet purified 
of all but the highest motives. Wirmer is reported to have said that 
political concerns were no longer important; the members of the first 
government would be liquidators.163 Meinecke quotes Beck as saying: 
11There is no deliverance. We Jm?-St now drain little by little the bit-
ter cup to the very bitterest end. 11164 Hassell records the results of 
a meeting between himself' and Goerdeler: 11We believe that in spite of 
everything it is imperative, for moral reasons ••• that an attempt be 
made. 11165 And Stauffenberg, who would decide personally to assassinate 
Hitler, was, unconsciously perhaps, transforming his own motives from 
the kill to sacrifice and purification. Fahrner was visiting him dur-
ing this period and recalls the way he put it: 
If we acted now we could still save a lot of property and much 
more human life--and not only of Germans. But even heavier was 
the knowledge that the whole affair was not a matter of outward 
success. It was a ~ommand of moral purification and honor that 
had to be obeyed.16o 
Presently, we will discuss the effects of this fatalism upon the 
events of July 20, but as noted previously, this transformation, or di-
alectic transcendence, represents the final moments of the drama for 
Stauffenberg and the others: Victimage and Mortification, Catharsis 
and Redemption. Clearly, the decision to kill Hitler is a manifesta-
tion of victimage, not only in the sense that he deserved to die-that 
163wirmer•s position is stated in John, pp. 144-145. 
164Meinecke, p. 101. 
165Hassell, p. 322. 
166Fahrner is quoted in Zeller, p. 289. 
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he was the 11Anti-Christ 11 who had transgressed all boundaries of politics 
and ethics,167but also in a persuasive sense-that his death would pro-
voke action, 11 convert the estranged /f,he undecided militarz] to 1tum 
toward' the movement !J.i/ increasing numbers.n168 Victimage, however, 
can merge into its opposite--mortification, or self-victimage,169as 
when men begin to realize, :iJnperfectly perhaps, that they may fail 
practically but succeed symbolically--a kind of pure persuasion,170or 
perfect act of martyrdom, a totally voluntary self-sacrifice enacted 
in atonement for their own and other's guilt. This is mortification, 
catharsis, and redemption reduced to one moment, and its outlines are 
already discernible in the resister's statements. 
The analysis can be extended further. Earlier in this act, we 
said that Henning von Tresckow would respond at a critical time and 
reveal the moral basis of the July 20 Attentat.171 That time came 
167aurke characterizes this kind of scapegoat as "worthy legal-
istically.11 Literary Form, p. 35. 
168crriffin, 11Dramatistic Theory," p. 464. 
169Burke calls this the 11imbiguity of sacrifice and kill •••• 
One or the other of this pair may be stressed as the •essence• of the 
two." Literary Fo:ny., p. 40. 
17°rn A Rhetoric Of Motives, Burke talks about a persuasion which 
"involves the saying of something, not for an extra-verbal advantage to 
be got by the saying, but because of a satisfaction intrinsic to the say-
ing." Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric Of Motives (New York, 1955), p. 269. 
171see p. JJ5. John Wheeler-Bennett specifically denies the men 
of July 20 any ground in the moral arena: 11They were no squalid band of 
traitors in the pay of the enemy, plotting to destroy their country from 
motives of gain or pique or jealousy. Nor were they, in the main, in-
spired by any higher motives than the destruction of a Leader and a re-
gime whom they had followed and tolerated as long as he brought them ad-
vantage but concerning whom, at various stages along the way, they had 
been disillusioned •••• 11 Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 592-593. In the last 
act and again in this one, we have explained how the resisters lost any 
when Stauffenberg, despite his public words of encouragement to the 
doubters, 172began to weaken inwardly in his own resolve. He wrote 
Tresckow, asking whether it made any sense to continue with the plot 
now that its political justification was gone. In reply, Tresckow 
upheld the need for assassination at whatever cost: 
Even should it fail, the attempt ••• must be undertaken. We 
must prove to the world and to future generations that the men 
of the German Resistance Movement dared to take the decisive 
step and to hazard their lives upon it~ Compared to this, 
nothing else matters.173 
And Stauffenberg, heartened by this answer, declared: 11 It must be 
done, coute que coute. 11174 Finally, when it was plain that the re-
volt had failed, Tresckow•s last statement to Schlabrendorff, while 
more eloquent perhaps than any of the others, makes clear the reasons 
why the resisters acted and why they would die: 
In a few hours time I shall be before God, answering for my 
actions and my omissions, and I shall uphold with a clear 
conscience all that I have done in the fight against Hitler. 
God promised Abraham to spare Sodom should there be found ten 
just men in the city. He will, I trust, spare Germany for our 
sake a~d not destroy her.175 
In examining the political and moral dimensions of the resistance 
movement during the months prior to July 20, we have neglected to look 
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real political basis for opposing Hitler. Thus, to accept Wheeler-Ben-
nett's argument would be to leave them without any impulse for opposing 
in this last critical moment, an impossibility in any case and one which 
Tresckow 1s answer disproves. 
172Hassell, p. 336. 
173Tresckow 1s response is quoted in Schlabrendorff, Ther Almost 
Killed Hitler, p. 103. 
l74stauffenberg is quoted in Germans Against Hitler, P• 276. 
175Tresckow 1s statement is quoted in Schlabrendorff, Thei Almost 
Killed Hitler, p. 120. 
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at what Cathcart calls "reciprocity or dialectical enjoinment, 11176not so 
much in the way he intends it-as an exchange of appeal and counterappea1 
that generates a rising and decisive tide of discourse, but in a way no 
less rhetorical--as a series of attempts to kill Hitler and counter-at-
tempts by the Gestapo to destroy the conspiracyl77--a kind of dialectic 
thrust and parry that will bring us to Stauffenberg's trips to Fuehrer 
Headquarters in July 1944, the last of which provides the frame for this 
act. 
We have already recounted Tresckow's unsuccessful effort in the ear-
ly autumn of 1943 to lure Hitler back to Army Group Center, and we have 
discussed Stieff's unwillingness to play the part of an assassin at a 
military conference in mid-October. In November, a third attempt was 
made. This time, the opportunity arose when the army decided to intro-
duce a new uniform into service and Hitler, with his fetish for details, 
wished to give it a personal inspection. Accordingly, Stauffenberg made 
plans, not only for the inspection but also for the Fuehrer•s death. A 
young front-line officer, Axel von dem Bussche, volunteered to model the 
uniform while carrying two bombs secreted in the pockets. At an appropri-
ate moment, he would leap at Hitler, seize him, and at the same time trig-
ger the bombs. On several occasions during the following week~, final ar-
rangements were made for the inspection date, but each time, Hitler unex-
pectedly cancelled his appearance, a state of affairs which continued until 
176cathcart, 87. 
177Griffin writes that "killing is rhetorical, whether it is in the order of Victimage or Mortification." Griffin, 11Dramatistic Theory, 11 
p. 464. And Burke, of course, discusses the rhetorical and dialectical 
aspects of the kill in many of his books~ See for example, Literacy Form, 
PP~ 34-43; Rhetoric, pp. 260-267; Permanence and Change (Los Altos, 1965), 283-294; and A Grammar Of Motives (Berkeley, 1969), pp. 406-408. 
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the end of the month when an Allied air raid destroyed both the inspection 
site and the uniform models, and the whole idea was discarded.178 In De-
cember, a fourth attempt was made. Shortly after Christmas, a meeting on 
manpower reserves was scheduled at Fuehrer Headquarters, and Olbricht, on 
a plea of ill-health, arranged for Stauffenberg to take his place. With 
a bomb in his briefcase, he made his way to the ante-room of the conference 
building, only to discover that the meeting had been cancelled at the last 
minute.179 Finally, in January 1944, another uniform inspection was sched-
uled. This time, Stauffenberg talked with the son of E~ald von Kleist, a 
prominent anti-Nazi,180who agreed, after discussing it with his father, to 
sacrifice himself. But once again, the Fuehrer postponed the inspection 
date, and finally cancelled it altogether.181 
The irre~larity of Hitler's few public appearances combined with his 
increasing penchant for remaining secluded at his headquarters near Rasten-
burg, made it necessary for the conspirators to learn about his routine ao 
that they could determine if there was some predictable moment when he 
could be assassinated. Schlabrendorff, who sometimes visited Fuehrer Head-
quarters, went to Rastenburg to explore the scene and obtain a copy of Hit-
ler's daily schedule. What he found was not encouraging. There, in the 
middle of a gloomy forest, reminiscent, as Jodl puts it, of a "cloister 
178wheeler-Bennett records this attempt, based upon an interview 
with von dem Bussche, pp. 590-591. 
l79Dulles, whose source is probably Gisevius, recounts this at-
tempt, p. 69. 
180For some of Kleist's activities in the resistance movement, 
see Chapter Two, pp. 124-127. 
181zeller, pp. 265-266. 
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and concentration camp, 11 182the Fuehrer lived for weeks on end, surrounded 
by minefields, barbed wire, and guards. 
Specifically, there were three Sperrkreise, or fortified perimeters, 
each concentrically smaller, and each broken by a check point at which 
guards demanded a new password each day. The outer enclosure was for-
tified with watchtowers and contained a railway station$ tank park, and 
a teahouse~where Hitler occasionally entertained guests~ The middle en-
closure housed the barracks of all camp personnel, the main dining hall, 
and the local communications center of the signal corps. The inner-en-
closure, or 11Wolfsschanze, 11 belonged to the Fuehrer alone, and contained 
his living quarters and private dining room, a kennel for his dogs, and 
a 11Lagebaracke, 11 or situation building where the daily war briefings 
were held .183 
From Colonel Dietrich von Bose, another or the conspirators, Schlab-
rendorff obtained a detailed account of Hitler•s daily schedule. The Fueh-
rer got up at ten in the morning, was provided breakfast by a servant, read 
& selection of translated excerpts from the foreign press supplied by Rib-
bentrop, and saw his adjutants around eleven. At one, he held a military 
conference with his army chiefs, lunched at two, often delaying his guests 
with monologues until four, slept until six or seven, and then gave offi-
cial audiences. Dinner was at eight--often another two hour meal, and af-
terwards, there was yet another monologue, usually lasting until four in 
182Jodl is quoted in TMWC, xv, p. 283. 
183The plan of Fuehrer Headquarters is in Germans Against Hitler, 
p. 121. 
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the morning, during which he talked to trusted friends.184 
It was apparent to Stauffenberg that the only way to kill Hitler was 
to gain access to his one o 1clock military briefings. That was when he 
approached Stieff,_only to have the Head of the Organizational Department 
lose his courage at the last moment. Another possibility involved secur-
ing an appointment to the Fuehrer 1s military staff, but Hitler, ever sus-
picious, gave an order forbidding any transfers to his headquarters unless 
he was told about them personally.185 Nor was the Fuehrer alone in his 
mistrust. Other Nazi leaders were becoming increasingly aware that some 
sort of plot was being planned against them. Early in November 1943, Goeb-
bels is quoted as saying: "I cannot tell whether it is a conspiracy with a 
defined purpose and a defined organization. 11186 And in his diary, he wrote: 
11The English and Americans are again talking about a general's plot •••• 
It is very suspicious that, whenever the enemy speaks of a domestic crisis 
in the Reich, he always thinks of the generals. 11187 Himmler, however, bad 
more than suspicions. In mid-November, he told Goebbels "about the exist-
ence of a group of enemies of the state, among whom are Halder and possi-
bly Popitz. rrl88 This was the result of the earlier Langbehn affair as 
well as a more recent Gestapo investigation of a peripheral opposition 
184schlabrendorff, They Almost Killed Hitler, pp. 100-101. 
185General Warlimont, to whom the order was given, writes that 
Hitler's reason for issuing it was "his fear of an attempt on his life." 
Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters 1939-45, trans., R.H. 
Barry (New York, 1964), p. 48. 
lS6Goebbels is quoted in Roger Manvell & Heinrich Fraenkel, TI!! 
July Plot (London, 1964), p. 86. 
187Goebbels, p. 559. 
188Ibid., pp. 570-571. 
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group known as the Solf Kreis, the effects 0£ which would reach as far as 
the inner-councils of the conspiracy. 
In late September, a Gestapo agent posing as a Swiss, attended a tea-
party at the home of Hanna Solf, the widow of Imperial Germany I s last for-
eign minister. Among the guests that afternoon was otto Kiep from the Ab-
~' who talked indiscretely about his associate Ludwig Gehre, while~ 
Solt and some of the others entrusted the agent with letters to friends in 
Switzerland, one of which contained an incriminating reference to General 
Halder.189 For months, Himmler circled his prey, tapping their telephones 
and opening their mail, hoping to enlarge his• catch in "this nest of sedi-
tion. 11 And he was duly rewarded. In January, Helmuth van Moltke learned 
the real identity of the agent and called Kiep to warn him.190 That was 
when Himmler struck, arresting Moltke, Kiep, and the other guests at the 
tea-party. Gehre luckily managed to escape, moving from one hideout to 
another, and growing a mustache to change his appearance.191 Halder was 
placed under observation at home. 
Kiep•s arrest and Gehre 1s flight again focussed suspicion on the Ab-
~- Nor was it lessened any when, late in January, two of its agents 
in Istanbul refused an order to'return to Berlin. They were Erich and 
Elisabeth Vermehren who, while not members of the resistance, were out-
spoken critics of the Fuehrer and his 11New Order." Rather than face im-
prisonment and possible death in Germany, they asked for asylum with the 
189For the full story of the Solf tea-party, see the account by Lagi von Ballestrom Solf, in Boehm, pp. 132-148. 
19°For details of Moltke•s part in the affair, see Michael Bal-four and Julian Frisby, Helmuth von Moltke (London, 1972), pp. 296-298. 
191John recounts the details of Gehre 1s escape and adventures underground, pp. 134-13?. 
British and were taken to England where, unfortunately, stories of their 
defection, somewhat embellished by reports that they had taken the Abwehr 
code book, were widely publicized in the press.192 For Hitler, it was the 
last straw. He summoned Canaris to the 11Wolfsschanze 11 and heaped abuse up-
on him, accusing him of helping to lose the war. And when Himmler suggested 
that the Gestapo could do a more effective job of intelligence-gathering, 
the Fuehrer signed an order abolishing the Abwehr and transferring its per-
sonnel and functions to the Gestapo Security Service.193 Canaris ceased 
to be Chief of Army Intelligence, and his post, truncated beyond all re-
cognition, devolved to Colonel Georg Hansen, who, fortunately, was an-
other member of the conspiracy. He would manage to keep alive a rump op-
position cell in the very center of Hitler I s Praetorian Guard until after 
July 20, but any hope the resisters still harbored ror making the Abwehr 
an agency of change in the Third Reich was finished. And while Canaris 
was given a sinecure as Head of the Economies War Department, Himmler 
left him with little doubt that his and the other resister•s days were 
numbered. As the Reichsfuhrer put it, he now knew who was behind the 
opposition to the regime and "he was going to deal effectively with such 
men as Beck and Goerdeler. 11194 
The months from January to July became a death struggle between the 
Gestapo and the resisters, the one trying to ferret out the exact design 
192The Vermerhren Affair is discussed in Karl Abshagen, Canaris, 
trans., Alan Brodrick (London, 1956), pp. 237-238; and Ian Colvin, Chief 
Of Intelligence (London, 1951), pp. 181-185~ After the war the Vermehr-
ens told Colvin that they had not taken the code book. 
193Abshagen, pp. 238-239. 
194Himmler1s statement to Canaris is quoted in Schlabrendorff, They 
Almost Killed Hitler, p. 97. 
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of the plot, the others looking anxiously for an opportunity to strike~ 
while from the periphery of the scene, events were moving to defeat both 
groups as Russian attacks moved steadily closer to the old Polish fron-
tier and Anglo-American armies prepared for the invasion of France. 
With the resisters, the tensions are indicated by Leuschner•s com-
plaint that the colonels were having second thoughts just like the gen-
erals before them.195 Or there was Gehre 1 s warning that if the Gestapo 
caught him, he would "blow the whole Bendlerstrasse shop sky high," a 
threat, John explains, which was intended to accelerate the coup.196 
I 
Beck's home in Lichterfelde was under close surveillance until an air 
raid destroyed the other houses on the block, including the one requi-
sitioned by the Gestapo so that they could photograph visitors.197 And 
Goerdeler, though not yet under arrest, was forced to maintain a low pro-
file, which meant staying out of Berlin.198 
The first good news was that the conspiracy had gained another Field 
Marshal to replace Kluge. This was Erwin Rommel, the most popular of Hit-
ler1s generals, and the Commander of Army Group Bin France. In November 
1943, Rommel had been assigned to inspect and strengthen the western de-
fenses of 11 Festung Europa." What he saw along the Atlantic Wall must have 
convinced him that the army, composed as it was of "Positional Formations 0 
(i.e., equipped with horse-drawn transport), or in some cases, of divisions 
consisting entirely of men with flat feet or stomach ailments, stood very 
195Ritter, p. 270. 
196John, p. 137. 
l97Gisevius, p. 516. 
l98Hassell, p. 340 
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little chance of repelling a determined assault.199 And at his head-
quarters, Rommel found himself in a hotbed of resistance activity. We 
have already mentioned General Stulpnagel, the City Commandant of Paris, 
who had served as an instructor with Rommel at the Dresden Infantry School 
before the war. And there was Hans Speidel, Rommel's Chief of Staff, who 
had been such a severe critic of the regime that Hitler had earlier ex-
pelled him from the Luftwaffe and returned him at reduced rank to the ar-
mf200 
Caught between the importunings of these two officers and his own 
knowledge that the front would not hold, Romme1's attitude began to un-
dergo a change. Speidel reports that the Marshal, who until then had 
been largely apolitical, now began to read Hitler's Mein Kampf, and was 
especially struck by the passage used to introduce this act: 11If, by the 
instrument of government power, a nationality is led to its destruction, 
then rebellion is not only the right of every member of such a people, 
it is his duty. 11201 To accelerate this change., Stulpnagel and Speidel 
contacted the resisters in Berlin, and an old friend of Goerdeler and 
Romm.el, Dr. Carl Stroelin, the Mayor of Stuttgart, arranged to visit 
the Marshal. Their meeting was held in Rommel's home at Herrlingen, 
near Ulm. Stroelin did most of the talking, but limited himself to 
military matters, supporting his remarks about Germany's worsening 
situation with facts and figures from the other fronts, prepared for 
I him by the officer-conspirators at the War Ministry. He insists that 
l99Goerlitz, p. 454. 
200ibid., p. 456. 
201Hans Speidel, Invasion 1944 (New York, 1968), p. 71. 
he said nothing about assassination (an act which Rommel opposed), but 
he did put the issue of revolt squarely before the Marshal: 11You are our 
greatest and most popular general •••• You a.-re the only one who can 
prevent civil war in Germany-. You must lend your name to the movement." 
And Rommel, after thinking about it for some time, replied: "I believe 
it is my duty to come to the rescue of Germany.n202 
Upon returning to France, Rommel again talked with Stulpnagel and 
Speidel and the three of them sought to in.f'luence Field Marshal Rund-
stedt, Commander-in-Chief, West. But that old soldier wquld have noth-
ing to do with a conspiracy. He said to Rommel.: 11You are young. You 
know and love the people. You do it.n20J And Rommel did, although in 
his own way. In meetings with Speidel, he made it plain that he opposed 
assassination, but he was willing to make plans to arrest Hitler and se-
cure an armistice on the western front, if the P.~ehrer would not listen 
to reason. 204 This was not quite consistent with Stau£fenberg1s ideas, 
part of which involved an armistice, and part of which included Hitler's 
death. Another meeting, this time between Stroelin and Speidel in late 
May, did nothing to resolve the issue, so a memorandum was prepared, to 
be presented to Rommel as a fait accompli, stating his objections to mur-
der, but underscoring his willingness to support a revolt.205 And stauf-
fenberg went to France in June and arranged wit.h Colonel Finckh, the Quar-
termaster General of the Gennan Army, West, for a system of signals between 
202The Stroelin-Rommel exchange is quoted in Desmond Young, Rommel 
(New York, 1950), p. 179. 
203Rundstedt is quoted in Speidel, Pa 73. 
204-Ibid., pp. 101-102. 
20~anvell & Fraenkel, p. 88. 
Berlin, Paris, and Rommel's headquarters at La Roche Guyon, so that the 
three resistance centers could coordinate their actions when the time 
cmne.206 
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On June 6, the Anglo-American Armies launched their long-awaited 
invasion of France, and by the end of a month's fighting, the German de-
fenses were close to the breaking point. The urgency of the situation 
was underscored in a battle conference held on June 17 at Margival near 
Soissons, attended by Hitler and his two Western Front Marshals. During 
the course of the conversations, Rommel urged the Fuehrer to consider end-
ing the war in view of the desperate situation in Normandy, but his plea 
was met with a categorical refusal, and he was told to mind his own bus-
iness and leave the intricacies of statesmanship to those better able to 
handle them.207 For Rommel, it was the end, and he considered himself a 
free agent. For Rundstedt, it was his last conference for awhile, since 
Hitler was looking for a scapegoat, and he rep~a.ced the old Field Marsha1 
with Kluge, now recovered from his injuries. This was the second good news 
for the resisters because Kluge had long been aware of the conspiracy, and 
though he came to France fresh from two weeks under Hitler's 11spell11 at 
Berchtesgaden, he soon discovered, as Speidel writes, that the Fuehrer 
was living 11 in a dream world. 11208 Thus, Kluge again declared himself 
ready to make common cause with the conspirators in Paris and Berlin 
(though not entirely with Rommel), by sending word to Beck that he would 
206Krmnarz, p. 173. 
207speidel, p. 94. 
208Ibid., p. 106. 
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support a coup providing Hitler was dead. 209 And he and Rommel even man-
aged a trial annistice by arranging a local suspension of hostilities with 
the Allied Command in order to exchange German nurses captured at Cherbourg 
for severely wounded American soldiers.210 
In the east, military conditions were even worse. On June 23, acting 
in coordination with the Anglo-American invasion, the Russians launched 
their summer offensive against Arrrry Group Center, an attack which would 
cost the Germans twenty-eight divisions (400,000 men killed, wounded and 
missing), thirty-one of the forty-seven generals serving with the Army 
Group, and territory extending up to the East Prussian frontier.211 For 
the resisters, ironically enough, this was the third piece of good news. 
Such tremendous losses meant replacements, and that meant conferences be-
tween staff officers of the Reserve Army and their Commander-in-Chief, now 
returned to the 11Wolfsschanze 11 under the delusion that as long as he was in 
East Prussia, the province would not fall.212 More importantly, in late 
June, Stauffenberg was appointed Fromm's Chief of Staff. This was a key 
position since it allowed hL~ to sign orders in Fromm's name and to at-
tend military conferences at Fuehrer Headquarters, although this last 
had its drawbacks since it meant that if he undertook the attempt on 
Hitler in East Prussia, he would be lost to the conspirators in Berlin 
209Wheeler-Bennett, p. 639~ 
210speidel, p. 107. 
211These figures and territorial losses are reported in Paul Car-
ell, Scorched Earth: The Russian-German War 1943-1 4, trans., Ewald 
Osers New York, 1971), pp. 596-598. 
212Hitler is quoted on this point in Ho R. Trevor-Roper, The L_ast 
Days Of Hitler (New York, 1962), p. 127 
during the travel time between the two scenesn In any event, there ap-
peared to be little choice, so Stauffenberg decided to do the job him-
self, "with my three fingers," as he put it. 213 And even his injuries 
had their advantages, for his empty sleeve, missing eye, and mutilated 
hand were themselves guarantees of good faith8 
On July 1, Stauffenberg was called to the "Wolfsschanze, 11 and for 
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the first time, the two leading characters in this act faced each other. 
Hitler is reported to have asked who this one-eyed colonel was: he found 
him sinister. 214 And Stauffenberg said later that he was gratified to 
discover that the Fuehrer 1s magnetism had no effect upon him, though he 
recalled one moment, while everyone else was studying maps spread across 
the table, that Hitler had glanced up and looked at him for a long time, 
apparently trying to assure himself that this new participant posed no 
threat. 215 For his part, Stauffenberg secured explosives from Colonel 
Hansen, similar to those used by Tresckow and Schlabrendorff a year ear-
lier, and he learned to activate the mechanism by operating a small pair 
of pincers which would break the glass vial. Thus, from the first week 
in July, he warned the resisters to be prepared for action. Gisevius 
slipped across the frontier from Switzerland and made his way to Berlin 
where he stayed with friends~ 2l6 Otto John flew in from Madrid where he 
had been trying to arrange an armistice through the American Embassy.217 
213stauffenberg is quoted in Boveri, p. 299. 
214wilhelm Keitel, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel, ed., Walter 
Goerlitz, trans., David Irving (New York, 1966), p. 265. 
215stauffenberg1s reactions are in Zeller, p. 277. 
216Gisevius, pp. 491; 500-501. 
217 John, p. 145. 
Hassell succeeded in reaching Berlin from his home in Ebenhausen, al-
though air raids had disrupted railway service to such an extent that 
it took him three dayso218 And Beck, Olbricht, Hoepner, Schulenburg, 
Trott, Yorck, and the others were informed. 
These same days saw the margin of the struggle between the re-
sisters and the Nazis narrow perceptibly. On July 5, Julius Leber 
and Adolf Reichwein, who were trying to sound out communist under-
ground leaders on the possibility of cooperation, were arrested; 
they had been recognized and denounced by a Gestapo agent masquer-
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ading as a communist.219 On July 13, General Falkenhausen, the Mil-
itary Governor of Belgium and a man upon whom the resisters had counted 
for help in the west, was dismissed from his post and replaced by a Gau-
leiter.220 On July 17, Rommel was eliminated when his car was shot up 
by a British fighter, killing the driver and wounding the Field Marshal. 
so seriously that he was first thought deact.221 And on the same day1 the 
Gestapo issued a warrant for Goerdeler 1s arrest, making it necessary £or 
him to go into hiding.222 
The conspirators were quite shaken by these 11 reciprocating acts. 11 
Stauffenberg was worried that Goerdeler would not be able to keep silent 
under Gestapo interrogation,223and he had counted particularly on Leber's 
218Hassell, p. 359. 
219Krarnarz, p. 184. 
220zeller, p. 296. 
22lspeidel, p. 112. 
222Gisevius, p. 533. 
223Fest, p. 707. 
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help. 224 With Rommel, nothing would be done, but Kluge was still in com-
mand and the connection with France remained intact. Falkenhausen was 
told to remain in Brussels and await events.225 And Stauffenberg made 
arrangements with Goerdeler to stay at specified addresses so that he 
could be notified as soon as the coup was completect.226 
On such notes, events moved forward to July 20, a day on which 
Stauffenberg had been ordered to report for a conference at Fuehrer 
Headquarters. On two earlier occasions that month, arrangements for 
the attempt had been made and he had traveled to the 11Wolfsschanze, 11 
armed with a 11bag of tricks," as he said.227 On each occasion, how-
ever, a combination of adverse circumstances had thwarted his plans, 
once when Himmler and Goering had not attendect, 228and again when he 
was called upon so quickly to report that he lacked an opportunity 
to trigger the bomb.229 But this time, he was determined that there 
would be no turning back; for good or ill, the attempt would be made. 
Early on the morning of July 20, Stauffenberg, Stieff, and Stauf-
fenberg1s adjutant, Lieutenant Werner von Haeften, flew from Berlin to 
an airfield at Rastenburg, East Prussia, a trip which lasted somewhat 
over two hours. In his briefcase, Stauffenberg carried statistical 
data on Germany's manpower reserves, a shirt, and wrapped inside it, 
224Kramarz, p. 184. 
225Gisevius, p. 518. 
22t-.... v.H.itter, p. 288. 
227stauffenberg is quoted in Kramarz, p. 177. 
228zeller, p. 293. 
229Ibid., pp. 295-296. 
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a two-pound bomb. Of British origin, this bomb could b€ fitted with a 
variety of fuses: one caused an explosion after two hours, another after 
half an hour, and the third after ten minutes .. 230 This bomb was fitted 
with the shortest fuse. 
After driving from the airfield to Fuehrer Headquarters, the three 
men separated, Stieff going to his office, Haeften to a building reserved 
for visitors, while Stauffenberg went to the main dining hall where he had 
breakfast with Captain Mellendorf, aide to the headquarters commandant and 
a member of the conspiracy. Afterwards, Stauffenberg visited with Fell-
giebel, presumably to make a final check on transmitting word of Hitler's 
death and blocking the communications center. Then, he made his way to 
Keitel's office, arriving at 12:JO. 
The Field Marshal was upset. Mussolini was scheduled to visit head-
quarters that afternoon so the military conference had been moved up to 
12:JO; for the same reason, it would be necessary to keep reports as brief 
as possible. Stauffenberg interrupted to ask if he might change his shirt, 
and Keitel impatiently agreed. In the privacy of a small washroom, the re-
sistance leader opened his briefcase, unwrapped the bomb, and activated it 
with a pair of pincers.231 
Carrying a live bomb, Stauffenberg, together with Keitel and Keitel's 
aide, Lieutenant-Colonel von John, walked across to the nwolfsschanze," 
Keitel trying to hurry them and John gesturing to help Stauffenberg carry 
his briefcase, an offer declined with thanks.232 The "Lagebaracke" which 
230schlabrendorff, p. 55. 
231zeller, p. 302. 
23? __ 
-Kramarz, p. 186. 
they entered shortly after 12:JO was a one-story wooden building, re-
inforced with concrete, and containing a central corridor, a telephone 
room, a cloakroom, and a conference room, some forty by sixteen feet, 
most of which was taken up with a very long and heavy map table, held 
up on either end by thick wooden supports running its entire width,233 
a stage property which would bear significantly upon the day's events. 
They were, as Keitel had feared, late. Hitler and some twenty of-
ficers were already gathered around the table, the Fuehrer in his accus-
tomed place at the center of one of its long sides, listening to a report 
by General Heusinger, Chief of Operations of the Army High Command, on the 
military situation at the eastern front. Keitel briefly interrupted the-
proeeedings to announce Stauffenberg, who, he said, would report on the 
status of the much needed reserves. Heusinger continued his report, while 
Stauffenberg edged as close to Hitler as possible and placed his briefcase 
under the table on the inside of the supports. Then, excusing himself,on 
the pretext of an urgent telephone call, he left the building and went to 
the communications center located a short distance away where Fellgiebel 
.and Haeften were waiting beside a staff car.234 
Inside the conference room, Colonel Heinz Brandt, ironically, the 
same officer to whom Schlabrendorff had entrusted the "cognac bottles" 
a year earlier, attempted to get closer to the table so that he could 
follow Heusinger•s report on the maps, and discovered Stauffenberg•s 
briefcase in his way. Never suspecting its contents, he moved it away 
233The design and contents of the 11Lagebaracke 11 are in Gennans 
Against Hitler, pp. 123; 128 
234Kramarz, p. 187. 
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from Hitler, to the, other side of the supports235 __ an act which helped 
to save the F\J.ehrer 1 s life. 
Heusinger was reaching the end of his report: "West of the Divina, 
strong Russian forces are driving northwards. Their spearheads are al-
ready southwest of Dvinsk. Unless at long last, the army group is with-
drawn from Lake Piepus, a catastrophe ••• • 11236 The exploding bomb cut 
off his sentence, flames shot up and smoke filled the room-the time was 
12:42. 
To Stauffenberg, standing a hundred yards away, it seemed as if a 
fifteen centimeter shell had hit.the building. 237 Convinced that no one 
could have survived such a blast, he and Haeften took their leave of Fell-
giebel. For the' Signal Corps Chief, the problem was to flash word of the 
assassination to Hahn at Mauerwald and then block the communications cen-
ter. For Stauffenberg and Haeften, the problem was to bluff their way 
through the two outer checkpoints and reach the airfield, and it is a 
measure of Stauffenberg 1 s talent for improvisation--a talent, as we shall 
see, that was not shared by many of his co-conspirators-that he was able 
to do so. 
At the first barrier, the guards, alerted by the explosion, refused 
to let them pass until Stauffenberg said that he had an urgent order from 
235Brandt 1 s deathbed deposition is in Germans Against Hitler, p. 
129. 
236Heusinger recounts his last words that day in Adolf Heusinger, 
Befehl in Widerstreit (Stuttgart, 1950), p. 352. 
237This is the way he would describe it later to the conspirators 
in the War Ministry; in Gisevius, p. 546. 
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the Fuehrer to fly to Berlin at once,238and by sheer effrontery succeeded 
in getting through. At the second barrier, however, the guards were more 
suspicious, so Stauffenberg demanded to use their telephone. Calling the 
office of the headquarters commandant, he got Captain Mellendorf, who, as 
a member of the conspiracy, confirmed to the guards that the two officers 
were allowed to pass, and their departure was logged at 12:44239 From 
here it was simply a race to the airfield, and at 1:15, Stauffenberg and 
Haeften were in the same plane that had brought them to Rastenburg ear-
lier that morning, flying back to Berlin, secure in the knowledge that 
Hitler was no more.240 
They were, tragically enough, mistaken. Many of the participants, 
including the Fuehrer, had survivect.241 Brandt 1 s unconscious action, 
coupled with the fact that Hitler was nearsighted and had been sprawled 
across the heavy table, following Heusinger 1 s report on the maps, pro-
tected the Fuehrer from the full effects of the blast. At that, he was 
hurled across the room, his hair was set on fire 1 his right arm was par-
tially paralyzed, his right leg was badly burned, and both his ear drums 
were damaged. Also, the explosion blew his trousers off, and a beam fell 
across his back, bruising him so that his 11backside, 11 as he said later, 
11 was like a baboon. 11242 
238The Gestapo investigation report of Stauffenberg 1 s ruse to get 
through the checkpoint at Sperrkreis II is in Spiegelbild, p. 230. 
239Ibid. 
240This is the way Haeften would describe it later in the day to 
Otto John, p. 148. 
241.or the twenty-four people in the room, four were killed, three 
were injured seriously, and a number of others, including PJ.tler, were 
treated for minor injuries. 
242Hitler is quoted in Manvell & Fraenkel, pg 109. 
Fellgiebel, to judge by an eyewitness account,243was badly shaken 
when he saw Hitler, supported by Keitel, being led from the shattered 
ruins of the "Lagebaracke." But the Signal Corps Chief decided to act 
as if the Fuehrer was dead. Although he was unable to prevent two im-
mediate calls--one from Goebbels' representative at headquarters to the 
Propaganda Minister in Berlin,244and another from Hitler's second adju-
tant to Himmler in nearby Rastenburg,245neither message contained any 
hint of a conspiracy. Indeed, Goebbels thought the attempt was the work 
of someone on the construction crew that had recently reinforced the build-
ing with concrete, while Himmler was summoned to begin a standard police 
investigation. In any event, Fellgiebel called Hahn at Mauerwald: 11Some-
thing frightful has happened. The Fuehrer is alive. Block everything. 11246 
And considering the circumstances: the scene, his state of mind, and the 
fact that the lines were tapped, the message was pregnant with meaning 
since it indicated not only that the attempt had failed ( "The Fuehrer 
is alive"), but also that the action was to go forward ("Block every-
thing"). Then, with the unexpected help of Hitler himself, who natu-
rally wanted no word of the attempt to get out, 247Fellgiebel closed 
down the communications center at Fuehrer Headquarters, and Hahn, after 
243This was Lieutenant-Colonel Sander, who joined Fellgiebel at 
the very moment of the explosion, and recalled how the Signal Corps 
Chief paced back and forth after seeing Hitler emerge alive; in Zeller, 
pp. 346-347. 
244This call is verified by Speer, who was with Goebbels on the 
afternoon of July 20; p. 487. 
245zeller, p. 246. 
246spiegelbild, p. 329. 
247zeller quotes Lieutenant-Colonel Below, who gave the order; 
p. 346. 
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relaying the message to General Wagner at Zossen and General Thiele in 
the War Ministry at Berlin, did the same to the center at Mauerwald. By 
Gestapo accounts, the lines remained closed from 1:15 to 3:Jo, 248thereby 
providing the conspirators with the vital head start needed for seizing 
control of the state and bringing a genuine 11 New Order" to Germany.249 
Two generals had been left in charge of operations in Berlin: Fried-
rich Olbricht and Erich Hoepner. They were responsible for issuing the 
necessary orders and supervising the seizure of the capital as soon as 
word of Hitler's assassination was received. Like the other conspirators, 
they had been engaged for some time in a life and death struggle against 
the functionaries and practictioners of the Third Reich, with the exhaus-
tion of nerves and weariness of spirit that that implies. But there is 
something more that needs to be said because, in microcosm, it helps to 
explain their actions and omissions as well as the actions and omissions 
of other officer-conspirators on that critical day.250 Olbricht has been 
described by Gisevius as "an administrative head. • .Gquipped for doini/ 
preparatory work ••• but not a man for revolutionary action. 11251 Such a 
combination is probably appropriate in many dramas, but something of an 
incongruity when the script calls for resolute actors--men who have 
248spiegelbild, pp. 6J; 329. 
249speer reports that early on the afternoon of July 20, many of 
the Nazi leaders were at a meeting in Berlin. "If the rebels had been 
more skillful and taken parallel action immediately, they could have had 
a lieutenant with ten men march into this assembly and arrest many impor-
tant members of the Reich government. 11 Speer, pp e 486-487. 
250This refers, of course, to motives; something the movement crit-
ic must uncover; Griffin, 11 Dramat1.stic Theory," p. 461. 
251Gisevius, p. 464. 
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progressed from a "passive condition, state o:f'mind, through 'a deed, do-
ing, action, act,' to 1an adequate understanding; the thing learned. 111252 
Similarly for tloepner, although the difficulty in his case was a narrow, 
militaristic outlook that prevented him from seeing beyond the confines 
of the war games table or the battlefieldo Gisevius, who was on the 
scene, relates that Hoepner later spent more time bemoaning the fact 
that the conspiracy lacked the militarily all :important fifty-one per-
cent chance of success than he did in trying to assure that it had any 
chance at au.253 
This, then, was the background of the two officer-conspirators who 
received the message from Hahn at Mauerwald shortly after 1:00. Admit-
tedly, it was contradictory, reporting an abortive assassination and the 
closing of communications channels.254 So Olb:richt- consulted with Hoep-
ner and the two of them decided to wait until m~re definite information 
252Griffin, 11 Dramatistic Theory, 11 p .. 461. 
253Gisevius, p. 559. What is being described here is a state of 
mind conditioned largely by past scene-agency ratios--what Burke calls 
adherence to "custom, usage, manner, fashionou Grammar,. p. 15. Another 
way of putting it is to use Burke's notion of trained incapacities or 
terministic screens: 11A way of seeing Lwhich/ is also a way of not see-
ing." Permanence and Change, p. 49. Perhaps statements by two partici-
pants will serve to introduce the concept, variations or which will be 
examined as they arise. Franz Halder writes: 11·The tradition which grew 
up in the Prussian-German Army, namely that the military was not an in-
strument of revolution ••• influenced the officers and made them con-
scious of the fact that they were not revolutionarieso 11 "Letter of Gen-
eral Franz Halder," August 16, 1965. And Fabian von Schlabrendorff adds: 
"One of the main characteristics of the average German officer was his 
one-track mind. His concentration on military matters made him incompe-
tent in non-military matters. 11 Schlabrendorff ,, Thev Almost Killed Hit-
ler, p. 65. 
254Hoepner later affirmed this before the "People's Court, 11 quoted 
in TMWC, xxxiii, p. 399ff. 
could be obtained.255 What they failed to realize·was that with the very 
I 
detonation of the bomb, they were already committed to a course of action 
in which delay would be fatal. As we have noted, Hitler was not waiting 
for more detailed knowledge. Although he did not suspect a conspiracy, 
he had had Heinrich Himmler called, and the fitl.,chsfuhrer and his minions 
were now sifting through the wreckage looking for clues. It would not be 
long before the thread of evidence led to Stauffenberg, and from him the 
whole skein could be unraveled to the officers in the War Ministry~ In 
what must be considered the limits of incapacity, Hoepner would later 
theorize that it was still possible to back out: that everyone could 
just go home and pretend nothing had happened.256 It was simply be-
yond the scope of his perspective to realize that it was far too late 
for such make-believe. And even the excuse of waiting until a clearer 
picture could be obtained was little more than a rationalization. Be-
tween Fellgiebel 1s ability to block communications and Hitler's own de-
sire that news of the attempt should not leak out, the exchanges at Fueh-
rer Headquarters and Mauerwald were shut down and remained silent for more 
than two hours--time enough to launch a coup, had they only done so~ 
Stauffenberg and Haeften landed at Rangsdorf airfield outside Berlin 
shortly after 3:45. Symptomatic of the fact that plans had gone awry was 
the absence of a car to take them to the War Ministry.257 Stauffenberg 
immediately telephoned the Bendlerstasse to find out what had happened to 
their transportation, and it was only then that he learned nothing had been 
255olbricht had Thiele keep trying to get through to Fuehrer Head-
quarters until nearly 4:00, when Stauffenberg called. Kramarz, pp. 189-
190. 
256Gisevius, p. 559. 
257 Boveri, p. 311. 
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done. Infonning his fellow-plotters that Hitler was dead, he urged them 
to delay no longer. The "Valkyrie" Orders should be issued at once, even 
before he and Haeften reached the War Ministry.258 
Stauffenberg•s call finally galvanized Olbricht into action. He gave 
the necessary instruction to Colonel Mertz von Quirnheim, another conspir-
ator, who brought the long-secreted orders out of a safe and took them to 
the communications center for dispatch to the military district commanders. 
Major Egbert Hayessen, liaison to General Hase, left to join the City Com-
mandant. Lieutenant-Colonel Bernardis, to save time, telephoned the train-
ing schools outside the city, and then called the commander of the Watch 
Battalion, a Captain Ernst otto Remer, and ordered him to divide his unit, 
sending part of it to guard the War Ministry, while he took the rest to 
the city commandant's office where he would be given .further instructions. 
Police Chief Helldorf was alerted to report to the Bendlerstrasse, and Cap-
tain Karl Klaussing organized an ad hoc detachment of non-commissioned of-
ficers and men to protect the building until the Watch Battalion arrived. 259 
~y 4:15, General Hase had received his orders, and with the cry of "Gentle-
men, we're off!" prepared to call up the ordnance school and the territorial 
brigadea.260 
The issuing of the "Valkyrie Befehl" meant that the military conspira-
tors and Hitler and his hierarchs were now fully embarked on a collision 
course. For though the officers in the War Ministry did not know it, some 
of the Wehrkreis commanders, after receiving orders announcing the death of 
258zeller, pp. 304-305. 
259John reports the presence of guards as early as 5:00; p. 1.47. 
260Gisevius quotes Hase, p. 540. 
.392. 
the Fuehrer and a state of military emergency, telephoned Keitel at Fueh-
rer Headquarters for confirmation,261.anct because the lines were open again, 
they were able to get through. This was the first hint to the Nazi loyal-
ists that the at tempt was part of a wider plot. In fact, Himmler had just , 
narrowed the list of suspects to the missing colonel from the War Ministry, 
and had telephoned Gestapo offices in Berlin, ordering Stauffenberg to be 
arrested inconspicuously, a task undertaken by SS Standartenfuhrer Pif-
fraeder.262 Thus, Keitel informed Hitler that the Reserve Army had ac-
tivated the "Valkyrie" Orders, and that the assassination attempt was no 
isolated incident. 
That this news disturbed the Fuehrer's fra.~e of mind would be an un-
derstatement. Until then, he had been euphoric, showing Mussolini the 
ruined building, the damaged map table, and his tattered trousers (this 
last destined to become a pious relic of miraculous intervention),263 
and adducing from these proofs the somewhat overdrawn conclusion that 
nothing would befall him and that the Nazi cause would come through its 
present perils to final victory. On this bit of casuistry, the two dic-
tators adjourned to Hitler's tea house, and together with their associ-
ates, began to celebrate the Fuehrer's narrow escape. 
261The most complete account of events at Fuehrer Headquarters 
during the afternoon and early evening is by Engen Dollman, an SS li-
aison officer to Mussolini, and a eyewitness. His interrogation by 
Allied investigators after the war is summarized in Dulles, pp. 9-ll, 
and is the primary source for the following narrative. It will not 
be cited hereafter except for purposes of direct quotation. 
262John, p. 147. 
263tater, Hitler had these trousers carefully wrapped and sent 
to Eva Braun with instructions to guard them carefully. 
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It was during this 11Mad Hatter's tea party, 11264where Hitler's court 
vied with one another in protests of loyalty mixed with mutual recrimina-
tions, that Keitel broke the news of the revolt. Someone started to make 
a comparison between Stauffenberg's attempt and the plot of 1934 when Ernst 
Roehm and the SA had allegedly planned a putsch. Suddenly, the Fuehrer was 
seized with blood lust. He leapt to his feet like a wild man, foam fleck-
ing his lips, and shouted that he would be revenged on all traitorso He 
would root them out, and their women and children too. They would all be 
killed; they would all be thrown into concentration camps-it was an eye 
for an eye and a tooth for a tooth-not one of them would be spared. Then, 
subsiding as quickly as he had flared up, Hitler ordered Keitel to counter-
mand the "Valkyrie Befehl. 11 Later, as the situation worsened, he would 
call Goebbels, instructing him to broadcast an announcement that there 
had been an attempt on his life but that he had emerged unscathect,265 
and he would appoint Himmler Commander-in-Chief of the Reserve Army with 
orders to fly to Berlin and crush the revolt. 266 Hitler sat down again, 
and looking at his assembled and somewhat astonished guests, he said: 
"The German people are unworthy of my greatness •• oof what I have done 
for them. 11267 
With the Fuehrer's escape from death, and equally, with his knowl-
edge that an attempt was being made to overthrow his regime, the stage 
264This is Wheeler-Bennett's characterization, p. 464. 
265speer, p. 487. 
266zeller quotes Hitler's precise orders: 11 Shoot anyone who re-
sists, no matter who it is •• o • The fate of the nation is at stake. 
Be ruthless!" Zeller, p. 339. 
267nu11es, p. 11. 
is set for the final struggle of this drama268--a struggle for which the 
resisters, sensing their wlnerabilities, had tried to compensate by as-
sassination, and which they still had an easy chance to win during the 
hours of inactivity between 12:42 when the bomb exploded and 4:00 when 
Stauffenberg returned to Berlin. Now it would be necessary for them to 
employ discourse--lines of argument and emotional appeals to counter the 
inherent advantage held by Hitler and his followers. 269 The object of 
both side's attention would be the agency of the German Army, represented 
by a field marshal, several generals, and a captain, all in positions of 
authority. Whichever group could influence these few officers to identi-
fy with them would carry the day, for between them, these military agents 
commanded enough soldiers to tip the scales of decision. The balance of 
this act, therefore, will be concerned with an account and critique of 
268cathcart writes: "It is not the alienation of an outgroup alone 
that produces a movement •••• Rather, it is the formulation of a rhet-
oric proclaiming that the new order, the more perfect order, the desired 
order, cannot come about through existing agencies of change, and this, 
in turn, produces a counter-rhetoric that exposes the agitators as an-
archists or devils of destruction." 87. The new order, of course, was 
the resister's plans for a post-Hitler Germany which were explained at 
some length in the last chapter, and which were, in part, embodied in 
their radio addresses and declarations as well as in the "Valkyrie" Or-
ders. The counter-rhetoric, the impulse for which is revealed in Hit-
ler's frenzied statements to his guests, and which at the least identi-
fies the resisters as "anarchists or devils 'of destruction," will be 
included in the Nazi's counter-arguments and orders. 
269rnherent advantage refers to more than just a dialectically se-
cured position or the presumption traditionally accorded the status quo. 
The perservering reader may want to look again at Chapter One, especially 
pp. 35-44, where an analysis was made of the factors in Hitler's god-like 
hold over the German people. For others, perhaps Richard Weaver 1s descrip-
tion of "god-terms" as the uprime movers of human impulse, 11 or his defini-
tion of the even more potent "charismatic term" which has 11 a power which 
is not derived, but which is in some mysterious way given, 11 will suggest 
something of the nature of the rhetorical force which Hitler as Fuehrer 
possessed. Richard Weaver, 11 Ultimate Terms In Contemporary Rhetoric, 11 
in The Ethics Of Rhetoric (Chicago, 1953), pp. 211; 227. 
395. 
the rhetoric used by both sides as it occurred in £our decisive encounters 
during the afternoon and evening of July 20~ for it was in these encounters 
that the drama of the German Resistance Movement reached its penultimate mo-
ment. 
The first took place in the War Ministry~ shortly after Stauffenberg's 
call. With the "Valkyrie" Orders going out, Olbricht went to the office of 
General Fromm, Commander of the Reserve Army. His intention was to induce 
Fromm to give his approval and the authority o~ his name to the orders, a 
factor of some importance in view of his rank and position. 
Fromm was listening to a military report when Olbricht entered and an-
nounced that Hitler had been assassinatect.270 Fromm asked: "From whom have 
you heard that ? 11 Olbricht replied that the information came from Hahn at 
Mauerwald, who had gotten it from Fellgiebel at Fuehrer Headquarters. As 
we shall see, this prevarication was an error in tactics since Olbricht 
would be asked to substantiate it. Had he waited until Stauffenberg, his 
real source, was on the scene to support him, the need £or other corrobo-
rating evidence might have been unnecessary~ In any event, Olbricht con-
tinued: 11 I propose therefore that under the circumstances, Valkyrie Exer-
cise be issued to all Military District Commanders and that you assume ex-
ecutive powers of the Armed Forces." Fromm replied that. he could only take 
such far-reaching measures if he personally were convinced of the Fuehrer's 
death. 
At this, Olbricht made his second tactical error. Since he believed 
270schlabrendorff, who was in prison with Fromm, relates the ac-
count of ~his conversation and the later one between Fromm, Olbricht, 
and Stauffenberg, based upon Fromm 1s recollections; Schlabrendorff, Th~ 
Almost Killed Hitler, pp. 112-117. They will not be footnoted hereafter. 
396 .. 
Hitler was dead and that confirmation would induce Fron:an to act, he 
picked up the telephone and asked for a priority call to Field Marshal 
Keitel at Fuehrer Headquarters. If only he had done this earlier when 
communications were still shut down. Even the strange lack of contact 
between Berlin and East Prussia might have aroused enough concern to mo-
tivate Fromm. But the time gap was passed, a connection was made, and 
Keitel was on the line. 
Fromm: What has happened at General Headquarters? Wild rumors 
are afloat in Berlin. 
Keitel: What should be the matter? Everything is as usual here. 
Fromm: I have just received a report that the Fuhrer has been 
assassinated. 
Keitel: That's all nonsense. It is true that there has been an 
attempt, but fortunately it has failed. The Fuhrer is 
alive and only slightly injured. Where, by the way, is 
the chief of your staff, Colonel Count von Stauf fen berg? 
Fromm: Stauffenberg has not yet returned to us. 
For our purposes, two of Keitel 1s statements are important: the news 
that Hitler was alive, which meant that the authority of his position was 
still intact; and the implied threat of punishment contained within the 
ominous question about "your ••• Stauffenberg." As we have noted, Keitel 
was already aware of the assassin's identity and his parting shot was not 
intended as polite repartee, something known by the guilty-conscienced Com-
mander of the Reserve Army. 
To extend the analysis, Stauffenberg's earlier opinion that Fromm would 
go along once Hitler was dead reveals Fromm's sensitivity to the ultimate au-
thority in the Reich.271 Moreover, General Witzleben writes that Fromm was 
271There are two a~ects to this argument. First, while order in 
the Third Reich 11 involvel,g/ a distribution of authority •• owith its un-
certain dividing line between loyalty and servitude" (Burkep Permanence 
and Change, p. 176), the dividing line between loyalty and disloyalty 
was rather clear cut, and Fromm's status as Commander of the Reserves, 
though allowing him certain prerogatives, did not extend to treasono 
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a canny operator who tried to "play both sides. 11 272 As such, he was not 
about to mistake a movement in crisis for a movement consummated. And fi-
nally, the implication of punishment if Fromm was disloyal also achieved 
its desired effect. The Chief of the Reserve Army had knowingly harbored 
a conspiracy within his own headquarters. That was treason, and it nul-
lified all the protestations of loyalty which he had ever made to Hitler. 
It did not require great foresight to predict that the consequences of 
such falsehood would be pitiless retribution. When conditions warranted 
it later in the evening, Fromm would do eve!'J"-.t;hing within his power to 
divide himself from the resisters, even if it meant executing half his 
staff. 
When the conversation ended, Fromm turned to Olbricht and gave pre-
cise commands that the "Valkyrie" Orders were not to be put into effect. 
Astonished by the news that Hitler was alive, and, as Gisevius notes, "e-
quipped to be what he was, an administrative head ••• not a man for revo-
lutionary action, 1127.301bricht backed out of the office without an argu-
ment. 
It was now 4:30. Many of the resisters were in the War Ministry: 
Beck, Helldorf, Gisevius, Gerstenmaier, John, Yorck, Schulenburg.274 
Second, Fromm's tacit affirmative to the resisters was a negative to Hit-
ler. Kenneth Burke, Language As Symbolic Action (Berkeley, 1968), p. 458. 
As such, it contained the potential for guilt if discovered, and victimage 
or mortification to expiate the guilt. (Burke, Rhetoric of Religion, pp. 
4-5). Since making a victim of others is always less painful than making 
a victim of oneself, Fromm's subsequent acts are understandable, if rep-
rehensible. 
27211Letter of General Hermann von Witzleben," July 16, 1966. 
273Gisevius, p. 464. 
274Gerstenmaier, Gisevius, and John report approximately the same 
cast of players. Gerstenmaier in Boehm, pp. 187-188; Gisevius, p. 511; 
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And Stauffenberg had just arrived. Gisevius describes his appearance as 
"impressive. Tall and slender, he stood breathless, bathed in perspera-
tion. Somehow the massiveness of the man had been reduced; he seemed 
spiritualized, lighter. 11 275 
Olbricht hastened to inform him of Fromm's unfavorable reaction, and 
the two of them went into the general's office to make another attempt to 
influence him. Fromm received them with something less than cordiality: 
"Keitel says the fuhrer was only slightly injured .. 11 Stauffenberg replied, 
"Field Marshal Keitel is telling his customary lies. I myself set the 
bomb and saw Hitler's body being carried away. 11 This evidence, from an 
eye-witness, might have given Fromm cause to reassess his position, but 
Olbricht did not allow him the opportunity. With a regrettable sense 
of timing, he added: "This being the case, we have issued the code word 
for rioting to the District Commanders. 11 
Upon hearing that his authority was challenged, and even worse, that 
he was exposed, Fromm jumped to his feet, banged on the table and shouted: 
"This is open insubordination. Count Stauffenberg., the attempt has failed. 
You must shoot yourself on the spot. And you /Jo Olbrich,Y, consider your-
self under arrest." In answer, Olbricht made his only attempt to persuade 
Fromm. "General," he said, 11 the moment for action has come. If we do not 
strike now, our country will go down to utter destruction." To a man of 
Fromm's character, an appeal transcending self'-interest was patently the 
wrong approach. He was concerned with his own safety, not the welfare of 
the Fatherland. Perhaps an argument expanding the scene-say, one that 
and John, pp. 147-149. 
275Gisevius, p. 541. 
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referred to plans, already fill train, for opening up the western front and 
allowing the Allied Arnues free access to Germany, might have convinced 
Fromm that he could play the role of 11 Savior of his Country" with very 
little risk.276 But Olbricht merely said: 11 You cannot arrest us; you 
deceive yourself as to the true situation. It is we who arrest you." 
Thereupon followed a scuffle between Fromm and Olbricht in which Stauf-
fenberg intervened. The Commander of the Reserve Army was overpowered 
and placed under arrest. To his position, the conspirators appointed 
General Hoepner who, typically enough, insisted upon seeking Fromm's 
approval for the change in command.277 
In the long run, Fromm's defection meant that he would be unavail-
able to the conspirators to speak and offer reassurances when confused 
officers in the Wehrkreis Districts phoned in during the course of the 
evening. The task of answering their many questions would fall largely 
to Stauffenberg, and, as we shall see, he would perform admirably, but 
he was still only a colonel and not in a high enough position of auth-
ority to command the same kind of obedience as his opponent Field Mar-
shal Keitel, who was speaking in the Fuehrer's name. 
Finally, it should be added that the conspirators did not kill 
Fromm but only placed him under "honorable detention" in a vacant of-
fice. Gisevius, watching the incarceration with surprise, wanted to 
know why Fromm was not "shot out of hand?" He was told by Olbricht 
276This would be somewhat similar to Burke's definitional argu-
ment: 11 A given act is in effect a different act depending upon the scene 
in terms of which it is located or defined." Burke is quoted in Daniel 
Fogarty, Roots For A New Rhetoric (New York, 1959), p. 70. 
277Manvell & Fraenkel, p. 124. 
that "Fromm had always been fair. If he gave his word of honor /;ot to 
escapi}, he would keep it."278 The handicap of trained incapacities, of 
selective blindness caused by habits of thought, was working against the 
officer-conspirators. As Hitler himself suggested in Mein Kampr, 279any 
man who is not ¼Qth you is against you, and harsh decisions must often 
be made for the sake of the higher goal. Gisevius, looking at the ac-
tion from a civilian perspective, recognized this. Olbricht, and even 
Beck, to whom he turned for support, did not.280 Thus, they afforded 
Fromm the honors of w~litary confinement, and he would repay their cour-
tesy, first by secretly ordering the tanks from the Panzer School back 
to base, 281and later by breaking his parole and helping to quash their 
revolt. 
No sooner had Fromm been detained that SS Standartenfuhrer Pif-
400~ 
fraeder arrived. He, too, was placed under arrest, and again Gisevius 
wanted to know why he was not shot? This time, the answer was that there 
278The Gisevius-Olbricht exchange is in Gisevius, p. 549. 
279The Fuehrer declared: "Firm belief in the right to apply even 
the most brutal weapons is always bound up in the existence of a ••• fa-
natical faith in the necessity of victory of a revolution •••• 11 Adolf 
Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans., Ralph Manheim (Boston, 1962), p. 533. 
280Gisevius, p. 549. 
281The conspirators must have forgotten that the office in which 
Fromm was held had a second door, because when General Specht, the Com-
mander of the Panzer School, arrived to report that his tanks were in 
the city, he could not find anyone in the War Ministry to give him in-
structions. Otto John reports hearing him say to two other officers: 
"Do any of you gentlemen know why we have been ordered here? 11 John, 
p. 148. Evidently, he must have gone looking for Fromm and found him 
by entering the second door. And Fromm's orders must have been to re-
turn to Wunsdorf, since that is what Specht and his panzers proceeded 
to do. Boveri, p. 295. 
were insufficient troops available to form a firing squad,282although 
the thought persists that if someone had given him a pistol, Gisevius 
would have done the job himself. Simultaneously, Olbricht was giving 
instructions to Helldorf, subordinating the Kriminalpolizie to the Re-
serve Army, and commanding them to carry out any measure ordered .. He 
had just finished when II Beck's quiet, firm voice reached out to him. 
'One moment, Olbricht. In all loyalty we must inform the chief of po-
lice that according to certain reports from headquarters ••• Hitler may 
not be dead.' n283 Again, the honorable code of the officer and gentle-
man was working at cross-purposes with the revolutionary need for vic-
tory, and Helldorf 1s later decision to have the police merely stand by, 
and this at a time when armed men were desperately needed, can probably 
be traced to Beck's insistence upon honesty. 
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With Fromm and Piffraeder in custody, the conspirators faced their 
second major confrontation. This came in the person of General Joachim 
von Kortzfleisch, Commander of the Berlin Military District, who arrived 
at the War Ministry in perplexity and annoyance. He had heard reports 
that Hitler was dead, and he had come to the Bendlerstrasse to obtain 
clarification from General Fromm. Since that was impossible, Beck was 
delegated to talk to him. Perhaps he would be able to convince Kortz-
fleisch to join the conspiracy. The addition of a general with his au-
thority would be of great value, especially in the critical area of Ber-
lin, where his status gave him legitimate control over military units. 
No record of the conversation between the two men exists, but 
282Gisevius, p. 552. 
283Ibid., p. 542. 
Gisevius, who was standing nearby, recounts Beck's reaction immediately 
afterward, and it is not difficult to see that the outcome of the attempt 
to influence Kortzfleisch hinged upon Beck's choice and expression of ar-
guments for breaking the oath of allegiance. 
Beck returned. I had never seen him so angry. He described the 
scene that had taken place. General Kortzfleisch had refused to 
cooperate on the grounds of his oath to Hitler. Beck repeated 
his indignant reply to me: 11 How da,re you refer to your oath of 
loyalty to such a perjurer •••• 11284 
From this brief fragment, it is evident that Beck made two errors, one 
substantial, the other formal, and both exceedingly strange in view of his 
background and tempennent. Concerning the substantive error, he treated 
the oath like a contract which is equally binding on both parties, although 
he should have known, as Halder writes, that "the duty of the soldier who 
has taken an oath of loyalty is not legal or contractual, but ethical. 11 285 
All German soldiers, both before and after taking the oath, were lectured 
on its significance, complete with examples of those who had betrayed the 
honor of their country, their army, and themselves, by failing to keep 
it.286 And unlike other countries, the German oath was not administered 
willy-nilly in some recruitment sergeant's office. Instead, it was part 
of a solemn public ritual in which a man dedicated himself to his country 
284Gisevius, p. 552. 
285 111etter of General Franz Halder," August 17, 1965. 
286:Examples of political betrayal must have been very hard to find. 
General Blumentritt writes: "there were always instances of disobedience 
in purely military commands having to do with tactics and operations, but 
never in connection with political problems. Only in 1812 did the famous 
General Yorck, contrary to the command of the king, successfully conclude 
a pact with the Russians against Napoleon. But this heroic example was 
mentioned only very briefly and incidently during the training of an of-
ficer." 11 Letter of General Guenther Blumentritt, 11 October 22, 1965. 
in the presence of family and friends, and before his fellow-soldiers~ 
on the most sacred of military symbols, the flag. Add to this the for-
mal error--that Beck was uncharacteristically angry, 287and the conclu-
sion seems inescapable that he was directing his anger and the thrust 
of his argument at the wrong man. If anything, Kortzfleisch was dis-
playing a moral attitude appropriate to men of his caste,288and Beck, 
a former officer who had had his own inner-struggle of conscience and 
scruple before breaking the oath, should have understood that others 
could have the same struggle, and adjusted his tone and arguments to 
I 
meet it. But he did not, and Kortzfleisch was consigned to detention 
in another vacant office. 
While these confrontations were taking place in the War Ministry, 
another critical encounter was beginning to unfold some blocks away at 
the office of General Hase. This denouement involved the detailing of 
Captain Ernst Otto Remer and his battalion Grossdeutschland. As noted 
at the beginning of the act, the conspirators intended to employ the 
bulk of this unit to cordon off the government quarter, seize the Prop-
aganda Ministry, and arrest party officials, particularly the Gauleiter, 
Dr. Joseph Goebbels. At one stroke, they would thereby gain control of 
the Reich capital and many of its important administrative and communi-
cations facilities. However, for the third time in as many exchanges, 
287The differentiation between sense and expression is only for 
purposes of analysis. As Burke puts it, "You persuade a man only inso-
far as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, 
image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways 'With his." Burke, Rhet-
.2.!i.£, p. 55. Obviously, Beck failed on all these counts. 
288This is the scene-agency ratio mentioned earlier. Interest-
ingly enough, Burke notes that 11morality11 -one of the terms character-
izing this ratio--has its etymological origin in the Latin word for 
"custom." Burke, Gr~, p. 15. 
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the weight of tradition and its effect upon the officer-consp1rators was 
working to their disadvantage. 
At a few minutes past 5:00, Remer arrived at Hase's headquarters on 
Unter ill!!! Linden. The officers in the commandant's office, like their 
counterparts at the Bendlerstrasse, were initiates to the conspiracy. Un-
fortunately, they possessed a second similarity: they were equally ill at 
ease in the unfamiliar role of revolutionaries. If, to quote Susanne Lang-
er, each group "meets a new idea with its own concepts, its own tacit., fun-
damental way of seeing things, 11289then the military conspirators were to a 
large extent trapped by their own values and training, and their every ac-
tion revealed it. 
The Commander of the Watch Battalion was admitted without delay and 
given his orders. The Fuehrer had met with an accident, internal disor-
ders were brealcing out, and the army was assuming executive power. His 
assignment was to blockade the government section, allow no one in or out, 
seize the Propaganda Ministry, and arrest Dr. Goebbels.290 In Remer's own 
account, written after the war, he relates his shock at the news of Hitler's 
death, and more importantly, his suspicions over the manner in which he was 
given his orders. 
I asked: Is the Fuhrer dead? Has he had an accident or was it an 
assassination? Where are the internal disorders? I did not notice 
anything driving through Berlin. Who is the successor to the Fuh-
rer? It should be a German ["Fielij Marshal. Are there any orders 
from this successor?291 
289susanne Langer, Philosophy In A New Key (New York, 1951), p. 4. 
290Remer 1s orders appear in "The Remer Report of July 22, 1944," in 
Germans Against Hitler, p. 144. 
291Ernst Otto Remer, Meine Rolle, 20 Juli, 1944 (Hamburg, 1951), p. s. 
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The officers involved--General Hase and his liaison, Major Hayessen, 
made no attempt to improvise--to answer questions as respondents in a di-
alectic. Instead, in Remer 1s words, "they acted nervous and remained si-
lent.11292 Since the orders had been given verbally, Remer tried to glance 
at the papers lying on the desk, hoping to get a clearer picture of the 
scene. When Hayessen noticed this, he took the papers away in what Remer 
described as "an ostensive /.revealingfl manner" and hid them in portfoli-
os.293 This, too, helped to kindle the captain's suspicions, nor were 
they dampened any when, as he made ready to depart, the conspirators cli-
maxed their blunders by detailing one of their own number to accompany 
him back to his unit. The Commander of the Watch Battalion writes: 
••• the Lieutenant-Colonel, who had been given to me ••• as a 
liaison officer, told me that I should not believe he was a spy. 
Such a statement, from an officer on active duty, was strange to 
say the least. It not only made me very angry, but it aroused 
within me the thought that these people had something to hide~294 
Thus, Remer was receptive to a suggestion from his unit's "political 
leadership" officer, Lieutenant Dr. Hans Hagen. Earlier that day, Hagen 
had seen a staff car in which he thought he recognized Field Marshal von 
Brauchitsch.295 Since the fonner Army Chief had been dismissed by Hitler 
in 1941, Hagen wondered if a military putsch might not be underway. In 
civilian life, he had been on the staff of the Propaganda Ministry, and 
292Remer, p. 9. 
293.!_l&g. 
294rbid. 
295 11 The Hagen Report of October 16, 1944," is in Germans Against 
Hitler, p. 152. Hagen was mistaken; Field Marshal Brauchitsch was not 
in Berlin on July 20. 
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he volunteered to go there and check with Dr. Goebbels.296 
Remer, already upset by the unusal manner in which he had been given 
his orders, readily agreed. He provided Hagen with a motorcycle and in-
structed him to make a reconnaissance of the ministry and report back 
with whatever infonnation he could obtain. Meanwhile, he himself would 
follow the 11Valkyrie 11 Orders by dividing his unit, sending part to guard 
the War Ministry and taking the rest to the center of the city. By 6:JO, 
the Watch Battalion was in place, and the cordoning off of the government 
quarter had been completect.297 Remer was in conference with his squad 
leaders when a message arrived from Hagen, requesting him to report to 
Goebbels in the Propaganda Ministry. With the distinct sensation that 
his "head was at stake, 11298Remer complied. 
For Goebbels, it had been an afternoon of rising tensions. Although 
the message from Fuehrer Headquarters, immediately after the assassination 
attempt, had not been too unsettling--indeed, Speer, who was with him, re-
calls the Propaganda Minister saying, not without sarcasm, that it must 
have been the work of some of Speer's construction crew which had recently 
reinforced the building with concrete,299the scene had grown more threaten-
ing with the passing hours. First, there was a visit from a former employee 
with whom he did not wish to speak, until the man told him to look out the 
window as the Watch Battalion surrounded his ministry.JOO Then there was 
296 11 Hagen Report," p. 15J. 
297 11Remer Report," p. 145. 
298Ibid., p. 146. 
299speer, p. 487. 
300Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels--The Man Next To Hitler, trans., G. S. 
Wagner (London, 1947}, p. lJJ. 
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the comment of Rudolf Semmler, one of his many aides, that 11they were all 
trapped like rats. 11301 Hitler had just telephoned from the 11Wolfsschan~e," 
demanding that he get out a broadcast announcing the failure of the at-
tempt,302but Dr. Naumann, another of his aides to whom he gave the news 
bulletin, could not get through the cordon of troops, even through it was 
a short distance from the ministry to the radio station.303 Now this cap-
tain was coming to his office, and Speer, who was still with him, notes 
that Goebbels took some pills from a box, put them in his pocket, and said: 
"Well, just in case, 11 before having Remer admitted .J04 
It is a credit to Goebbels' self-control and to his confidence in his 
rhetorical abilities305that he faced the Commander of the Watch Battalion 
with an outward show of certainty and, unlike his opponents in the office 
of the city commandant, a sure grasp of his audience's susceptibilities. 
He began by reminding Remer of his oath to the Fuehrer, and when Remer 
replied that Hitler was dead, Goebbels retorted: "The Fuehrer is all ve." 
Seeing that Remer was taken aback, the Propaganda Minister drove home 
his advantage. "I spoke to him just a few minutes ago. An ambitious 
little clique of generals has begun this military putsch. A filthy 
trick. The filthiest trick in history. nJ06 
JOlsemrnler, p. lJJ. 
302speer, p. 489. 
JOJsemmler, p. lJJ. 
J04speer, p. 490. 
J05Goebbels told Speer, just before Remer came in, that "He was 
sure he could win Remer over to his side." ~., p. 4 92.. 
J06This is Speer's account, Ibid. 
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Speer writes: 11 You had only to see Remer to observe the change that 
these words produced, to realize Goebbels had already won. 11307 But the 
Propaganda Minister had not earned his post for nothing. He asked Remer 
if he would like to talk personally to the Fuehrer by telephone? Remer 
agreed, a connection was made, and Hitler was on the line. 
Do you hear me? Do you recognize my voice? I am living. The attempt has not succeeded. A small group of glory-seeking of-ficers would dispose of me, but now we know against whom we are fighting and we will dispose of them in short measure. You are hereby commanded in my name to restore order in the capita1.308 
The Commander of the Watch Battalion was no longer dealing with men 
who were unsure of themselves, who acted in a furtive manner, or apolo-
gized for what they were doing. Goebbels declared: "The Fuehrer is alive." 
Ergo, the ultimate source of authority and the oath of allegiance which 
helped to guarantee that authority were still predominant. And Hitler 
himself recognized the same rhetorical potential: rrDo you hear me? I 
am living. 11 Only a Voice embracing a whole hierarchy-a god-term, as 
Richard Weaver writes, whose "force imparts to others their lesser de-
gree of force, and fixes the scale by which degrees of comparison are 
understood, 11309could speak in such a manner. 
But Hitler was not content to let matters rest there. Just as gods 
307speer, p. 492. 
J08Remer quotes Hitler, p. 12. Speer, who listened to Remer's part of the conversation, writes: "We could only hear the repeated phrases: '~-wohl, rnein Fuhrer ••• Jawohl! 111 Ibid., p. 493. 
J09weaver, "Ultimate Terms," in Ethics Of Rhetoric, p. 212. Burke lists several pages of synonyms for god-terms. A few, chosen at random, should provide some idea of their power: "title of titles ••• over all motivation ••• authority ••• principle of hierarchy ••• object or source of reverence ••• fear ••• final cause ••• apex ••• all. 11 Burke, Rhetoric, pp. 299-301. 
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have the power to reward and punish, so too do their secular variants,310 
and the Fuehrer 1s threat to dispose of his opponents "in short measure" 
as well as deigning to allow Remer to act in his ••name" must have exer-
ted considerable influence.Jll For as our narrative has shown, the cap-
tain was, in part at least, ready to carry out the orders of the conspir-
ators, and he had felt that his "head was at stake•J when he was summoned 
to C-oe bbels I office. Thus, his evident relier 312at learning the truth 
was probably motivated not only by the news that Hitler was alive but 
also by the thought that in this ambiguous scene he had not yet trans-
gressed the dividing line between loyalty and treason. F.qually impor-
tant, however, was his right to act as surrogate for the Fuehrer. Few 
officers of captain's rank suddenly transcend above generals and field 
marshals and find themselves placed in command of a national capital. 
Such a mounting is a heady experience, and the critic, studying the re-
mainder of Remer 1s account, can almost hear the sell-satisfied tone of 
the man as he issued orders throughout the evening to superiors and un-
derlings alike. 
When the conversations were concluded, Remer assembled his soldiers 
in the garden of the Propaganda Ministry and Goebbe1s addressed them. To 
Speer, he said, 110nce I convince them, we've won the game. Just watch how 
JlOBtlrke refers to God's capacity to bless and punish. Rhetoric of 
Religion, pp. 131; 50. From here, it seems like a small extrapolation to 
transfer these powers to His secular variant, Adolf Hitler. 
311Hitler reinforced this reward an hour later when he telephoned 
again and elevated Remer to the rank of major. By the end of the war, 
less than a year later, Remer had risen to the rank of major-general. 
312speer notes this, p. 492. 
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I handle them. 11313 And though the speech was II rather insignificant, 11314 
the Propaganda Minister's sense of assurance and his familiar platitudes 
about loyalty, tra.dition, and responsibility, had a "mesmeric effect. 113'15 
When Goebbels finished, Remer sent his troops to patrol the city streets 
and detailed one of his subordinates, a Captain Schlee, to take command 
of the rest of the battalion at the War Ministry, with orders to arrest 
every suspicious person found there.316 For all intents and purposes, 
the revolt in Berlin was over. 
In the resistance headquarters on the Bendlerstrasse, news of Remer's 
defection was not yet known. The first installments of the 11Valkyrie Be-
fehl" had been issued and Stauffenberg was busily engaged answering tele-
phone calls from confused officers in the military districts. These men. 
had been the recipients of conflicting sets of orders during the early 
evening. First, they had received instructions from the Reserve Army, 
announcing the death of Hitler and the assumption of state control by 
the military. Shortly thereafter, opposing orders had arrived from Hit-
ler's Headquarters, signed by Field Marshal Keitel. These declared that 
Himmler had been appointed Chief of the Reserve Army, that only orders 
from him or Keitel were to be obeyed, and that "any orders issued by 
Fromm, Witzleben, or Hoepner are invalid. 11317 
313speer, p. 493. 
314This is Speer's judgment, Ibid., p. 494. 
3l5This is Speer's conclusion, Ibid. 
31611The Schlee Report of July 23, 1944," is in Germans Against 
Hitler, p. 150. 
317The full order runs: "With immediate effect the Fuehrer has 
appointed Reichsfuhrer SS H:unmler to command the Reserve Army and has 
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Understandably, the Wehrkreis Commanders were confused, and the con-
spirator•s liaison officers were phoning in for help. Otto John, who was 
watching Stauffenberg, relates his attempts to hold the conspiracy to-
gether: 
Stauffenberg here--yes--yes-they are all C-in-C's orders,-yes, 
that stands--all orders are to be carried out at once-you must 
occupy all radio and signal stations rorthwith--any resistance 
will be broken--counterorders from the Fuhrer's headquarters-
they are unauthorized-no-the Wehrmacht has assumed plenar)" 
powers--no one except the C-in-C Reserve Army- is authorized to 
issue orders--do you understand--Yes-the Reich's in danger-
as always in a time of supreme emergency the soldiers are now 
in full control--yes--Witzleben has been appointed Commander-
in-Chief--it is only a formal nomination--occupy all signal 
stations--is that clear?318 
Gisevius, who was also nearby, was particularly impressed by the tones 
which Stauffenberg employed: 
One moment his voice was firm and commanding, the next friendly' 
and persuasive, the next imploring. - "You must -hold firm. • • • 
See to it that your chief doesn't weaken •••• I'm depending 
upon you •••• Please don't disappoint me •••• We must hold 
firm. • • • We must hold firm. • • • n319 
From these accounts, it is plain that Fromm or Kortzfleisch's author-
ity was being sorely missed by the conspirators. Had either of these im-
prisoned officers been present, the weight of their evidence might have 
been enough to tip the scales of decision.320 As it was, Staurrenberg 
given him the appropriate authority. Only orders £rom the Reichsfuhrer 
and from myself are to be obeyed. Any orders issued by Fromm, Witzleben, 
or Hoepner are invalid." Fuhrer Naval Conferences (London, 1947), p. 51. 
318John, p. 151. 
319G. . isevius, p. 555. 
320Indicative of how close-run the struggle was is Constantine 
Fitzgibbon's account of July 20, where he lists six of the military dis-
tricts, exclusive or Paris, in which the resister's orders were followed 
in whole or in part. Constantine Fitzgibbon, July 20 (New York, 1956), 
pp. 197-199. 
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was having to depend primarily upon the m.ilitary•s inborn sense of obedi-
ence to orders, or when that did not work, upon importunities, to keep the 
weakening district commanders in line. Since he was only a colonel, such 
a task posed formidable difficulties in the best of circwnstances, but dur-
ing the evening of July 20, when his opposition was the ultimate authority 
of the Fuehrer himself, the difficulties were almost insurmountable. 
By 6:45 the Deutschlandsender had broadcast the communique that the 
Fuehrer had survived the attempt.321 By 7:00 General Wagner, the man in 
charge of communications at Zossen, would not even answer his telephone.322 
And by 7:30 Field Marshal Witzleben, who had just arrived to take over com-
mand of the armed forces, learned that the operation was not going accord-
ing to plan, and instead of thinking of alternatives, flew into a rage, 
criticized the other officer-conspirators, and marched out of the War Min-
istry declaring: 11a fine mess this. 11323 
In the midst of these discouraging events, a call came in from Paris. 
General Stulpnagel, the City Commandant, was phoning to announce receipt 
of the "Valkyrie" Orders and the arrest of all Gestapo personnel in his 
area. This was the best news yet, and Beck, who took the call, thanked 
Stulpnagel for his suppo:r,t and asked him if he had any news from Field 
Marshal Kluge. Stulpnagel replied that he did not, and offered to trans-
fer the call to the Marshal's headquarters at La Roche-Guyon.324 
321zeller, p. 310. 
322Gisevius, p. 566. 
323Ibid., p. 558. 
324Ibid., p. 557. 
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Kluge was the key to the plot in France and Beck was well-advised 
to be concerned. As Stulpnagel's superior, he could reverse the actions 
of the city commandant.325 But as commander of the western front, he 
could also order a halt to the fighting in Normandy and sue for an ar-
mistice with the Anglo-American forces--actions he had agreed to pro-
viding Hitler was dead. General Witzleben writes that had Kluge fol-
lowed this latter course, the fact that Hitler had not been killed or 
that Fromm and Remer had defected, would have made no difference; the 
gap in the west could never have been repaired, and the conspirators 
would have successfully brought Hitler's rule to an end.326 
And Kluge was prepared to act. General Blumentritt, his Chief of 
Staff, reports that when the orders arrived from Berlin announcing the 
Fuehrer's death and the state of military emergency, the Field Marshal 
told him that his first step would be to stop the discharge of V 1 1s 
/;ocket bombi/ against &lgland, and the second step would be to get in 
touch with the Allied Commanders preparatory to an annisticea327 
Then came Keitel 1s countermanding order with the news that Hitler 
was alive and the threats of punishment implied in the statement that 
orders from the officers in the War Ministry were not to be obeyed. 
Typically, Kluge began to waver. Blumentritt writes: 11These were po-
litical decisions and he was not capable of answering them because of 
325This is what he would finally do, after his conversation with 
Beck. See Schramm, pp. 45-65. 
326111etter of General Hermann von Witzleben, 11 July 16, 1966. 
327Blumentritt is quoted in B. H. Liddell Hart, The German Gen-
erals Talk (New York, 1964), p. 262. 
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tradition. 11328 Unsure of which orders to follow, unsure of the Fuehrer's 
death, and most of all, unsure of himself, Kluge readily agreed when Blum.-
entritt suggested calling Hitler's Headquarters in East Prussia to try to 
clarify the situation. 
When a connection was made, Blumentritt asked to speak to any of the 
ranking staff officers: Field Marshal Keitel, General Jodl, or General War-
limont. The operator informed him that none of these officers was avail-
able to come to the phone.329 This was an unusal occurrence; it might e-
ven be termed suspicious. Perhaps something had happened at Fuehrer Head-
quarters and they were trying to keep it hidden.330 When Blumentritt ex-
pressed these fears to Kluge, the Marshal only shook his head. As his ad-
jutant, Count Ludwig von Berg observes, 11 He /jf.lugiJ preferred certainty to 
chance., 1133land he was willing to wait to get it. 
For the next quarter of an hour, the line was kept open in the hope 
of receiving some news. Finally., General Stieff, a member of the conspir-
acy., came to the phone. In this officer was represented another of the 
hinges in the critical moment of July 20, for depending upon what he said, 
Kluge would make a decision. Tragically, Stieff was not equal to the oc-
casion. Already as much a prisoner to the pieties of his caste as many 
32811 tetter of General Guenther Blum.entritt, 11 October 22, 1965. 
329Hart, p. 262. Jodl was missing because he had been hurt in the 
explosion (a chandelier had fallen on his head); Warlimont had also been 
in the conference building, although no specific report is given as to 
his injuries; and WJ..th Keitel, a possible explanation 1s that he, like 
Stauffenberg, was waging a ceaseless battle by telephone for control of 
the military districts, and was taking incoming calls without regard to 
the relatJ.ve importance of the caller. 
JJOThese are Blumentritt 1 s suspicions, in Jbid. 
33111 Letter of Count Ludwig von Berg, 11 December 12, 1965. 
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of the other officer-conspirators, he had silently abandoned the resist-
ance movement, probably when he saw Hitler emerge alive from the ruins of 
the shattered 11 Lagebaracke. 11 In reply to Blumentritt•s question, he said: 
"Where did you get the news that the Fuehrer was dead? He is quite well 
and in good spirits. 11332 
Blumentritt had just relayed this disconcerting piece of information 
to Kluge when the Paris-Berlin call was transferred to La Roche-Guyon and 
Beck was on the line. Although neither man was aware of it, the impending 






Kluge, announce publicly that you're a party to what's 
being done here in Berlin and give the word for a gen-
eral revolt. 
What is the actual state of affairs at headquarters? 
In the long run, does it make any difference provided 
we're determined to go ahead? 
Yes, but •••• 
At this point, Gisevius, who had been standing near Beck, felt the resist-
ance leader was not pressing Kluge toward an unequivocal decision. He whis-





Kluge, I'm asking you for a straight answer: do you ap-
prove of what we're doing here and will you place your-
self unconditionally under my orders? 
followed a rather lengthy pause) 
Kluge, in order to avoid misunderstandings ••• I would 
remind you of our last conversation and of what was a-
greed between us. I ask again: Do you place yourself 
unconditionally under my orders? 
First, I must consult with my people here, on the basis 
of the actual state of affairs. I'll ring you back in 
half an hour. 
332stieff is quoted in Hart, p. 262. Stieff's defection would not 
save him. He was among the first group of conspirators to be tried and 
executed in August 1944. 
333The entire conversation, as well as Gisevius' aside, is in Gis-
evius, pp. 557-558. It will not be footnoted hereafter. 
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He never did. 
An analysis of the Beck-Kluge interchange, together with Giseviusw 
aside, suggests two reasons for the failure to influence Kluge: Beck's 
unwillingness to counter the news that Hitler was alive, and the manner 
in which he expressed his arguments. To explain, Beck is known to have 
taken part in two of the day's confrontations: this one with Kluge and 
the earlier one with Kortzfleisch. While Beck himself left no state-
ments regarding his feelings about these exchanges, his remarks to Gis-
evius concerning his anger at Kortzfleisch and the subsequent failure of 
that method may have been working on his mind. If any angry, unyield-
ing manner was the wrong approach, then he would try another. When we 
recall the classical bent of his own character, the one he chose, ap-
propriately enough, was a bland "cornradly tone. 113.34 
Unfortunately, he failed to account for the fact that Kortzfleisch 
and Kluge, while both officers, were still unique in important respects. 
Kortzfleisch was apolitical and definitely a soldier of the old school, 
while Kluge, though privy to the plot, was a waverer. Thus, if Beck had 
been listening more carefully, he would have noticed that even at this 
late hour, Kluge was vacillating, hoping that someone would give him the 
desired push to the sanctuary of a firm decision.335 His opening gambit, 
3.34This is the term used by Gisevius to describe Beck's tone during 
the first part of the encounter; p. 557. To extend the point briefly, we 
have no wish to quarrel with philosophers generally, but Aristotle (whom 
Beck admired), took as hls model the "Golden Mean. 11 Hence, Beck 1s natural 
tendency would have been to self-control, to an avoidance of excess or de-
fect. Unhappily, Beck was probably not familiar with another classicist-
the Roman poet Horace, one of whose odes contains the line: 11If you wish 
me to weep you must weep first." 
335This is not only my interpretation. Blumentritt writes that e-
ven after Stieff I s response, "We felt very uneasy. • • realizing how sus-
picious it was in the circumstances." Hart, p. 262. 
asking about the actual state of affairs, was indicative of this wish. 
If Beck had grasped the reins firmly and responded with a clear, unam-
biguous statement about the Fuehrer 1s death, it is possible that he 
might have steadied the tottering Kluge once and for a11.336 
Instead, Beck unwittingly reinforced an earlier defense argument 
of Keitel and Stieff by telling Kluge that the actual state of affairs 
made no difference. To the western front marshal, fretting at his head-
quarters in remote La Roche-Guyon, they made all the diffsrence in the 
world. Gisevius, listening only to Beck's part of the conversation, was 
perceptive enough to realize that things were going wrong; hence, his 
whispered advice. But it was already too late. Kluge had heard from 
the very leader of the opposition the implied admission that Hitler 
might not be dead. Keitel's orders could have been fabrications; even 
Stieff could have been forced to say what he did; but if the conspir-
ators-in a sense, unwilling or hostile witnesses-were admitting to 
the Fuehrer 1s survival, then there could be no doubt. Unintentionally, 
Beck had been trapped by his opponents own argument, and it proved to 
be the final straw which broke the conspiracy. 
Although it probably made little difference at this point, Beck 
made at least two more tactical errors in his conversation with Kluge. 
Hard on the blunder of his implied admission that Hitler lived, Beck 
demanded that Kluge place himself under his /_Beck'i/ unconditional 
336For Beck, strangely enough, Hitler was dead~ Gisevius quotes 
him as saying: 11 A 'leader' whose immediate entourage included those who 
opposed him to the extent of attempting assassination must be considered 
morally dead. 11 Gisevi.us, p. 557. But Beck was unable to transfer this 
kind of death to the more important political realm where it would have 
been much more meaningful in h:!.s argument. 
orders. It was a vain hope. In the hierarchy of the Fuhrer Staat, on-
1y one man--Adolf Hitler--had the right to make such a claim, and Beck 
had just conceded the possibility that Hitler was alive. Finally, for 
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a man of Kluge's temperment /}iHe preferred certainty to chance!i}, it is 
possible that Beck could have succeeded by commenting on the glittering 
success of the plot in Paris. This was part of the-field marshal 1s ter-
ritory, and the use of this shift of scene argument,337demonstrating to 
Kluge that he had nothing to fear, might have convinced him. Beck had 
just finished speaking to Stulpnagel and wa.s in possession of all the 
facts; yet, he said nothing and let the wavering Kluge hang up without 
such easily offered and obviously needed re-definition. The entire con-
versation was a series of misplaced overtures and missed opportunities, 
and its conclusion ended the conspirators last chance for success. 
With the desertion of Kluge, the exchanges during the critical eve-
ning of July 20 came to an end. There remained only Frormn's delayed re-
sponse to the earlier threat of punishment for disloyalty. Shortly be-
' fore 10:00, the Reserve Army Commander succeeded in escaping from cus-
tody. The knowledge that retribution was close at his heels added an 
almost indecent haste to his actions.338 Gathering weapons and Nazi 
sympathizers from within the confines of the War Ministry, he and his 
cohorts surprised and overwhelmned the band of resisters. One report 
337see p. 399, fn. 276. 
338Fromm was not quite fast enough. Although Gestapo investiga-
tors were unable to link him directly to the plot, he was charged with 
"cowardice" and condemned and executed in March 1945. Schlabrendorff, 
his fellow-prisoner, relates that the sentence affected Fromm deeply. 
He had not expected it. Schlabrendorff, They Almost Killed Hitler, p. 
121. 
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says that Haeften aimed his pistol at Fromm, until Stauffenberg waved him 
off, apparently resigned to letting the inevitable take its courseo339 An-
other says that Stauffenberg was wounded, shot in the left arm or back; by 
one of the officers accompanying Fromm.340 We are certain that only two 
of the resisters managed to escape: Otto John, who fled first to the home 
of his brother Klaus, and then on July 24, boarded a Lufthansa plane to 
Madrict;341and Gisevius, who moved from one resistance hideout to another 
until Allen Dulles was able to supply him with a set of Gestapo papers 
which allowed him to travel safely to Switzerland in January 1945n342 
For the rest, however, there was no deliverance. Fromm established 
a drumhead courtmartial and in the name of the Fuehrer condemned to death 
Stauffenberg, Olbricht, Quirnheim, and Haeften. Hoepner, for the sake of 
old times, was given the choice of arrest or suicide,343and Beck was al-
lowed to take his own life. By this time, Captain Schlee had arrived and 
part of the detachment from the Watch Battalion was pressed into service 
as a firing squad. The condemned were taken to the courtyard below, 
Stauffenberg supported by Haeften. The scene was lit by the headlights 
of an army truck. There was only one volley.344 
339Kramarz, p. 200. 
340zeller, p. 316. 
341John, p. 152. 
342Dulles, p. 141. 
343Hoepner, remarking that he really did not think he had done any-
thing too bad, chose arrest. Two weeks later, he was in the first group 
of conspirators to be tried, condemned, and executed. 
344Gerstenmaier, who was under guard in an office, thinks he heard 
Stauffenberg cry "Long live our sacred Germany" just before the volley; in 
Zeller, p. 436. 
CHAPTER VI 
EPILOGUE: THE GERMAN RESISTANCE MOv»iENT IN RETROSPECT 
11There was saved out of Nazi-ruled realit7 a treasure of wine pressed from the good grapes that ripen in the innermost places of man•s be-, ing, in vineyards that are holy and hushed. It is a strong and mys-terious vintage, sweet and bitter alike; and God grant that we shall never tire of drinking it, so that perhaps its aroma may outlast the stench of the marshes which once seemed to stretch almost to the ends of the earth. 11 George N. Schuster 
Hardly any of Hitler's opponents escaped after the failure of Jul.7 
20. The discovery by the Gestapo of secret documents-some of them in 
a briefcase of Goerdeler•a, left at a hotel where he often stayed in Ber-
lin,1 and others in Olbricht•s safe in his office at the War Ministry,2 
soon gave the investigators a fairly comprehensive picture of the revolt, 
allowing them to refute with comparative ease the denials of those who 
were already under arrest, and to add to their number almost all of the 
other resisters. 
Peter Yorck, Fritz Schulenburg, Eugen Gerstenmaier, Erich Hoepner, 
Stauffenberg•s brother Berthold, and Haeften 1s brother'Bernd, were taken 
into custody that night in the Bendlerstrasse. At almost the same time, 
Stieff and Fellgiebel were arrested at Fuehrer Headquarterso Hase, Han-
sen, Popitz, and Witzleben were picked up on the 21; Schacht on the 23; 
luerhard Ritter, The German Resistance, trans., R. T. Clark {New York~ 1958), p. 292. 
2Eberhard Zeller, The Flame Of Freedom, trans., R. P. Heller and D.R. Masters (London, 1969}, p. J65. 
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Helldorf on the 24; Adam von Trott on the 25; Hassell, seated "at his 
desk, 113on the 28; Jessen on the .30; and in ear1y Au.gust, they were fol-
lowed by Canaris, Delp, Haubach, Maass, Leuschner, Lejeune-Jung, Oster, 
Schlabrendorff, Wiriner, and Goerdeler (for whose capture Hitler had set 
a reward of one million marks). A few succeeded in trucing their own 
lives: Henning von Tresckow, F.duard Wagner, and Guenther von Kluge; oth-
ers, like Heinrich Stulpnagel, who was ordered to report to Berlin on 
July 21, only managed to blind himself, a condition which did not spa.re 
him from later trial and execution;4 and Romme1, when bis complicity be-
came known, chose to commit suicide rather than subject his family to 
persecution.5 
The scope of the resistance surprised even the "intuitive" Hitler. 
There was not a single agency in his 11New Order11 which had not been 11in-
fected, 116although the number and status of the civilians involved as well 
as the extent to which the officer corps was implicated particularly en-
raged him.7 If Heinrich Himmler's speech to the Gauleiters on August 3 
was any reflection of his master's voice, not only those directly accused 
3This is how .El:sm., Hassell told Gestapo inves~igators that they 
would find her husband, in Ulrich von Hassell, The Von Hassell Diaries, 
trans., Hugh Gibson (Westport, 1971), p. 366. 
4wilhelm von Schramm, Conspiracy Among Gene·rals., trans., R. To 
Clark (New York, 1956), p. 120ft. 
5nans Spiedel, Invasion 1944 (New York, 1968)., pp. 142-143. 
&rhis is Ribbentrop's term, in a telegram. sent to all diplomatic 
missions; quoted in Germans Against Hitler, ed., Erich Zimmerman and 
Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, trans~, Allan and Lieselotte Yahares (Bonn, 1964), 
p. 189. 
?Albert Speer, who went to the 11Wolfsschanzen on July 21, records 
Hitler's outbursts against these two groups; Inside The Third Reich, trans., 
Richard and Clara Winston (New York, 1970)., pp. 498-499. 
but their families too faced a merciless reckoning: 
You need only re-read the Germanic sagas. When they proscribed a 
family or declared them outlaws ••• they went all the way, with-
out mercy. They outlawed the entire family and said: A man has 
committed treason, the blood is bad, there is traitor blood in 
it, and it will have to be exterminated. And ••• that was what 
they did, down to the last member of his kin.8 
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Fortunately, less irrational minds prevailed, but even that did not 
prevent the arrest and imprisonment of whole families whose only crime 
was the circumstance of birth. Captain Payne Best9writes that at one 
time in Buchenwald, there were ten Stauffenbergs, eight Goerdelers, the 
widow of Caesar von Hofacker, General Erich Hoepner 1s brother, and many 
others.10 Age and sex made no difference. Among those in custody were 
at least a dozen women over seventy, while under a certain age, children 
were taken forcibly from their parents and_ placed in foster homes.ll 
For those immediately involved, Hitler exacted the most terrible re-
ciprocity of which his totalitarian order was capable: special military 
courts for the officers (so that they could be handed over to the civi1 
authorities);12 drug injections;l3 "sharpened interrogations" by the 
8Excerpts from Himmler's speech are in Germans Against Hitler~ p. 
195. 
9For Payne Best's role in this drama, see Chapter Three, p. 203. 
10Payne Best, The Venlo Incident (London, 1950), pp. 259-260. 
llTypical was the removal of Adam von Trott 1s two children, one 
aged two and a half, the other nine months, from the family estate at 
Imshausen; Christopher Sykes, Tonnented Loyalty (New York, 1969), pp. 
441-442. 
12General Guderian, who served on the court, recounts this "un-
pleasant task." Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, trans., Constantine 
Fitzgibbon (New York, 1957), p. 275. 
13Karl Abshagen mentions drug injections which, according to the 
prisoners, made it difficult to concentrate. Karl Abshagen, Canaris~ 
trans., Alan Brodrick (London, 1956), p. 246. 
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Gestapo;14 stage;--managed trials before the "People's Court" and its Pres-
ident, Roland Freisler, a jurist who combined "knife-edged legal acumen 
••• {idt'i/ theatrical eloquence; 1115 and then the butcher•s hooks and 
gallows of the prison and concentration camps.16 
In this process the Nazis made every effort to de.fame their cap-
tives-to rob them of their moral motivesl7and, in public at least, to 
prevent them from testifying to their belief in the "movement's guiding 
vision or Order-its dream of •heaven,• paradise, the 1good society,• 
Utopia. 1118 And in this, they have been vied with by critics like John 
Wheeler-Bennett whose account or the poor showing by some of the defend-
ants during the First Senate of the "People's Court" on August 7-S,19 
remains the commonly-accepted version or the resistance leaders at their 
14This term was coined by 11Gestapo11 Mueller, who had charge or ex-
Slnining the resisters. Generally, it included "simplest rations (bread 
and water), hard bed, dark cell, deprivation of sleep, exhaustion exer-
cises, and resort to blows." Mueller' directive is quoted in Germans 
Against Hitler, p. 190. 
15This is the judgment of Rudolf Diels, Gestapo Chief in Prussia, 
quoted in Zeller, p. 444. 
16Hitler•s instructions ran: "I want them to be hanged, strung up 
like butchered cattle." Quoted in Joachim C. Fest, Hitler, trans., Rich-
ard and Clara Winston (New York, 1974), p. 172. 
17rn the 11official" line of the Nazi leadership, there was an un-
deviating attempt to discredit the resisters morally. Thus, Bormann•s 
circulars to party officials referred to "reactionary- criminal riff-raff;" 
Ribbentrop's telegram to "treacherous ••• criminals;" and Jodl•s speech 
to the armed forces to "plotters ••• still more villainous than the most 
sordid professional criminals." Quoted in Gennans Against Hitler, pp. 
183; 187. 
18r.eland M. Griffin, 11A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of Move-
ments," in Critical Responses To Kenneth Burke, ed., William H. Rueckert 
(Minneapolis, 1969), p. 468. ) 
19The transcript of the first trial is in Trial Of The Ma.jor War 
Criminals, 42 Vols., (Nuremberg, 1947), xx:xiii, pp. 299-530. Hereafter 
abbreviated as~. 
movement's ultimate moment.20 Pointing out that only two weeks earlier, 
these same men had been ready to hazard everything on a plot to overthrow 
Hitler, he charges that "now not one of them could muster up the strength 
or will to interrupt Friesler•s obscene rhetoric ••• and make it clear to 
Gennany and to the world ••• the reasons why they stood in the dock. 1121 
While conceding that some of the resisters cut poor figures at the 
trial-Witzleben in his age and ill-health, and Hoepner in his foolish-
ness-we should bear in mind the scene in which they found themselves. 
These men stood amid the ruin of their hopes. For most, the time be-
tween sentence and execution would be a matter of hours.22 And the pro-
ceedings were, from beginning to end, a caricature, designed only to ex-
ploit and humiliate them. Thus, they were even costumed for the occasion, 
dressed in shabby clothing, often many sizes too large for them, their sus-
penders and belts were taken away, they were unshaven, several of them 
20rrbis period of interrogations, trials, final messages, and ex-
ecutions, represents the ultimate moment of the resistance movement £or 
several reasons. First, the resisters themselves interpreted their mar-
tyrdom as a symbolic expiation for the guilt shared by all Germans, and 
this is not far from Griffin's description of the period of conswmna.tion 
as a "time of' Redemption Lwhen mei/ are charged with attitudes of benevo-
lence ••• attitudes ultimately in the order of self-sacrifice." Griffin, 
11 Dramatistic Theory," p. 467. Second.a. the resisters had the opportunity 
at last of going public-of 11announcLini/ a stand, a •standing together,• 
an understanding." .!!21,g., pp. 462-463. And while Griffin places such a 
statement in the inception stage of a movement, conditions would appear 
to alter categories since those in a hidden movement cannot express them-
selves openly until exposado Third, in this same vein, the resister's 
dialectical exchanges with their Nazi opponents were, for the first time, 
unmediated, and though they got little chance for the statement-counter-
statement usually associated with such interchanges, the Nazis' verbal 
attacks did not go wholly unchallenged. 
21John Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis or Power (New York, 1954), p. 
682. 
22Hitler said: 11The sentence must be carried out within two hours or its being passed ! They must hang at once.. • • • 11 Quoted in Fest, p. 
711. 
showed signs of the Gestapo's "sharpened interrogations," and in Witz-
leben1s case at least, his jailers had refused to let him wear his den-
tures.23 Moreover, Hitler had given strict instructions that none of 
them were to be allowed to explain themselves: "they must not be given 
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a chance to make any grand speeches," was the way he put it.24 And in 
Freisler, they had an interlocutor whose concept of the law was the will 
of the Fuehrer, 25and whose idea of an examination was "making propaganda 
speeches. 1126 
In spite of this logomachy--this war of words directed against them, 
many of the resisters defended themselves stubbornly, and when the oppor-
tunity arose, countered Freisler's tirades with declarations of their own. 
Thus, even during the first trial, where the storm of abuse cut off al.moat 
before it had begun, any continuous discourse from the dock, Peter Yorck, 
asked by Freisler why he had not joined the party, replied: ,:Because I am 
not and would never be a Nazi. 1127 Later, when Freisler accused him of dis-
agreeing with Hitler's ideology, his concept of justice, his extermination 
of the Jews, Yorck answered: "The essential point is the connection between 
all these questions: the claim by the state to total power over the citizen 
23Photographs of the defendents, disclosing all of the above, is in 
Germans Against Hitler, pp. 299-307. 
24Hitler is quoted in Fest, p. ?ll. 
25This was the so-called 11Gesinnungsstrafrecht," or "political-crim-
inal justice" in which 11 right conaists in whatever is of service to the Na-
tional Socialist State. 11 For an extended discussion, see Joseph Goebbels., 
The Goebbels Diaries, edo, and trans., Louis P. Lochner (New York, 1948), 
pp. 159-160. 
26Schlabrendorff, who appeared before Freisler, describes his man-
ner thusly; Fabian von Schlabrendorff, They Almost Killed Hitler (New York., 
1947), p. 135. 
27TMWC, xxxiii, p. 420. 
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with the elimination of his religious and moral obligations toward God. 1128 
And even pathetic, old Field Marshal Witzleben, who had repeatedly played 
into Freisler•s hands, swmnoned the strength to meet the judge on the most 





You were going to govern against the people! That's 
true isn't it? 
What makes you think so? 
You were !!2!:, going to govern against the people? 
Certainly not?29 
Perhaps even more damaging to the Nazis than the public trials were 
the prior interrogations. Admittedly, the intended audience was smaller-
only the Fuehrer. But Gestapo Chief Kaltenbrunner, as he saw his prison 
cells fill to overflowing,30became as determined as his captives to give 
Hitler an unvarnished account of the movement, its actors, and their mo-
tives, in the hope that "the revelations may be just what is needed to 
make him see the necessity of change.n31 Thus, the investigation reports 
include this declaration by Berthold von Stauffenberg: 
28'fMwc~ xxxiii, p. 424. 
29.!fil:.g_., p. 368. Defendants in later trials were equally defiant. 
For example, Bernd von Haeften, asked by Freisler why he had criminally 
broken faith with Hitler, replied: "Because I regard the Fuehrer as the 
instrument of evil in history." Zeller, p. 373e Attorney Joseph Winner 
proved a particularly tough proposition for the judge: 11If I am hanged, 
its not me who's frightened, but you •••• " Freisler: 11You 1ll soon be 
in hell. •• 11 Winner: 11It 1ll be a pleasure, if you .follow soon., J:!m 
President." .!P.!£!., pp. 373-374. 
30conditions in the Berlin jails became so crowded that the Ge-
stapo was forced to transfer many prisoners to Ravensbruck, a concentra-
tion camp for women north of the capital. Lagi Ballestrom Solf, who was 
already there, writes that it was not until September that Ravensbruck 
became quieter and less crowded. By then, of course, many of the re-
sisters had already been executed. Countess Solf is quoted in Eric H. 
Boehm, We Survived (New Haven, 1949), p. 145. 
31Kaltenbrunner•s instructions are quoted in Ritter, p. 297. 
As regards domestic policies /_referring to 193i/ we had fully 
endorsed most of the National Socialist tenets: the Fuehrer 
principle, the idea of expert leadership, responsible for it-
self and linked with the concepts of a healthy respect for 
rank and of a "people's community; 11 the principle of common 
welfare before individual welfare; the struggle against cor-
ruption ••• Lfhif rejection of the big city mentaJ.ity ••• and 
the will to build a new system of law on German foundations-
all these seemed sound and full of promise to us. 
But nearly all the basic ideas of National Socialism were com-
pletely reversed by the regime. Instead of 11leaders with a 
calling," as a rule "mediocrities," who exercised uncontrolled 
power, got to the top. The idea of a "people I s communityn was 
violated by incitment against the upper classes and the intel-
lectuals and by generally arousing resentment among the petit-
bourgeoise.32 
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32sEiegelbild einer Verschworung, ed., Karl Peter (Stuttgart, 1961), 
pp. 447; 453. The Gestapo prefaced this report by noting:. "His LStauffen-
berg•iJ short evidence was the clearest and most important document indict-
ing Hitler that may ever have been written and shown to him. It manifested 
a type of Gennan manhood with deep religious, political, and artistic prin-
ciples, utterly divorced from Hitler." The interested reader may wish to 
refer again to the ideals of National Socialism in the £irst part of Chap-
ter One; for the others, perhaps Guderian•s retrospective summary will ex-
plain the initial dialectic merger and subsequent division described by 
Stauffenberg 1s statement and the next one by Schulenburg.. 0 The reasons 
for the Germans• submission to Hitler's powers ••• must first be sought 
in the failure of policy as manifested ••• after the First World wa.r •••• 
It gave us unemployment, heavy reparations, oppressive lack of equality, 
lack of military strength •••• As a result, the man who now promised 
to free /_ui/ ••• had a relatively easy task, particularly since the for-
mal democracy of the Weimar Republic ••• could achieve no significant suc-
cesses in the diplomatic field and at home proved incapable of mastering 
Germany's internal difficulties. So when Hitler promiseda •• the Germans 
that abroad he could free them from the injustices of Versailles and that 
at home he would abolish unemployment and party strife, these were aims 
which were entirely desirable and with which any good German must agree. 
Who would not have approved of them ••• ? Once in power Hitlera •• a-
chieved a number or outstanding successes: the disappearance of unemploy-
ment, the raising of the workers' morale, the re-creation of national feel-
ing, the elimination of party strife. It would be wrong to not grant him 
the credit for these achievements. Once his internal power was affirmed, 
Hitler turned to his external political program. The return of the Saar, 
the re-introduction of military self-determination, the occupation of the 
Rhineland, the incorpoTation of Austria--all these were completed to the 
delight of the German nation •••• Thus Hitler's self-confidence grew, 
and, as his power became more firmly established in both external and in-
ternal matters, so he developed an over-bearing arrogance which made every-
thing a.nd everybody appear quite unimportant in comparison to himself. This 
attitude assumed unhealthy proportions owing to•the mediocrity and, indeed~ 
Schulenburg spoke in a similar vein: 
The whole leadership has turned its back on the principles of 
simplicity and modesty which it preached in the early days of 
National Socialism. We want leaders who set an example by 
their conduct and action. • • • We want a society again based 
on the sanctity and inviolability of law. • • • We want Ger-
many to be purged of corruption and crime, and justice and de-
cency restored for all, without discrimination.33 
Hitler 1 s response to these reports is not known, but the reactions 
of some of the interrogators have, in some instances, been preserved. 
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insignificance of the men he had summoned io fill the most important ap-
pointments in the Third Reich. Up to this time Hitler had been receptive 
to practical considerations and had at least listened to advice and been 
prepared to discuss matters with others; now, however, he became increas-
ingly autocratic ••• e There was no longer any collective examination 
of major policy. Many ministers never, or very seldom, saw Hitler ..... 
Administrative power passed into the hands of the~. These men 
were appointed, not on account of their qualifications ••• but because of 
their achievements within the party; and in such appointments sufficient 
attention was by no means always paid to a man's moral character. Since 
many party functionaries at.tempted to copy Hitler, s ru.thlessness. .. • po-
litical morals soon tumbled. The national administration was emasculated. 
It was the same story with the judiciary. The fatef'IJ.l Authorization Act 
entitled the dictator to give his re_gulations the force of law without 
the approval of parliament •••• LAls9./ certain elements of his closest 
entourage, persons themselves of low culture, awakened in him a strong dis-
like for those people of a more spiritual nature and with a socially super-
ior background with whom he had previously been able to get on; they did 
this with the conscious purpose of bringing him into conflict with those 
classes and thus of destroying what influence they still possessed. In 
this attempt they were very successful ••• because in Hitler resentment 
still slumbered as a.relic of his difficult and humble early yearse •• §.niJ because he believed himself to be a great revolutionary and thought 
that the representatives of older traditions would hinder him, perhaps e-
ven deflect him from the fulfillment of his destiny •••• By the spring 
of 1939 Hitler 1s had reached /J.ts highes!:.7 point ••• and /;ihili/ 
the position of Germany was so powerful that there seemed no reason why 
the remaining national aspirations could not be left to solve themselves 
gradually and peacefully ••• such a policy was foreign to Hitler. o •• 
11 have not much time to lose. My successors will possess less energy 
than I. They will be too weak to take the fateful decisions that must 
be taken. I, therefore, have to do it all myself, during my own life-
time.' And so he drove himself, his colleagues, his whole nation for-
ward at a breathless pace along the road he had chosen. 11 Guderian, pp. 
359-366. 
33spiegelbild, p. 454. 
Thus, Gestapo officials in Paris, art.er examining Caesar von Hofacker, 
are reported to have said that he was the most dangerous enemy who had 
yet crossed their path; it was almost~ compliment.34 Another investi-
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- gator was heard telling one of the resisters: 11 No doubt you and your 
friends are good Germans. But you are enemies of the regime and there-
fore we must destroy you. 1135 And in the cases of Goerdeler, Popitz, and 
Schulenburg, none of them was executed immediately after trial. Instead, 
they were put to work formulating proposals for the reconstruction of a 
post-war Germany. With Schulenburg, the Gestapo's interest was in re-
districting the Lander (something he had dona as a member of the Krei-
sau),36while with Goerdeler and Popitz, Kaltenbrunner himself requested 
their views on Reich reform and the relationship between national, state, 
and local governments.37 In the long-run, of course, all three would be 
executed: Schulenburg a month after sentencing; Goerdeler a.nd Popitz, con-
demned to live for five months in the twilight world of the prison cell un-
til February 2, 1945, when they were hanged together. 
Survival was invariably a matter of chance. Joseph Mueller, Hjalmar 
Schacht, and General Halder, for example, were saved because Himmler got 
34irhis reaction is in Schramm, p. 177. 
35zeller, p. 380. This statement by the Gestapo interrogator at 
once concedes the moral ground from which the resisters operated, and 
discloses the "reciprocating act from the establishment or counter-rhe-
tors /yhiJ perceive the demands of the agitator rhetors ••• as direct 
attacks on the foundations of the established order. 11 Robert s. Cath-
cart, "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: Defining Movements 
Rhetorically," Western Speech, XXXVI (Spring, 1972), 87. 
36see Chapter Four, p. 275. 
37An account of Goerdeler and Popitz's work in prison is in Rit-
ter, pp. 298-299. 
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the idea that a distinguished group of "hostages" might be a bargaining 
chip in negotiating with the Western Powers.JS Gerstenmaier, as we noted 
earlier, played the role of an otherworldly cleric so convincingly, that 
he was sentenced to only seven years.39 Schlabrendorff was being brought 
into the courtroom for his trial on February J when an Allied bombing at-
tack struck the building, killing Freisler and destroying the prosecution's 
evidence. 40 But for the others, there was no escape, and .five thousand 
were executed for complicity in the plot to assassinate Hitler41--a fig-
ure which should provide some indication of the dimensions of the move-
ment. 
Evidence of a different sort comes from one of the under-secretaries 
in the Ministry of Justice, who, when presented with a petition for mercy 
by the widow of Hermann Maass, exclaimed: "The 2oth of July is getting be-
yond us. We can •t control the thing any longer. 11 42 For our purposes, how-
ever, the important point is the forum used by these captives before the 
end-their letters and messages from prison, because they disclose, more 
fully than either the trials or the interrogations, the strength of their 
moral motives, Nazi attempts to discredit them to the contrary. Thus, Pe-
ter Yorck wrote to his wife two days before his execution: 
38For Himmler's plans, see Schlabrendorf£, p. 4. 
39see Chapter Four, p. 263. 
40schlabrendorff, pp. 139-140. 
41.rrhese figures are in Karl Bracher, The Gennan Dictatorship, trans., 
Jean St~inberg (New York, 1970), p. 458. Zeller lists 4,980 victims, based 
upon a British Admiralty Report of July 20, 1947; Zeller, p. 445. 
42The government official is quoted in~-, p. 380. 
Tomorrow the People 1 s Court will sit in judgment on me and the 
others. I hear that the army has expelled us: they can take 
our garments, but not the spirit in which we acted •••• I be-
lieve myself to be impelled by a sense of guilt which is weigh-
ing all of us down, and to be pure in heart. That is why I con-
fidently hope to find in God a merciful judge •••• 
My death will, I hope, be accepted as an atonement for all my 
sins and as a vicarious sacrifice in expiation of the guilt we 
harbor in common. May it also lessen, if only by a hair's 
breadth, the alienation of our era from God. I too am dying 
for my Fatherland. Though in appearance my death is an inglo-
rjous, even a shameful one, I tread this last path erect and 
unbowed, and I only hope that you will not see this as arro-
gance and delusion. We meant to kindle a torch of ,life. And 
now a sea of fire engirds us.43 
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If, as Gisevius argues, all Germans were guilty for the evils of Hit-
ler1s 11 New Order 11 --not so much in the sense of criminal responsibility, but 
in terms of "passive acceptance, intellectual subservience •• • [oiJ silent 
support, 11411-then Yorck I s statement signifies a readiness to shoulder that 
guilt in an act of martyrdom, what Griffin calls a "purgative striving 
that ends in ••• transcendence. 1145 This is very' similar to Burke's no-
tion of the 11 perfect victim.u46--the sacrificial vessel whose worthiness 
is not defined by those who wish to 11 perfect 11 it as a scapegoat, but by 
the intrinsic worth of the vessel itseir.47 For despite Yorck•s admis-
sion of personal responsibility, the fact remains that "all men begin in 
43Peter Yorck von Wartenburg, "Farewell Letter to his Wife," Au-
gust 6, 1944, quoted in Dying We Live: The Final Messages and Records 
of the Resistance, ed., Helmut Gollwitzer, Kathe Kuhn 1 and Reinhold 
Schneider, trans., Richard C. Kuhn (New York, 1956), p. 134. 
44Hans Bernd Gisevius, To The Bitter End, trans~, Richard and 
Clara Winston (Boston, 1947), p. 603. 
45Griffin, p. 464. 
46rhe reference here is to Burke's idea of a scapegoat 11too good 
for this world." Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy Of Literary Form {New 
York, 1957), p. 35. 
47lli!!. 
a fallen state, burdened by ••• hierarchic psychosis and categorical 
guilt. 1148 Thus, his willingness to become a scapegoat for himself and 
others represents 11the highest value ••• thd most perfect sacrifice1149 
since he, among all Germans, must be considered least guilty in view of 
his ongoing struggle for perfection in an imperfect society. And Yorck 
is synecdochic in the sense that we have used his letter as surrogate 
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for those of other resisters: Ale.xis von Roenne,50ttelmuth von Moltke,51 
Alfred Delp,52carl Goerdeler,53or the statement of Henning von Tresckow 
which we cited earlier.54 Some of them may have lacked Yorck 1s eloquence, 
but none of them lacked his readiness or transcendent worthiness, borne of 
striving. 
There is yet another theme in these farewell messages which properly 
belongs to this analysis. Perhaps it is expressed best by Helmuth Moltke 
when he described an exchange between himself and Freisler: 
Freisler said to me during one of his tirades: 11In one respect 
only are we and Christianity alike. We claim the whole man!" 
I don't know whether the people sitting there took that in, for 
it was a kind of dialogue between Freisler and myself-a mental 
48william H. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Re-
lations (Minneapolis, 1963), p. 133. 
49Burke, Litera~r Form, p. 35. 
50Roenne•s last letter is in Germans Against Hitler, pp. 257-258. 
51Moltke's last letters are in Michael Balfour and Julian Frisby 
Helmuth Von Moltke (London, 1970), pp. 317-331. 
52nelp 1s diary fragments and farewell letters are in Zeller, pp. 
103-106. 
53Rothfels quotes the end of one of Goerdeler•s letters from pris-
on: "I ask the world to accept our martyrdom as penance for the German 
people. 11 Hans Rot hf els, The German Opposition To Hitler, trans., Law-
rence Wilson (Chicago, 1962), p. 152. 
54see Chapter Five, p. 368. 
one, because I was not allowed to say much. But during it 
we came to know each other through and through. Of the 
whole pack, only Freisler understood me, and of the whole 
pack, only he knows why he has to kill me4 There was no 
talk of 11 complicated individual" or 11 complicat.ed ideas, 11 
but simply, 11The mask is off • 11 We talked to each other, 
so to speak, in a vacuum. He did not make a single joke 
at my expense, as he did with Delp and Eugen ffierstenmaie.!'.7~ 
No, between us, it was all in grimmeat earnest. .. 11 From whom 
do you take your orders? From the other world, or from Ad-
olf Hitler? To whom do you owe loyalty and faith? 11 55 
Freisler, whom Moltke described as 11talented, with some degree of 
genius in him, 11 56had apprehended the crux of the di-vision between the 
resisters and Hitler. Defeated in their many attempts to overthrow the 
Nazi dictatorship, unable to overcome the objections of enough officers, 
spurned in their continuing efforts to obtain :political support abroad, 
and, in truth, trapped repeatedly in their dilemma between moral imper-
atives and political necessities, the men of the 11decent Germany" could 
still dissent on the basia of conscience--a viable counter-faith which, 
as we have seen, went far beyond mere non-acceptance of the ordained 
creed. Accordingly, the dialogue between Freisler and Moltke reveab 
the genuine religious vision with which the resister~ matched Hitler•a 
"corrupt use of religious patterns 11 57--a perspective embodying the key 
concepts and equations of their movement and a comm.on denominator by 
which they could be identifiect.58 It was this ~eligious conviction 
5~oltke is quoted in Balfour and Frisby, pp. 326-327. 
56Ibid., p. 317. 
57This is Burke I s description of Hitler" s perspective in "The 
Rhetoric of Hitler I s Battle, 11 in Literary Form, p. 1.73. 
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58Karlyn Kohrs Campbell argues that the distinguishing character-
istic of "enduring criticism" is the discovery of forms that permit and 
evoke participation. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "Criticism: Ephemeral and 
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that initially drove them into opposition; it was this religious convic-
tion that lay behind their political ideas and programs; it was this re-
ligious conviction that provided them enough ground to struggle in the 
dialectic arena; and in the final analysis, it was this religious con-
viction, as Freisler so well understood, that made it necessary- for the 
Nazis to execute them. 
William L. Shirer has observed that while the revolt against Hitler 
required eleven and a half years to prepare, it took only eleven and a 
half hours to put do'Wll.59 Like some of his other judgrnents,60this one 
Enduring," paper presented at the Central States Speech Convention, A-
pril, 1973, p. 4. Iden~ifying the resistance movement's genuine reli-
gious perspective does not constitute any lasting contribution to rhet-
orical theory since Professor Campbell rightly limits such contributions 
to "symbolic processes that are not self-evident," and this one was not 
camouflaged in the least. However, there is some room to disagree w;ith 
Professor Campbell when she writes that 11the oxymoron, the figure of par-
adox and contradiction, is the distinguishing linguistic resource of the 
Women's Liberation Movement." Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, 11The Rhetoric Ot 
The Women's Liberation Movement: An Oxymoron," Quarterly Journal Ot 
Speech, LXI (February, 1973), 84. As this study has shown, the 11oxy--
moron11 is fundamental to describing the initial state of merger between 
any incipient movement and the existing order in that both begin with a 
single reality structure in which their potential opposites are combined .• 
Subsequent stages in the dialectic may call tor new linguistic forms-
say, "irony" (restrictively defined as 11 opposite 11 ), might be the mast.er 
trope for the division period, and then 11 oxymoron11 again for the new syn-
thesis, since in the dramatistic perspective, the ongoing nature of or-
der inevitably implies new divisions. 
59william L. Shirer, The Rise And Fall Of The Third Reich (New 
York, 1960), p. 1068. 
60rhe reference here is to a remarkably short survey of twent.7-
three pages entitled, "The Historical Roots Of The Third Reich, 11 in 
which Shirer attributes the causes of the Nazi dictatorship to three 
forces: (1) The Protestant Reformation; (2) The Thirty Years War; and 
(3) The Rise of Prussia to Power in the 18th and 19th Centuries. Fore-
going invidious comparisons which could be made in a similar sketch of 
any nation's history, we can content ourselves with observing that po-
litical phenomena ought to possess enough common features to make it 
susceptible to some sort of general analysis. Yet, to accept Shirer•& 
suffers from an imbalance between simplicity and substance because it 
tells us nothing about the causes for the failure of the movement's im-
mediate purpose or the possibilities of its longer-range success. 
Taking these points in turn, there is no doubt that the drama we 
have witnessed was a tragedy. 61 The more important question, however, 
is why? To answer it, we might divide the response into the three ar-
eas which were raised at the beginning of the prologue:62morality, pol-
itics, and practical execution,63bearing in mind, of course, that these 
are not autonomous; that indeed, one of the main reasons for the fail-
ure of the movement lies in the fact that many of its actors were never 
able to reconcile the competing claims of these areas. 
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causal relations would be to leave us with no way of accounting for oth-
er 2oth Century dictatorships like Italian Fascism or Russian Communism, 
neither of which can lay claim to Shirer•s 11 antecedents. 11 
6lc1early, failure should not preclude the study of a movement. 
Griffin writes: 11 As students of persuasion, interested not so much in 
the accomplished change of opinion as in the attempt to effectuate 
change, we should find the rhetorical structure of the lost cause as 
meaningful as that of the ca.use victorious." Leland M. Griffin, 11The 
Rhetoric Of Historical Movements, 11 Quarterly Journal Of Speech, XXXVIII 
{April, 1952), 185. 
62see Chapter One, p. 2. 
63To these three causes must be added a fourth-- 11 chance, 11 which 
Meinecke defines as 11a unique and unexpected intervention of some sort 
of extraneous force." Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe, trans., 
Sidney B. Fay (Boston, 1969), pp. 56-57. No other cause could account 
for the fact that the explosives that Tresckow and Schlabrendorff had 
placed in the Fuehrer•s plane in March 1943 failed to explode, or that 
Hitler was sprawled across the heavy conference table, following Heus-
inger•s report on the maps, when Stauffenberg•s bomb went off. By Mein-
ecke1s definition, chance is not susceptible to the kind of rhetorical 
analysis which follows, although he does argue that 11in everyt!µ.ng we 
may call chance there lies something of the general tendency Lor a peo-
pli/, and in every general tendency something of chance" (Ibid., p. 57), 
which is perhaps another way of saying that men more adept a.t revolution-
ary action run less risk of being thwarted by chance. 
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We can begin with morality, treating the term as Burke does, in the 
dual sense of "custom, usage, manner ••• fani/ right. 11 64 Thus defined, 
the pieties which first drove the conservatives into opposition: their 
concept of an anny, bureaucracy, church, state, and their moral code-
all of which the Fuehrer was twisting into new shapes--also made it dif-
ficult for them to engage in acts necessary to overthrow the Nazi dicta-
torship. Examples, which have been detailed in earlier scenes, come read-
ily to mind. One of the most important was Goerdeler and Beck's scruples 
about assassination; scruples, incidentl.y, which Goerdeler never overcame.65 
Up to 1941, before Hitler withdrew to the sanctuary of his field headquar-
ters, there were opportunities to kill him, and though he was never an eas-
y target, he himself admitted that a ruthless assassin, determined to haz-
ard his own life in the attempt, could have succeeded.66 Surely, in a na-
tion of fifty-million people, a killer aufficiently skilled could have been 
found, but only once in the drama of the resistance movement did anyone 
look for such a desperado. That was when Nikolaus Halem, "independent of 
us," as Schlabrendorff put its, 67decided to hire an assassin. The one he 
found (and this too is typical of what happens when 11decent 11 men are un-
prepared to engage in "indecencies"), was more interested in the money 
than the task, and eventually, when Halem refused to keep paying, one of 
64Kenneth Burke, A Grammar Of Motives __ (Berkeley, 1969), p. 15. 
65Ritter writes that when Goerdeler met a fellow-resister shortly 
after the failure of July 20, his first words were: "Thou shalt not kill." 
Ritter, p. 292. 
66For Hitler's statement, see Chapter Three, p. 168. 
67schlabrendorff, p. 93. 
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the killer 1 s accomplices informed the Gestapo.68 
Perhaps the most fateful instance of this orthodox moral code work-
ing against political necessities occurred during the second act when HaL-
der, the key military conspirator, pleaded with his civilian counterpart.a 
to remove the Fuehrer once and for allo Despite the outbreak of war, Ha1-
der was not unwilling to act, but he was deeply troubled by his oath, his 
duty to protect the state, and his fear that Nazi ideology had made deep 
inroads in the army-. Yet, when he expressed these apprehensions, the ci-
vilians responded with a barrage of memoranda full of irrelevant arguments 
about broader political issues; and Gisevius, who had not yet acquired the 
"gangster" perspective necessary to meet the Nazis on their own terms, could 
only write that Halder ought to 11 openly stand by his act which his intelli-
gence and conscience made mandatory for him. 1169 What Gisevius, the civil.-
ian, could not recognize'was that Halder•s moral code, defined in the sense 
of customs, traditions, caste concepts, and the like, embodied the very fac-
tors that made it almost impossible for him to "openly stand by his act." 
And Beck was more culpable than Gisevius. As a former officer who had had 
to conquer many resistances within himself, Beck should have grasped the 
significance of Halder•s difficulty and made plans for Hitler's death. 
But instead, he reproached Halder for his lack of courage, pointing out 
to him that as an experienced horseman, he ought to know that at the hur-
dles, the rider threw his heart over first70 __ hardly the kind of answer 
68Schlabrendorff, p. 93. Halem was arrested, tried, and executed. 
69oisevius, p. 295. 
70See Chapter Three, p. 220. Beck•s error is characteristic of 
Griffin 1 s warning: that one of the dangers in a movement is the failure 
of its leaders to make their rhetoric 111 perfect by adapting it in every 
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Halder was seeking to resolve his dilennna. 
By the time, then, that the younger generation of resisters came on 
the scene-Tresckow, Schlabrendorff, Stauffenberg, and the others-men 
who understood that the Fuehrer was the principle of his hierarchy and 
that nothing short of destroying him would bring the whole order down, 
the earlier, more favorable circumstances had changed. Beck now ap-
proved of assassination, but that was of little help against Hitler•s 
knack for sensing danger. To altered schedules, cancelled appearances, 
and irregular comings and goings, the Fuehrer had added withdrawal to the 
seclusion of the 11Wolfsschanze 11 where no one except his closest friends, 
highest functionaries, and selected officers were permitted to enter. 
Thus, it was necessary for Stauffenberg, one of the few resisters with 
access to this inner-sanctum, to divide his efforts between the role of 
assassin in East Prussia and director of operations in Berlin. It was 
a desperate decision and a fatal division, and Gisevius• post-mortem-
that "before the Putsch began, an inexorable text was writ large above 
the catastrophe: !:,22 .!fil11 71--can serve as an epitaph for a moral code 
sufficiently inhibiting to prevent revolutionary acts at the most op-
portune moment.72 
Politically, there were two reasons for failure: the unwillingness 
minute detail to the {riaturaf/ appetites of its hearers. 111 Griffin, 
11 Dramatistic Theory, 11 p. 466. 
7J.c.isevius, p. 489. 
72This effort to break with the past--with habits of thought and 
reflexes santified by traditional values as well as with political forms 
like the monarchy, represents another variation of the dialectic struggle 
--what Griffin calls 11 a progress from pa.thema through poiema to mathema: 
from •a suffering, misfortune, passive condition, state of mind,' through 
1 a deed, doing, action, act, 1 to I an adequate idea; the thing learned. 111 
Griffin, 11 Dramatistic Theory," p. 461. 
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of any power to come to the aid of the movement either at home or abroad. 
Within the totalitarian scene, there was, of course, no chance of organ-
izing a popular political front in the commonly accepted sense. The on-
ly internal agency that counted was the army, and in the final analysis, 
the resisters were unable to influence enough officers in key positions 
to join the plot. Here 8:gain, morality in the guise of tradition enters 
the scene. Franz Halder writes that 11the German Army could never become 
an instrument of revolution because that was contrary to its entire his-
tory.1173 He ma.y be exaggerating somewhat since a number of officers did 
join the movement. But tragically, the resisters were limited in their 
choice of agencies to the one in which the concept of disobedience was 
low among the terminology of motives. As Beck said to Halder in 1938, 
"Mutiny and revolution are words that have no place in the dictionary 
of the German s0Idier1174-a statement Halder himself felt so strongly 
about that he repeated it at Nuremberg.75 Thus, Stauffenberg 1 s deci-
sion to usurp the machinery of command, a decision that might have 
worked had it been implemented in time, as witness Kluge's initial 
readiness to act when the 11Valkyrie 11 Orders arrived, properly headed., 
formulated, and signed.76 Reinforcing this military attitude of obe-
dience was another moral im.perative--the oath of allegiance--sworn "be-
fore God "--and binding every soldier to Hitler as Fuehrer and Supreme 
73 11Letter of General Franz Halder., 11 August 17, 1965. 
74Beck is quoted by Halder in Peter Bor, Gesprache mit Halder 
(Wiesbaden, 1950), pp. 112-113. 
75Halder•s statement is in Nazi Conspiracy And Aggression, 10 
Vols., (Washington, D. c., 1946), Supp., B, p. 1563. Hereafter abbre-
viated as !!Q!. 
76see Chapter Five, p. 413. 
Commander, just as its archtype, the vassal's oath, bound the giver to 
his liege lord. If this bond could have been broken, the internal po-
litical success of the movement would have been assured. Thus, Tresc-
kow1s argument for assassination, not so much to kill Hitler the man 
but to eliminate Hitler the recipient of the oath.77 How right Trese-
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kow was can be seen in the statement of Dr. Hans Hagen, the "political 
leadership" officer who played such an important role in the events of 
July 20. After the war, he was quoted as saying that if Hitler had been 
killed by the bomb, his duty would have been to obey the generals in the 
War Ministry. "I would have shot Goebbels, even though he was my friend," 
was the way he put it.78 
If the shibboleths hindering the political support of the German Ar-
my seem strange, the failure of the dialogue between the opposition and 
the Western Powers is equally so, and for largely the same reasona.79 A-
gain, there are many examples from which one or two will have to suffice. 
Particularly galling must have been the resisters journeys to London dur-
ing the period of the Sudeten Crisis~ At that time, Kleist, Kordt, and 
Tettelbach tried to impress upon the British the officern• fears of a 
full scale war for which they knew the army was unprepared. If Britain 
would only stand firm against Hitler, they argued, there would be a mil-
itary coup, followed by negotiations on the Versailles Treaty with a 
77see Chapter Four, p. 308. 
78ttagen is quoted in Roger Manvell & Heinrich Fraenkel, Dr. Goeb-
bels. His Life and Death (New York, 1961), p. 275. 
79stauffenberg I a statement to his brother: that 11 the only' thing 
the English supplied /J,he bom'il did not work.," is somewhat' harsh but 
not wholly' inaccura~e. Spiegelbild, p. 55. 
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"reasonable" German Government which, unlike the Nazis, would be trust-
worthy and employ acceptable methods.SO No real apology for the nega-
tive British reaction has been made except by Wheeler-Bennett who writes 
that while Chamberlain can be faulted for many shortcomings, "neglecting 
the advances of the Berlin conspirators is not among the most serious. 11 
He goes on to claim that the western leaders "were being asked to gam-
ble the fate of their countries on the very uneven chance of a success-
ful coup d 1etat in Germany" and that even had it succeeded, there was 
no indication that the anti-Hitler faction would have followed foreign 
policies any different from the Fuehrer.Bl 
A common thread runs through this argument: an inability to distin-
guish German from German. Beginning with foreign affairs, there is no 
doubt that the resisters wanted to change the peace treaty, particularly 
in regard to the Sudetenland and the Polish "Corridor. 11 But that is not 
the same as Hitler's policy of 11Lebensrauum11 at the expense of the whole 
Slavic world, and of course, Wheeler-Bennett says nothing about Chamber-
lain1s imminent trip to Munich where he was blackmailed into conceding 
more of Czechoslovakia than was ever dreamed of by the most imperialistic 
resister. Then there is the claim about "gambling the fate of their coun-
tries." Totalitarian orders, as Wheeler-Bennett should know, survive in 
part through foreign triumphs and in part by presenting a monolithic do-
mestic front to the outside world. Yet here were emissaries with an al-
most embarrassing wealth of information on how to thwart a triumph and 
whose very presence suggested something less than solidarity. Where, 
80see Chapter Two, pp. 124-218; 96-97. 
81Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 414-415. 
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then, is the gamble? If the coup had succeeded, Chamberlain could have 
had the peace he so earnestly deeired for Europe. If the coup had failed, 
Hitler would have had a civil war on his hands or, at the least, an army 
purged of many of its highest ranking officers. Either of these would 
have cracked the facade of monolithic unity and left the Western Powers 
in a far stronger position than the one they were in after Munich. 
More understandable was the Allies mistrust following the inability 
of the resisters to persuade the officers to act in the spring of 1940. 
(Although it should be noted that Beck sent Mueller back to the Vatican 
with an admission of failure and a compensating warning about the immin-
ent Germ.an attack. )82 In th~ past, the opposition had been undone by 
western responses to Hitler's diplomatic succes3es. Now, his military 
victory over France and the Low Countries, and later in the Balkans and 
Russia, made the Allied Powers reluctant to treat with people who seemed 
to represent the very agency upon which the Fuehrer depended for his tri-
umphs: militarists, Prussian Junkers, and the General Staff. Reinforcing 
this view was Hitler's claim to "die ganze Welt"-a claim which he appeared 
near to realizing and which seemed to demand an Allied counter-claim aimed 
at his destruction. Thus, the resisters faced the problem of Germans and 
the Nazis being regarded as one by the statesmen whose political sµpport, 
was indispensable.83 After Stalingrad, and again, after the losses in 
the summer of 1943, the prevalent mood in Germany was one of fear and 
war weariness, a mood which prompted an increasing number of officers 
82see Chapter Three, p. 228. 
83Hassell 1s diary entry in February 1942 expresses the fear: 11I 
have been apprehenaive lest the idea that Germany and Nazism were one 
was ••• a falJ::. accompli." Hassell, p. 240. 
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to receptivity and spurred the efforts of the resisters because there 
was again some hope of military support. But now their attempts tone-
gotiate with the Western Powers was met with the final paragraph of the 
Atlantic Charter, calling for German disarmament. This was Roosevelt's 
invention,84as was the even stronger doctrine of Unconditional Surrender 
promulgated at Casablanca.85 Granted, that the President did not wish to 
tie his hands as Woodrow Wilson had done, and granted that he was concerned 
about affronting the Russians. But at base, Roosevelt's insistence on the 
formula was due to his concept of moral war and total victory86-a concept 
84churchill affirms this in The Grand Alliance (Boston, 1950}, pp. 
434-435. 
85winston Churchill, The Hinge Of Fate (Boston, 1950), p. 685. There 
is no intent to excuse Churchill, who writes that he takes his share of the 
responsibility, but the initiative came from Roosevelt. For corroboration, 
see Elliot Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York, 1946), p. 117. 
86see Chapter Four, p. 296. This study is not the place for a long 
discussion of Roosevelt's motives. However, since dramatism asswr.es moral-
ity as part of the ground and dialectic as the form of a movement, the Pres-
ident's motives in demanding moral war and total victory--motives which ended 
the dialogue between the resisters and the Allies-need to be examined brief-
ly. First, there was Roosevelt 1s desire to stir up public opinion, and he 
understood American values well enough to know that we prefer our wars por-
trayed in terms of a struggle between the forces of light and darkness: 
11This is a conflict that day and night now pervades our lives. No compro-
mise can end that conflict. There never has been--there never can be-suc-
cessful compromise between good and evil. Only total victory can reward the 
champions of tolerance, decency, and faith. 11 War Messages of Franklin D. Roo-
oevelt: December 8, 1941 to April 13, 1942 (Washington, D. C., na), p. JO. 
Second, as well as Roosevelt understood Americans, he misunderstood Germans; 
thus, his identification of Prussian militarism with Nazism: 11When Hitler and 
the Nazis go out, the Prussian military clique must go with them. The war-
breeding gangs of militarists must be rooted out of Germany ••• if we are to 
have any real assurance of future peace." Ibid., p. 85. Third, there was 
the moral lesson Roosevelt wanted to teach: 11 As for Germany, that tragic na-
tion which has sown the wind must reap the whirlwind. • • • The German peo-
ple are not going to be enslaved--because the United Nations does not traf-
fic in human slavery. But it will be necessary for them to earn their way 
back into the fellowsPip of peace-loving and law-abiding nations. And, in 
their climb up that steep road, we shall certainly see to it that they are 
not encumbered by having to carry weapons." Ibid., p. 145. 
which sacrificed political advantage to moral principle, and one which 
he pursued, with the Germans at least,87until there were no resisters 
left who might have helped deny Hitler the bloody Gotterdamerung he 
sought at the enct.88 
The final reason for the failure was practical-the mismanaged 
plans for a coup d'etat. Once again, the cause must be sought beyond 
the practical, in the areas or morality and politics. Carl Burkhardt 
describes the German attitude toward revolution: 
Germans are by nature not adapted to play the part or revolu-
tionaries. They have an inborn respect for the authority of 
the state. Riots and civil wars have often occurred in other 
countries, but they have almost never occurred in German his-
tory.89 
Narrowing the scope to the military, upon whom, as Schlabrendorff writes, 
11the practical execution of the scheme would fall, 1190there is General Witz-
leben' s analysis: 
87The reference here is to Roosevelt•s selective application of 
the doctrine; that is, he was willing to endorse the political arrange-
ments made by General Eisenhower with Admiral Darlan for Vicy French 
cooperation in North Africa, and he approved the negotiations between 
Foreign Secretary Eden and Marshal Badoglio for an Italian Armistice. 
But with the German resisters, who had better moral credentials and 
potentially more to offer in the way of political gains than either 
the French or Italians, Roosevelt continued to maintain an uncompro-
mising attitude. 
88speer quotes Hitler as saying: 11If the war is lost, the peo-
ple will be lost also. It is not necessary to worry about what the 
people will need for elementary survival. On the contrary, it is 
best for us to destroy these things. For the nation has proved to 
be weaker •••• 11 Speer, p. 557. 
89Burkhardt io quoted in Ernst von Weizsacker, Memoirs, trans., 
John Andrews (Chicago, 1951), p. 182. 
90schlabrendorff, p. 49. 
The German Army was, for the first time in 2ts long history, 
faced with a situation for which it was unprepared. The of-
ficers were not able to initiate a civil war or start a rev-
olution. They were entirely helpless before a criminal who 
pretended to be Germany.91 
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July 20 witnessed the truth of these statements as most of the sol-
dier-conspirators demonstrated their shortcomings as revolutionary dia-
lections: Olbricht I s failure to issue the nvalkw-rie" Orders during the 
first critical hours of the coup; Hoepner's moaning about the odds a-
gainst success; Olbricht I s inability to employ arguments which might 
have influenced Fromm; Beck's misdirected rage at Kortzfleisch over 
the issue of the oath; Hoepner•s misplaced courtesy in afforing Fromm 
and the others the honors of military confinement; Hase and Hayessen 1 s 
furtiveness in giving orders to Remer; Stieffrs unwillingness to tell a 
single lie to Blumentritt; Beck's implied admission that Hitler was a-
live in his conversation with Kluge. All these errors, which are trace-
able to habits of thought, combined to rob the plot of any chance of suc-
cess. As Schlabrendorff puts it, 11We were not ru.atural revolutionaries; 
for our strength lay in the officers and officials who took part. Blood 
should have run-instead the men of July 20 said to all and sundry-Have 
a sea.t. 1192 
Among the officers, only Stauffenberg proved to have the strength to 
act against his background instead of merely reacting to it-to improvise 
and match rhetorical abilities in the dialectic struggle with the Nazis. 
Thus, his clever bluffs through the checkpoints at Fuehrer Headquarters 
9l!1Letter of General Hermann Witzleben, ii Jul.y 16, 1966. 
92schlabrendorff is quoted in Terence Prittie, Germans Against 
Hitler (Boston, 1964), p. 248. 
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and his tireless battle to counter Keitel 1s orders, speaking firmly to 
one, referring to the realities of the situation with another, entreat-
ing a third, basing his plea on the patriotism of a fourth. Even Gis-
evius, whose own transformation to a revolutionary was evident in his 
repeated demands for summary justice and whose word carries added weight 
because he was a critic of Stauffenberg, was impressed: 11 Stauffenberg was 
the only one in control of the situation, the only one who knew what he 
wanted. 1193 
In sharp contrast to most of the officer-conspirators, the dialec-
ticians of the Third Reich--particularly Hitler, its god-term, and Goeb-
bels, its high priest, committed very few mistakes in defending the ex-
isting order. They recognized the susceptibilities of their audience 
and manipulated it to their greatest advantage. Hitler, for instance, 
had boasted to Hermann Rauschning that he understood the proper methods 
for dealing not only with the masses but with the elite: 
I have been busy with what amounts to the study of human weak-
ness. We do well to speculate on human vices as well as human 
virtues •••• And it is not enough to work on the weaknesses 
of the masses; those of the men at the head of affairs is of 
much more importance. I cannot embark on a policy without 
knowing them. A thorough knowledge of the weaknesses and vices 
of ••• my opponents is the first consideration of success •••• 94 
Goebbels too was a master at bending men on the basis of their weaknesses: 
11Put pressure on your adversary with ice-cold determination. Probe him, 
search out his weak spot; deliberately and calculatingly sharpen the spear 
/J.ni/ hurl it with careful aim where the enemy is naked and vulnerable. 1195 
93Gisevius, p. 555. 
94Hermann Rauschning, The Voice Of Destruction (New York, 1940), 
pp. 273-274. 
95Goebbels is quoted in Joachim C. Fest, The Face Of The Third 
With such insights, it is little wonder that the loyalists' argu-
ments ranged the entire gamut of contentions that promote obedience, 
loyalty, law, order, and all the other symbols of the prevailing sys-
tem of authority which, in German military tradition, were regarded as 
the highest virtues. It was almost like a refrain: 11The Fuehrer is a-
live; 11 11 Do you recognize my voice? I am living; 11 11 He is unhurt;" 11A 
small group of ambitious officers would dispose of me;" 11 Any orders is-
sued by Fromm, Witzleben, or Hoepner are invalid;" 11We shall dispose of 
them in short measure; 11 11 You are hereby comm.anded in my name to restore 
order;" "Where does your loyalty and responsibility lay?" And like so 
many automatons, the soldiers to whom these arguments were directed-
Fromm, Remer, and Kluge, clicked their heels, said "Jawohl, 11 and o-
beyed. 
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It would be a fitting conclusion to the drama of the resisters if 
their immediate failure could be offset with examples describing their 
longer-term success; if the accident of history which caused their to-
tal disappearance96could be compensated by showing that their spiritual 
values and ideas of order have triumphed in post-war Germany and Europe; 
if the Biblical quotation used by one of them to dedicate his diary could 
be said to have been vindicated: "unless the seed falls into the ground 
and dies, it remains alone. But if it dies, it brings forth good fruit. 11 97 
Reich, trans., Michael Bullock (New York, 1970), p. 1370 
96The bodies of the executed men were turned over to the Anatomical 
Institute of Berlin University. The head of the Institute was a friend of 
many of the resisters, and therefore blocked their use as cadavers. He had 
them cremated intact and the ashes buried in a nearby cemetery. There, an 
Allied air raid destroyed th~ urns. Zeller, p. 445. 
97Albrecht von Kessel, 11 Verborgene Saat: Das •Andere' Deutschland, 11 
an unpublished diary, p. 1. 
Unfortunately, in the three decades since the events of July 20 
wrote a tragic end to their movement, the results have been a merging 
of lighter and darker shades, more accurately reflecting life than the 
theater. In the early years at least, a number or factors--the need 
to survive, the official silence in Germany and abroad, the beginning 
o.t, the cold-war, and the establishment of a government in Bonn-mili-
tated against the issues raised by the resisters: the limits or obedi-
ience, the claims of conscience, the question of tyrannicide, the dis-
tinction between patriotism and treason, the bindL--ig quality of the 
oath, and the burden of guilt. 
On this last issue in particular, there has never been any reso-
lution, despite the Nuremberg Trials and other judicial proceedings. 
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For it was the resisters intent, once the coup had succeeded, to spell 
out the Nazi crimes and atrocities to the German people in the hope that 
the revelation of these horrors-committed in their name--would bring 
them to a feeling of repentance and a willingness to accept responsi-
bility. As one writer suggests, sparing them this opportunity may be 
the real tragedy for the fact 11that it is embedded in history and can 
never be raised again, means that the German people will be branded, 
as by the mark of Cain, with the symbol of a past with which they will 
never be able to come to terms.1198 
With the issue of the oath, there has been more progress. General 
Blumentritt writes that the officers informally discussed the subject 
while they were still prisoners in Britain,99and that following their 
98Dieter Ehlers, quoted in Hermann Graml, et. al., The German Re-
sistance To Hitler (Berkeley, 1970), p. 234. 
99 111etter of General Guenther Blumentritt, 11 October 9, 1965. 
release, these conversations continued: 
After the war I had a long discussion about this problem in 
Marburg-Lahn. Participating ••• were professors of theology, 
of history, and of political science •••• Towards the end 
of this discussion a very young student said in a skeptical 
and ironic tone that in the future we should introduce a new 
course into our military schools; namely, "Oath Science. 11100 
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The young student was worried unnecessarily. In 1950, when the West-Ger-
man Government joined NATO, the whole issue of the military oath was care-
fully examined. The hearings took place behind closed doors and the re-
sults were never officially revealed. But it is significant to note that 
far-reaching changes in the formulation have occurred. The new oath sim-
ply- runs: 11! swear tq faithfully and truly serve the Federal German Gov-
ernment and to bravely defend the freedom of the German people, so help 
me God. 11101 
The differences between this vow and its predecessor are substantive. 
No longer does the soldier swear loyalty to an individual; instead, it is 
to the state and people that he gives his allegiance. Thus, the tragic 
dilemma so often encountered by German officers in the Third Reich--that 
of deciding when the welfare of the nation differed from that of its Fueh-
rer-should finally be laid to rest. The new oath discloses a second dif-
ference as well. No longer is unconditional obedience demanded of the sol-
dier. Two passages in the 11Soldatengesetz11 or "Military Law" spell this 
out clearly: 
If an order, offending against-the dignity of man is not fol-
lowed, this is not to be considered as disobedience •••• 
l0011Letter or General Guenther Blumentritt," October 9, 1965. 
101111etter of General Werner Boie," October 2, 1965. 
Furthermore, it will not be considered a case of disobedience 
if an order provoking an offense or crime is not followed.102 
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When we recall Hitler's criminal commands to his soldiers,103these moral 
qualifications become extremely important. As Dr. Rupert Angermair put 
it, 11 an oath can be valid only under condition that the subject or con-
tent of the promise is acceptable to God. It is impossible to 1swear to 
God,' that is, to call on God as a solemn witness, when one intends to in-
sult God if a human, be he the highest superior, so orders. 11 104 
The other issues--the claims of conscience, the question of tyranni-
cide, and the distinction between patriotism and treason--were discussed 
in connection with the trial of Ernst otto Remer, the officer who had com-
mand of the Watch Battalion on July 20. After the war, Remer helped to 
found a neo-Nazi political party, one of whose means of gaining power was 
to libel the men of the resistance movement as 11traitors 11-to brand them 
the way Hitler did the Social Democrats following World War I. Hailed be-
fore a court, Remer 1 s trial, conducted with German thoroughness and, to 
judge by the testimony, with a certain Gennan ponderousness, became a 
11 cause celebre 11 since it brought to the witness box theologians of both 
confessions, jurists, and officers, all of whom testified as to the rights 
of resistance against a totalitarian order. We have already quoted part 
10211Letter of General Werner Boie, 11 October 2, 1965. 
l03Hassell records an example of the soldier's choices under Hitler. 
11 A young officer, now in Munich, received an order to shoot three hundred 
and fifty civilians, allegedly partisans, among them women and children. 
He hesitated at first, but was then warned that the penalty for disobedi-
ence was death. He begged for ten minutes to think it over, and finally 
carried out the order with machine-gun fire. He was so shaken by this 
episode that, although only slightly wounded, he was determined not to 
go back to the front. 11 Hassell, p. 276. 
l04nr. Angermair is quoted in Germans Against Hitler, p. 278. 
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of the opinion of Dr. Angermair, the Catholic theo1ogian, in which he at-
tacked the unconditional nature of the oath. Addi~ionally, he dealt with 
the boundary between treason and patriotism, draWllllg it on the basis of in-
tent: 
A traitor acts from pure hatred or greed, from personal ambi-
tion, ,lust for power, and so on. He subjects: the common wel-
fare of his whole people to criminal private :interest. That 
is contrary to the deed of the men of July 20,"" who put their 
personal welfare so far behind their love of the people that 
they gave their o°l'm lives. 11My people may perish, so long as 
I have the profit," murmurs the traitor on his dark ways. 
"Long live our holy Germany," called Graf von Stauffenberg 
when he was led to his death for his attempt t,o save Germany .105 
Dr. Angermair 1 s Lutheran counterpart, Dr. Hans Joachim !wand, addres-
sed himself to the issue of resistance in general,, and from a confession 
which has traditionally submitted to the authority of state rulers, cited 
doctrine supporting rebellion from the writings or Martin Luther: 
I may conclude with Luther 1s words in his essay, 11Warning to 
My Beloved Germans": 110ne must not let everything be rebel-
lious that the bloodhounds call rebellious. For they want 
to shut the mouth and tie the fist of the whale world so that 
nobody can punish them with sermons and defenu himself with 
the fist, while they keep an open mouth and a free hand. Thus, 
they want to frighten and catch the whole world by the name of 
rebellion and to console and safeguard themse,J.ves. • • • One 
would have to put the definition and interpretation differently. 
Rebellion is not if somebody acts against the law; otherwise all 
violations of the law would have to be called rebellione But he 
is called rebel who does not want to stand tha authority and the 
law, and attacks them and fights them, and wants to be master 
himself and to set up the law himself~ • o 6 That is rightly 
called a rebel; so that resistance against the bloodhounds can-
not be rebellious. 11106 
The need to unite the military, which had divided over the issue of 
resistance, was attempted by General Helmuth Frieb£, who endeavored to 
l05nr. Angermair is quoted in Germans Against Hitler, p. 281. 
106or. !wand is quoted in Ibid., p. 286. 
acknowledge the army's debt to those officers who had opposed Hitler 
while not alienating the many who did not. 
Sunnnarizing, I will ••• use a classification from General 
Spiedel--which, however, is not to suggest an evaluation: 
11 only-soldiers 11 rejected the plot for reasons of soldierly 
obedience and soldierly loyalty. These quaJities are the 
basis for all military discipline, and for those who had 
them, an oath was an oath. • • • The 11thinking-soldiers 11 
were led by the unique circumstances surrounding July 20 
to the concept that it was really a question of to be or 
not to be for the nation. For them, the oath-bearer--the 
head of state--became and was a mortal danger; and for them, 
the oath, under special and quite extraordinary circumstances, 
found its limits •••• During the war the prevailing view 
was that of the 11 only-soldiers, 11 who as officers at the front 
saw only, and were permitted to see only, their hard task. 
Since the collapse, a great many 11 only-soldiers 11 have be-
come 11thinking-soldiers 11 •••• The two groups stand side 
by side today, honoring and understanding their mutual con-
ceptions. Both groups, in their overwhelming majorities, 
recognize the motives of their comrades involved in the 
plot of July 20 as motives which were in truth noble and 
patriotic. 
For Remer, however, there was no place in this transce11dent merger: 
The few that represent the attitude of Herr Remer are of 
such an imperceptible minority that their voice--with what-
ever volume it speaks--does not deserve attention. To rep-
resent them as spokesmen of a reactionary officers corps 
11 that has learned nothing new and does not want to learn 
,anything new 11 strikes us old officers as bitter and un-
.fair.10'/ 
Finally, the issue of tyrannicide-an obstacle, as we have seen, 
that men as different as Goerdeler and Moltke could never surmount, and 
that Beck negotiated only with great difficulty, was discussed by Her-
mann Weinkauff, former President of the Federal Court. 
If the possessor of state power ••• becomes a tyrant; if he 
establishes a despotism over his own people by means ofter-
ror, lies, and a state organization that resembles a slave-
keeper; if he makes the legal order invalid by subjecting 
it to his personal will; if he commits or incites atrocities 
l07General Friebe is quoted in Germans Against 'Hitler, p. 296. 
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• • • against a part of the people of the state; if during 
the war he permits immense atrocities to be committed a-
gainst other peoples, crimes that cover the name of his 
own people with shame and dishonor· if he continues the 
war to the dead end ••• disregarct/ing/ the enormous, use-
less sacrifices •• 8impose@ on his own people and on oth-
er peoples; if he deliberately tries to drag his own peo-
ple into his personal downfall ••• then indeed he has for-
feited ••• every right to obedience and subordination; then 
the people's o~m responsibility for the disgraced order comes 
invincibly to the fore; then resistance is permitted and asked 
for; both passive and active--and, if it must be--violent re-
sistance. Then, if no other means is open ••• the slaying of 
the tyrant is also permitted. Here, if anywhere, the slaying 
lacks the legal character of murder, and has rather the char-
acter of a lawful execution of a criminal.108 
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In defense of the conditional nature of these arguments--the strained 
formulas and references to special circumstances--we should note that in 
German tradition, there never has been any justification for tyrannicide, 
either moral or political, except in cases of illegal usurpation,109which 
would not have applied to Hitler.llO Also, all social orders rest upon the 
positives and negatives of the 11 thou shalt" and the 11 thou sha.lt nots, nlll 
and they would soon crumble if the ruled were licensed to kill the rulers 
willy-nilly. Thus, the attempt to partially reorient national coordinates, 
to readjust "expectanc/J.e~7 and. • .affect. • • choice of means with reference 
108Hermann Weinkauff is quoted in Germans Against Hitler, p. 266. 
Herr Weinkauff 1 s statement, together with that of General Friebe, Dro I-
wand, and Dr. Angermaier, may represent movement toward the final stage 
in the "progress from J2il,thema through poiema to mathema; from •a suffer-
ing, misfortune, passive condition, state of mind, 1 through •a deed, do-
ing, action, act,' to •an adequate idea; the thing learned. 111 Griffin, 
11 Dramatistic Theory, 11 p. 461. 
l09on the lack of justification for tyrannicide, see Sister Mary 
Alice Gallin, German Resistance To Hitler {Washington, D. c., 1961), p. 
3lff. 
llOon the legal aspects of Hitler's accession to power, see Chap-
ter One, pp. :U.-16. 
111Kenneth Burke, 11 A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language," 
in Language As Symbolic Action {Berkeley, 1968), p. 4J3ff. 
to the future, •• £,so that the peopli/ lrnow what ••• is expecte@ of 
them ••• and decisions and judgments and policies ••• F,an taki/ such 
expectancies into account. rrll2 
Remer 1 s trial ended with a guilty verdict and a prison sentence 
of four months. Upon his release, the former commander of the Watch 
Battalion weighed his political chances, found them unpromising, and 
emigrated to Egypt. But his party remained, led by other Hitler apol-
ogists, old fighters, and right-wing extremists, whose political slo-
gans echoed another era: 11 No servitude to Jewry, 11 11South Tyrol is suf-
fering for Germany," "Breslau, Koenigsburg, Danzig, and Stettin will 
be German again," and of course, the old standby, 11Gennan Democracy." 
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At the polls, the neo-Nazis met with mixed results, making some 
gains in Lander politics, but failing to obtain the five percent nec-
essary for representation in the federal Bundestag.113 However, they 
compensated for their lack of electoral power with an avalanche of pam-
phlets, newspapers, magazines, and books, designed to keep alive the old 
symbols--the elitist, national, and racial catchwords. The "Deutsche 
Wochzeitung, 11 for example, published by Alfred Rosenburg 1 s ex-secretary, 
hews strictly to the anti-Bolshevik line of Hitler 1 s old order. 114 Ger-
hard Frey, who fancies himself the new Fuehrer, owns the 11 National und 
Soldatenzeitung," and claims a circulation of more than 100,000--third 
largest among the political journals of West Germany.115 And "Nation 
112Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change (Indianapolis, 1965), p. 18. 
113Bracher, p. 487. 
114Ibid~, p. 473. 
115Amos Elon, Journey Through A Haunted Land (New York, 1967), p. 35. 
Europa, 11 which purports to speak for European fascism provides a forum 
for individuals like Hermann Ramcke of parachute troop fa.me, Hans Grimm, 
author of People Without Living Space, Wenzel Jaksch, President of the 
League of German Refugees, and many others.116 Books like I Was Hit-
ler's Doctorll7and Forward Gunner Asche,118not only blur the harsh re-
alities of the Third Reich but condition the reader to stronger stuff 
like Benno Zieser 18 odious novel, The Road to Stalingrad119and TI!!! 
Forced Warl20(written, ironically enough by an American historian, 
David Hoggan), which shifts the blame for starting World War II from 
Hitler to the British and the Poles. 
In this rhetorical struggle, where old words are deployed like 
soldiers, reminding people of a time when language expressed the un-
expressible, camouflaged obscenities, and turned lies into special 
kinds of truth, there is a real danger that the terministic screens 
of the past--the deflections and selections against which the re-
sisters fought--will reassert themselves. Democratic order has nev-
er been strong in Germany, and it requires not only the economic pros-
perity which has been part of the scene for the past twenty years, but 
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an understanding of the language which is logically prior to economics.121 
116Bracher, p. 474. 
117Biltmore Publications, 1948. 
118Little, Brown, and Company, 1956. 
ll9Ballantine Books, 1957. 
120Hochschuller-Zeitung Verlag, 1964. 
121Burke writes: "For the human mind, as the organ of a symbol us-
ing animal, is 'prior• to any particular property structure--and in this 
sense the laws of symbols are prior to economic laws." Kenneth Burke JI ,A 
Rhetoric Of Motives (New York, 1955), p. 136. 
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Perhaps that is what Heinrich Boll had in mind when he wrote: 11Words, as 
soon as they are uttered or written down transform themselves and impose 
a reality on the speaker or writer. /Ji.e whi/ writes down a word should 
know its ancestry and of what transformations it is capable. 11122 
Democracy is the most difficult form of government. It can only be 
assured, as Konrad Adenauer once said, 11when the concepts of freedom and 
order have become part of the very being of each individuai. 11123 Gennans 
have always had order; freedom, however, in the sense of commitment-of 
active participation in public affairs, is much more novel. Typically, 
the German language has used foreign words to designate many of the bas-
ic attributes of a free society.124 A good example is one we mentioned 
in earlier acts: 11 Zivilcourage. 11 The German word"~" is a different 
kind of courage. 11 Heldenmut 11 (heroic courage) is expected in certain 
situations and is honored. But "Zivilcourage" signifies the courage to 
oppose the opinion of the majority--to violate taboos. Today, this is 
changing slowly. Post-war Germans have created the cumbersome 11meinungs-
freudig.11 which means "the joy of having my own opinion." Or there is 
the phrase, "seiner Uberzeugung gemass bandeln," which, while more awk-
ward that 11 Zi.vilcourag~ haben, 11 is at least a native product. A drama-
tistic view of man assumes that motives are 11 rough shorthand descriptions 
for certain patterns of discrepant and conflicting stimuli. 11125 If the 
122Herr Boll is quoted in Elon, p. 25. 
123nr. Adenauer is quoted in Richard Hiscocks, Democracy in West-
ern Germani (London, 1959), p. 233. 
124By comparison, Cassell's Gennan Dictionary lists eight deriva-
tions for order. 
125Burke, Permanence and Change, p. JO. 
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Germans continue to invent words to allow identification with a democrat-
ic hierarchy--words which provide them with choices against totalitarian 
order, then the conditions which created the need £or the resistance move-
ment, like the movement itself, ma.y be a thing of the past. 
There is a recurring line from Burke's "Prologue in Heaven" which 
seems appropriate as an introduction to this ffinal section on methodo-
logical implJ..cations for future study. During a dialectic in which The 
Lord and Satan examine the infinite analogs between theology and logo-
logy, the 11 Blakean bearded patriarch" repeatedly warns His "over-hasty 
••• young companion" that 11It 1s more complicated than that." For our 
purposes, the same could be said about four areas of methodology: (1) 
the tension between morality and politics; (2}, the influence of orien-
tations upon actors; (3) the ubiquity of dialectic conf'lict; and (4) 
the importance of existing agencies as instruments of change. 
Taking these areas in order, Griffin and Cathcart locate the origin 
of rhetorical movements in morality and polit:ics-"strivings for salva-
tion, perfection, the 'good 1 ••• §..ni} the wielding and obeying of au-
thority.nl26 There can be no quarrel with this approach since all three 
of Burke's major motives--Order, Secret, and the Kill--are encompassed 
within it. However, Griffin and Cathcart say nothing about the possi-
bility of tensions between morality and politics as a movement progres-
ses from origin to object--say, for example, between the desirability 
of achieving a new political order and the undesirability of killing 
to achieve it. As this study has shown, such ongoing tension is a 
126Griffin, 11 Dramatistic Theory,n p. 456; Cathcart, 86. 
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fundamental part of the drama of movements and the critic needs to be a-
ware of the complications involved in it. 
From a theoretical standpoint, part of the explanation for the ten-
sion--in this case, for stressing arrest instead of kill--can be found 
in Burke's concept of motives: "words for situations ••• [that] prepare 
us for some functions and against others. 11127 This, in turn., implies o-
rientations since "motives are subdivisions in a larger frame of mean-
ings.11128 Thus, there is a critical serviceability in a linguistic ac-
count of motives in that it allows us to predict certain responses rather 
than others once we have identified the orientation. 
However, a second part of the explanation., which elevates men above 
the predictable, makes the critical function at once artistic and more 
difficult. My reference here is to the Negative, that uniquely hwnan 
resource which provides men choice in their actions by giving them the 
minimal option of saying "yes" or "no." Briefly, Burke's statement that 
11 an act, to be an act., must be willed fa.nil the will, to be a will., must 
be free, 11129means that men can be more than the sum of their orientations 
--that the essence of drama is choice and willed action. Thus, the critic 
is involved in the task of deciding to what extent men give evidence of be-
ing free, and more importantly, of increasing the capacity of their fellow-
men to choose, to act, and to advance the movement so that its success is 
possible. 
127This quotation is a composite taken from Permanence and Change, 
p. JO; and Attitudes Toward History (Boston, 1961), p. 4. 
128Permanence and Change, p. 19. 
129 11 Dramatistic Origins of Language," in Symbolic Action, p .. 436~ 
In this particular study, placed as it was within a totalitarian 
scene, my judgment has been to blame the older generation of resisters 
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for obstructing choice in the matter of assassinating Hitler, although 
their motives for doing so are understandable. Men like Beck, Canaris. 
and Goerdeler were not always able to overcome the hampering nature of 
their moral values and become determined political revolutionaries like 
Tresckow and Stauffenberg. These yo~nger men, who saw the scene differ-
ently, supplied the movement with the impetus to overcome these inhibit-
ing orientations and pieties. One of them, Rudolf Gersdorff, recognized 
this contrast between the generations. He has written an account of Mar-
shal Manstein, carefully dividing himself from a discussion about ways of 
assassinating Hitler. During a pause, he broke in: "Then you mean to kill 
him? 11 The answer was short and to the point: 11 Jawohl, Herr Feldmarschall, 
like a mad dog? 11130 
In other studies, critics may reach different conclusions about kill-
ing since the nature of the dialectic exigence will vary in intensity. But 
the point with which we began still holds: that tensions arising from the 
competing claims of morality and politics are not limited to the moment 
when a movement begins or the moment when a new order is established and 
the wheel turns once more; rather, tensions continue throughout all the 
stages of a movement and provide additional complications for the critic. 
The second area-that of the influence of orientations upon actors 
-concerns the fact that men, like movements, must go through periods of 
change. Griffin discusses this by referring to a movement beginning "when 
lJOGersdorff'is quoted in Fest, Hitler, p. ?00. 
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some pivotal individual or group ••• gives voice to a No? 1113l And he de-
scribes the importance of change in actors as 11 a progress from pathema 
through poiema to mathema; from 'a suffering, misfortune, passive condi-
tion, state of mind,' through 'a deed, doing, action, act,' to 'an ade-
quate idea; the thing learned. 1 nl32 
Again, there is little argument over the designation of a llpivotal 
individual or group" saying "No?" except to note that in a totalitarian 
scene, the negative must be uttered privately since, as Bethge puts it, 
"the use of camouflage becomes a moral duty11133and a public 11No11 would 
at the least mean dismissal from posts within the governing hierarchy. 
Also, it should be stressed that in revolutionary movements (and per-
haps in all movements, since they exist outside the established order's 
concept of morality and politics), the "pivotal individual or group" will 
not be s01ne rabble-rouser or anarchist but men of stature who emerge from 
moderate, traditional backgrounds to assume the role of leaders. This was 
certainly true of the German Resistance Movement, all of whose members in 
the early stages ca.me from the conservative upper-class and nobility. And 
the phenomenon seems generalizable to other revolutionary movements. Eras-
mus, for instance, was the forerunner of the Reformation, Mirabeau and La-
fayette of the French Revolution, Kerensky of the Communist Revolution, 
and so on. 
The importance of identifying this pivotal individual or group as 
moderate and traditional is two-fold. On the one hand, it narrows the 
131.ariffin, 11 Dramatistic Theory, 11 p. 462. 
l32Ibid., p. 461. 
l33Bethge, p. 532. 
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initial scope of inquiry, allowing the critic to concentrate on a spe-
cific level in what Burke calls 11 the pyramidal or hierarchical form .. 11134 
In the upper-class, there will be both the partial immunity bestowed by 
rank and the ready-made network of personal contacts which give a sem-
blance of order to the movement. Goerdeler, for example, with his many 
acquaintances in the civil service, possessed an automatic entree into 
every bureaucratic corner of the Reich, and as lord mayor, his work in 
labor mediation made him known to socialists like Leuschner and Kaiser.135 
On the other hand, this upper-class designation helps to explain why 
some actors are able, by slow degrees, or only in part, to make the trans-
formation from pathem.a through poiema to mathema. Put differently, a mod-
erate, traditional background is very similar to the scene-agency ratio 
which Burke defines as "custom, usage, manner •• • ffiniJ right. 11136 And 
of all the pivotal individuals or groups, those who perceive their acts 
in terms of tradition are least equipped to make the changes necessary 
as a revolutionary movement progresses from origin to object& Just as 
Erasmus was followed by Luther, Mirabeau and Lafayette by Danton, Des-
moulins, and Robespierre, and Kerensky by Lenin and Stalin, so too will 
old actors be replaced by new ones-men who join a movement in its later 
stages and assume leading roles because they 11/;eri} quickest to sense 
new factors in their incipient stages" and to carry out the hard deci-
sions necessary if the movement is to overcome the existing order-in 
l34Burke, Permanence and Change, p. 276. 
135Ritter, pp. 19-20. 
136 Burke, Grammar, p. 15. 
short, ujJ,iJ effect the collective killing of the Kill. 11137 Thus, the 
critic should be prepared not only to account for the presence of these 
new actors, but also for the absence or decreasing importance of the 
others. 
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The third area--that of the ubiquity of dialectic conflict--presents 
the critic with a seemingly endless problem for which the methodology is 
inadequate. Simply put, Griffin and Cathcart leave the reader with the 
impression that only two orders-an existing one and.its incipient oppo-
nent--are involved in dialectic conflict at any given moment,138a reduc-
tion that does not allow us to account for other forces which bear upon 
a movement's success or failure. 
Without getting into a lengthy explanation of the extent to which 
Burke perceives dialectic as the stuff of life, a passage from A Rhet-
oric Of Motives;, in which he deals with 11 Identification and the Auton-
omous, 11 may suggest something of the scope of the problem: 
••• the principle of Rhetorical identification may be summed 
up thus: The fact that an activity is capable of reduction to 
intrinsic, autonomous principles does not argue that it is free 
from identification w:i.th other orders of motives extrinsic to 
it. Such other orders are extrinsic to it, as considered from 
the standpoint of the specialized activity alone. But they are 
not extrinsic to the field of moral action as such~ considered 
from the standpoint of human activity in general.1~9 
l37Griffin, 11 Dramatistic Theory," p. 467. 
138rn fairness to Griffin, it should be noted that one of his ap-
plication essays, "The Rhetorical Structure Of The 1New Left' Movement: 
Part I, 11 Quarterly Journal Of Speech, L (April, 1964), makes specific 
reference to ualliances 11 between liberals in America and socialists in 
Europe. However, since this article appeared before his methodological 
essay on dramatism, the reduction to two orders is even more difficult 
to understand. 
139Burke, Rhetoric, p. 27. 
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Defining dialectic in Burkean terms of 11merger, division, and tran-
scendence,11140and speaking very- summarily but adequately for our purpose, 
this study has revealed the following forms of diaiectic conflict at dif-
ferent times, or, in some cases, at the same time, in the drama of the 
Gennan Resistance Movement: (1) the struggle of the resisters to divide 
themselves from the attractions and evils of the Third Reich; (2) the 
struggle of the resisters with their past-the pieties and orientations 
which prevented them from reconciling the competing claims of morality, 
politics, and practical execution; (3) the struggle among the resisters 
over political programs, to merge themselves into a movement wi·th au-
nified vision of order; (4) the struggle between the resisters and the 
Anglo-American Powers with whom they sought to identify; and (5) the 
struggle between the resisters and Hitler's 11 New Order," as mediated 
through the agency of the army. 
From a historical as well as a theoretical perspective, it was im-
possible to explain the drama of the German resistance without reference 
to each of these conflicts (and by implication, it should be impossible 
to explain the drama of any movement without reference to those actions 
which impinge upon it directly). Thus, the critical problem becomes one 
of choice-of determining the number of scenes and the extent of analy-
sis necessary to explain each struggle. And chronoiogy too is a prob-
lem since a movement goes forward"! fronte, futuris:tically, 11141thereby 
making it necessary to cut in repeatedly on those struggles which endure, 
140Burke, Grammar, p. 402. 
141Griffin, 11 Dramatistic Theory," p. 458. 
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re-illuminating their transactions and, in time, their resolutions. There 
is, then, no easy answer for the critic who endeavors to study a complete 
movement. Perhaps that is why Griffin recommends taking the briefest move-
ment or part of a movement so as to encompass it more easily.142 As an ex-
tension to his recommendation, a further suggestion seems in order: that 
the work involved in putting together segments from previous studies of 
movements should be considered a legitimate scholarly undertaking. 
The fourth area--that of the importance of existing agencies--arises 
from one of Cathcart I s statements in which he argues that "the new order, 
the more perfect order, the desired order, cannot come about through ex-
isting agencies of change. 11 143 As this study has shown, the very oppo-
site is true: the new order ,can come about only through existing agen-
cies. 
The reason for this difference begins with the existing system's 
method of governing and decision-making; in this case, with the Fuehrer•s 
principle of dividing power and blocking channels of communication so that 
all lines of authority converged at the top144--11 an order," as Griffin calls 
it, "marked by misunderstanding, the growth of ab~urdity and injustice, the 
increasing loss of communication. 11145 Bethge argues that in such an order, 
the first thing needed for resisting was information since Hitler•s sud-
den actions were invariably a surprise.146 And information, in turn, 
142Griffin, 11Rhetoric Of Historical Movements," 185. 
143cathcart, er,. 
144speer, p. 65ff. 
145Griffin, 11 Dramatistic Theory," pp. 459-460. 
146Bethge, p. 527. 
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meant holding on to key positions because, as Hassell notes, small though 
the chance of opposing was within the system, "on the outside the chance 
for successful opposition would be even smaller. 11147 
In the Third Reich, the key agency for information was the Abwehr. 
With its protection from the Gestapo, its multitude of covert activities, 
and its potential for contacts that cut on the bias across the hierarchy 
of the Fuhrerstaat, the counter-intelligence agency afforded a well-placed 
center from which to keep informed. And after the Fritsch crisis, Gisevius 
writes that Oster became "communications facilitator" and set up his own 
"secret service" so that the resisters "would learn in good time what was 
being devised in the triangle formed by the chancellery, Karinhall /J,oer-
ing1s estate outside Berli.!!7, and the Gestapo.n148 
Information, however, had to be disseminated, and Gisevius' account 
of a meeting between Hjalmar Schacht, General Kluge, and Carl Schmid, is 
a classic illustration of clandestine communication in a police state: 
It may sound like a very simple matter for a government min-
ister, an army commander, and an administrative president to 
get together. But not in revolutionary Germany. For weeks 
I had to shuttle back and forth between Muenster, Dusseldorr, 
and Berlin before I finally got all parties to agree on a time 
and place. F.a.ch of them wanted to prepare an alibi; each had 
to arrange some official journey as a pretext.149 
As it happened, the three missed the rendezvous, and the next few hours be-
came a series of uneasy waits interspersed with disguised telephone calls 
and hurried trips as Gisevius tried in vain to re-establish connections.150 
147Hassell, p. 1. 
148Gisevius, p. 235. 
149Ibid., p. 206. 
150rbid., pp. 206-208. 
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Such, then, were the frustrations that were the daily lot of resisters in 
Hitler's "New Order. 11 
In a scene of terrorism, organized as it was to a high degree of ef-
ficiency, it was impossible to resist II from bel.ow. '' Thus, Gisevius' ar-
gument for an Archimedean point--a fulcrum for action or a power base with-
in the system from which to mount a serious threat.151 And that meant the 
military. As Schlabrendorff writes: 110nly the army had the weapons and 
power to overthrow the firmly entrenched Nazi regime •• • • It was there-
fore necessary to win anny leaders and officers to our cause, and this is 
the reason why military men had to play an outstanding role in the resist-
ance movement. 11152 
Schlabrendorff is correct about the importance of the military in Na-
zi Germany. As we have seen, one of the chief "rhetorical pattern@ in-
herent in the movement" was the mediated dialectic between the men of the 
"decent Germany" on the one side and Hitler on the other, each trying to 
influence army agents to identify with their cause--what we have earlier 
called a micro-argument within the framework or the larger macro-argument 
between the resisters and Hitler. In fact, the drama of the German oppo-
sition has been organized around four critical moments when the resisters 
succeeded in mastering some of their own vulnerabilities, importuned other 
powers for help, answered the objections of the officers, and set en train 
plans to strike. And the "representative anecdote" in each moment was a 
different part of the military establishment: the General Staff, the Abwehr1 
l51Gisevius is quoted in Hassell, p. 87. 
l52schlabrendorff, pp. 14-15. 
the Central Army Group in Russia, and the Reserve Anny. 
Thus, the importance of agencies as instruments of change, at least 
in this unusual scene, is established. But methodologically, it seems 
possible to extend the issue to include agencies placed in less ominous 
surroundings than Hitler's Germ.any. Cathcart 1 s own examples of the abo-
lition movement and the women's suffrage movement both employed the agen-
cies of church, school, and press to facilitate their demands for change. 
So the difference is more a matter of degree than of kind, and the critic 
should be aware that the scene-agency ratio, in which Burke discusses the 
principles of determination for instrumentalities, is essential to under-
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